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ABSTRACT 
Muhammad Usman 
 
Does Cyberspace Outdate Jurisdictional Defamation Laws? 
 
Keywords: Cyberspace Regulation, Internet Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, Defamation in 
Social Media, Libel, Private International Law, Foreign Defendant, Civil Procedure 
Rules, The Defamation Act 2013 
 
Cyberspace produces friction when the law is implemented by domestic courts using 
'state-laws'. These laws are based on a ‘physical presence’ of an individual within the 
territory. It elevates conflicts relating to cyberspace jurisdiction. This research examines 
private international law complications associated with cyberspace. The paradigm of 
libel that takes place within the domain of social media is used to evaluate the utility of 
traditional laws. This research is conducted using ‘black-letter’ methodology, keeping 
in mind the changes constituted by the Defamation Act 2013. It pinpoints that the 
instantaneous nature of social media communication demands an unambiguous exercise 
of 'personal-jurisdiction', beyond the doctrine of territoriality. An innovation to the code 
of Civil Procedure is recommended to revise the process of service for non-EU 
defendants. The permission to serve a writ via social networks (or to the relevant 
Embassy of the defendant’s domicile state), can accelerate the traditional judicial 
process.  
 
This thesis can be utilised as a roadmap by libel victims for preliminary information. It 
contributes to the knowledge by discovering that the thresholds under Section 1 and 
Section 9 of the Defamation Act 2013 overlap with the conventional ‘forum-
conveniens’ tests. This crossover is causing legal uncertainty in the application of 
existing rules to the digital libel proceedings. Section 1 and Section 9 thresholds do not 
fulfil the purpose of eliminating ‘libel-tourism’ and maintaining a balance between 
speech freedom and reputation rights. They raised the bar for potential victims and 
restricted their rights to justice. It is proposed that the traditional ‘conveniens test’ must 
be used for social media libel victims to produce legal certainty in cyberspace 
defamation.  
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THE PROSPECT OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
This research determines the problems that arise when private international law rules are 
applied to cross-border defamation disputes. This research has three broad areas that act 
as a foundation:  
 
1. Private international law  
2. Cyberspace  
3. Defamation 
 
THE PROSPECT OF THIS THESIS 
 
This thesis evaluates jurisdictional issues associated with cyberspace, with a focus on 
libel arising in social media. Social media for this thesis includes social networking, 
email and smartphone-text, but it is also relevant to other embodiment of 
communication by telephone, radio communication or print media. To complete this 
research at PhD level, this thesis will focus on the following sub-categories:  
 
1. Personal jurisdiction  
2. Social media  
3. Libel  
 
THE NOVELTY OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
The legal effects of the meteoric amplification in social communication have not been 
academically analysed. This thesis will contribute to the interpretation and application 
of the Defamation Act 2013 and evaluate the misconceptions found in the use of the 
traditional legal framework to libellous statements published via social media. The 
novelty of this thesis lies in the comparison that social communication incentivises the 
sharing of opinions without fact checking whereas other broadcasting media have a fact-
checking mandate. Can they all be liable under the same rules? 
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defendant 
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1
 
21. Publication – The act of making something known; anything shared via social 
media will be classed as publication in libel cases 
22. Privacy - The ability of an individual/group to stop personal information being 
shared or becoming known to others. (It excludes the individuals/authorities 
those whom they choose to give the information to) 
23. Reputation – A prevailing opinion that someone or something has a specific 
characteristic; the way in which people think of someone. 
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on behalf of such communication service. 
                                                          
1
 Section 10 (2) of the 2013 Act provides that the terms 'author', 'editor' and 'publisher' in this context 
have the same meaning as in Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996 
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25. Service - Steps required by rules of court to bring documents used in court 
proceedings to a person’s attention (CPR rules) 
26. Summary judgment – It is also called judgment as a matter of law; when judge 
decides a case in favour of one party without full hearing trial 
27. User - Any natural person using a publicly available electronic communications 
service, for private or business purposes 
28. URL - Uniform Resource Locator (URL): The specific global address of 
documents and other resources on the World Wide Web 
29. Web Page - Pages on the World Wide Web with links which enable navigation 
from one page or section to another 
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Glossary  
 
The terms defined below, are used with the following meaning unless otherwise 
indicated: 
 
1. Defamation: Violation of the right to personal and professional reputation 
2. Libel: A published/written false statement that is damaging to a person's 
reputation  
3. Slander: A false spoken statement, which is damaging to a person's reputation  
4. Tortfeasor: A wrongdoer or a person who commits a tort; a social media user 
who publishes defamatory material, which may injure other’s reputation and for 
which the defamation law provides a legal right to seek relief; it is also called a 
defendant in a civil tort action
2
 
5. England: England and Wales 
6. Intermediary: It refers to a company that facilitates the use of the Internet. In 
this thesis it refers to internet service providers (ISPs); however, it is different 
from content providers, search engines and social media platforms
3
. 
7. English law: In this thesis, it refers to the legal system of England and Wales.  
8. Internet: It will be used as a metaphor for cyberspace. It is a diverse online 
communication service including WWW, social media platforms, mobile apps 
and other applications. 
9. Uploader: In this thesis, a publisher will refer to as ‘uploader’. A person 
legal/private, who places data online. For a legal person, this term “publisher” 
also covers the act or omission of its employee(s)  
10. State: In this thesis, it will refer to an independent, sovereign, self-governing 
political entity that is recognised by the international community as such. An 
independent country.  
 
 
 
 
                 
  
                                                          
2
 Bouvier, J., (1856), ‘A Law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States’ pp ix 
3
 Leng, K., (2015), ‘Internet defamation and the online intermediary’, Computer Law & Security Review, 
Vol 31, Issue 1, pp 68-77 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
THE FOUNDATION  
 
 
 
This chapter moves from the grounded base of this research towards the emergence of 
this topical area. To simplify these founding principles, this chapter is divided into two 
parts:  
 
 
Part A - Background of this research  
Part B - Structure of this thesis 
  
SECTION 1:  
Introduction of Method and Literature 
[CH. 1; CH. 2 and CH. 3] 
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Part - A  
Background of the Research 
 
1.1.: Synopsys of this research:  
 
This preface gives a snapshot of overall research by outlining: 
 
a. The problem  
b. Where it arises  
c. The suitable method  
d. How it can be resolved  
 
a. The evolution of the problem:  
 
There is a conflict between the nature of ‘national sovereignty’ and how the internet 
operates
4. Sovereignty is the manifestation of a country’s control, which, for the most 
part, is fixed by international boundaries
5
. Throughout most of history, it has been 
impermeable with movements being regulated by the state through various agencies 
such as border control and customs. Individuals moved in and out of the state physically 
and could send physical mail to other countries. The advent of radio communications 
changed these dynamics and the internet represents another fundamental change in how 
information is exchanged and influence manifested
6
. The control of borders is regulated 
by government, which in itself can manifest in a variety of forms: In the UK a sovereign 
parliament legislates and the courts interpret this legislation within state frontiers. 
Various institutions of state such as the army and intelligence services provide security 
through a variety of means. Often, interactions with other states and individuals take 
place between both physical and intangible borders. The very nature of a boundary 
indicates a transition from one thing to another; state boundaries, once simple things, 
have been complicated by the emergence of the internet, which further complicates the 
                                                          
4
 Manea, A. C., (2017), ‘The security of personal data of users in online socialization networks: Legal 
aspects’, Transilvania University of Brasov, Series VII, Social Sciences Law, Vol 10, Issue1, pp 179-186. 
5
 Szigeti, P. D., (2017), ‘The illusion of territorial jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol 52, 
Issue 3, pp 369-399. 
6
 Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56; the internet is a telecommunications network that links other 
telecommunication networks. It enables inter-communication using multiple data-formats, among an 
unprecedented number of people using an unprecedented number of devices [and] among people and 
devices without geographic limitation. 
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idea of international interactions
7
. These international interactions are partially 
delineated by various bilateral and multilateral international agreements, which outline 
the rights and responsibilities of the states involved in the compact
8
. However, the rise 
of cyberspace transactions and online communication challenges the core concept of 
material territoriality jurisprudence
9
.  
 
b. Cyberspace:  
 
Cyberspace
10
 now facilitates global communication and to a certain extent, within the 
remit of certain activities, it renders national borders irrelevant and creates jurisdictional 
conflicts
11
. Although in arguing that the internet creates a new method to pass through 
borders, it can be similarly argued that, certain types of interaction (for example the 
intangible nature of electronic mail) do not leave the confines of the state (see-2.3.2). 
On the other hand, electronic communication could in theory move between two 
accounts held on a server located outside the nation-state
12
. The transactions, which 
were once at the core of jurisdiction, have moved into cyberspace and in doing so, have 
presented various difficulties to domestic courts in assuming any jurisdiction
13
 (see-6.2, 
6.6.1). 
 
                                                          
7
 The fundamental difficulty in coping with legal relationships involving foreign elements flows from the 
fact that the legal systems of more than one country may be involved. The application of the laws of one 
system, rather than that of the other, will lead to different results. 
8
 Daskal, J., (2018), ‘Borders and bits’, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol 71, Issue 1, pp 179-240; the ease and 
speed with which data travels across borders, the seemingly arbitrary paths it takes, and the physical 
disconnect between where data is stored and where it is accessed critically test these foundational 
premises. 
9
 Daskal, J., (2015), ‘The Un-territoriality of Data’, Yale Law Journal, Vol 125, pp 365-78 ; territoriality, 
after all, depends on the ability to define the relevant “here” and “there,” and it presumes that the 
“here” and “there” have normative significance. 
10
 It is probably the world's first true mass media because it allows anyone with a few simple tools to 
communicate ideas to thousands of persons at once. It inspires tolerance and promotes mutual 
understanding by connecting people around the world [Beeson, A., (1996), ‘Top ten threats to civil 
liberties in cyberspace’, ABA, Vol 23 Issue 2, pp 10-13]. 
11
 Rahman, A., (2015), ‘Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet: A Global Perspective, Journal of Internet 
Commerce’, Vol 14, Issue 1, pp 114-122; the service of court documents on defendant while in England 
and Wales establishes English jurisdiction. The presence of the foreign defendant in English territory also 
denotes his or her acceptance of the jurisdiction of the English court. 
12
 Daskal, J., (2018), ‘Borders and bits’, Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol 71, Issue 1, pp 179-240. 
13
 Cyberspace is a complex, anarchic, and multi-national environment where old concepts of regulation, 
reliant as they are upon tangibility in time and space, may not be easily applicable or enforceable. 
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An internet user can simultaneously be present everywhere in the world
14
 (see-2.3.1.1). 
This kind of global accessibility brings benefits; however, governance at a state level 
becomes problematic. Should a cyberspace
15
 user be subject to the governance of every 
country’s judicial system? If an internet user writes a defamatory blog on his computer 
in Bradford, can he be subject to the legal system of all the sovereign states 
worldwide
16
? A myriad legal questions arise but at their heart is the concept of 
sovereignty, the control a country has over the actions of its citizens
17
. 
 
c. Private international law:  
 
Private international law is of importance here; it is best described as a legal framework 
comprising a diverse set of documents and instruments forming conventions and 
protocols
18
. It relates to the determination of conflicts resulting from a wide diversity of 
courts and the accompanying diversity of approaches to law in sovereign states
19
. This 
framework is supplemented by case law that regulates the wide variety of interactions 
that take place between individuals in an international context
20
. Private international 
law rules are based on a variety of factors; they can include the physical presence, 
nationality, domicile or geographical location
21
 and this, in turn, results in territorial 
laws only operating within physical borders
22
.   
                                                          
14
 Jimenez, W., & Lodder, A., (2015), ‘Analysing Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction Based on a Model of 
Harbours and the High Seas’, IRLCT, Vol 29, pp 266-268; the Internet has the ability to exert effect in 
many places at once. 
15
 William Gibson used this term in 1948 in a novel 'Neuromancer’. He described it as a futuristic 
computer network, which people will use by plugging their minds into it; Smith, P. A., (2014), 
‘Conversations with William Gibson’, (1
st
 Ed, University Press of Mississippi, jstore), pp xi-xxiv. 
16
 Cyber-space cannot fulfil its promise of knowledge and freedom, if web sites continue to be subject to 
hundreds of conflicting procedural and substantive rules simply because the material can be accessed in 
every nation of the globe. 
17
 Reed, C., (2012), ‘Making Laws for Cyberspace’, (OUP, Oxford University, UK), pp 13-14; most 
individuals have only a general impression of the rules of their own national law, and are likely to be 
completely ignorant of the multiplicity of foreign laws which claim to apply to their cyberspace activities. 
18
 Dickinson, A., (2016), ‘Back to the future: the UK’s EU exit and the conflict of laws’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 12, Issue 2, pp 195-210. 
19
 Michael, D., (2017), ‘A consideration of current issues in private international law’, Australian Bar 
Review, Vol 44, Issue 3, pp 338; Conflict of laws (2017), Britannica Academic,  
http://academic.eb.com/levels/collegiate/article/conflict-of-laws/109442 [Assessed 27th June 2018] 
20
 Modamani vs Facebook [2017], Arlewin v Sweden [2016], Orlovskaya Iskra v Russia [2017], Ilsjan Case 
[2016], Sloutsker v Romanova [2015], Ahuja v Politika [2015]; these cases are detailed at 7.6. 
21
 American Banana Co. v United Fruit Co [1909] 213 US 347, 357; established that any statute is 
presumed to be intended to operate within the territorial limits of the sovereign state. 
22
 Mills, A., (2014), ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law’, The British Yearbook of International 
Law, Vol 84, Issue 1, pp 187–239. 
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It can be argued that there is an urgent need to authenticate the validity of the 
application of private international law in cyberspace
23
 or implement significant 
changes within the current legal framework
24
. The principles behind private 
international law developed long before the advent of the internet
25
. Today, the location 
of online activity is never extensively assured due to problems with the:  
 
1. Classification of place26: Is it the location where the defamatory material was 
written, published, downloaded or where it affected the individual? 
2. Disguise27: Is the location traceable, encrypted, or re-routed?  
 
d. Jurisdiction after the Defamation Act 2013: 
 
Jurisdiction is determined by national civil procedural rules which indicate the value, 
validity and articulation of law (see-6.9.1). The term ‘jurisdiction’ is derived from Latin 
‘juris-dictio’28, which determines a state’s extraterritorial power over a foreign 
defendant. Importantly, exercise of personal jurisdiction does not mean that a judge is 
empowered in one state to rule on the jurisdiction of a foreign state (see-7.7). A court 
will contravene international policies by exercising jurisdiction over a foreign national 
without following due process
29
. English due process is based on the service of a writ 
which allows the courts to exercise jurisdiction over a non-EU foreign defendant (See-
4.2, 6.9). The defendant can also contest jurisdiction by challenging the court not to 
exercise its jurisdiction if there is another appropriate forum
30
. The effect of this 
                                                          
23
 Svantesson, D.J.B., (2016), ‘Nostradamus lite - selected speculations as to the future of internet 
jurisdiction’, Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 30, Issue 1, pp 47 – 72. 
24
 Svantesson, D. J. B., (2016), ‘International law and order in cyberspace—cloud computing and the 
need to revisit the foundations of jurisdiction’, Aspen Review Central Europe, Vol 1, pp 88 – 92. 
25
 Conflict of law principles in cyberspace have been inadequately served by traditional principles 
established over centuries. The judges formed new approaches to tackle social media defamation, which 
is unlike the static occurrences (see-7.7). A defamatory statement can be published worldwide. The 
courts have had to reconsider the single publication rule, and the applicability of local laws to a website 
intended for another jurisdiction, but with global reach (see-7.2,7.3, 7.13). 
26
 Briggs, A., (2008), ‘Agreements on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law’ (3
rd
 Ed, Oxford Private International 
Law Series, OUP), pp 55. 
27
 Lutzi, T., (2017), ‘Internet cases in EU private international law: Developing a coherent approach’, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 66, Issue 3, pp 687. 
28
 Dorsett, S., & McVeigh, S., (2007), ‘Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction’ (1
st
 Ed, Oxon : Routledge - Cavendish, 
New York), pp 3; saying or speaking of the law. 
29
 Fire Clean, LLC v Andrew Tuohy [2016] WL 3952093; a state, after following due-process, exercises its 
judicial power over a foreign-defendant, if he intentionally directs his online activity in that state  
30
 This is called forum non conveniens test – (see 2.7.2, 2.17.1, 6.9.1.2). 
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jurisdictional based problem is not limited to a particular field of law
31
. However, this 
research will focus on civil disputes based within the area of defamation. 
 
The introduction of the Defamation Act 2013 failed to address certain areas in relation 
to cyberspace (see-7.3). For instance, Section 9 set the rules for exercising jurisdiction, 
but its interpretation becomes confusing for social media libel (see-7.7). Analysis of the 
provisions of the 2013 Act demonstrates that the solution of ‘cyber-defamation’ must 
not be limited to the government regulations
32
 (see-2.13.1) but the judiciary, legislators, 
practitioners and academics must all contribute to interpreting an appropriate framework 
regarding defamation and cyberspace jurisdiction (see-9.8, 9.9).  
 
e. Method:  
 
This research will use a conventional legal approach based upon legal rules, statutes and 
precedents to examine whether national jurisdictional laws are appropriate to 
cyberspace (see-1.8). Historically rules, in the form of state-enforced law, have 
developed to aid in the resolution of domestic (state-based) disputes; however, current 
laws may not be adequate to address the variety and scale of the challenges surrounding 
internet interactions
33
. The internet brings with it a staggering complexity that in turn 
presents a number of legal problems; anonymity is one of them (see-2.1). 
Anonymisation services
34
 and a range of other strategies allow dark-web users to hide 
their identity, location and server. For instance, Tor (the Onion Router), hides a 
computer’s IP address when accessing the site, enabling decentralised and relatively 
untraceable cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and litecoin and encrypted communication 
between participants
35
. This idea of an information-based war where participants are 
                                                          
31
 The victims of intellectual property rights, cyberbullying, personality breach, identity theft, fraud and 
hacking involving cross-border defendants have to go through the hurdles of jurisdiction. 
32
 The governments try to designs sets of laws, which can only be operated inside the states. However, 
with cooperation of all the stake holders a general policy can be introduced to regulate external factors; 
therefore, these laws may likely to be complex, inflexible, difficult to implement, and worst of all 
counterproductive when applied to the internet. 
33
 Geographic borders may give notice that the rules change when the boundaries are crossed i.e. after 
crossing a boundary the person is warned to abide by the laws of the jurisdiction whereas no such 
notices are given to the cyberspace users. 
34
 Gehl, R., (2014), ‘Power/Freedom on the Dark Web: A Digital Ethnography of the Dark Web Social 
Network’, New Media & Society, Vol 1, Issue 17. 
35
 Jayswal, N., (2014), ‘Attack Monitoring and Detection System using Dark IPs’, International Journal of 
Engineering Research & Technology, Vol 3, Issue 1. 
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able to hide their identity and utilise social media for specific goals continues to grow in 
complexity
36
 (see-2.1).  
 
The legal methodology will be suitable for the issues outlined above (see-3.10). It will 
allow evaluation of the pros and cons of private international law rules when applied to 
online defamation (see-1.8). The analysis of case law will identify if there are any 
instances where current laws are proving to be inadequate and insufficient to assume 
jurisdiction (see-7.8). The precedents can be used to enhance the applicability of 
traditional rules at the preliminary stage, which can effectively work as damage control 
(courts granting an injunction at an early stage can save victims from further 
reputational harm) (see-7.4, 7.5, 7.16).  
 
f. The output:  
 
This research will analyse whether the application of existing ‘jurisdictional laws’ 
provides a robust and reliable set of rules to provide an adequate balance between 
certainty and fairness within the domain of cyberspace. This analysis will lead onto the 
question of the competence of courts over internet users and the wide range of disputes 
within the sphere. Concerning competence, one court cannot have the power and ability 
to trial divergent and peculiar internet transactions, without ‘personal jurisdiction37’ 
(see-2.6.3). Personal jurisdiction is a standard due process doctrine under civil 
procedural rules, which varies across the continent. In England, courts can establish 
‘personal jurisdiction’ if the defendant is resident in England, or he has substantial 
connections in England, or he is served a writ in England (See-4.2, 6.9). If a court 
exercises its jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who is not resident in England and 
has no substantial connections, it will be unfair to that defendant
38
. He may want that 
case to be determined by the court in a different country
39
 (see-6.8, 6.9.1.3).  
 
                                                          
36
 Holger, P., (2015), ‘The Emergence of I-War: Changing Practices and Perception of Military 
Engagement in Digital Era’, New Media and Society, Vol 17, Issue 1; the increasingly user-friendly 
interfaces and the availability of programming software imply that a higher percentage of the 
population can utilise these new technologies in a way that may infringe existing legislation. 
37
 Spencer, A.B., (2006), ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Principles to Analyse 
Network-Mediated Contacts’, University of Illinois Law Review, pp 71; personal jurisdiction enables a 
court or legal authority to exert its power over the alleged disputes, be it cyber, digital or non-virtual. 
38
 Frederick, A., (2015), ‘Online defamation of California defendant did not support California personal 
jurisdiction’, Computer and Internet Lawyer, Vol 32, Issue 4, pp 18. 
39
 Defendant still have the option to challenge personal jurisdiction and the option of ‘de novo review’ - 
a new trial in which all issues are reviewed as if for the first time.  
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No unified cyber code nor even a single regulatory authority exists within this sphere
40
; 
however, cyberspace cannot be regarded outside the law (see-1.5.2). Domestic laws and 
even international treaties apply to cyberspace disputes; however, these disputes often 
lack the same predictability and certainty found in traditional conflicts
41
. This 
complexity is compounded when diverse legal systems from around the world are added 
to the internet’s diverse jurisdictional mix42. Alongside this, each state will have a 
distinct enforcement mechanism that is utilised for civil and criminal matters
43
 (see-
1.10). In the absence of any uniform codified internet law related to jurisdiction
44
, this 
research will scrutinise if the courts have been able to respond to this challenge posed 
by cyberspace.  
 
1.2.: Introduction: 
“Beyond the familiar online world that most of us inhabit – a world of Google, Hotmail, 
Facebook and Amazon – lays a vast and often hidden network of sites, communities and 
cultures where freedom is pushed to its limits, and where people can be anyone, or do 
anything, they want - Bartlett
45”. 
 
 
The flexibility and diversity of the internet have facilitated the evolution of a diverse 
array of approaches, arising from both the public and the private sector, regarding 
subversive activity. The scope ranges from the private sector contracting for the 
disclosure of industrial secrets to nation states sponsoring security agencies to spy on 
and hack other states. Running through this diverse array of information exchange is the 
                                                          
40
 Fangfei, W. F., (2009), ‘Obstacles and Solutions to Internet Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis of the 
EU and US laws’, Journal Of International Commercial Law And Technology, Vol 3, Issues 4, pp 233-241. 
41
 Svantesson, D. J. B., (2016), ‘Jurisdiction in 3D – “scope of (remedial) jurisdiction” as a third dimension 
of jurisdiction’, Journal of Private International Law, Vol 12, Issue 1, pp 60-76; many applicable laws are 
not substantively compatible because every nation has different interests and may want state based 
legislation to regulate cyberspace conflicts. 
42
 Internet & Jurisdiction (2017), ‘12 Jurisdiction Cases that Marked the Year 2016’; Child pornography, 
terrorism, suicide materials, spyware and censorship are issues on which laws vary internationally, and 
yet each website is typically available globally. Freedom of speech has different standards and 
defamation is remedied subjectively across globe. Nations have different ages at which a person is no 
longer regarded as a child; freedom of speech issues arise with terrorism issues (plans to make a bomb) 
and suicide information, but the law must address the easy reach of such material in the digital age, in 
ways that in other contexts may be considered draconian. 
43
 A wider concept of governance may be more suitable to tackle online disputes in cyberspace. This 
multi layered governance system should be a mixture of national and international legislation, and self-
imposed regulation by the ISPs and on-line users.  
44
 Chen, C., (2002), ‘United States and European Union Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction and their 
Impact on E-Commerce’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol 25, 
Issues 1, pp 423-455. 
45
 Bartlett, J., (2014), ‘The Dark Net: Inside the Digital Underworld’, (William Heinemann, London), pp ix 
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law and the concept of relevant and enforceable jurisdiction. These provisions regulate 
how the state operates and how the private sector actors behave within the environment 
of the state. Control over areas of cyberspace is maintained by various provisions, 
covering a number of legal areas including both civil and criminal law and reaching into 
many of the separate legal areas that exist
46
.  
 
Sovereign states can also territorialise the internet by introducing regulations to deal 
with an activity that takes place online
47
 (i.e. data privacy laws). They can execute 
‘technology regulations’ which can restrict the manufacturer by placing certain 
obligations
48
 (see-1.10). This enables them to exert their sovereign power over the part 
of cyberspace which exists within their physical borders. These restrictions can be in the 
form of a hardware filter or software control:  
 
1. Russia49, North Kora50 and China51 control their part of cyberspace by placing 
various restrictions on the accessibility of certain websites. They have petrified 
digital borders through aggressive ‘Internet filtering and control’ which 
represent a binary opposition to the idea of an open internet and the free flow of 
information
52
.  
 
2. Muslim countries apply their censorship restrictions within their physical 
borders. For example, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan Governments 
banned YouTube channel and demanded the removal of blasphemous material 
from Facebook (see-5.8.3). It implies that these states are giving their national 
                                                          
46
 Cyberspace has reached into the majority of legal areas:  Contract, negligence, intellectual property 
have all had parts overhauled due to the influence of the internet. 
47
 Zimmermann, A., (2014), ‘International Law and ‘Cyberspace Space’, European Society of International 
Law, Vol 3, Issue 1. 
48
 China and Russia use internet filters to control cyber-traffic. France and Germany had implemented 
fines for companies that allow Nazi content to remain online. In the US the FBI demanded that Apple 
write software to hack into an iPhone used by one of the San Bernardino killers and took the firm to 
court when it refused. 
49
 Nocetti, J., (2015), ‘Contest and conquest: Russia and global internet governance’, International 
Affairs, Vol 91, Issue 1, pp 111-130. 
50
 Zeller, T., (2006), ‘The Internet Black Hole That Is North Korea"; The New York Times, online 
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/23/technology/23link.html [Assessed 23
rd
 July 2018]. 
51
 He, X., & Lin, F., (2017), ‘The losing media?, An empirical study of defamation litigation in China’, China 
Quarterly, Vol 230, Issue 230, pp 371-398. 
52
 Dou, E., (2016), ‘Microsoft, Intel, IBM Push Back on China Cybersecurity Rules’, The Wall Street Journal 
online url: http://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-intel-ibm-push-back-on-china-cybersecurity-rules-
1480587542 [Assessed 7
th
 December 2016].  
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law's wide extraterritorial effect. Such material may not be defamatory or 
blasphemous in other countries
53
.  
 
3. Compounding this complexity, every country has its laws to regulate cyberspace 
(see-2.5). It makes the cyberspace a ‘wild west54’ in which the laws of the states 
are applied in a way that may not be conducive to resolving disputes
55
. There is 
a possibility that this digital coexistence of diverse national laws in shared cross-
border online spaces may divide cyberspace into fragments
56
.  
 
This fragmentation is visible when law is implemented by domestic states
57
 using 
‘municipal-laws’, based on the territoriality of jurisdiction. Due to the nature of 
sovereignty and the complexity of the regulation of interstate relationships, there are 
currently no truly global agreements that deal with the issue of jurisdiction
58
. The 
myriad situations that arise in cyberspace further increases the complexity of the area
59
. 
An argument is presented, that cyberspace is only a tool and medium
60
; hence, the focus 
of ‘regulation’ must be placed on the individual’s conduct. Territorial norms already 
regulate these individuals
61
; however, domestic laws can only impose national 
restrictions, which mostly avoid international conventions and agreements
62
. For 
                                                          
53
 It is detailed in later Chapters (see-2.3.1, 5.5) 
54
 Hua, W., (2017), ‘Cybermobs, civil conspiracy, and tort liability’, Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol 44, 
Issue 4, pp 1217; the Internet raises complex substantive legal conflicts as to what constitutes a 
defamatory statement and how reputation is to be measured for Internet transmissions. With hundreds 
of countries connected to the Internet, it is unclear as to whose community standards apply. 
55
 Lambach D., (2016), The Territorialisation of Cyberspace, Conference Paper: Heidelberg,  online url: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308720083_The_Territorialization_of_Cyberspace [Assessed 
8
th
 December 2016]. 
56
 Dou, E., (2016), ‘Microsoft, Intel, IBM Push Back on China Cybersecurity Rules’, The Wall Street Journal 
online url: http://www.wsj.com/articles/microsoft-intel-ibm-push-back-on-china-cybersecurity-rules-
1480587542 [Assessed 7
th 
December 2016].  
57
 Many applicable laws are not substantively compatible because every nation has different interests 
and may want state based legislation to regulate cyberspace conflicts. 
58
 Szigeti, P. D., (2017), ‘The illusion of territorial jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol 52, 
Issue 3, pp 369-399. 
59
 Johnson, David R., &  Post, David G., (1996), ‘Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’,  
Stanford Law Review, Vol 48, pp 1367. 
60
 Leong, N., & Morando, J., (2016), ‘Communication In Cyberspace’, North Carolina Law Review, Vol 94, 
Issue 1, pp 105-162. 
61
 Hourani v Thomson and others [2017] EWHC 432 (QB); Warby J concluded that the conduct of making 
fake YouTube events to lobby is not protected by the rights to freedom of speech or freedom of 
assembly at the expense of the claimant's right to privacy and family life. 
62
 Svantesson, D., (2015), ‘The holy trinity of legal fictions undermining the application of law to the 
global Internet’, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 23, Issue 3, pp 219-234 
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instance, jurisdiction laws of England are based on physical presence
63
 and proper 
service
64
. Similarly, other state laws are also based on their jurisprudence, which raises 
problems that relate to online jurisdiction
65
. 
 
‘Jurisdiction’ is the core of this research because it can play an important role regarding 
the future directions of internet regulation
66
. Each country has a system of domestic 
provisions to regulate state-level cyber activities and cyber activities that cross 
international borders
67
. The cross-border nature of cyberspace has created 
unprecedented benefits
68
 for humanity, enabling the exchange of manifold of data 
almost instantly. It has become central to the world economy
69
 but there are various 
factors, which threaten its stability (threat of ISIS and Al-Qaeda, piracy, privacy, 
personality breaches and freedom of expression, etc.). The law has often been unable to 
keep up with the technological advances in cyberspace
70
, for example, defamation law, 
in particular, lags behind the technological innovation of cyberspace (see-2.14). The tort 
of defamation is not concerned with the impact of the publisher’s statement on the 
claimant, but the impact of that statement on those who are the part of the claimant’s 
community
71
. Millett LJ
72
 decided that calling someone ‘hideously ugly’ is potentially 
defamatory; whether it is so or not depend on the individual circumstances. Social 
media users publish opinions and casual comments, which may not reflect the 
                                                          
63
 Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982; it is based on two basic principles of physical presence and 
actual service of writ. 
64
 Ministry of Justice, Civil Procedure Rules, Rules & Practice Directions; Part 6 - Service of documents,  
practice direction 6b – service out of the jurisdiction. 
65
 Rahman, A., (2015), ‘Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet: A Global Perspective, Journal of Internet 
Commerce’, Vol 14, Issue 1, pp 114-122. 
66
 Jimenez, W., & Lodder, A., (2015), ‘Analysing Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction Based on a Model of 
Harbours and the High Seas’, IRLCT, Vol 29, pp 266-268; law can only be applied if the jurisdiction is 
certain because jurisdiction deals with territory which must be linked to the internet transaction, or to 
be more precise to the defendant.  
67
 Bucaj, E., (2017), ‘The Need for Regulation of Cyber Terrorism Phenomena in Line With Principles of 
International Criminal Law’, Acta University Danubius, Vol 13, Issue 1, pp 140-161. 
68
 Online business, online banking, easy communication, entertainment. 
69
 Ghappour, A., (2017), ‘Searching places unknown: Law enforcement jurisdiction on the dark web’, 
Stanford Law Review, Vol 69, Issue 4, pp 1075; Lewis, J. A., (2010), ‘Sovereignty and the Role of 
Government in Cyberspace’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol xvi, Issue ii.  
70
 Hua, W., (2017), ‘Cybermobs, civil conspiracy, and tort liability’, Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol 44, 
Issue 4, pp 1217; the Internet raises complex substantive legal conflicts as to what constitutes a 
defamatory statement and how reputation is to be measured for Internet transmissions. With hundreds 
of countries connected to the Internet, it is unclear as to whose community standards apply. 
71
 Hooper, D., Waite, K., & Murphy, O., (2013), 'Defamation Act 2013 – what difference will it really 
make?' Entertainment Law Review, Vol 24, Issue 6, pp 199–206;  Pring v Penthouse [1982] 695 F. 2d 438, 
the court considered two questions (1) whether the publication was about the claimant, and concerning 
her as a matter of identity; (2) whether the story must reasonably be understood as describing actual 
facts or events about the claimant or actual conduct of the claimant. 
72
 Berkoff v Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008. 
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claimant’s character or reputation73. Yet, these jokes might lead an ordinary reasonable 
person to shun them. The purpose of defamation laws is to protect an individual’s 
privacy, dignity and reputation (see-5.2).  
 
Social media has accelerated the pace of innovation in communication and the way it 
affects others. It has made existing principles irrelevant
74
 because traditional models of 
interstate jurisdiction struggle to cope with the digital realities of the twenty-first 
century
75
. The continuing push towards user-friendly interfaces and continued 
smartphone evolution alongside a population that continues to use and thus progress 
technology has resulted in social media evolving at a rapid pace (see-2.1, 5.8.4). For this 
research, social media relates to any website or application, which allows peer-to-peer 
communication and content sharing. These networking platforms may be used for a 
variety of purposes
76
 (see Appendix-VII).  The most popular social media platforms are 
Facebook, Twitter, Google+, YouTube, Reddit, Pinterest, Yahoo chat, Wikipedia, Wiki-
How and LinkedIn
77
. Anybody registered on these sites can write an article, blog or 
opinion; leave remarks or tweet; ‘like’ other’s post or share something. By doing so, an 
online user can immediately be subject to the laws of every country, wherever the 
information is published, read, downloaded, or shared
78
. This published information 
will be potentially defamatory if it impugns somebody’s reputation79. The use of 
doctrinal research will allow the thesis to critically analyse whether the existing 
jurisdictional laws are still valid within cyberspace (see-3.12.1).  
 
                                                          
73
 An Islamic fundamentalist female might be publicly shamed by being depicted on a web site that 
shows her unveiled face. A Hindu might be humiliated by being placed unwittingly in a hamburger 
chain’s online advertisement. The exceptions are detailed at 5.4.1. 
74
 Chesterman, S., (2015), ‘Law plays catch-up with technology’ – available online at: 
http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/law-plays-catch-up-with-technology [Assessed 21 February 2018]; 
there exists a danger that, in near future, the dominant public/private actors rather than individual 
states will set de facto rules. As evident from Facebook and Google data storage policies (see-2.3.2). 
75
 Holland, H. B., (2005), ‘The Failure of the Rule of Law in Cyberspace? : Reorienting the Normative 
Debate on Borders and Territorial Sovereignty’, J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L., Vol 24, Issue 1. 
76
 Stewart, D. R.,  (2013), ‘When retweets attack: Are twitter users liable for republishing the defamatory 
tweets of others?’, Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, Vol 90, Issue 2, pp 233-247. 
77
 Arkowitz, J., Pearson, L., Benjamin, B., (2013), ‘A Brand Owner’s Guide to Social Media’, Kilpatrick 
Townsend & Stockton LLP, Available online: 
http://kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/Publications/May%202013%20Brand%20Owners%20Guid
e.ashx [Assessed 31
st
 January 2017]. 
78
 George, S., (2017), ‘Social Media Policy’, NWU, File reference 6P/6.2.10; Andreas, M., & Haenlein, M., 
(2010), ‘Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media’, Business 
Horizons, Vol 53, pp 62-64. 
79
 Lunney, M., & Oliphant, K., (2013), Tort Law: Text and Materials (5
th
 Edition, Oxford University Press, 
UK), pp 581 (see-Ch.5).  
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1.3.: The aim of the Research: 
 ‘No conflict exists…“Where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply 
with the laws of both” - Justice Souter80. 
 
Cyberspace challenges the traditional legal framework because it is borderless, whereas 
jurisdictional laws are limited to geographical boundaries
81
. There is a need to identify 
“how to preserve the global nature of cyberspace while respecting domestic laws82”. 
This thesis aims to analyse two areas:      
 
1. Traditional laws: This thesis will critically interrogate the application of 
classical rules in modern digital communication. Private international law rules 
assist courts in deciding online conflicts involving foreign elements. It 
encompasses choice of law (national or foreign law), the court's jurisdiction 
(which court is competent to determine the case) and the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments
83
. 
 
2. Cyberspace: The relationship between national courts and the internet has been 
the subject of wide-ranging discussions. It caused authorities (parliament as well 
as courts) to create cyber laws in response to various situations and disputes
84
; 
this took place for the most part on an ad hoc basis
85
. In the absence of a clear 
                                                          
80
 Dodge, W. S., (1998), ‘Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial 
Unilateralism’ Harvard International Law Journal, Vol 39, Issue 101, pp 136. 
81
 Marton, E., (2017), ‘Violations of personality rights through the Internet: jurisdictional issues under 
European law (Nomos 2016), Ch. 2, pp 55-70. 
82
 A body of ‘cyber law’ is non-existent; it is dangerous to pretend that it exists. A lust to define the law 
of the future is even worse, since law tends to evolve through an inductive accretion of experience. It is 
much safer to extract first principles from a mature body of law than to extract a dynamic body of law 
from timeless first principles. An overly technological focus can create bad taxonomy and bad legal 
analysis; Sommer, J., (2000), ‘Against cyber law’, Berkeley Tech L J, Vol 15, pp 1145. 
83
 The process of seeking the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments can be technical, time-
consuming and expensive; however, there may be following further hurdles: (1) Objections based on the 
public policy, (2) Lack of jurisdiction of the foreign court, (3) Procedural defect in the judgment or award, 
(4) Damages may not be recognised in the enforcement state, (5) Judgment is not conclusive, etc. 
84
 The problems of internet jurisdiction are always evolving - each new law creates loopholes, which in 
turn fuels the technology designed to take advantage of these loopholes. Not all cases of internet 
jurisdiction are black and white i.e. it is impossible to create a blanket law that applies to all cases 
Jurisdictional issues within cyberspace are an ongoing fight with no clear winners or losers. 
85
 Lautman, R., & Curran, K., (2011), ‘The Problems of Jurisdiction on the Internet’, International Journal 
of Ambient Computing and Intelligence, Vol 3, Issue3, pp 36-42; cyber law forms a unique area of legal 
discourse. Any lesson about cyberspace requires an understanding of the role of law, and that in 
creating a presence in cyberspace, we must all make choices about whether the values we embed there 
will be the same values we espouse in our real space experience. Understanding how the law applies in 
cyberspace in conjunction with demands, social norms and mores, and the rule of cyberspace, will be 
valuable in understanding and assessing the role of law everywhere.  
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cyber law approach, judges decided the cases on an individual basis
86
; similarly, 
statutes were passed without a coherent plan in place
87
 - Computer Misuse Act 
1990
88
 and Cyber Terrorism Act 2006 are clear examples. To date, many 
cyberspace-based issues are resolved by the application of traditional principles
89
. 
For instance, commercial, contract and consumer laws still apply to cyberspace 
transactions as they are applied to non-digital transactions
90
. However, 
cyberspace creates unusual circumstances which in certain situations cannot be 
resolved by applying traditional regulations
91
 (see-2.10). Defamation provides an 
example, as a defamatory tweet can be re-tweeted; therefore, the traditional 
‘multiple publication’ rule cannot be applied to social media defamation92.  
  
                                                          
86
 Roth, A. L., (2016), ‘Upping the ante: Rethinking anti-SLAPP laws in the age of the internet’, Brigham 
Young University Law Review, Vol 6, Issue 2, pp 741. 
87
 Lessig, L., (1999), ‘The law of the horse: What cyber law might teach’, Harvard L Rev, Vol 117, pp 501; 
Johnson, David R. & Post, David G., (1996), ‘Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’, Stanford 
Law Review, Vol. 48, pp 1367.   
88
 It does not define misuse of computer: Unauthorised access; R v Bedworth [1991] – intent; R v Cropp – 
when an offence takes place; DPP v Bignell [1998] -  unauthorised access of personal information.  
89
 Boyle, J., (1977), ‘Foucault in cyberspace: Surveillance, sovereignty, and hard-wired censors’, 
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol 66, pp 177. 
90
 Wang, F. F., (2008), ‘Obstacles and solutions to internet jurisdiction: A comparative analysis of the EU 
and US Laws’, Journal of International Commercial Law & Technology, Vol 3, Issue 4, pp 233-241 
91
 Sommer, J. H., (2000), ‘Against cyber law’, 15 Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol 15, Issue 3, pp 
1145. 
92
 Sapna, K., (2003), ‘Website Libel and the Single Publication Rule’, University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol 70, Issue 2, Article 5, pp 638-263. 
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1.3.1: Contribution to knowledge: 
 
The core vision of this research is to probe whether national rules on jurisdiction, which 
have been developed since the Victorian period, are still applicable to the ever-evolving, 
cross-border nature of cyberspace (see-9.2.3). Connecting factor, which provides the 
basis to assume jurisdiction, is the most critical legal issue (see-4.6). This research will 
evaluate whether conventional connecting factors (domicile, nationality or the place of 
publication) are still applicable to social media communication. Alternatively, there is a 
need to establish a new basis to assume jurisdiction in cyberspace.  
 
This thesis will contribute to the existing knowledge by attempting to test traditional 
rule’s validity concerning social media libel. As a whole, this thesis will become a 
research guide for the victims of social media libel to obtain initial information before 
pursuing legal action against a foreign-based defendant (see-9.3).  
 
However, this thesis does not recommend changing the jurisdiction laws, but the 
practical methods which are used to apply traditional laws; for example, an alteration of 
‘service of writ’ and ‘physical presence process’ (see-6.2.3, 6.6.2). The change of 
medium does not necessarily mean that a new regulatory framework has to be created to 
resolve social media libel disputes
93
. In the Ainsworth
94
 case, the court held that 
traditional laws could be applied to resolve cyberspace conflicts. This thesis will 
explore what is unique
95
 about social media, which can warrant the abandonment of 
traditional choice of law rules
96
. Hence, rather than changing the private international 
law framework, this thesis may recommend modernising the conventional methods of 
assuming jurisdiction in cyberspace. In this way, traditional rules can still be applied 
effectively for social media defamation claims. This revamp will ensure that online 
jurisdictional rules are equivalent and as predictable as those in off-line matters. 
 
1.4.: The objective of this research: 
                                                          
93
 Zekos, I., (2002), ‘Legal problems in cyberspace’, Journal of Managerial Law, Vol 44, Issue 5, pp 45-102 
94
 Lucasfilm v Ainsworth [2009] EWCA Civ 1328 [193]–[94]. 
95
 It is independent from physical elements and geographical places; Svantesson, D., (2013), ‘Private 
International Law and the Internet’, (2
nd
 Ed, Kluwer, OUP), pp 52–62. 
96
 Schulz, T., (2008), ‘Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the Private/Public 
International Law Interface’, EU Journal of International Law, Vol 19, Issue 4, pp 802-803. 
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 “If there exist conflicting laws, it will hamper the universal trade and cooperation with 
private individuals
97”. 
 
Previous researchers
98
 have discussed the issue of private international law rules and 
their problematic application to cyberspace. It is argued that the traditional framework is 
obsolete
99
 and not fit for the ever-growing nature of cyberspace (see-7.8, 7.9). 
Traditional jurisdictional laws have been developed for ‘offline activities’ in the 
physical world. The transitional nature of the internet means that online disputes can 
involve foreign elements from more than one country
100
. The conflict of law rules are 
applied in internet-based civil disputes as if they apply to similar offline disputes. This 
will allow the thesis to offer some suggestions to improve existing rules which can then 
be equally applied to online and offline disputes.  
 
The objectives of this research can be accomplished via the following means, using the 
black letter methodology:  
 
1. Microscopic analysis of how the cause of action provided by online 
defamation can be interpreted for social media (see-7.1.1)  
 
2. A systematic analysis of private international law rules, jurisdiction and 
choice of law rules; how they are applied or are likely to apply, to material 
published via social media (see-7.1.1) 
 
1.5.: The importance of this research: 
 “People like to express themselves, and are curious about other people…101”. 
 
The importance of this research lies in the question: Will it be practical to adapt 
traditional jurisdiction rules which have slowly developed for centuries to cyberspace. 
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 Faria, J. A. E., (2009), ‘Future Directions of Legal Harmonisation & Law Reform : Stormy Seas or 
Prosperous Voyage?’, Uniform Law Review, Vol 14, Issue 1, pp 5-34.  
98
 Mugarura, N., (2017), ‘The interaction of public and private international law in regulation of markets’, 
International Journal of Law and Management, Vol 59, Issue 6, pp 1236-1256.  
99
 Darrel, C. M., (1998), ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces’, Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review, Vol 4, Issue 1, pp 69-105. 
100
 The author is not concluding that all the cyber-transactions traverse sovereign borders; however, a 
significant proportion of all internet communications are trans-border in character.   
101
 Cassidy, J., (2006), ‘Me Media: How Hanging Out on the Internet Became Big Business’, New Yorker, 
available online  http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/05/15/060515fa_fact_cassidy  [Accessed 
14
th
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These rules are already practised for non-internet disputes involving foreign elements. If 
jurisdictional rules are changed to accommodate the challenges of cyberspace, then 
England will have two sets of private international law rules, one for offline and one for 
online transactions.  
 
English private international law rules have great importance in the international 
community
102
 as they are:  
 
1. A reference point on jurisdictional issues  
2. A guide to be considered in the subsequent choice of law issues  
3. Incorporated into many countries (Australia, India, Pakistan and Canada) 
private international law rules
103
  
 
Arguably, Commonwealth and Common law countries are still using traditional rules to 
assume jurisdiction in cyberspace. There is no need to create another domestic body of 
jurisdictional rules to accommodate cyberspace. England cannot afford to have two tiers 
of private international law to accommodate geographically dependent local values, 
public policies and online commercial efficiency and cyberspace dispute resolution
104
.  
 
The reasons are as follows: 
 
1. Private international law is not solely concerned with the practice of courts and 
tribunals because it is not exclusively private in its nature and function
105
. It also 
plays a global regulatory role when applied to cyberspace disputes
106
. There is a 
need to change the regulatory approach when traditional rules are applied to 
                                                          
102
 Carballo, L., &  Kramer, X., (2014), ‘The Role of Private International Law in Contemporary Society: 
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cyberspace because the internet has changed behaviours and methods of 
interaction. Therefore, after fine-tuning of jurisdiction, service of court 
documents, and establishing a physical presence, traditional rules can still be 
applied to internet transactions.    
 
2. Traditional jurisdictional rules were developed long before the advent of the 
internet. Irrespective of the internet, these rules are also applied to ‘offline’ 
cross-border disputes (see-6.6.3). It can be argued that if these rules can be 
applied offline, they can also be applied to online transactions. However, in 
online transactions, there can be more than one foreign element involved, which 
may trigger more than one competent jurisdiction. If a court establishes personal 
jurisdiction, it becomes the appropriate jurisdiction to decide the case
107
. 
Although, it does not prove that the other parallel jurisdiction becomes 
inappropriate to decide the case
108. This issue can be resolved via ‘convenient 
forum test’. It decides the appropriate forum by giving due regard to the 
litigant's choices, availability of evidence, witnesses suitability and needs of 
justice (see-2.17.1, 4.7, 6.9.1.2).  
 
3. Traditional rules still apply to cyberspace disputes, but there can be some 
practical difficulties in the application of jurisdictional rules
109
. For instance, a 
Chinese author will be a defendant if he publishes a defamatory statement in a 
newspaper. He can be served with a claim form because he is physically present 
in China. Whereas, a similar statement published via social media would be 
difficult to trace because it can be re-published. Who would be a defendant in 
social media defamation (see-7.18): The first person who uploaded a defamatory 
statement, the users who republished it or the user who merely shared/forwarded 
it? It is possible that the writer, uploader/publisher and internet users are 
                                                          
107
 Piper Aircraft v Reyno [1981] 454 U.S. 235. 
108
 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] 97 CLR 124. 
109
 It may be argued that conflict of laws principles in cyberspace have been inadequately served by 
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instance, social media libel is unlike the static occurrences. A defamation statement can be published 
continuously worldwide 24 hours a day. The courts have had to reconsider the single publication rule, 
and the applicability of local laws to a website intended for another jurisdiction, but with global reach. 
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different people. In this scenario, the user who shared the statement cannot be 
blamed if he believed it was not defamatory material
110
 (see-5.5.2.2).  
 
Interactive social networking makes it difficult to predict whether traditional rules will 
able to cope with the cross-border nature of cyberspace disputes. Schulz
111
 also 
highlighted that the peculiarities of social media communication are not easily 
accommodated by rules, which rely on geographical ‘connecting factors’. This dilemma 
may lead to the risk of an inappropriate law being applied or loss of time spent litigating 
(see-7.3).  
 
1.5.1: An alternative to traditional laws: 
 
Alternatively, another set of private international law rules could be introduced to 
resolve online cross-border disputes. However, the application of two parallel sets of 
rules may not work unless jurisdiction is harmonised globally. In the contemporary 
political environment, it may be impossible to harmonise cyber-laws. There have been 
many efforts to align these laws previously but without success. For instance, the Hague 
Conference on private international law took much time to negotiate and draft a 
convention intended to create standard jurisdictional rules. It was regarded as the most 
important legal event in the history of cyberspace
112
; however, to date, there are still 
numerous complications regarding its application. Intergovernmental organisations
113
 
made similar efforts, including, the World Trade Organisation and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation. These instruments
114
 have been difficult to create but 
                                                          
110
 There appears to be no single solution to the regulation of defamatory and harmful content on the 
Internet because the exact definition of defamatory publications and what is considered harmful varies 
from one country to another. What is defamatory in China may be highly protected speech in the UK. 
111
 Schulz, T., (2008), ‘Carving up the Internet: Jurisdiction, Legal Orders, and the Private/Public 
International Law Interface’, EU Journal of International Law, Vol 19, Issue 4, pp 802-803 
112
 Tanada Y.J., (2001), Global Treaty Tames the Web, Business World; Available online at: 
www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/716.doc [Assessed 16
th
 March 2017]. 
113
 Many international organisations have spent considerable time and resources on resolving legal 
issues and difficulties in cyberspace activities: (The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (UNCITRAL), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, the International Telecommunications 
Union and the International Organisation for Standardisation); to date there is no disparate and 
coherent body of law applicable to cyberspace. 
114
 International Electrotechnical Commission, Electronic Signature, International Organization of Legal 
Metrology, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Unification of Private International Law, 
Intellectual Property Rights, etc. 
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unworkable once created; therefore, the harmonisation of a single instrument may not 
be possible
115
. 
 
1.5.2.: Uniform code: 
 
Cyberspace is global, so its legal framework must be consistent across countries (see-
2.5). The above analysis shows that a single uniform code in cyberspace may not be the 
solution to resolve the wide range of legal disputes. Even various independent-
organisations
116
 tried to unify the fragmented part of cyberspace regulation by 
introducing mandates and providing consistent solutions to internet disputes. These 
efforts to create uniform international laws have been conducted in a range of fields in 
both public and private spheres. However, despite these efforts, there exists an ever-
increasing problem in digital-signature, e-commerce, copyright, online-trade, and 
internet-contracts. Even the Hague Conference on private international law
117
 failure, 
despite various attempts, to resolve this issue indicates that a state-level coalition is 
needed to resolve the issue of jurisdiction in cyberspace
118
. With increased globalised 
online trade, there are numerous issues relating to parallel proceedings and concurrent 
jurisdiction
119
.   
 
The above analysis shows that these organisations have been unable to negotiate a 
unifying code that applies to cyberspace. To date, the issues of jurisdiction, choice of 
law and the application and enforcement of law by foreign judges are still the main 
areas of concern in cyberspace. Additionally, the resolution of social media defamation 
claim demands an appropriate framework covering technical, commercial, and legal 
aspects. It seems that the above-mentioned international conventions cannot facilitate 
social media libel transaction satisfactorily. This thesis will not duplicate their work but 
determine what has not been discussed previously. For example, social media libel did 
not exist when the conventions were introduced.   
                                                          
115
 Davidson, A., (2012), ‘The Law of Electronic Commerce’, (2
nd
 Ed, Cambridge University), pp 11. 
116
 Davidson, A., (2012), ‘The Law of Electronic Commerce’, (2
nd
 Ed, Cambridge University), pp 23. 
117
 The Hague Conference on Private International Law (1893) - is the oldest international organisation 
of nearly 130 member states. It is the world’s leading intergovernmental organisation in the field of 
private international law. Its mission has been to work towards a world in which individuals and 
companies can enjoy a high degree of legal security when crossing borders between countries. 
118
 Teitz, L.E., (2004), ‘Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, Roger Williams UL Rev, Vol 10, Issue 1.  
119
 Bookman, P.K., (2015), ‘Litigation isolationism, Stanford Law Review, Vol 67, Issue 1, pp 1081 – 1144.  
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1.6.: The scope of this research: 
 “The Internet is becoming the town square for the global village of tomorrow.” 
 Bill Gates - 1999
121
 
 
The scope of private international law varies from state to state because each 
jurisdiction has distinct rules
122
. It can produce complexity even in offline conflicts. 
Compounding these controversies is the fact that the internet does not recognise 
sovereign states or physical boundaries
123
. The biggest challenge cyberspace creates for 
private international law is the application of material-world rules to a non-material 
interface (see-2.6). These rules were formulated for a world with geographical 
boundaries, which are further divided into sub-territories, each with a significant 
domain based on jurisdiction. Within the US, there are 50 states, each with further 
levels of court hierarchy. Similarly, Canada, India and Australia are also sub-divided 
into separate jurisdictions. The UK comprises of Scotland, Northern Ireland, ‘England 
and Wales’, each having a degree of separate legal jurisdiction (the Defamation Act 
2013 is not adopted  by Scotland and Northern Ireland).  
 
There is scope for future research to include other jurisdictions. Considering the 
ubiquitous nature of cyberspace and cross-border nature of social media defamation, it 
is very difficult to ignore developments in private international law across the world. 
The sources of private international law for this thesis include English legislation, the 
decisions of national courts, treaties and international uniform laws on jurisdiction (see-
4.2.1). The regional instruments such as EU legislation and the writings of jurists from 
the US, EU
124
, Australia, and other Commonwealth countries will also be incorporated 
                                                          
121
 David, L. G., (2008), ‘I-Quote: Brilliance and Banter from the Internet Age’, (Lyons Press, UK), pp 6. 
122
 Rukundo, S., (2018), ‘‘My President is a Pair of Buttocks’: The limits of online freedom of expression 
in Uganda’, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, eay009, Issue 0, pp 1–20; calling 
president on Facebook as a pair of buttocks was treated as harassment in Uganda but it clearly falls 
under defamation. 
123
 Ali G. R., (2016), ‘A proposed solution to the problem of libel tourism, Journal of Private International 
Law, Vol 12, Issue 1, pp 106-131. 
124
 The European Union tried to harmonise the jurisdictional approach across Europe by adopting 
standard regulation; Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters  
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to form the views presented in this thesis. However, the primary scope of this research 
is to consider the governing laws of England and apply them to social media defamation 
cases.  
 
1.6.1.: The law of England and Wales: 
 
In the wake of the modern division of wrongs, the law of England and Wales 
recognises
125
:  
Common law civil wrongs - tort, breach of contract  
1. Equitable wrongs - breach of fiduciary duty, breach of trust, breach of 
confidence, dishonestly procuring and estoppel  
2. Statutory wrongs - contravention of primary or delegated legislation 
 
The equitable and statutory wrongs are beyond the subject matter of this research. This 
research will focus on civil wrongs which do not involve any form of consent from 
social media users and ignore the breach of contract, trust or fiduciary duty. 
 
1.7.: Summary: 
 
This study represents a topical area of law and an area that needs reform if it is proven 
that existing laws are invalidated or attenuated by the advent of cyberspace. It also 
highlights that only a slim prospect of success for a universal code of cyberspace exists 
unless national laws are harmonised. This thesis recommends introducing a legal system 
of legal systems just like the internet is working fine as a network of networks. It would 
allow traditional domestic laws to operate in harmony without any clashes of 
jurisdiction. This remodelled legal framework could provide the legal certainty, 
application consistency and outcome predictability, which is required for cyberspace to 
prosper
126
. This may also be subsequently applied to social media as well. In short, this 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
OJ L 12/1. 
125
 Descheemaeker, E., (2010), ‘The Division of Wrongs: A Historical Comparative Study’, (2
nd
 Ed, Oxford 
Uni Press), Part III – Modern English Law, pp 208; Bigos, O., (2005), ‘Jurisdiction over Cross-Border 
Wrongs on the Internet’, ICLQ, Vol 54, pp 585-602; law of tort is biggest form of torts and this research 
only focus on one of the area of tort law: Defamation, which excludes statutory duty and consent. 
126
 Svantesson, D., (2015), ‘The holy trinity of legal fictions undermining the application of law to the 
global Internet’, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 23, Issue 3, pp 219-234. 
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research can contribute to the existing literature by making recommendations which are 
designed to (see-8.5):  
Address a gap in legal literature  
a. Produce a statement of law about jurisdictional rules  
b. Offer suggestions and required amendments  
c. Test the validity of traditional laws in cyberspace  
d. Offer a road-map for libel victims 
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Chapter 1 
PART B 
STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
 
This thesis adopts the standard academic structure of British PhD research assignments 
(see Appendix-II). It contains background, literature review, analysis, findings and 
conclusion. 
 
1.8.: Literature review:  
 
The review of existing literature is a guide and pointer to others’ works to justify a 
framework in the same field
127
. For doctrinal research, no further justification is needed 
other than the task of identifying what the law is and the inconsistencies it contains
128
. 
Unlike social science, a legal thesis does not commence with a general literature 
comparison
129
; however, wider literature appears in the footnotes
130
. This thesis 
conducted a thorough review of the relevant provisions in Chapter 2, which moves from 
broader concepts (cyberspace and defamation) to a more specific focus (social media 
and libel).  
 
1.8.1.: The availability of literature: 
 
Relevant literature is extensively available in commentaries about the impact of the 
internet, the nature of digital communication and cultural and behavioural changes after 
the development of cyberspace
131
. Existing literature elaborates that the internet has 
become an arena for deviant behaviour (see-2.1, 2.5, 5.6, 8.1.3.). The relevant literature 
required for this thesis is based on two statutory rights ‘freedom of expression’ and 
‘protection of reputation’:  
                                                          
127
 Fink, A., (2010), ‘Conducting Research Literature Reviews: From the Internet to Paper’ (1
st
 Ed, Sage 
Publication, London), pp 3; Dimakopoulou, S., Dokou, C., & Metse, E., (2013), ‘The letter of the law: 
Literature, justice and the other, (Frankfurt, Peter Lang GmbH, Internationaler Verlag der 
Wissenschaften), Part 1: The Others before Law, pp 13-90. 
128
 Dixon, M., (2015), ‘A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law Scholarship: Who Cares and Why?’, Kings 
and Bishops in Medieval England, 1066-1216, Chapter 1. 
129
 Dixon, M., (2016), ‘A Doctrinal Approach to Property Law: Who Cares and Why?’ in Bright, S., & 
Blandy, S., (eds.) ‘Researching Property Law’, (1
st
 Ed, Palgrave Macmillan, UK), Chapter 1. 
130
 The footnotes appreciate the work of academics who have taken a different view of the law or 
approached the topic with a different methodology, or who have already commented on the material. 
131
 Bell, D., & Kennedy, B. M., (2000), ‘The Cyber cultures Reader’, (London, UK); Castells, M., (1996), 
‘The Rise of the Network Society’, (Oxford University Press, UK). 
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1. Unpredictable behaviour is becoming the norm on social media because users 
find it easy to insult, ridicule, or even harass other users
132
. Previously, people 
used to refute speech with speech, but since the development of social media 
diverse culture, the trend has changed to refute statements with claims. There has 
been an overall  22 % decrease (from 2009 till 2013) in defamation cases
133
. On 
the contrary, social media libel claims have increased in that period
134
 (see 
Appendix-I). It is the evidence of this cultural shift
135
 due to social networking 
sites
136
. However, there has been no modification of English law concerning 
social media communication since the Defamation Act 2013.  
 
2. ‘Freedom of speech’ protects the publishers137 but if they damage others’ 
reputations, they can be sued for libel, personal rights, breach of privacy or 
harassment
138
. A claim of defamation can be used in connection with 
harassment, malicious falsehood and negligence
139
 so a social media user cannot 
assume that his online communication is immune from legal action. Research 
has shown that the internet as a communications medium helps to spread illegal 
activities faster
140
 and facilitates the recruitment of potential criminals
141
 (see-
                                                          
132
 Li, D., Li, X., Zhou, Z., & Zhou, Y., (2016), ‘Perceived school climate and adolescent Internet addiction: 
The mediating role of deviant peer affiliation and the moderating role of effortful control’, Computers in 
Human Behaviour, Vol 60, pp 54-61. 
133
 According to Thomson and Reuters research (https://www.thomsonreuters.com/en.html; Assessed 
20
th
 June 2019), high defamation case costs deterring people to go to court or making them less willing 
to fight defamation court cases all the way to a verdict. Out of court settlement is a cheaper option for 
defendants in England which is around 140 times more costly than the average; 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/oct/09/medialaw.pressandpublishing [Assessed 20
th
 June 
2019].   
134
 Allen-Back, I., (2018), ‘Defamation claims on the rise in London’, available online at out-law.com; the 
growing use of social media is a factor behind the 39% rise in the number of defamation claims brought 
before the courts in London. 
135
 In social media, abnormal behaviour is the status quo, tempers can flare in the heat of debate and 
word wars can last for days or even weeks.  It's not uncommon for users to ridicule, harass or insult 
those who disagree with them. 
136
 Gimenes, G., Cordeiro, R. L. F., & Rodrigues-Jr, J. F., (2017), ‘ORFEL: Efficient detection of defamation 
or illegitimate promotion in online recommendation’, Information Sciences, Vol 379, pp 274-287;    
Perry, S. J., & Marcum, T. M., (2016), ‘Unmasking the anonymous online speaker: Balancing free speech 
and defamation’, Labor Law Journal, Vol 67, Issue 4, pp 529. 
137
 Art 10 & Art 7 of ECHR 1950; Art 7 Universal Declaration of Human rights 1948; Art 26 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political rights 1966; Art 5 Convention of Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 1969, Human Rights Act 1998 & Equality Act 2010. 
138
 Marwick, A., & Miller, R., (2014), ‘Online harassment, defamation, and hateful speech: A primer of 
the legal landscape’, Fordham Centre on Law and Information Policy Report No 2. 
139
 Peter Cruddas v (1) Jonathan Calvert (2) Heidi Blake (3) Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 171. 
140
 Lucchi, N., (2014), ‘Internet content governance and human rights’, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law, Vol 16, Issue 4, pp 809. 
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2.1). However, there are still questions about the extent to which online 
behaviour facilitates defamation, breaches privacy, or undermines freedom of 
speech
142
.  
 
Common law
143
 doctrine of defamation precedent has been generated since the 17
th
 
century
144
. The emergence of the internet meant that there was a need for new 
guidelines; however, this has not happened yet
145
. There is also an issue of libel tourism 
and undue favouritism to claimants and curtailment of the concept of freedom of 
speech. This thesis will evaluate the myth of English libel laws being exploited by the 
rich/public-figures to censor things they disapprove of
146
 (see-7.21). 
 
1.9.: Methodology: Library-based research study:  
 
This is a library-based research thesis. The chosen methodology is ‘doctrinal research’. 
The philosophical and theoretical underpinning of using this methodology is explained 
in Chapter 3. This thesis will use the term ‘method and methodology’ interchangeably 
because it does not require an interview or survey to collect data
147
. The required data 
come from statutes, case law and journal articles (see-3.5.1).  
 
1.9.1.: Limitations: 
 
In any methodology, there are pitfalls to consider regarding the quality of information 
used. This thesis research design is based on case laws so the following issues may 
arise:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
141
 Mann, D., & Sutton, M., (1998), ‘Net crime: More Change in the Organization of Thieving’, British 
Journal of Criminology, Vol 38, Issue 1, pp 201-229. 
142
 Cohen, J. D., (2016), ‘The next generation of government CVE strategies at home: Expanding 
opportunities for intervention, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 668, Issue 1, 
pp 118-128. 
143
 It originated during the reign of King Henry II (1154-89), when many local customary laws were 
replaced by new national ones, which applied to all and were thus ‘common to all’; 
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com [Assessed 11
th
 May 2018]. 
144
 Wilson, T., (2015), Twitter and Facebook users need grasp of defamation law, online published at 
www.mancunianmatters.co.uk [assessed 14
th
 February 2017].  
145
 The only latest instrument is the Defamation Act 2013, however, it has many flaws (see 2.14.1). 
146
 Goldberg, D., (2011), ‘To Dream the Impossible Dream-Towards a Simple, Cheap, (and Expression-
Friendly) British Libel Law’, Journal of International Media & Entertainment Law, Vol 4, Issue 1, pp 31-56. 
147
 Greenberg, M., (2017), ‘What makes a method of legal interpretation correct?: legal standards vs 
fundamental determinants’, Harvard Law Review, Vol 130, Issue 4, pp 105-105. 
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1. When analysing the documented-data, one must always look for a balance in the 
writer’s work or at least ‘record’ a biased work. It is often seen in the case notes 
that the British barristers have a strict approach concerning UK sovereignty
148
 
when it comes to the application of private international laws. It may be the 
reason London is famous for forum shopping because judges always find a way 
to assume jurisdiction
149
. The above is always a problem when one cannot ask 
direct questions of those who either make the law or who work within (or 
without) it. In effect, one has to rely on the word of others. To overcome this 
problem, it is necessary only to take information from high-quality journals 
written by those with vast experience in the field of jurisdiction (see-4.2.1).   
 
2. It is also necessary to consider the existing legislation to find out what the law 
says and then compare it to decisions given in court to see how much leeway 
judges are providing within their judgments. This can also be applied to similar 
cases with similar facts that offer differing outcomes. To overcome this problem, 
only the cases of the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court are analysed because 
they provide binding decisions upon lower courts (see-7.1.2).  
 
3. The internet is borderless whereas the central principle currently used in 
jurisdiction is ‘territoriality-based’. A sovereign state has the right to operate any 
laws and rules as it wishes within its territorial borders (see-2.3.2). Therefore, 
over the centuries, rules that have developed in one country are often very 
different from those in neighbouring countries. This thesis can only effectively 
dissect English jurisdictional laws so the findings cannot be generalised. 
 
4. It will not consider the areas of ‘enforcement of foreign judgments’ and 
‘quantification of libel damages’. The validity of jurisdictional defamation laws 
cannot be attained without the analysis of enforcement of judgments and 
damages. These are extensive areas, which can only be conducted at a project 
level. 
 
                                                          
148
 S. E. I., (2003), ‘Conflicts Between Community and National Laws: An Analysis of the British 
Approach’, Sussex European Institute, SEI Working Paper No 66; for example, the professors who 
support strict laws in this matter will often try to slant the article in that way. 
149
 Blanco, E. M., & Pontin, B., (2017), ‘Litigating extraterritorial nuisances under english common law 
and UK statute’, Transnational Environmental Law, Vol 6, Issue 2, pp 285-308. 
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5. It will ignore the criminal aspect of social media communication (harassment or 
cyberbullying), so the findings cannot offer the alternative legal options 
available for victims if they are unable to initiate libel proceedings. 
 
6. The jurisdictions of Scotland and Northern Ireland are not considered, so the 
relevant suggestions offered to amend the Defamation Act 2013 will only be 
implemented in England and Wales.   
 
1.9.2.: Gap in the existing literature: 
 
This research is not building a strategy to resolve the current cyber-security issues, but it 
will test the validity of private international law rules. This thesis will also suggest 
modifying any of the jurisdictional laws, which are outdated concerning issues 
presented by a constantly evolving internet sphere. There is a need to concentrate more 
on the law to synchronise the concept of jurisdiction via private international legal 
systems rather than from the sociological point of view. There is a definite gap in 
knowledge:  
 
1. Various writers have considered the question of jurisdiction either with a 
comparison of the EU laws or without involving cyber-laws. Regarding black-
letter, the argument of social media jurisdiction still needs to be taken further.  
 
2. Academics have widely covered cyberspace policies, lawmaking and its 
governance related issue but there are few doctrinal studies on cyberspace 
jurisdiction
150
. Research has been conducted which criticised the lack of cyber-
laws and the issues surrounding defamation on the web, especially online libel. 
However, there is a lack of argument concerning jurisdictional issues in social 
media libel utilising doctrinal research
151
.  
 
                                                          
150
 Kahin, B., & Nesson, C., (1998),  ‘Borders in Cyberspace’ (1
st
 Ed, Routledge Publication, Cambridge), 
pp ix. 
151
 Hein, J., & Bizer, A., (2018), ‘Social Media and the Protection of Privacy: Current Gaps and Future 
Directions in European Private International Law’, International Journal of Data Science and Analytics, pp 
1-7; Mills, A., (2015), ‘The law applicable to cross-border defamation on social media: whose law 
governs free speech in Facebookistan?’, J. Media Law, Vol  7, pp 1–35; Davidson, S., (2008), 
‘International considerations in libel jurisdiction, In Forum on Public Policy’, A Journal of the Oxford 
Round Table, pp 1-28.  
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1.10.: Outline of the thesis:  
 “The internet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity doesn’t understand 
the largest experiment in anarchy that we ever had”- Eric Schmidt (Google Chief)152. 
 
 
This thesis has been divided into three sections. Please see Table-1: 
 
Table-1: Outline of thesis 
 
# OBJECTIVES CHAPTERS 
SECTION 1 Background, method and 
review of cyberspace literature 
Ch.1, Ch.2, C.h.3 
SECTION 2 Choice of law, Jurisdictional 
rules, social media and libel 
Ch.4, Ch.5, C.h.6 
SECTION 3 Discussion, analysis, findings 
and solution 
Ch.7, Ch.8, C.h.9 
 
 
1. Section-1:  
 
Cyberspace was created as an ungoverned space
153
, but it cannot be established that it is 
ungovernable; especially after the concept of ‘internet-neutrality154’. It empowers the 
governments to bind ISPs to treat every digital transaction equally (see-2.6.2). It forbids 
them to discriminate by content, website, platform, application, type of attached 
equipment, or method of communication
155
. In short, this concept controls ISPs because 
they are unable to block or slow down online content. 
 
                                                          
152
 Taylor, J., (2010), My Fears for Facebook Generation; http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/google-chief-my-fears-for-generation-facebook-2055390.html [Assessed 
2
nd
 May 2018]. 
153
 Barlow, J. Perry,  (1996) A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace; 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html [Assessed 7
th
 May 2018]. 
154
 Net neutrality relates to the openness of the internet and how internet service providers (ISPs) 
control customer information. 
155
 Cheruvalath, R., (2018), ‘Internet neutrality: A battle between law and ethics’, International Journal 
for the Semiotics of Law, Vol 31, Issue 1, pp 145-153. 
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Every country is playing an essential role in its governance
156
. This section will analyse 
cyberspace functions, background and characteristics, which in turn will set the scope of 
the research. There will be a summary of the development, nature, regulation, 
governance and the ownership of cyberspace. This structural analysis of cyberspace 
provides a vehicle for social media conduct (‘libel’ refers to social media conduct in this 
thesis). Without understanding the core operations of cyberspace, it will not be possible 
to impose a legal duty on its users because it is impossible to isolate the regulations 
regarding internet conducts from cyberspace. Therefore, it is imperative to understand 
background information about cyberspace before discussing the legal issues raised by 
social media
157
. 
 
1. Does cyberspace constitute a new object158?  
2. Is it just a communication medium159? 
3. Is it ethical to regulate cyberspace? 
4. How and why social media raise jurisdictional issues? 
 
2. Section-2:  
 
In this section, principles of the ‘conflict of law’ will be analysed. It will critically 
evaluate how traditional rules apply to cyberspace disputes. What procedure a court 
adopts to assume jurisdiction, and in what circumstance a judge may grant permission 
to serve a foreign defendant in a libel claim
160
.  
   
1. How the physical presence of a foreign defendant is established in cyberspace 
                                                          
156
 Hollis, D. B., & Ohlin, J. D., (2018), ‘What if cyberspace were for fighting?’, Ethics & International 
Affairs, Vol 32, Issue 4, pp 441-456; Post, D. G., (2008), ‘Governing cyberspace: Law. Santa Clara 
Computer and High’, Technology Law Journal, Vol 24, Issue 4, pp 883.  
157
 Feng, X., (2011), ‘Impacts of the Internet on Traditional Jurisdictional Principles in International Civil 
& Commercial Cases’, Front. Law China, Vol 6, Issue 3, pp 387–402. 
158
 How is it different from other mediums. 
159
 The optimistic claims now being made about the internet are merely the most recent examples in a 
tradition of technological utopianism that goes back to the first transatlantic telegraph cables, 150 years 
ago: Shokri-Ghadikolaei, H., & Fischione, C., (2016), ‘The transitional behavior of interference in 
millimeter wave networks and its impact on medium access control’, IEEE Transactions on 
Communications, Vol 64, Issue 2, pp 723-740. 
160
 It is a common practice that in ‘severe criminal cases’ the judges do not hesitate to allow a claimant 
to serve a writ to foreign defendant.  
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2. Can a writ be served to an ‘out of jurisdiction’ defendant (using other 
methods
161
)? 
3. What are the ‘connecting factors’ and ‘choice of law’ rules? 
 
3. Section-3:  
 
In this section, the above-explained principles will be applied to social media 
defamation cases. This will be the main section and will determine whether the existing 
laws of jurisdiction are still applied effectively in tandem with the Defamation Act 
2013.  
 
1. Do judges create new laws to resolve a cyberspace case162? 
2. Are the ‘choice of law’ rules applied uniformly to cyberspace cases163? 
3.  Do English laws facilitate ‘forum shopping’ in social media libel cases164? 
4. What practical problems arise when applying traditional jurisdiction rules of 
“place of the wrong”165? 
5. Do Section 1 and Section 9 override the ‘forum non-conveniens’ principle?  
6. Which practical difficulties arise in the application of Private International Law 
rules to social media libel? 
 
This part will examine the practical application of jurisdictional rules because civil 
jurisdiction is not merely an exercise of power, but also a means of resolving private 
disputes. The whole idea is to analyse the courts’ approaches in social media cases 
before and after the 2013 Act. 
 
                                                          
161
 Barton v Wright Hassall [2016] EWCA Civ 177; Cifal Group v Meridian Securities [2013] EWHC 3553 
(Comm). At various occasions, service via internet is accepted; however, on some occasions it was not 
accepted by courts. Tieu, H., (2012), ‘Substituted service of legal documents via Facebook: “like” or 
“unlike” by Australian courts’, Colin Biggers & Paisley Lawyers, online url:  
http://www.cbp.com.au/publications/2012/december/substituted-service-of-legal-documents-via-
faceboo#page=1 [Assessed 14
th
 February 2019]. 
162
 Kleven, A. R., (2018), ‘Minimum virtual contacts: A framework for specific jurisdiction in cyberspace’, 
Michigan Law Review, 116(5), 785-810; Reed, C., (2018), ‘Why judges need jurisprudence in cyberspace’, 
Legal Studies, Vol 38, Issue 2, pp 263-278; Daskal, J., (2018), ‘Borders and bits’, Vanderbilt Law Review, 
Vol 71, Issue 1, 179-240. 
163
 Jurisdiction will only decide whether and where the claimant sues… the next steps are choice of 
forum and choice of law. 
164
 Blanco, E. M., & Pontin, B., (2017), ‘Litigating extraterritorial nuisances under english common law 
and UK statute’, Transnational Environmental Law, Vol 6, Issue 2, pp 285-308. 
165
 When conflicts of law arise, courts must decide which law will govern. Can the place of “wrong” aid 
courts in the decision between laws. 
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1.11.: Summary: 
"Transactions in cyberspace are no different from cross-border transactions occurring in 
the real space… Both involve people in real space in one territorial jurisdiction 
transacting with people in real space in another territorial jurisdiction."  
 Goldsmith
166
 
 
 
This research intends to highlight that cyberspace jurisdiction requires clear principles 
rooted in international law. These uniform principles will persuade sovereign courts to 
adopt a linear approach
167
 to assume jurisdiction
168
. This consistency may allow 
abolishing ‘enforcement of foreign judgment’ and concurrent jurisdiction issues 
altogether. For instance, Dr Cullen
169
 was awarded damages because the judge found 
the defendant’s conduct defamatory; however, he was denied any practical relief 
because the enforcing court concluded otherwise (see-6.2.3.1). Therefore, a linear 
approach means that a victim will get legal protection anywhere in the world. Judges 
will receive consistent information from a single source for all cyberspace civil 
disputes. This will ensure legal certainty for transnational cyberspace disputes. It will 
also help minimise various other cyberspace-based crimes because the application of the 
uniform choice of law will produce predictable judgments
170
.    
 
1.11.: Conclusion: 
 
This chapter concludes that the practical difficulties in the application of private 
international law rules arise due to the borderless nature of cyberspace. However, this 
does not mean that there is an urgent need to abolish existing jurisdictional laws. In the 
current political situation, each country may want to prosecute its citizens within its 
state-based legal system. However, once a proper protocol is followed, any court can 
assume jurisdiction over any internet user.  
 
                                                          
166
 Goldsmith, J. L., (1998), ‘Against Cyber-anarchy’, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 65, Issue 
4, pp 1199-1250. 
167
 Cullen v White [2003] W ASC 153.  
168
 A unilateral legislative reforms may offer an authentic solution to address cross-jurisdictional issues; 
however, an international cooperation (linear approach) may also provide the required solution. 
169
 Cullen v White [2003] WASC 153; Dr Cullen had difficulties trying to enforce the judgment against Mr 
White, however, the publicity which has surrounded the award of damages has gone a long way 
towards restoring his reputation. It may not be an ideal position for most of the claimants. 
170
 Michael, M., (2016), ‘Unification of choice-of-law rules for defamation claims’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 12, issue 3, pp 492-520. 
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This research encourages the lawmakers to authenticate specific laws for cyberspace 
transaction because previously it was seen as the new source of economic growth; the 
area to invest in. However, social media made people look it more rationally. Now it 
has become a part of everybody’s life. It can affect a person just like a student; can be 
affected in a classroom. 
 
1.12.1.:  Next chapters: 
 
The validity of traditional rules can only be judged if the interconnected elements of 
private international law, including jurisdiction, choice of law and declining of 
jurisdiction are determined. It is detailed in the following chapters: 
  
1. The relevant literature on cyberspace and evaluation of defamation rules (Ch.2) 
2. The method used to conduct this research (Ch.3)  
3. What are the private international law principles (Ch. 4)  
4. How traditional precedents apply to modern social media libel (Ch. 5)  
5. How judges assume jurisdiction in the multistate online environment (Ch. 6) 
6. What practical difficulties are caused by the application of these regulations to 
social media libel claims (Ch. 7) 
7. Is there any need for new libel laws for social media (Ch. 8) 
8. What can be concluded from this research (Ch.9) 
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Chapter 2  
 
 EVOLUTION OF LITERATURE 
 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines a critique of literature in the relevant key areas. It is designed to 
provide a contextual academic background to this research, which will form the basis of 
the next chapters. It has three sections: 
 
 
 
Part A: Characteristics of cyberspace  
Part B: Nature of communication in cyberspace 
Part C: The Defamation Act 2013 
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Part A 
Characteristics of Cyberspace 
  
 
2.1.: Overview of the literature: 
 
The progression in computer technology, innovation in user-generated content and the 
glorification of remote networking devices has changed many things, including data 
sharing, free flow of media content, and the ability to accumulate and transfer 
information quickly and efficiently
171
. The excitement that surrounds the internet is due 
to the flexibility of communication and availability of infinite information online
172
. 
This advancement of intertwined connections between computing and communication 
will continue producing revolutionary changes
173
. These changes constantly affect how 
people, who have become more sophisticated in the use of technology, live across the 
globe
174
. Furthermore, the availability of high-speed internet connections, a user-
friendly atmosphere and the provision of a wide variety of applications have increased 
the number of cyberspace users dramatically
175
. Three billion people are connected to 
the internet today
176
 and it will grow to 51.5% by 2019
177
.  
 
The prominence of and interest in social media websites contributed to a revolution in 
the advertisement and communication industries that transformed the moral perception 
of cyberspace
178
. It is proving hard to regulate the behaviour of internet users and the 
                                                          
171
 Briscar, J. R., (2017), ‘Data transmission and energy efficient internet data centres’, American 
University Law Review, Vol 67, Issue 1, pp 233-267; Polonetsky, J., & Gray, S., (2017), ‘The internet of 
things as a tool for inclusion and equality’, Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol 69, Issue 2, pp 103-
118; Mangan, D., (2015), ‘Regulating for Responsibility: Reputation and Social Media’, International 
Review of Law, Computers and Technology, Vol 29, Issue 1, pp 16-32. 
172
 Meltzer, J. P., (2015), ‘The Internet, Cross‐Border Data Flows and International Trade’, Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies, Vol 2, Issue 1, pp 90-102; McLean, D., (2002), ‘Internet defamation’, 
Communications and the Law, Vol 24, Issue 4, pp 21-38. 
173
 Rosenberg, D., (2018), ‘How 5G will change the world’, World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, 23-
26 January, Davos-Klosters, Switzerland; the new technology will usher in the age of fifth generation 
(5G) telecommunications; this technological evolution will lead to dramatic societal changes. 
174
 Beck, U., (2018), ‘What is globalization?’ (3
rd
 Ed, John Wiley & Sons, US ), Ch. 2, pp 64.  
175
 The rich graphical interface, flexible end-user applications, entertainment, and facility of social 
interaction have attracted users of all ages to social media. 
176
 Internet Live Stats: http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/#trend [Assessed 28
th 
July 2018] 
177
 The Statistic Portal: Global Internet User penetration; 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/325706/global-internet-user-penetration/ [Assessed 28
th 
July 2018]. 
178
 The Jubilee Centre (2016), ‘The Influence of Parents and the Media’, University of Birmingham press 
release; available online: https://theconversation.com/is-social-media-messing-with-childrens-morals-
62579 [Assessed 28
th 
August 2018]. 
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publication of user-generated content
179
. Particularly with smartphones, which have pre-
installed electronic and communication information dissemination systems (see-5.8.4), 
the ideas of social interactions have changed
180
. There has been a 13% increase in the 
number of people using social media sites in 2018
181
. These social networks allow the 
exchanging of opinions and quick publication without relying on the traditional mass 
media intermediaries
182
. Social networking sites, apps and platforms are equally organic 
and dynamic. These networks compete with emerging platforms to continue to develop 
the technological and economic
183
 infrastructure they occupy. They are constantly 
evolving to fulfil the needs of their users, which in turn allows them to attract more 
users.  
 
Monthly
184
 more than 25 billion individual items are shared on Facebook alone (see-
Table-1 (A)). According to the House of Lords Communication Committee reports
185
, 
34 million people use Facebook and 15 million Twitter users contribute 500 million 
tweets every day. Probably the lack of adequate checks and balances encourages users 
to share anti-social material via social networks
186
. It can be used as a tool by criminal-
minded/discontented users to victimise
187
, threaten, harass, commit fraud and post 
revenge porn
188
. There are many organisations (ISIS and Al-Qaeda
189
) who 
threaten/blackmail/groom online  audiences and attempt to recruit innocent teenagers to 
                                                          
179
 Mason, G., & Czapski, N., (2017), ‘Regulating cyber-racism’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 
41, Issue 1, pp 284-340. 
180
 US Telecom Association v FCC [2016] 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir). 
181
 Chaffey, D., (2018), ‘Global social media research summary 2018’, Smart Insight available at: 
https://www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-
media-research/ [Assessed 11
th 
July 2018]; the latest culture moved towards commercialisation because 
social interactions, fake news, anonymity and online adds are the famous trends in cyberspace. 
182
 Joyce, D., (2015), ‘Internet freedom and human rights’, European Journal of International Law, Vol 
26, Issue 2, pp 493-514. 
183
 They also meet the objectives of their owners. 
184
 Constine, J., (2018), ‘Facebook boosts daily users to 1.45 B ’; https://techcrunch.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/facebook-q1-2018-dau-slide.png?w=730&crop=1 [Assessed 11
th
 May 2018]. 
185
 House of Lords, (2015), Cybercrime and cyber security: Key issues for the 2015 Parliament, 
Parliamentary business, Publication and Records (HL). 
186
 Amedie, J., (2015), ‘The Impact of Social Media on Society’, Advanced Writing: Pop Culture 
Intersections, Vol 2, pp 24. 
187
 Lavorgna, A., (2015), ‘Organised crime goes online: Realities and challenges’, Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, Vol 18, Issue 2, pp 153-168. 
188
 Pollack, J. M., (2016), ‘Getting even: Empowering victims of revenge porn with a civil cause of action’, 
Albany Law Review, Vol 80, Issue 1, pp 353. 
189
 Softness, N., (2016), ‘Terrorist communications: Are Facebook, twitter, and google responsible for the 
Islamic state's actions?’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol 70, Issue 1, pp 201-21; The reasons that 
youths join terrorist organizations such as ISIS have little to do with being poor, brainwashed, a Muslim, 
or a psychopath, and more to do with vulnerabilities in human nature exacerbated by aspects of 
Western society. 
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fulfil their illegal purposes
190
. These groups use social networks effectively to influence 
vulnerable and antagonised teens
191
. They influence and encourage disaffected youths to 
commit acts of violence on behalf of their extremist causes
192
. There are various 
criminals and dark-web operators
193
, who create and distribute graphic, violent and 
threatening messages, images, and videos seeking to instil fear within the target 
audience
194
.  
 
There is no single economic, religious, ethnic, cultural, or educational profile for a 
violent extremist because there is no universal standard for criminal/illegal expressions 
in cyberspace
195
. At times, this flow of unrestricted information can bring a revolution 
and may aid in the overthrow of democratic governments
196
, incite hatred, 
discrimination, hostility, violence, or provoke rebellion
197
. The cultural shift in the 
political dynamics of the real world is also changing digital conduct and social 
                                                          
190
 Zeitzoff, T., (2017), ‘How social media is changing conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 61, 
Issue 9, pp 1970-1991; Social media increasingly plays a role in conflict and contentious politics. 
Politicians, leaders, insurgents, and protestors all have used it as a tool for communication. 
191
 Haque, O. S., (2015), ‘Why are young Westerners drawn to terrorist organizations like ISIS?’, Modern 
Medicine Network, Vol 32, Issue 9, pp 14; Attacks by violent extremist are not limited to those inspired 
by the ideology of groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. It may also involve individuals seeking recourse 
from some non-ideologically inspired grievance. 
192
 Cohen, J. D., (2016), ‘The next generation of government CVE strategies at home: Expanding 
opportunities for intervention’, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 668, Issue 1, 
pp 118-128. 
193
 Ghappour, A., (2017), ‘Searching places unknown: Law enforcement jurisdiction on the dark web’, 
Stanford Law Review, Vol 69, Issue 4, pp 1075. 
194
 Maras, M., (2017), ‘Social media platforms: Targeting the "found space" of terrorists’, Journal of 
Internet Law, Vol 21, Issue 2, pp 3. 
195
 Child pornography, terrorism, suicide materials, spyware and censorship are issues on which laws 
vary dramatically internationally, and yet each website is typically available globally. Nations have 
different ages at which a person is no longer regarded as a child; freedom of speech issues arise with 
terrorism issues (plans to make a bomb) and suicide information, but the law must address the easy 
reach of such material in the digital age, in ways that in other contexts may be considered draconian. 
Censorship laws for print and television are ineffective for online materials. Cyberspace in its nature 
does not recognise borders and it raises questions regarding security of transactions, standards and 
protection, legally and otherwise, in an international context. 
196
 In China, Facebook was blocked following the July 2009 ‘Urumqi riots’ because Xinjiang 
independence activists were using Facebook as part of their communications network; Arguably officials 
can order to shut down social networks in time of public unrest. However, "viral silence may have as 
many dangers as viral noise. 
197
 Trottier, D. and Schneider, C., (2012), The 2011 Vancouver riot and the role of Facebook in crowd-
sourced policing, BC Studies: The British Columbian Quarterly, Vol 175, pp. 57-72. The Riots 
Communities and Victims Panel (Darra Singh OBE, Simon Marcus, Heather Rabbatts CBE, Maeve 
Sherlock OBE) accepted that 2011 disorder was fuelled by social media, “UK riots 'made worse' by rolling 
news, BBM, Twitter and Facebook”. 
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communication
198
 (see-2.5). It demands the reconstruction of speech regulations 
because the traditional mode of communication has been transformed
199
 (see-7.21).  
 
 
Picture-1: http://www.visualcapitalist.com/internet-minute-2018/ [Assessed 4
th
 July 
2018] 
 
Picture-1 shows that social media is a big source of the flow of information
200
. It 
promotes social interactions that can lead to an increase in many forms of conflicts; 
however, social media libel is the objective of this research. This thesis will use this 
information as a starting point to evaluate whether a change in defamation laws for 
social networks is required. It becomes critical to examine the ‘characteristics of online 
communication’ with respect to ‘freedom of expression’ and when such freedom 
transforms into defamation.  
  
                                                          
198
 People have the tendency to select only those parts of a message that they want to hear. One reason 
is that decision-makers and policymakers, like all people, will react differently depending on objectively 
equivalent descriptions of the same problem. 
199
 Social media is here to stay. The officials have  to think outside the box i.e. if we wish to understand 
this phenomenon, capitalise on its benefits, and prevent or minimise its negative effects in relation to 
crime and the criminal justice system. 
200
 Sharing data can offer benefits, but what to share and who to share with, is up to the subscribers, so 
they should also be responsible for the legal consequences if the shared data is inappropriate. 
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This section will review the following areas: 
 
1. The functions and characteristics of cyberspace 
2. The possibility to regulate cyberspace  
3. The ownership of cyberspace 
4. The applicable laws to online communication 
5.  Are the existing laws consistent and in line with domestic legislation? 
6.  The grounds to assume jurisdiction in cyberspace communication 
 
2.2.: Cyberspace: Characteristics and functioning: 
 “The Internet is becoming the town square for the global village of tomorrow”.  
 Bill Gates
201
 
 
Scholars have conceptualised
202
 that cyberspace makes this world a global village
203
 but 
social media has converted that village into a community by causing many socio-
cultural upheavals
204
. It is a socially based shopping mall of cyberspace
205
, which 
consists of many groups from different backgrounds and histories
206
. There may be 
people who have never met but still share their emotions, feelings and circumstances 
(see-2.4.3). It has transformed the way families, colleagues and friends communicate 
with each other by reducing the importance of sovereign borders because it has no 
physical parameters
207
 (see-2.6). Smartphones with built-in communication software  
                                                          
201
 David L. G., (2008), I-Quote: Brilliance and Banter from the Internet Age [Lyons Press, UK], pp 6. 
202
 Junho, H. C., James A. D., (2002), ‘Making a Global Community on the Net – Global Village or Global 
Metropolis?: A Network Analysis of Usenet Newsgroups’, Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication, Vol 7, Issue 3; Hancock, J., (1998), ‘In Borderless Cyberspace : The Cross Jurisdictional 
Validity of Electronic Signature and Certificates in Recent Legislative Texts’, Jurimetrics, Vol 38, Issue 3, 
pp 301-315; McLuhan, M., & Powers, B., (1989), ‘The global village: Transformations in world life and 
media in the 21
st
 century’ (1
st
 Ed, Oxford University Press, NY), pp xii. 
203
 Manjikian, M.M., (2010), ‘From global village to virtual battlespace: The colonizing of the internet and 
the extension of realpolitik’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol 54, Issue 2, pp 381-401; internet-based 
networks, satellite transmission and electronic communication technology vanished time and space - 
people from around the world can communicate instantly as if they lived in the same village. 
204
 Gummerus, J., Liljander, V., & Sihlman, R., (2017), ‘Do ethical social media communities pay off?: An 
exploratory study of the ability of Facebook ethical communities to strengthen consumers’ ethical 
consumption behaviour’, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol 144, Issue 3, pp 449-465. 
205
 It is 24/7 accessible and have no security guards to stop or control the conduct and behaviour of 
shoppers.  
206
 Meder, J. W., (1997), ‘A visit to the cyberspace mall: Who owns a web site address?’, Duquesne Law 
Review, Vol 35, Issue 4, pp 989. 
207
 Schmitt, M. N., & Vihul, L., (2017), ‘Respect for sovereignty in cyberspace’, Texas Law Review, Vol 95, 
Issue 7, pp 1639-1670; Walton, B. A., (2017), ‘Duties owed: Low-intensity cyberattacks and liability for 
transboundary torts in international law’, Yale Law Journal, Vol 126, Issue 5, pp 1460-1519; Hildebrandt, 
M., (2013), ‘Extraterritorial jurisdiction to enforce in cyberspace?, Bodin, Schmitt, Grotius in cyberspace’, 
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and continued technological evolution are further fading these barriers
208
. The physical 
world has geographical boundaries but cyberspace itself has no physical parameters but 
horizons
209
. However, these worlds are not separated from each other. The 
actions/communication of cyberspace users have direct effects in the physical world
210
. 
Cyberspace users are based in ‘cyber-physical society’, in which everyday life is 
interwoven with electronic devices
211
. Equally, events in physical locations determine 
events in cyberspace
212
; therefore, the same laws of the physical world can regulate the 
digital world
213
.  
 
2.2.1.: Cyberspace: Definition: 
The evolution of cyberspace marks the creation of a world that is not separate but 
displaced from the physical world - Magermans
214
. 
 
 
There is no universally accepted definition of cyberspace because it is used in different 
contexts geographically and interpreted subjectively. International organisations 
(including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the United Nations) do not have 
an official definition that can be applied as a standard. This ubiquitous term 
encompasses a wide variety of complex areas
215
. In this thesis, to elaborate the 
jurisdictional issues relating to cyberspace, it is necessary to use a preferred definition. 
This thesis compares the Oxford English Dictionary and the ISO/IEC (International 
Organisation for Standardisation/International Electrotechnical Commission) definitions 
                                                                                                                                                                          
University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol 63, Issue 2, pp 196-224; Any advancement in communication 
technology will undoubtedly feed the growth of virtual communities without borders by physical users. 
208
 Zeitzoff, T., (2017), ‘How social media is changing conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 61, 
Issue 9, pp 1970-1991; For instance, Skype’s new translator service heralds the beginning of the first 
widely available real-time translation technology. It translates speech and speaks it in another language. 
Similarly, Twitter and Facebook have launched many new features. 
209
 Cyberspace is not an isolated and inaccessible world; but rather this world is within reach of 
everyone; the only requirement is to have the equipment (computer and internet connection). 
210
 Awan, I., & Zempi, I., (2017), ‘I Will Blow Your Face OFF’—VIRTUAL and Physical World Anti-muslim 
Hate Crime’, The British Journal of Criminology, Vol 57, Issue 2, pp 362-380; Anti-Muslim hate campaigns 
online resulted in increase in hatred crimes against Muslim in London. 
211
 An increasing number of physical objects feature an IP (Internet Protocol) address for internet 
connectivity and use the Internet for communication. Information and communication systems and the 
physical infrastructure have become intertwined, as information technologies are further integrated 
into devices and networks. 
212
 Magermans, A., (2004), ‘Architecture and cyberspace’, Intelligent Agent, Vol 4, Issue 3 
213
 Avellan, J., (1998), ‘The Cross-jurisdictional Validity of Electronic Signature and Certificates in recent 
Legislative Text’, American Bar Association, Vol 38.  
214
 Magermans, A., (2004), ‘Architecture and cyberspace’, Intelligent Agent, Vol 4, Issue 3. 
215
 Rajnovic, D., (2012), Cyberspace-what is it?, Cisco Blog https://blogs.cisco.com/security/cyberspace-
what-is-it/ [Accessed 23
rd
 July 2018].   
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to frame and then understand the corresponding characteristics and nature of 
cyberspace: 
 
1. Definition 1:  
“The space of virtual reality, the notional environment within which electronic 
communication via the internet occurs216”.  
 
2. Definition 2:  
“The complex environment resulting from the interaction of people, software 
and services on the internet using technology devices and networks connected to 
it, which does not exist in any physical form217”.  
 
The above comparison provides the following simple definition: “A domain, portrayed 
by the use of electromagnetic and electronics realm to save, modify and transfer data via 
a networked system and associated physical infrastructure i.e. the connection of humans 
through computers and telecommunication regardless of physical geography
218”. 
 
2.2.2.: Elements of cyberspace:  
“This world—cyberspace—is the world that we depend on every single day... [it] has 
made us more interconnected than at any time in human history
219”- Barack Obama. 
 
From the above comparison, there are three vital elements of cyberspace: 
 
1. Tangible - humans and computers  
2. Intangible - electromagnetic pulses and binary data  
3. Network-related items - telecommunication and physical infrastructures  
 
 
 
                                                          
216
 Oxford English Dictionary, Available online at: 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/cyberspace [Accessed 22
nd
 July 2017]. 
217
 ISO/IEC 27032 (2012), Information Technology -- Security techniques -- Guidelines for cybersecurity 
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=44375 [Accessed 
22nd January 2018]. 
218
 Rajnovic, D. (2012), ‘Cyberspace – What is it?’ Cisco blog, security: What is it? Found online at: 
https://blogs.cisco.com/security/cyberspace-what-is-it/[Accessed 7
th
 March 2018]. 
219
 International Strategy for Cyberspace 2011: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf 
[Assessed 8
th
 December 2017]. 
 54 
 
From the above elements, this thesis finds most relevant ingredients: 
 
1. The claimant and the defendant - tangible elements 
2. The place of upload and download - intangible elements 
3. The ISPs and the content providers - network-related elements 
 
The elements identified by this thesis are the required components for both the internet 
and cyberspace or social media, as listed in Table-2. 
  
Table-2: Important Elements 
 
# INTERNET CYBERSPACE FOR THIS THESIS 
 
1 
Tangible Humans and computers The claimant and the 
defendant 
 
2 
Intangibles Electromagnetic pulses 
and binary data 
The place of upload 
and download 
 
3 
Network 
Related 
Telecommunication and 
physical infrastructures 
The ISPs and the 
content providers 
 
 
So the internet and cyberspace can be interchangeable terms. However, technological 
differences exist, which are critical to understand because cyber-law literature argues 
that the outcome of many cyberspace issues depends on the court’s perspective of the 
internet and how it operates
220
 (see Table-3).  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
220
 Frischmann, B. M., (2003), ‘The prospect of reconciling internet and cyberspace’, Loyola University of 
Chicago Law Journal, Vol 35, Issue 1, pp 205. 
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Table-3
221
: Cyberspace Perspective View 
 
Perspective Cyberspace Users Judges Perception 
Traditional view: It is 
based on external 
perspective of 
Internet 
The social media user who 
is logged in and accepts 
cyberspace as a virtual 
reality 
Online user, exists in the 
physical world and 
communicates with others 
using the local network 
Internet view:  
It is based on internal 
perspective 
A computer with internet 
connection provides a link 
to virtual world which is 
roughly analogous to the 
physical world of real space. 
The user uses a 
keyboard/mouse/finger to go 
shopping. 
The internet is a network of 
computers located around the 
world and connected by wires 
and cables. The hardware 
sends, stores, and receives 
communications; using 
protocols. Keyboards/mouse 
input sources to the network 
and monitors are a destination 
for the output. 
 
 
 
This is what this thesis is trying to achieve by applying traditional laws to two different 
realities, two existing worlds. One is the actual world and the other is the virtual world. 
The virtual reality is only accessible via human interactions. Therefore, if the laws are 
applied to ‘human behaviour’ rather than the technology, there will be no need for a 
new set of law. 
 
2.2.3.: The internet or cyberspace:  
 
The internet is a physical infrastructure because computers, network cables, routers, 
switches all make up the internet. Its elements can be seen, touched, unplugged or 
                                                          
221
 This table is inspired from the authors who observed that the two dominant perspectives of the 
Internet are the internal perspective and the external perspective: Kerr, S., (2003), ‘The Problem of 
Perspective in Internet Law’, GEO. Law Journal, Vol 91, pp 357 and Frischmann, B. M., (2003), ‘The 
prospect of reconciling internet and cyberspace’, Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal, Vol 35, Issue 
1, pp 205. 
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moved
222
. Whereas cyberspace is not real. It is a virtual concept which is created by the 
existence of the internet
223
. It is the place where social media users can communicate 
with each other.  
 
2.3.: Cyberspace: An internet metaphor: 
 
Cyberspace, also known as ‘the internet’, has become a conventional means to describe 
anything associated with internet culture
224
. However, cyberspace should not be 
confused with the internet because it refers to objects (modems, routers, cables and 
computers) which exist within the communication network
225
. For instance, a website 
might be metaphorically said to exist in cyberspace
226
, but the activities performed on 
the internet are not happening at the physical location of the user or a server but in 
cyberspace, which is a conceptual place without any physical dimensions
227
. It is 
debatable, whether all internet communications traverse jurisdictional borders; however, 
this thesis presumes that a significant proportion of all internet communications are 
characteristically trans-border
228
.  
 
For this study, to adjust the legal complexities surrounding jurisdiction, it is pivotal to 
differentiate between the internet and cyberspace because communication or the entities 
of a networking system, in fact, exist in cyberspace (see Table-4). Besides, courts have 
seen cyberspace as a ‘metaphor’ to eliminate the perception of treating the internet 'just 
                                                          
222
 It is easy to put constraint on infrastructure because users may avoid legal constraints but they 
cannot avoid technological restraints; Lessig, L., (1999), ‘Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace’, (Routedge 
Publishers, London), pp 233-239. 
223
 Kleve, P., & Mulder, R., (2008), ‘Code is Murphy's Law’, International Review of Law, Computers and 
Technology, Vol 19, Issue 3, pp 95-107. 
224
 Damayanti, M., & Yuwono, E., (2013), ‘Avatar, identitas dalam cyberspace’, Nirmana, Vol 15, issue 1, 
pp 13-18; Stockl, A., (2003), ‘The Internet, Cyberspace, and Anthropology’, Cambridge Anthropology, Vol 
23, Issue 3, pp 67-78; Lessig, L., (1999), ‘Code and other Laws of Cyberspace’, (Basic Books Publication, 
New-York), pp 108. 
225
 The internet is a physical reality but cyberspace is an experience of being online, using the physical 
Internet. It is the sense of space generated within the mind while interacting through computer 
technology.  
226
 Graham, M., (2013), Geography/Internet: Ethereal Alternate Dimensions of Cyberspace or Grounded 
Augmented Realities, The Geographical Journal, Vol 179, No 2, pp 177-188. 
227
 Strate, L., (1999), ‘The Varieties of Cyberspace: Problems in Definition and Delimitation’, Western 
Journal of Communication, Vol 63, Issue 3, pp 385; Edwards, L., & Waelde, C.,  (1997), ‘Law & the 
Internet: Regulating Cyberspace ’, (Hart Publication, Oxford), pp 18. 
228
 Meltzer, J. P., (2015), ‘The Internet, Cross‐Border Data Flows and International Trade’, Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies, Vol 2, Issue 1, pp 90-102. 
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like' the physical world
229
. It is one of the reasons the traditional legal system is unable 
to adopt the social changes brought about by the internet
230
.  
   
Table 4
231
: Cyberspace versus Internet 
 
# CYBERSPACE INTERNET 
DEFINITION The local/domestic/notional 
environment which allows 
users to communicate using 
a computer network 
A global computer network 
providing a variety of 
information and 
communication facilities, 
consisting of interconnected 
networks using standardised 
communication protocols 
DESCRIPTION It is the symbolic space or 
plane that is created by the 
Internet 
It is a global network that is 
created out of smaller 
networks made from 
computers. It allows the 
transfer of data and 
information 
1
st
 USED 1960 1969 
DATA All data is transferred within 
the cyberspace 
Allows the transfer of data 
 
Conversely, if the internet is different from the real world, then physical world policies 
should be different for the internet
232
. Whereas, this thesis is analysing whether physical 
                                                          
229
 Alfred, C., (2000), ‘Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace’, 
Berkeley Technology Law review, Vol 17, pp 1207-1231; cyberspace as a metaphor is descriptively 
accurate but the normative question of whether to regulate cyberspace as a place is a different issue. 
However, courts have been unable to settle on the appropriate analogy and cause of action reflecting 
one or more specific policies. 
230
 Hua, W., (2017), ‘Cybermobs, civil conspiracy, and tort liability’, Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol 44, 
Issue 4, pp 1217. 
231
 Lingel, J., (2019), ‘The gentrification of the internet’; online Url www.culturedigitally.org [Assessed 
14
th
 Jun 2019]. 
232
 The perception of cyberspace as separate from real space also tends to encourage a belief that 
cyberspace is an actual jurisdiction separate from the polities that exist in real space and, therefore, 
should be governed in ways that traditional political processes cannot be trusted to handle; Jonathan J., 
(2000), ‘Cyberspace and the "Devil's Hatband’, Seatile U. L. Rev., Vol 24, pp 577- 592. 
 58 
 
world regulations can also be implemented to the internet. Thereby, it is imperative to 
understand the concept of ‘virtual-physical presence’.    
 
2.3.: Social presence via cyberspace: 
 
The concept of jurisdiction is internally based, which in turn, shapes the social 
construction of a country. The social concept of countries becomes irrelevant in 
cyberspace because it is an open space
233
. Consequently, once the social concept of the 
country is changed in cyberspace, the concept of jurisdiction must also be changed
234
 
(see-2.1). Even so, in England, traditional laws still apply to social media disputes, 
which makes judges analyse two distinct sets of facts for online communicational 
conflicts (see Table-3):  
 
1. Based on the external perspective  
2. Based on the internal perspective235  
 
This thesis will not further evaluate this difference because traditional laws are based on 
physical presence. As detailed above, a user (defendant) cannot be physically present in 
cyberspace; however, his actions can affect someone (victim) in the real world, by 
(metaphorically) being in cyberspace (see-2.2.). Besides, the defendant’s presence on 
the internet cannot be separated from their life in the physical world because there is 
interconnectedness between virtual and real space
236
. For instance, Tom Cruise 
reputation can still be damaged physically, even when the publisher chooses to limit his 
course of conduct solely to cyberspace.  
 
2.3.1.: Physical presence: 
 
A statement against the royal family may be acceptable in Pakistan but it is illegal in 
England
237. Similarly, religious remarks are ‘freedom of speech’ in England but they 
                                                          
233
 Goldsmith, J., L., (1998), ‘The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, Ind. J. 
Global Legal Study, Vol 5, pp 475. 
234
 Berman, P. S., (2002), ‘The Globalization of Jurisdiction’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 
151, pp 311. 
235
 Kerr, O. S., (2003), ‘The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law’, GEO., Law Journal, Vol 91, pp 357.  
236
 Hua, W., (2017), ‘Cybermobs, civil conspiracy, and tort liability’, Fordham Urban Law Journal, Vol 44, 
Issue 4, pp 1217. 
237
 The Queen and Law, https://www.royal.uk/queen-and-law [Assessed 22
nd
 May 2019] 
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may be blasphemous in Pakistan. Both states regulate the same act’s local effects 
differently but legitimately. It does not make any unilateral regulation illegitimate; 
however, this multi regulative scenario causes disharmony when the result becomes 
multi-jurisdictional (e.g. when a Pakistani makes remarks against the English royal 
family). In this scenario, English regulation requires extraterritorial effects, which 
depend on a physical presence (see-7.3).  
 
2.3.1: Extraterritoriality: 
 
The concept of extraterritoriality
238
 means that a nation uses the threat of force against 
local persons or property to punish, and thus regulate, extraterritorial acts that cause 
domestic harm. It does not (usually) mean that a nation enforces its law abroad
239
. The 
law of extraterritorial activity is efficacious only to the extent that the defendant has a 
local presence. It can also be useful if the agent of the act owns local property against 
which local laws can be enforced
240
. From the above example, physical presence (of 
Pakistani defendant) is compulsory to serve a writ in England (CPR r3.6). If court 
documents can be served on this Pakistani defendant in England, it establish English 
court’s jurisdiction. This service can be to  property, business or personal address (see-
2.12). Similarly, the presence of a foreign defendant in English territory also denotes 
acceptance of the jurisdiction of English courts (see-4.5.2, 6.9).  
 
2.3.1.1.: The concept of physical presence: 
Physical presence
241
, as a basis of jurisdiction is a long-standing precedent of common 
law
242. For the individuals ‘presence’ is defined in a literal sense. In the case of 
                                                          
238
 Extraterritoriality is not merely a transition, but an original feature of the global legal order, arising 
out of modern imperialism and imperial rivalry and yet conducive to the forging of new instruments of 
international law and governance: Todd, D., (2018), ‘Beneath sovereignty: Extraterritoriality and 
imperial internationalism in nineteenth-century Egypt’, Law and History Review, Vol 36, Issue 1, pp 105-
137. 
239
 Szigeti, P. D., (2017), ‘The illusion of territorial jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol 52, 
Issue 3, pp 369-399; There is a general uncertainty in what counts as "territorial" and what counts as 
"extraterritorial" jurisdiction, and this is the result of the almost complete lack of geographical 
information in jurisdictional discourse. This phenomenon is demonstrated by the impossibility of the 
cartographic-mapping of jurisdiction. The lack of a geographical connection means that most 
jurisdictional conflicts are better described as conflicts between communities and their legal orders, 
without a territorial connection. 
240
 Goldsmith, J., L., (1998), ‘The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, Ind. J. 
Global Legal Study, Vol 5, pp 475. 
241
 A claimant who sights his/her defendant within the territory of the English court can serve the writ 
on the defendant and the court is automatically seized of the matter. 
242
 Dicey and Morris, (1993), ‘the Conflict of Laws, (12
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 270–271. 
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Wildenstein
243
 case, both the claimant and the defendant were foreign nationals. The 
court exercised its jurisdiction because the writ was served on the defendant when he 
came to visit England. The defendant argued that it was an abuse of the court’s process 
because it was frivolous and vexatious (see-2.3.1.2). The judge decided that the 
claimant had properly served the writ and invoked the English court’s jurisdiction. 
Traditionally, a weak link with England may be enough for the courts to assume 
jurisdiction because serving the ‘summons’ to the defendant in England produces 
enough connection, albeit a tenuous one
244
.  
 
The Sarlie
245
 case set this precedent for English courts  
to assume jurisdiction if there is only a limited connection with England, but the writ is 
served in England (see-6.6.2). However, where a defendant is enticed, fraudulently 
lured or kidnapped to the jurisdiction of the court so a writ can be served on him, the 
court may invalidate such service
246
. Executives of a foreign company who visit 
England do not bring the company within the jurisdiction of the court
247
. However, if 
the defendant is an organisation/corporation/industry, they are considered ‘present’ in 
England if trading, directly or indirectly, in England (see-6.8.1.1).  
 
2.3.1.2.: The English ‘writ-rule’: 
 
This rule may not be adaptable to social media technology and remoteness of the data 
(see-2.3.2). It has been criticised by legal writers, both within and outside the common 
law jurisdiction, long before the advent of the internet
248
: 
 
1. Graveson249 noted that the service as a ground for jurisdiction is exorbitant;  
                                                          
243
 Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2QB 283; it is a classic example to explain the English 
approach because this case involves a French resident who bought a painting from another French 
resident. However, the English court assumed jurisdiction because the writ/warrant/summon was 
served on English soil. 
244
 South India Shipping v Bank of Korea [1985] 1 Lloyds Rep 413; English court assumed jurisdiction over 
Korean company despite very little connection in England. 
245
 Colt Industries v Sarlie [1996] 1 ALL ER 673; a short visit to England was sufficient to serve the foreign 
defendant. 
246
 Watkins v North American Timber [1904] 20 T.L.R. 534; a service of writ by a fraudulent act will be 
void. 
247
 If the defendant, individual or corporate, is not present in England  but has agreed that solicitors 
located in England can accept documents on the defendant’s behalf, then the service of writ to the 
solicitors will be  sufficient to invoke the English court’s jurisdiction over the foreign defendant. 
248
 McCLean, D., &Nigm, R.A, (2012), ‘Morris: The Conflict of Laws’, (8th Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), 
pp 112-114. 
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2. Minor250  stated that this rule is more akin to robbery than justice;  
3. North and Fawcett 251 are of the view that this rule may lead to a situation where 
the English court exercise jurisdiction over a case, which may be foreign 
regarding subject matter and parties.  
 
This thesis disputes this criticism because despite applying traditional jurisdictional 
laws to exercise jurisdiction over an overseas defendant, English law is not by-default 
applicable (see-4.3.3). The court will have to implement ‘choice of law principles’ to 
identify appropriate applicable law. It does not matter if an overseas defendant/claimant 
is before an English court because the judge may apply ‘foreign law’ if that is the proper 
law (see-6.4.2). Not only that, English court can exercise its discretion to stay/decline its 
jurisdiction if it forms the opinion that the action should have been brought elsewhere 
(see-4.5.4). 
 
The analysis of the internet versus cyberspace indicates that the dimensions of 
jurisdiction may change
253
 because in the absence of online-physical presence, different 
rules are required for both physical and virtual defendants (see-2.3.2). Here is why the 
internet is a computer network whereas cyberspace is that ‘imaginary network’ 
visualised as a virtual space
254
. For instance: Consider a book as the internet. It provides 
information similar to the way in which the internet transfers data. A reader reads a 
story from the book and imagines the characters and dialogues played out in the story. 
This virtual reality is called cyberspace on the internet. That is how internet users 
imagine the information they read on the internet. These terms are interchangeable. 
Before anything, there is a difference between physical presence of human behaviour 
and the data used online. It depends on the storage of the data whether it is stored via 
Icloud or on a physical server?  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
249
 Graveson, R.H., (1977), ‘Comparative Conflict of Laws, Selected Essays’, (Vol I, North Holland 
Publishing, Oxford), pp 9. 
250
 Minor, R., (1901), ‘Conflict of Laws’ (1st Ed, Boston), pp 283. 
251
 North, P., Fawcett, J., (1999), ‘Cheshire and North Private International Law’, (13
th
 Ed, OUP, Oxford), 
pp 32.  
253
 A user may be present in the internet via computer or network cable whereas in cyberspace he 
cannot be physically present because it is a digital realm, so law cannot be applied in absence of 
presence.  
254
 Cyberspace is nothing more than a symbolic and figurative space that exists within the scope of 
internet; it may be considered a subdivision of the internet.  
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2.3.2.: Physical location of data: 
 
The internet may be a network of networks, but cyberspace includes software, 
hardware, internet protocols, standards, biometrics and privately controlled governance 
structures
255. The ‘design of software’, ‘infrastructure of hardware’ and other elements 
form cyberspace within which social media users communicate with each other. 
Therefore, every component of cyberspace architecture has the potential to be regulated 
by law
256
. 
 
In the context of this chapter, cyberspace or the internet is a collection of inter-
networked systems of computers, which spans the entire earth
257
. The focus will be on 
identifying where the internet is or, in fact, where the internet programs, data or files are 
saved (see-2.4). The location, the data is stored in, will determine the applicable law
258
. 
Before the internet era, information could only be stored in one physical place, but in 
cyberspace, the data is stored in an anonymous location (iCloud
259
).  
 
Notwithstanding, the storage of information in the modern era does not affect the 
retrieval of data as long as it is consistent with Article 19
260
 (see-7.21). It allows 
freedom to receive and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of 
frontiers. For instance, considering the stats in Picture-1, the following users use 
cyberspace for a variety of purposes. The head offices of most of these sites operate 
from the US but the relevant information is available to everyone regardless of 
geographical difference
261
. 
                                                          
255
 Marton, E., (2017), ‘Violations of personality rights through the Internet: jurisdictional issues under 
European law (Nomos, e-library.com), Ch. 2, pp 55-70. 
256
 Callamard, A., (2017), ‘Are courts re-inventing internet regulation?’, International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, Vol 31, Issue 3, pp 323. 
257
 Graham, M., (2012), Geography/Internet: Ethereal Alternate Dimensions of Cyberspace or Grounded 
Augmented Realities, The Geographical Journal, Vol 179, No 2, pp177-188. 
258
 Bellovin, S. M., (2017), ‘Jurisdiction and the internet’, IEEE Security & Privacy, Vol 15, Issue3, pp 96. 
259
 Cloud based storage is a computing model where storing, processing and use of data takes place on 
remotely located computers accessible over the Internet and controlled by third party; Irion, K., (2015), 
‘Your digital home is no longer your castle: how cloud computing transforms the (legal) relationship 
between individuals and their personal records’, International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology, Vol 23, Issue 4, pp 348–371. 
260
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948); states that everyone has the right to freedom of 
expression and this includes the right to ‘impart information and ideas through any media’; Article 19(2) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of opinion and expression. 
261
 The extraterritorial jurisdictional questions are based on the so-called ‘country of origin’ standard 
which makes companies subject only to the jurisdiction of the law of the country in which they are 
established; Wimmer, K., (2003), ‘International liability for internet content: Publish locally, defend 
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Table-1 (A): Digital UK
262
 
 
Total Population of UK 66.38 
# Users (Millions) Penetration 
Internet 63.06 95 % 
Social Media 44.00 66 % 
Mobile 49.68 75 % 
Active Mobile Social 38.00 57 % 
 
2.3.3.: Physical location in cloud computing:  
 
Today, information stored at a physical location can be remotely moved anywhere 
without changing underlying services
263
. The dynamic use of cloud computing 
capabilities makes control over online data highly transient
264
. It raises the issue of data 
sovereignty and individual privacy
265
. The consumers who use online storage services 
do not know the actual location of their data nor how many copies of their personal 
information exists
266
. The actual whereabouts of the data is important for determining 
jurisdiction and applicability of domestic laws. For instance, to communicate via 
Outlook.com, a client requires a Microsoft subscription. Microsoft stores its client's data 
in a nearby data centre when a particular client requests a subscription. At a later stage, 
the client's data is transferred to another data centre based on the country code of that 
client’s presence267. Now if a Bradford university subscriber uses his account in 
Germany, his data will automatically be transferred to the closest datacentre i.e. data 
transfer is associated with the client's location
268
. This transfer of data may be 
temporary or permanent, depending on the IP address of the user’s device. So Microsoft 
                                                                                                                                                                          
globally’, in Thierer, A., & Crews, C., (eds), ‘Who Rules the Net? Internet Governance and Jurisdiction’ 
(1
st
 Ed, Cato Institute, Washington), pp 239–68 at 247. 
262
 Statista (2018), ‘Social media usage in the United Kingdom (UK) - Statistics & Facts’, 
https://www.statista.com/topics/3236/social-media-usage-in-the-uk/ [Assessd 24
th
 August 2018]. 
263
 Microsoft Corp v United States [2017] U.S. LEXIS 6343; Internet data resembles time sharing machine 
because it can move of its own accord. 
264
 Irion, K., (2015), ‘Your digital home is no longer your castle: how cloud computing transforms the 
(legal) relationship between individuals and their personal records’, International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology, Vol 23, Issue 4, pp 348–371. 
265
 Chris, R., (2010), ‘Information 'Ownership' in the Cloud’, Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 45/2010. 
266
 Google Spain, Google Inc v AEPD [2014] CJEU Case C–131/12; the data is stored temporarily on 
servers whose state of location is unknown, that being kept secret for reasons of competition.  
267
 Gillaspie, A., (2017), ‘Extraterritorial application of the stored communications act: Why Microsoft 
corp. v united states signals that technology has surpassed the law’, University of Kansas Law Review, 
Vol 66, Issue 2, pp 459. 
268
 What used to reside in the domestic sphere is now detached from its source and can now even live 
outside of personal hardware and physical spheres of influence. 
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has full discretion to control consumer data location at any time, without consumer  
knowledge. This data transfer does not verify user identity or location because it uses 
user-provided information during this process. That is how these companies keep 
unknown users profile anonymous (see-7.18). Officially, Microsoft and other search 
engines are independent of storing consumer’s records on any server within their 
control
269
 (data and privacy laws are beyond the scope).   
 
2.3.4.: Storage of data online: 
 
It is arguable whether the data is physically migrated from one location to another (does 
it cross borders during that process?). If the data is stored via the cloud, ‘which is a 
network of storage drives in a particular territory
270’, then the data must be considered 
as a physical object
271
. If it is presumed that the data is physically removed from one 
location and stored at another location; it will negate the importance of the Norwich 
Pharmacal Order to disclose anonymous users (see-5.9.3.1). The service provider may 
argue that the content for the requested account has been transferred to another 
datacentre in another sovereign state. This would negate any court order to reveal an 
anonymous user or remove alleged content from their databases
272
.  
 
Eventually, the technology companies will try to change the ‘storage location’ to 
offshore data barges to avoid being the subject of any sovereign jurisdiction
273
. Google 
is already trying to patent a water-based data centre, which may enable it to operate 
outside the impact of any potential jurisdiction of any country's laws
274
. To date, the 
                                                          
269
 Woods, A., (2016), ‘Against Data Exceptionalism’, Stanford Law Review, Vol 68, pp 729; there are no 
national restrictions or domestic laws which bind these companies to store consumer data in a specific 
location. 
270
 United States v Microsoft Corp [2018] 2
nd
 Circuit 17-2. 
271
 Data is an intangible assets, which require same practical steps that can be taken to address 
jurisdictional conflicts as explained for physical location (see-4.5.2). So location of storage of the data 
can be used as a connecting factor, regardless if the data is temporarily transferred somewhere else. 
272
 The ease with which data travels across states, the seemingly arbitrary paths it takes, and the 
physical disconnect between where data is stored and where it is accessed critically test these 
foundational premises. 
273
 Lima, M., (2018), ‘Future Today: The Data Centres Of 2025’, online Url: https://data-
economy.com/future-today-the-data-centres-of-2025/; Peter, J., (2015), ‘Floating data center is 
launched’; online Url: http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/content-tracks/power-cooling/floating-
data-center-is-launched/95209.fullarticle [Assessed  28
th
 July 2018]; in a not too distant future, humans 
will depend nearly exclusively on technology. That dependence will create ultimately new opportunities 
for data centre operators to expand and redesign how facilities are built and operated. 
274
 Steven, R., (2011), ‘Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International Law’, CONN. Law 
Review, Vol 43, pp 716-19. 
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question remains whether Microsoft (or other content providers) can be classed as the 
producer of the consumer data; especially for social networks which are based in the US 
but have subscribers around the globe (see-2.13.2, 5.9.1.1). The above analysis raises 
questions about concurrent jurisdiction because if the user is based in Germany and his 
data is stored in Dublin, then there are two physical locations
275
, whereas court orders 
can only be followed within a territorial jurisdiction. This section argues that states 
(individuals and officials) unilaterally access data located in another jurisdiction, 
without due regard to data-accessibility rules of the destination state
276
. Equivalently, 
court orders should also be followed unilaterally, using the same technology (it depends 
upon the global use of the world wide web (WWW); however, a further investigation of 
the characteristics of the internet and its structure – TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol), Modem is prerequisite to understand the WWW regulation. 
 
2.4.: Where is the internet?  
 
The internet was created in 1960 by the US ‘Defence Department’ and was named 
Arpanet
277
; however, its economic significance became visible in the 20
th
 century
278
. 
Today, it has become an integral and fundamental part of daily life, forming a social 
phenomenon (see-2.1). It influences daily life because it allows people to interact with 
other users. Internet users can enhance their social communication by exchanging 
information, learning ideas, playing games, discussing politics, providing social support 
and even conducting business
279
. This reliance on social networks exposes the need for 
internet regulation from the perspective of ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘individual 
rights’280.  
 
                                                          
275
 In the event of defamation, there can be three further physical locations, including the location of the 
ISP, place of harm and the place of cause of action. 
276
 This unilateral accessibility of data undermines longstanding assumptions about the link between 
data location and the rights and obligations because this production of data, located anywhere around 
the globe, is without regard to the sovereign interests of other nations; Microsoft Corp [2015] No. 14-
2985-CV 2d Cir.  
277
 Advanced Research Projects Agency, a development arm of the US military. 
278
 Wittzack, R. U., (2010), ‘Principles of International Internet Law’, Charlottesville: German Law Journal, 
Vol 11, Issue11, pp 245-1263. 
279
 Brown, J. S., (2000), ‘Growing up: Digital: How the web changes work, education, and the ways 
people learn’, The Magazine of Higher Learning, Vol 32, Issue 2, pp 11-20. 
280
 Manea, A. C., (2017), ‘The security of personal data of users in online socialization networks: Legal 
aspects, Transilvania University of Brasov, Series VII, Social Sciences Law, Vol 10, Issue 1, pp 179-186. 
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The facility of online networking has made the internet a very social place, as concluded 
by Morningstar and Randball
281
 in the 1
st
 International Cyberspace Conference, 
“cyberspace is defined more by the social interactions involved rather than the 
technology being used”. Social interactions are carried out by using social networking, 
which leads to the subject of this thesis (social media defamation). These interactions 
are only possible when data is transferred from operating system to network layers
282
 
(protocol transfer data in the form of packets). The communication between two 
computers is dependent on common software standards: TCP and IP (see-2.4.1). TCP is 
the transmission control protocol which establishes and breaks the connections, whereas 
IP is an internet protocol which assigns a unique numeric address to connected 
computers
283
. This thesis will use internet characteristics (anonymity, accessibility, 
retrieval, location etc.) to demonstrate a legal liability (see-2.5.1.2). It is important to 
understand how the data is stored and retrieved using internet infrastructure (IP, TCP/IP 
and modem etc.). 
 
2.4.1.: Transfer control protocol: 
 
The US Defence Department developed communications protocols to transfer data 
between computer networks
284
. Protocols are a set of rules for transmitting data between 
electronic devices, such as computers
285
. Computers exchange information using the 
same sized packets of information and there must be a pre-existing agreement as to how 
each side will send and receive them
286
.  Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) helps to 
maintain network conversation because it establishes which application programs can 
exchange data
287
. It is a connection-oriented protocol, which creates a connection to the 
                                                          
281
 Morningstar, C., & Randall, F., (2003), ‘The Lessons of Lucas film's Habitat’, Wardrip-Fruin and Nick 
Montfort (eds.), the New Media Reader, (The MIT Press, Cambridge), pp 664-667. 
282
 Arnold, R. D., (2016), ‘Strategies for Transporting Data between Classified and Unclassified Networks’, 
ARDEC, WSEC, RDAR-WSF-M Picatinny Arsenal United States, AD1005160. 
283
 Kessler, G. C., (2008), ‘On Teaching TCP/IP Protocol Analysis to Computer Forensics Examiners’, 
Journal of Digital Forensic Practice, Vol 2, Issue 1, pp 43-55. 
284
 Naughton, J., (2016), ‘The evolution of the Internet: From military experiment to General Purpose 
Technology’, Journal of Cyber Policy, Vol 1, Issue 1, pp 5-28. 
285
 Townes, M., (2012), ‘The spread of TCP/IP: How the Internet became the Internet’, Millennium, Vol 
41, Issue 1, pp 43-64; Protocols are established by international or industry-wide organizations as an 
agreed standards. 
286
 Valdovinos, I. A., Arturo J. P., Villalba, G., & Kim, T., (2017), ‘BATCP: Bandwidth-aggregation 
transmission control protocol’, Symmetry, Vol 9, Issue 8, pp 167. 
287
 Leung, K. C., Li, V. O., & Yang, D., (2007), ‘An overview of packet reordering in transmission control 
protocol (TCP): problems, solutions, and challenges’ IEEE transactions on parallel and distributed 
systems, Vol 18, Issue 4, pp 522-535. 
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application programs at each end to finish exchanging messages
288
. It maintains error-
free data transmission because it breaks application data into small packets, sends 
packets and acknowledges all received packets
289
. Whereas, the Internet Protocol (IP) 
defines how computers send packets of data to each other
290
. TCP and IP are the basic 
rules, which define the Internet. Together, TCP and IP form a common uniform 
language TCP/IP (Transfer Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) to transfer data packets 
from one user to another
291
.  
 
For instance, libel content is published using a social media application (Facebook). The 
web server of the user will send this content using a hypertext markup language 
(HTML) file to other user’s computer application (Facebook). The social media web 
server uses hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) to transfer this data. The HTTP program 
layer will ask the TCP layer to establish a connection and send this content. The TCP 
will divide this file into small packets and forward them to the IP layer for delivery. All 
these packets will have the same IP address but they can be sent along different routes. 
The TCP layer of the client’s computer will receive all packets, assemble them and 
deliver the file to the receiving application (Facebook). See Picture-2. 
 
Picture-2
292
: Connection manager represents TCP/IP 
  
                                                          
288
 Goralski, W., (2009), ‘The illustrated network: How TCP/IP works in a modern network, (1
st
 Ed, 
Morgan Kaufmann Publishers/Elsevier, Amsterdam), Chapter 2, pp 428. 
289
 Qaddoura, E., (2003), ‘Method and system for transmission control protocol (TCP) packet loss 
recovery over a wireless link’, U.S. Patent 6,646,987. 
290
 Nagle, J., (1984), ‘Congestion control in IP/TCP internetworks’, ACM SIGCOMM Computer 
Communication Review, Vol 14, Issue 4, pp 11-17. 
291
 Dostalek, L., & Kabelova, A., (2006), ‘Understanding TCP/IP: A clear and comprehensive guide to 
TCP/IP protocols’ (Packt Pub, Birmingham, UK), pp 626.  
292
 Xu, L., Xu, K., Jiang, Y., Ren, F., & Wang, H., (2017), ‘Throughput optimization of TCP in cast 
congestion control in large-scale datacentre networks’, Computer Networks the International Journal of 
Computer and Telecommunications Networking, Vol 124, pp 46. 
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The TCP/IP
293
 allocates a unique IP address to every computer, which is connected to 
the internet using a modem through an ISP. This IP address helps the transfer of 
information, which is divided into small data packets (binary codes 1 or 0) and 
recombined at the destination, from one user to another
294
. This coding and decoding of 
information is done by the modem which stands for modulator and demodulator.  
 
2.4.2.: Modem: 
 
A modem is an integral part of the data transfer process because a computer uses digital 
data (binary: 0 or 1). When it is transferred through telephone wires, it can only travel in 
analogue or signal form
295
. All computer applications (email, www etc.) utilise TCP/IP. 
However, internal communication depends upon two main elements
296
:  
 
1. Various sets of rules called protocols  
2. A massive infrastructure of routers 
 
The routers make it possible for the computers to communicate across the internet 
because they transmit signals to and from satellites
297
. If proper protocols are not 
followed then the communication through the internet is impossible
298
. The protocols 
are designed to allow various networks to communicate with each other
299
. For instance, 
consumers utilise the resources of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) whereas the 
providers interconnect with each other to provide services
300
. This whole mechanism 
allows information to be shared using the World Wide Web. After the technological 
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explanation of the technology to understand the WWW, the literature connects back 
with the subject matter of this research. It is the World-Wide-Web which remains 
uncontrolled
301
 because any individual or institution can create a website with any 
number of documents and links. 
 
2.4.3.: The ‘World Wide Web’ (the web)302: 
 
In the 1990s the internet was described as “a grey and dreary place devoid of content – 
like a TV station without programs
303”. The web provided the desired multimedia 
interface in the mid-1990s. It allowed transmission of text, pictures, audio, and video 
collectively known as web pages
304
. It enlivened the internet with search functions that 
could retrieve information on any topic imaginable
305
. It was later transformed into a 
robust commons with the arrival of ‘Netscape, Microsoft, AOL and Yahoo’; this 
commercialisation was later transformed into a content generating environment of social 
media.  
 
The web’s development, from information acquisition to content publishing, has 
involved the innovation of numerous communications platforms (social media such as 
emails, Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter and Instagram)
306
. The blogs and video blogs such 
as YouTube and Snapchat are the latest additions, which are also available on smart 
devices (such as laptops, tablets, smartwatches and mobile phones) (see Appendix-VII). 
The openness allows individual users to become publishers of their content, much of it 
is autobiographical and revealing. That information is consumed and retransmitted by 
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third parties with little regard for the context in which it was created (see7.17). Smart 
devices make it simple to take photographs, tagged with names, and transmitted to third 
parties (many of them unknown to sender), creates high risks of reputational harm 
through embarrassment, shame, or the inability to stop an unfavourable image from 
viral distribution across cyberspace. 
 
2.4.3.1.: The internet versus the web:  
 
The web and the internet are two separate things: The internet is a networking 
infrastructure, which connects various devices globally and allows them to 
communicate with each other
307
. The Web is a method of accessing information using 
the medium of the internet. It is an information-retrieval model, built on the internet, 
which helps transmit data using Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) (see-2.4.1). 
Thereby, the web is simply a small portion of the internet
308
. The darknet or deep web is 
also a part of the web, which is hidden because it cannot be accessed using ordinary 
search engines
309
. Following from this, the internet is a medium to connect the 
networks; the web is the source, which helps to share information over that medium, 
whereas the darknet is also a part of the internet (a massive part 500 times bigger than 
the web) which is hidden from the surface
310
.  
 
2.4.3.2.: The relevance of technology: 
 
The technological elements elaborated before may not be directly relevant to social 
media libel. This thesis analysed technology to comprehend: 
 
1. Characteristics of social media communication (see Part-B) 
2. Regulation of the Internet (see Part-C) 
3. Technology regulation by filters 
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For instance,‘why can’t authorities control the use of the internet technologically by 
developing protocols, which do not permit unauthorised access? The answer depends 
upon the functions of speed and time effectiveness. For example, if a mason builds a 
secure house which takes at least half an hour to get into and a half hour to get out of, 
after following all the security measures and protocols. This safe house may not serve 
the purpose of speed and accuracy. To compass the speed of the internet, a little security 
has to be compromised. Alternatively, internet users’ conduct can be regulated to relax a 
few of the security options. For instance, China regulates online conduct by blocking 
international communication via Facebook
311
.  
 
Therefore, a balance between speed and security can be achieved by placing various 
regulations/restrictions on the use of online communication. For that cause, social media 
users have to decide whether they desire regulated cyberspace and regulated by 
whom
312
.  
 
2.5.: The regulation of the internet: 
 “Cyberspace presents something new for those of us who think about regulation and 
freedom. It demands a new understanding of how regulation works and of what 
regulates life there?” – Lawrence Lessig313. 
 
Social networks are regulated by the companies who own that network
314
. However, 
cyberspace is not owned by any single organisation
315
. Concerning its regulation, it is 
debatable whether there should be ownership of cyberspace. To date, it is not owned 
and considered as free space (as a whole); albeit, local companies own domestic 
networks. The main hurdle for internet regulation is that laws have been created on the 
assumption that activities are geographically bound (the Defamation Act 2013 is not 
applicable in Scotland even within the UK
316
). Contrariwise, location is still a criterion 
for assuming jurisdiction. Legislators are unable to accommodate social interactions 
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within their allocation rules based on location. Therefore, they will have to decide if 
they are willing to abandon the territorially based system of regulation
317
.  
 
Johnson and Post
318
 argued that traditional laws should not govern the internet because 
these laws are based on territory, whereas cyberspace is a borderless space. It may be 
virtual
319
, yet it involves cables, modems, satellites, computers and users (see-2.3). 
Therefore, regulations can be in the form of a legal constraint on any transaction (web – 
certain websites are illegal) or on those who carry out this transaction (users – hacking 
is illegal). The constraints are required to regulate transactions via the internet. From 
this perspective, the internet is already regulated because there are defamation laws, 
intellectual property laws, trademark rules, data privacy, pornography and obscenity 
regulations. These laws were created for ‘offline activities’ so they do not accommodate 
the purpose of online transactions’ regulation. 
 
2.5.1: The purpose of regulation: 
 
It is important that internet regulation should address two components
320
:  
  
1. The content that is transmitted  
2. The infrastructure on which content is transmitted 
 
However, when it comes to regulating certain transactions (defamation) involving 
foreign elements, the legislators are in an awkward position to regulate the internet see-
7.23.2). They cannot give their laws exterritorial effects, so they create laws, which 
protect local users from international cyber-intruders (see-9.8). They also have the 
responsibility to create legislation to determine which transactions may contravene 
national laws. A simple solution could be to limit cyber-borders to geographical 
nationals (China
321
 has blocked social media access for its citizens (see-1.2.1)). It may 
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protect the internal internet user; however, it may not serve the purpose of the web, data 
sharing, information retrieval and freedom of expression
322
. Even closing cyber-borders 
may also offend the online community as the nature of the internet is ‘openness’ 
because it has no borders
323
. This borderless characteristic of cyberspace implies: It is 
not always a question of controlling cyberspace but controlling individuals who use 
it
324
. 
 
2.5.1.1.: Regulating behaviour: 
 
The traditional approaches ignore the nature of ‘digital social community’, where 
communication has different concepts because the pattern of the behaviour is 
divergent
325
. Social networking has modernised communication culture which allows 
users to acquire an altogether different online-personality (see-2.5.1.3). It inevitably 
affects forms of deviant behaviour that naturally arise to exploit new opportunities (see-
2.1, 2.5, 5.6, 8.1.3.). The user’s behaviour can be controlled by placing certain 
restrictions and raising awareness about what is a legitimate transaction
326
; and to what 
extent the user must be aware of cyberspace laws to abide by them
327
. It will not be so 
straightforward to regulate cyberspace by just enacting legislation, especially with the 
frequent use of social media by teens. Abusers always utilise loopholes in-laws: If law-
making bodies cannot control the behaviour of cyber-users
328
, then the hurdles of 
jurisdiction and proper law become meaningless
329
.  
 
Social media user’s behaviour can be changed by limiting access to libellous 
material
330
. As in the Licra case
331
, the French court ruled that the US-company must 
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ensure that French residents could not access content on their site that violated French 
laws (see-7.9.2).  This can be done with the help of service providers but they are not 
under any government regulation (see-2.4.3.1). In addition, it will raise privacy 
concerns whether the third party (content-provider) is entitled to choose the content to 
block (this is outside the scope of this research). 
 
This thesis does not provide a detailed analysis of the status of internet governance, 
although its consideration is important to an understanding of the complexity of 
internet-regulation. Online communication is crucial to our knowledge-based economy. 
Therefore, there is a need to preserve its operation through which we see our political, 
social and economic freedoms
332
. Social communication can be explored by analysing 
the core characteristics of the internet which will evaluate if traditional laws apply to 
internet conduct. 
 
2.5.1.1: The characteristics of the internet: 
 
Justice Faieta
333
 described  online communication as instantaneous, seamless, 
interactive, blunt, borderless and far-reaching. Along with its absolute and immediate 
worldwide ubiquity and accessibility, it is also impersonal
334
. However, it is its 
anonymous nature of transactions which create a greater risk that the defamatory 
remarks are believed
335
. However, it uses protocols to transmit and retrieve information 
in the form of data packets (see-2.4.2). Each packet travels through network layers. It 
passes through a series of specialised ‘routers’, which determine its direct path from 
sender to receiver. Routers also make a copy (for a fraction of a second) of each packet 
to read and direct it (see-2.4.2). During information search, a user enters words into a 
search engine (Google, Firefox or Yahoo). Every ISP has an allocated website with a 
domain name; it serves as the entry point to information stored on Google as contained 
on the WWW (see-2.4.3.1).  
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The domain name
336
 is an alias for a number which is what the computer uses to find 
the location of the website. Once the website has a domain name, it becomes accessible 
by any user on the web. In theory, search results are non-discriminatory: Any user 
should be able to enter the domain name above, type in a search word or phrase, and 
receives the same search listings in the same order as any other user who enters those 
search words
337
. For instance, a terrorist in the caves of Afghanistan, a businessman in 
London and a researcher in Australia, all have access to the same data online. Other 
than a domain name, the internet has many other characteristics, but a few areas that are 
relevant in social media defamation proceedings are
338
: 
 
1. It’s global nature 
 
2. Interactivity 
 
3. It can shift the balance of power in the offline world 
 
4. Accessibility 
 
5. Anonymity 
 
6. Its facilitation of republication 
 
7. The prominence of intermediaries 
 
8. Its reliance on hyperlinks/hypertext 
 
9. Its long-term impact — the use of permanent archives 
 
10. Its multimedia character 
 
11. Its temporal indeterminacy 
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2.5.1.3.: Temporal Indeterminacy:  
 
The temporal indeterminacy of the internet relates to its unique characteristics of 
anonymity in space and time; absence of geographical borders; the capability to throw 
surprises with rapidity and its potential to compromise assets in the virtual and real 
world
339
.  In cyberspace, anonymous transaction has become commonplace (see-2.10.2). 
Anonymity allows users to achieve the benefits of social networking and maintain their 
privacy. For instance, hiding identity may help those who live in countries where 
freedom of speech is not widely upheld
340
. It provides an open forum to communicate 
and inform others without danger to themselves.  
 
On another note, a terrorist may be communicating with his organisation while hiding 
his online identity
341
. For example, ISIS and Al-Qaeda were able to recruit teens via 
social networks (see-2.1).  The question arises: Is anonymity in cyberspace a norm or a 
deviation? In social communication, knowing the identity of other users is essential for 
understanding and evaluating interaction. In the physical world, the norm is one body 
one identity. It is different in the virtual world because it consists of information rather 
than matter
342
. Therefore, in cyberspace a single person can create multiple electronic 
identities with distinct characteristics and qualities
343
. It gives online users a false sense 
of security that they are no longer accountable for their publication because they could 
hinder accountability (see-7.5). It allows them to publish fake content without any 
sound proof or research and without taking the outcome into perspective (see-8.2.2). 
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These characteristics of the internet attract the attention of wrongdoers who misbehave 
during cyberspace communication
344. In the physical world, ‘face to face 
communication’, inappropriate behaviour would bring about retaliation. The key 
concepts of social interaction and social communication differ in cyberspace from the 
real world. Such differences should influence the debate about the nature and form of 
cyberspace regulation. The above analysis is essential to understanding the regulation of 
the internet and the applicability of traditional laws. The traditional laws of the physical 
world face challenges to their application to conduct in cyberspace due to issues of 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, trans-national investigation and extra-territorial evidence. 
However, before applying existing jurisdictional rules to cyberspace conduct and its 
users’ behaviour, it is salutary to understand who owns it. 
 
2.6.: Ownership of cyberspace: 
 
Cyberspace may have little substance of its own but have tremendous influence by way 
of its users
345
. To apply traditional laws in cyberspace, it is important to understand that 
it has formed its community – the society of net346 (see-2.1). Unlike individual 
computers, which individually owned, virtual space itself has no owner
347
. There is no 
single country, which controls activities carried out in cyberspace. However, its parts 
are regulated by domestic legislation, whereas, various institutions share ownership of 
the local internet 
348
 but cyberspace as space is not owned (see-2.3). Within a particular 
geographical area, a firm, a corporation, The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN), Inter Network Interface Card (NIC) or Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), have always owned the discrete internet connection
349
. It is a widely 
distributed network without a central regulating authority.  
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2.6.1: Ownership versus subscription: 
 
There are some information providers (Microsoft, eBay, Amazon, Lawtell, Westlaw, 
online gaming etc.) who, irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries, regulate their 
websites by charging a subscription fee
350
. The subscribers pay a fee to use these 
resources and agree to follow their terms and conditions of use
351
. Their subscription 
may be cancelled if they violate their usage terms. Therefore, the users of such websites 
can effortlessly be located/identified/traced because they have to upload their 
profile/location/payment info before utilising these resources
352
. In the event of 
defamation, these users may be subject to a different set of laws because cause of action 
arises when the material is downloaded (see-7.18). Whereas, with paid subscription it 
varies, as in the Raphael
353
 case, the court held that the cause of action arose at the time 
of the creation of the fake Facebook account (see-7.11). However, there are differences 
in social communication sites and social trading sites because the purpose of creating a 
profile is altogether different.  
 
2.6.1.1.: Ownership: Net-neutrality or free speech: 
 
Network neutrality defines that the network operators cannot unreasonably discriminate 
between the data carried across their networks (see-1.10). It is the fundamental principle 
to create the internet, which binds the data-providers not to discriminate between 
various types of data and reinforces the concept of freedom
354
. Without net neutrality, 
intermediaries and carriers can select which traffic they carry, or charge more for 
separate streams, or bundle packages of pre-determined content
355
.  
 
The idea of ‘net neutrality’ makes censorship a difficult task. It is the most required 
concept of this century. Otherwise, the powerful content providers can dominate the 
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internet at the expense of smaller companies
356
. This could severely damage innovation 
and potentially freedom of speech online and proving that the rich can exploit loopholes 
for their own benefits (see-1.8.1). They can monopolies and lobby to defend their 
interests or to directly fund personal campaigns
357
.  
 
2.6.2.: Sovereignty in cyberspace:  
 ‘The Internet is not only large, it is sublimely large; in comparison with it, all other 
human activity is small’ - James358. 
 
Sovereign states have their own regulations and no country permits a breach of its 
sovereignty
359. A country’s sovereignty is the foundation of the concept of 
jurisdiction
360
 because every independent state is responsible for the safety of its 
residents. Similarly, the power of any legal authority is restricted by the territorial limits 
of its country
361
. If a legal authority exercises its power beyond its territorial limits, it is 
considered an illegitimate assumption of power (see-6.2.3). That’s why jurisdictional 
rules are most often unilateral because a legal authority can only decide whether or not 
it has jurisdiction but cannot determine whether other forum courts have the power
362
. 
For instance, the US could not force an English court to sentence Gary McKinnon to 70 
years
363
. 
 
2.6.3.: English court’s approach: 
 
Cyberspace may not be regulated but its use can be subject to agreements
364
. The law 
can control the use that human beings put it to
365
 however, that regulation will only be 
                                                          
356
 Cheng, H. K., Bandyopadhyay, S., & Guo, H., (2011), ‘The debate on net neutrality: A policy 
perspective’, Information systems research, Vol 22, Issue 1, pp 60-82. 
357
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359
 Schmitt, M. N., & Vihul, L., (2017), ‘Respect for sovereignty in cyberspace’, Texas Law Review, Vol 95, 
Issue 7, pp 1639-1670. 
360
 Boyle, J., (1997), ‘Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty and Hardwired Censors’, 
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol 66, pp 177-205. 
361
 McArdle, D., (2008), ‘Computer crime: Computers – hacking – extradition –abuse of process, Scottish 
Legal Action Group Journal, Vol 367, pp 130. 
362
 Kruger, T., (2010), ‘Civil Jurisdiction Rules and their Impact on Third States’, (Oxford University Press, 
UK), Chapter 4. 
363
 McKinnon v Government of the USA [2008] UKHL 59. 
364
 Rosenne, S., (2003), ‘The Perplexities of Modern International Law’, Private International Law, RCADI 
Tom III, pp 20-29. 
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valid within certain sovereign territories. English approach is based on physical 
presence which provides the base for the assumption of personal jurisdiction (see-2.3.1, 
4.5.2, 6.9). British judges give regard to the due process of assuming jurisdiction in 
‘ordinary defamation’ cases. The judgment depends upon courts’ understanding of this 
digital realm of social communication. 
 
2.6.4.: Court’s skills: 
 
Courts have to avoid undue enforcement on the jurisdiction of other foreign nations
366
. 
British courts exercise moderation in assuming jurisdiction over non-resident 
defendants by following the CPR. However, different sets of skills required to interpret 
social media communication. Non-governmental organizations  and cyber activists 
claim that courts are not trained to cope with technology
367
. Judges have been reluctant 
to rule over a trans-border, international medium of communication they did not 
understand, and over an area of law involving several jurisdictions for which they had 
not been trained at all
368
. These cyberspace-territoriality violations can disturb 
international order and produce legal, economic and political reprisals. However, 
international law allows courts to extend their jurisdiction (universal jurisdiction) in 
certain matters. 
 
2.7.: Jurisdiction in international law:  
 
International courts have the authority, in certain circumstances, to extend jurisdiction 
beyond the sovereign state (see-6.4). Jurisdiction in international law is a wider concept: 
It refers to the power of a court to regulate conduct in matters not exclusively of 
domestic concern
369
. In domestic law, jurisdiction is limited to geographical boundaries. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
365
 The Internet Aids in Detecting Violations & business online Url: 
https://www.coursehero.com/file/p1o0kah/3-The-Internet-Aids-In-Detecting-Violati [Assessed 28
th
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Transnational Cooperation’, Global Communication on Internet Governance, Chatham House, Paper 
series no 28. 
367
 Freeman, L., (2003), ‘Mobilizing and demobilizing the Japanese public sphere: Mass media and the 
Internet in Japan’, The state of civil society in Japan, pp 381-411; Barger, C. M., (2002), ‘On the internet, 
nobody knows you're judge: Appellate courts' use of internet materials’, Journal of Appellate Practice 
and Process Vol 4, Issue 2, pp 417-450. 
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 Callamard, A., (2017), ‘Are courts re-inventing internet regulation?, International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, Vol 31, Issue 3, pp 323. 
369
 Kuner, C., (2010), ‘Data Protection Law and Internet Jurisdiction on Internet (Part 1), International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 2, Issue 18, pp 176-193.  
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The courts follow the rules and principles that determine the circumstances under which 
a court is entitled to adjudicate and render a substantive judgment concerning the 
international and interstate connections involved. For instance, EU directives defined 
specific rules to regulate jurisdiction involving EU nationals. These can only be applied 
within the EU and may not be applied in the UK after Brexit in 2019 (see-2.7.2). 
 
2.7.1.: Jurisdiction in the EU: 
 “Persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the 
courts of that Member State – Art 2370”. 
 
EU rules originate from its member's treaties which are enacted by the Parliament and 
Council of the EU. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has legislative control and 
interprets the laws. However, the courts of the member state have to choose from the 
following jurisdictional regulations: (1) National laws and (2) European laws
371
. 
National law jurisdiction is often contained in various civil/criminal procedure rules 
(common law countries) and administrative procedure codes (civil law countries
372
).  
 
The most relevant EU legislation for this thesis, along with Brussels I Regulation is:  
 
1. For Jurisdiction - Article 5 (3), “A person domiciled in a Member State may, in 
another Member State, be sued: In matters relating to tort, delict, or quasi-delict, 
in the courts of the place, where the harmful event occurred or may occur”373  
2. For social media - Article 23 (2), “a durable recorded agreement shall be 
equivalent to writing
374
   
3. For choice of law cases - Regulation (EC) 864/2007 of the European Parliament 
and Council on Non-contractual Obligations in Civil and Commercial Matters  
 
The European Commission policy document of 2014 on internet governance 
highlighted tensions between the cross-border internet and national internet 
                                                          
370
 Article 2(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, Report Jenard, OJ [1979], C-59/18 - the "principle of equality 
of treatment". 
371
 Dinan, D., (2006), ‘Origins and Evolution of the European Union’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford), pp 110, 155, 174. 
372
 Civil Law countries Jurisdiction is not based on due process (Australia) or minimal contact rules (US). 
373
 The ECJ interpreted the scope of Article 5(3) in eDate Advertising GmbH v X (C-509/09); & Olivier 
Martinez and Robert Martinez v MGN Limited (C-161/10) cases in 2011. 
374
 Wang, F. F., (2008), ‘Obstacles and Solutions to Internet Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis of the 
EU and US Laws,  Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, Vol 3, Issue 4, pp 233-241. 
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jurisdictions. EU parliament introduced ‘Data Protection Regulation 2014’, which can 
be applied extraterritorially regardless of the jurisdiction in which European personal 
data is processed
375
. There is still confusion in the application of both sets of rules. The 
Brussels Convention provides jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters in a general 
way
376
: A national domiciled in a member state will be sued in that state. However, if 
the claim involves harm/injury to reputation, he will be sued in the place where the 
harm took place.  
 
This convention
377
 tried to make jurisdiction more predictable by allowing the court to 
decide wherever the claim is brought forward. However, it is only available to EU 
citizens and this convention also allows claimants to choose to sue in their domicile-
state or other jurisdiction
378
. It is also in contradiction to Article 4
379
 because if a person 
is not domiciled in a member state, it can apply national laws rather than EU laws. 
Therefore, EU nationals can only be sued in the member state where they are domiciled. 
These rules are based on forum conveniens, which is applied differently in England
380
 
(see-2.17.1). 
 
2.7.2.: Jurisdiction: England versus EU: 
 
s often use English courts to resolve libel cases, even when neither party is based in 
England
381
 (see-2.17). It depends on the party’s choice, which is granted under Article 6 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (see-6.8). If a claim is registered in England, the courts 
must have personal jurisdiction to proceed in accordance with CPR and applicable 
                                                          
375
 European Commission, (2014), Communication on Internet Policy and Governance; Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/communication-internet-policy-and-governance [Assessed 
26
th
 November 2017].  
376
 Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968, on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters  OJ L 299/32 
377
 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L 12/1. 
378
 Stone, P., (2008), ‘EU Private International Law: Harmonization of Laws’, (2
nd
 Ed, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Cheltenham), pp 46, 198. 
379
 Article 4(1), Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters, Brussels Regulation (2000) OJ C 160/41- If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, 
the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Art 22 and 23, be determined by the 
law of that Member State. 
380
 Forum non-conveniens is not a valid argument in the EU; Article 5 of the Brussels Regulation states 
that the court which seized jurisdiction first, it must not decline its jurisdiction. 
381
 Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 2053 (QB); both the claimant and the defendant were foreign 
nationals. 
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law
382
. An English court has to decline its jurisdiction if England is not a proper forum 
even if the defendant is domiciled in England (see-6.6.2). If an English court has 
jurisdiction, it does not mean that it must exercise it if another appropriate forum 
exists
383
. This is in contrast to the Brussels Regulation. 
 
A court should not decline its jurisdiction on the grounds of forum non-conveniens, if 
the defendant is domiciled in the EU
384
 (see-6.7.1). Under Article 27 (2) Brussels I if 
the jurisdiction of the first court is established, then the second court shall decline 
jurisdiction in favour of that court. Whereas, in England it depends on the convenient 
forum as court assumed jurisdiction over the foreign defendant in the Google [2015]
385
 
case because England was the convenient forum (see-2.17.1). In short, the mechanism 
of exercising jurisdiction in England is different as compared to EU regulations. 
 
2.7.3.: Jurisdiction in England: 
 
In traditional English private international law, the claimant has to persuade the court 
that service of the writ on the foreign defendant should be granted
386
. The conditions set 
in the Spiliada case
387
 must be submitted to the judge with suitable evidence (see-6.9.1). 
This evidence can be presented to the court either on paper or at a hearing to which the 
defendant is not invited. English law allows a defendant to contest the court’s 
jurisdiction; however, the defendant’s chance to argue arises after service has been 
affected
388
. Concerning defamation, the focus is on the harm suffered
389
 so ‘forum non-
conveniens’ principle will be connected to:  
 
  
                                                          
382
 Trachtman, J. P., (2001), ‘Economic Analysis of Perspective Jurisdiction and Choice of Law’; Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=258183 [2
nd
 August 2017]. 
383
 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills P Ltd [1990] 171 CLR 538. 
384
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Overview & Colombian cases, International Law Journal, Vol 26, pp 13-62. 
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386
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387
 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] HL. 
388
 Fawcett, J. and Carruthers, J.M., (2008), ‘Cheshire, North and Fawcett in Private International Law’ 
(14
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp 235, 275. 
389
 The nature of defamation is less jurisdictionally constrained than some other causes of action 
involving the publishing of information, due to its strong focus on damage suffered by the plaintiff 
rather than on the behaviour of the defendant. 
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1. The place of publication or  
2. The place of injury  
 
Once jurisdiction is established, the courts have to resolve the issue of choice of law
390
. 
The default choice of law rules are based on “lex loci delictii commissii” (the law of the 
place where the tort is committed)
391
, which is applied as governing law and limitation 
periods and damages are considered as substantive matters (see-2.11.6). In social media, 
the tort of defamation can be committed in several places because the place of 
downloading is ordinarily the place where online defamation occurs (there is a 
difference in reading online and downloading; this thesis is concerned with the 
accessibility of online material in any form). This may raise questions regarding the 
extent to which a publisher can practically comply with the defamation laws of various 
states in the case of multi-jurisdictional publications
392
. Arguably, the law of the place 
where the protection is claimed
394
  or reputation vindicated
395
 may be the natural forum 
for the choice of law rules because it is the place where the claimant resides and has a 
reputation to protect
396
. 
 
There is another issue of publication because the tort of defamation is not complete until 
publication (see-2.13).  Publication occurs where it is received, downloaded from the 
internet, or read online.  It may only be materialised if it is brought to the notice of the 
third party and the claimant has the burden to prove that it is accessible to other users 
(see-5.5.3).  It can also be shown by circumstantial evidence (online live stats are 
available). However, finding available evidence is not as easy in online disputes 
compared to offline disputes (see-7.7).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
390
 Choice of law rules are used to resolve the question of which laws should apply to proceedings that 
have connections with more than one state or country. 
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2.8.: Jurisdiction for offline disputes: 
 
Jurisdiction for offline disputes can be assumed by applying public international law or 
private international law rules. The application of the relevant rules depends upon the 
nature of the transaction. The most important international instruments relevant to this 
thesis are the Hague Conference on Private International Law and the United Nations 
Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications and Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements. 
 
2.8.1.: Public international law: 
 
Jurisdiction rules of public international law are derived from international conventions 
and international treaties. Public jurisdiction law mostly focuses on criminal matters 
between the states parties. It firmly regards ‘the non-intervention principle’, which 
appeared from the accepted idea of sovereign equality of states
397
 (see-1.1). The idea of 
territory limits states’ ability in determining jurisdiction to execute judgments over 
persons or things
398
. This is called the territoriality principle of law (see-6.4).  
 
2.8.2.: Private International Law: 
 
In contrast to disputes between states, private international law regulates international 
disputes among persons
399
, for instance, disputes involving commerce, contracts, or 
defamation. Thus, determining jurisdiction becomes crucial, even for civil issues. 
Private international law is also used in continental Europe; however, it is also named 
conflict of laws in the US, Canada and England. In different countries, different 
connecting factors are used for jurisdiction and applicable law. For instance, Lex Fori is 
used in England. The states, which follow Roman civil law system, use “actor sequitur 
forum rei
400” and “lex loci delicti commissi401”.  
 
                                                          
397
 Ambos, K., (2004), ‘The Fundamentals of Ius Puniendi National’  In Particular, Your Application  
Extraterritorial, Vol 51, pp 225-254. 
398
 Guillermo, W., (2015), ‘Rules for Offline & Online in Determining Internet Jurisdiction: Global 
Overview & Colombian cases, International Law Journal, Vol 26, pp 13-62. 
399
 Wang, F., (2010), ‘Internet Jurisdiction & Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US and China’ (1
st
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400
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residence. 
401
 The law of the place where the tort, offense or injury was committed. 
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2.9.: Jurisdiction for online disputes: 
 “The illusion of an International law term ‘no-man’s land’, should be changed in 
cyberspace by a realistic term ‘every-man’s land’402”. 
 
Online jurisdiction may be extended over everybody, everywhere, especially in social 
media libel. Physical borders can no longer operate as 'signpost' to online users so they 
remain unaware of the existence of any borders in cyberspace.  
 
The assumption of jurisdiction for cyberspace transaction becomes crucial. Its 
importance can be understood that to implement ‘municipal-laws’ in cyberspace, 
jurisdiction is the first step
403
. Jurisdiction deals with territory therefore anything which 
happened on the internet must be linked to the country whose court is assuming 
jurisdiction
404
. Precisely, the internet transaction must be linked to the claimant, the 
defendant, or the particular state where the claim is filed
405
. Interestingly, if this 
approach is extended then any social media defendant must be sued at his place of 
domicile, which reduces the uncertainty of jurisdiction and applicable law. 
 
In England, there is a ‘double action-ability’ principle that was established in the 
Shevill
406
 case. The claimant can choose to sue at the place of distribution or where the 
loss of reputation occurred but only for the reputation lost in that jurisdiction. As 
discussed earlier, application of laws is limited to territory, even in cyberspace cases. 
This provides legislators with the option of ‘harmonisation407’ but that requires every 
state to accept the same standards by compromising their national laws. This 
harmonisation may only work in the presence of an international standard code
408
.  
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 Svantesson, D., (2017), ‘Private International Law and the Internet’, (3
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408
 Lessig, L. (1999), ‘Code and other Laws of Cyberspace’ (Basic Books Publication, New-York), pp 118 
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2.9.1.: Controversy surrounding online jurisdiction: 
 
Is there a need for specific internet laws or are traditional rules sufficiently well 
defined? Cyberspace is different from traditional media because of the speed of 
communication and nature of transmission. Therefore, it should have its laws to solve 
the problem traditional approaches cannot
409
. Especially, when states have contrasting 
approaches to determine and resolve defamation issues. This clash of defamation laws 
between jurisdictions reflects different cultural values in relation to freedom of 
speech
410
.  
 
Cyberspace transforms domestic users into global users and allows them to propagate 
unrestrained by physical space, time, borders or jurisdiction
411
. On the other hand, the 
traditional concept of jurisdiction is based on the idea that “The law is made for a 
definite group of people residing in a certain territory. Legal rights and responsibilities 
are therefore largely dependent on where one is located
412”. Unless this issue of 
domestic applicability is resolved, physical presence, court competence and 
jurisdictional problems will continue to cause hurdles to the delivery of justice in online 
disputes
413
.  
 
2.9.2.: Alternative approaches: 
 
The following approaches regarding jurisdiction on the internet can be applied:  
 
1. Traditional rules about personal jurisdiction apply to cyberspace transactions in 
the same way as they are applied to physical transactions. It was assumed that 
traditional approach would be sufficient enough to avoid legal anomie in 
cyberspace (see-7.8). 
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410
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st
 Ed, New Era Law 
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413
 Burk, D. L., (1997), ‘Jurisdiction in a World without Borders’,  VA JL & Tech, Vol 1, issue 1. 
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Many legal professionals
414
 believe that new jurisdictional rules are required for 
cyberspace transactions. They argue that traditional jurisdictional rules based on 
geographic location are not transferable to the transnational Internet
415
 (see-
7.8.1). 
 
2. Scholars from the 1990s416 reflected that cyberspace is a distinct place. It is 
separate from the physical world. It provides an “alternative to the difficult and 
dangerous conditions of contemporary social reality” so it should develop 
without any regulations
417
. 
 
Arguably, social media facilitates communication of real users based in a real place 
therefore the new regulation is out of context (see-2.3). Conversely, pre-internet, the 
effect of a defamatory statement was generally limited to a defined audience (the 
readership of a local newspaper or the viewers of a local broadcast). Therefore, any 
action of libel would still be limited to local jurisdiction. However, in social media 
communication, a defamatory statement can be instantaneously available throughout the 
world i.e. jurisdiction can be available anywhere social networks can be accessed
418
. 
This transnational feature of social media may be very significant in deciding 
defamation cases because it transforms ‘local matter’ into a transnational matter. The 
question arises in a situation when both publisher and victim are within one state
419
 
(social media does not necessarily transform in this case). It can only be evaluated 
properly by explaining the nature of communication in cyberspace.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
414
 Allan Stein, Chris Reed, David Johnson, David Post, Jack Goldsmith, Lawrence Lessig, Longworth 
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 Ed, 
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 Ed, Routledge Publishers, London), pp 77-95. 
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jurisdiction problem. 
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Chapter 2 
Part B 
Nature of Cyberspace Communication 
 
Lord Best
420
 asserted that what is criminal off-line is also criminal online but the 
inclination towards technology has also created unparalleled opportunities for the cyber-
wrongdoers that were not even imaginable a few years ago. There is no mechanism in 
place to draw a line between legal, illegal or criminal information. To resolve the issue 
of improper use of public electronic communications, the Communication Act 2003 was 
introduced which repealed the Telecommunications Act 1984. It ensures that criminal 
offences committed using social media would be adequately prosecuted but it does not 
clarify when an indecent communication should be subject to prosecution, other than 
clear instances of bullying, threats, menace or harassment. A clear-cut online 
communication standard is required to protect freedom of speech
421
 because it differs 
from traditional methods of communication. The freedom of speech is subject to 
national limitations because it is not an absolute right
422
. However, the digital reality of 
cyberspace has further affected the exercise and the judicial protection of freedom of 
expression in a comparative perspective
423
 (see-7.21). 
 
2.10.: Traditional versus cyberspace conflicts: 
 
Traditional media publication was transitory. Pre-internet published newspapers could 
only be found in libraries and old broadcast were not available after they had been 
made. Besides, civil law heavily constrained traditional media in what they publish. 
Traditional publishers employed in-house lawyers for legal checks to avoid legal 
accountability. The realm of free communication gave a false sense of freedom, which 
                                                          
420
 HL (2014), Social Media and Criminal Offences Inquiry, Select Committee on Communication, 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/communications/socialmediaoffences/SMCOEvidence.pdf [Assessed 8
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makes online publishers to ignore legal constraints (see-2.11.3, 7.5, 8.2.2). This digital 
century is the era of knowledge and information; however, it is pivotal to understand the 
impact of knowledge and information provided. Social media publishers do not analyse 
the obtained information
424
 and how other readers will react to this information
425
. The 
readers follow information supplied via online means more quickly than that supplied 
by traditional methods
426
. Social media forever democratised information and reset the 
balance of influence, which has increased defamation cases and online character 
assassination
427
. For instance, if a single source (Facebook) is providing information, it 
leads the user to a stage where their (personal/intellectual) ability to analyse things 
diminishes. They share or like without confirming authenticity or even understanding 
the context. A user in Denmark created a Facebook page against Muslims’ Prophet, 
which attracted more than 1160 likes in two days
428
. The question arises, the  users who 
followed and shared that page without analysing/understanding the content can they all 
be held liable?  (Yes, according to the law they are all liable
429
). The individual who 
shares a defamatory post without analysing its credibility may still be a potential 
defendant of defamation (see-7.15). Internet users are legally responsible for material 
they publish, circulate, acknowledge or upload
430
. If they breach this responsibility they 
can be legally liable for the tort of defamation, privacy, and breach of personality rights.  
 
Part-A established that the enhancement of internet technology, evolution of 
information sharing and communication via social media has transformed global 
communication (see-2.5). These changes may have both positive and negative impacts 
on the internet user. For example, sharing of information via social media is an 
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427
 Thomas, J. B., Peters, C. O., Howell, E. G., & Robbins, K., (2012), ‘Social media and negative word of 
mouth: strategies for handing un-expecting comments’, Atlantic Marketing Journal, Vo 1, Issue 2, pp 84. 
428
 Prophet Mohammed (ﷺ) cartoons controversy: timeline, (2015), online url: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11341599/Prophet-Muhammad (ﷺ)-
cartoons-controversy-timeline.html [Assessed 21
st
 April 2017]. 
429
 Monir v Wood [2018] EWHC 3525 (QB); as per Mr Justice Nicklin ‘you can be held responsible for 
someone else's actions’. 
430
 This material is known as user-generated content (UGC), it ranges from tweets, Facebook statuses, 
and comments to various uploads and significantly includes comments made by readers on blogs and 
online news articles. 
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effortless, swift and instant way of transmitting information
431
 (see-2.5.1.2). The 
problem arises when transmitted information is negatively portrayed and shared without 
credibility. A negative impact arising from technology on society can manifest itself if a 
user accumulates, publishes, or shares harmful information which can victimise 
others
432
. Fake news and transmission of false information is an abuse of freedom of 
expression
433
. Such users violate fundamental statutory rights and they should be liable 
for the legal responsibility of defamation
434
. This legal responsibility may have been 
shifted from traditional legal responsibility to a digital one (cyber defamation). The 
application of law is still conventional and difficult to implement in cyberspace. A 
scholarly
435
 debate can help identify whether this digital legal responsibility has been 
adequately handled by using traditional methods
436
.   
 
2.10.1.: Electronic versus traditional defamation:  
 
The damage caused by social media defamation could be much more than in traditional 
media. The 2013 Act puts the entire burden on the author of the defamatory content in 
social media (Section 5, excludes ISPs); whereas in traditional media, the author, editor 
and publisher are equally responsible in a defamation claim. The defamation that takes 
place via social media can be considered to be, in certain ways, radically different from 
defamation through other mediums because it poses new technology-based legal 
complications. The new legal issues arise because:  
 
1. Social media communications can be anonymous  
2. A social media post can be published at various locations at once 
 
 
                                                          
431
 Joyce, D., (2015), ‘Internet Freedom and Human Rights’, European Journal of International Law, Vol 
26, Issue 2, pp 493-514. 
432
 John, S., (2000), ‘Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace’, Duke law journal, Vol 49, pp 855-878; 
once a message enters cyberspace, millions of people can access it. Even if it Is posted in a private 
discussion forum. 
433
 AB v Facebook Ireland [2013] NIQB 14; social media sites can be misused as a medium through which 
to defame, abuse, intimidate or threaten. 
434
 Equality and Human Rights Commission, (2105), Legal Framework, Freedom of Expression; online 
file:///M:/00%20fINAL%20DRAFT%20aUGUST/Progression%20document%20chapters/foe_legal_frame
work_guidance_0.pdf [Assessed 20
th
 April 2018]. 
435
 Judges, Solicitors, practitioners and even academics can be invited to shed light and resolve this 
issue.  
436
 Magalla, A., (2016), ‘It’s All Begins with Unlawful Publication: Cyber Defamation in Tanzania: Law and 
Practice’ (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, Tanzania), pp ix. 
 92 
 
2.10.2.: Anonymity: 
 
The informal, seemingly unregulated nature of cyberspace often leads social media 
users to believe their communication will be immune from defamation liability (see-
7.5).  However, this imprudent perception is far from reality because cyberspace 
defamation occurring via emails, bulletin boards, during chats in chat rooms or even via 
‘social media websites’ are all actionable (see-8.2.2). The anonymity of social media 
users will also present enormous challenges to traditional defamation laws (see-2.10.4). 
Ascertaining the identity of the person hiding behind the veil of anonymity can prove to 
be a major hurdle because once a defamatory article is published through social media it 
is readily available to any user to read/comment and re-publish
437
. If the person who 
published the potentially defamatory statement is untraceable
438
, the question is who 
should be held liable in such circumstances. Proceeding in the absence of the defendant 
(see-7.6) and Norwich Order (see-5.9.3.1) helps the victims because the general idea is 
that the anonymous users cannot be allowed to use social media to degrade others 
freely.  
 
Along with the above-mentioned challenges, the most problematic issues while 
preparing a claim include determining the victim’s community, establishing the liability 
of the content publisher, identifying anonymous defendants and evaluating the freedom 
of speech aspects. It is interesting that all these challenges are resolved by applying 
traditional rules; however, these legal questions ask legislators and judiciaries to think 
in digital terms rather than in geospatial, chronological, sequential, and hierarchical 
ones i.e. cyberspace defamation demands a redefinition of the key legal terms
439
. For 
instance, a publication is radically different in printed media as compared to electronic 
media. In social media, published content can be republished in seconds, so there can be 
no comparison of the distribution of content between the two forms of media.  
 
 
 
                                                          
437
 Lewis, E.P., (2009), ‘Unmasking Anon 12345: Applying an Appropriate Standard when Private Citizens 
Seek the Identity of Anonymous Internet Defamation Defendants’, Uni. Of Illusion Law Rev, Issue 3, pp 
947-973. 
438
 He may be using dark-net or nothing more than anonymous username. 
439
 Kulesza, J., (2008), ‘Internet Governance and Jurisdiction of States: Justification of the Need for an 
International Regulation of Cyberspace’, Global Internet Governance Academic Network, Annual 
Symposium, pp 22. 
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2.10.3.: Publication: 
 
The mode of ‘publication’ is particularly noteworthy in a social media context because 
of the single publication rule. Social media communication, unlike the more traditional 
mediums, is interactive, far-reaching, borderless and instantaneous (see-2.5.1.2). Such 
online engagements have the ephemeral qualities of gossip concerning accuracy because 
it enables its users to tweet/share/broadcast a publication to a much wider audience at no 
cost at all
440
. Due to the impersonal and anonymous nature of online social interactions, 
they may invoke greater risks. These social interactions do possess tremendous power to 
harm other’s reputations because they are communicated via a medium, which is more 
persuasive than printed media, or any other medium
441
. Justice Kearns
442
 differentiated 
between electronic and traditional defamation because internet material can reproduce 
itself in a variety of ways:  
 
1. Voluntarily by archiving/backing up  
2. Incidentally by bots and spiders  
 
Users have the option to ‘save/download’ on most devices. Therefore, there exists a 
potential for future defamation because if one copy of the ‘restricted content’ is kept 
somewhere, it can resurface at any point
443. The ‘HTTP protocol’ can preclude search 
engines, spiders and bots from indexing a page and its material (see-2.4.1). It cannot 
prevent the online user from saving or reproducing anything.  
 
2.10.4.: Anonymity in social media: Challenge to defamation: 
 
A social media user cannot direct his post to a specific fraternity because he may not 
have control over who accesses this information (see-7.21.1). This publication is 
available for anybody to access and worldwide availability can subject him to a legal 
                                                          
440
 Osterrieder, A., (2013), ‘The value and use of social media as communication tool in the plant 
sciences, Plant Methods, Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 9-26. 
441
 Lidsky, L.B., (2000), Silencing John Doe: defamation & discourse in cyberspace. Duke Law Journal, Vol 
49, Issue 4, pp 855-946.  
442
 CSI Manufacturing Ltd v Dun and Bradstreet [2013] IEHC 547; the court clarified that for internet 
publications, if the content has been placed online or accessible in the claimants state is sufficient under 
the Defamation Act; however, if the publication is by subscription site, which are only accessible to 
people paying a fee, it does not fulfil the requirements of publication under this Act. 
443
 The ability of internet users to save pages for later access and the ease with which information is 
shared nowadays (with a mere click of a button), is it not highly anticipated as a ‘probable’ result. 
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action anywhere in the world. Technically, a court cannot have power over every social 
media user because before deciding a case, a court must have ‘personal jurisdiction’ 
over the litigants (see-2.3.1, 4.5.2, 6.9).  
 
To avoid global prosecution internet users rely on anonymous tools
444
. Anonymity via 
the dark web has become a more significant challenge in the application of traditional 
rules
445
. These networks (Tor, I2P, Freenet, GNU net, and Zero Net) are made for 
anonymity and keep users anonymous while browsing or hosting websites
446
. They 
disguise users’ IP address by routing web traffic through a worldwide series of nodes 
and relays (other computers) (see 2.4.1). Social networks exist, similar to the ones on 
the ‘clear net’, which use the same format as Facebook. There are also IRC chat rooms, 
which allow connectivity with other regular social media websites while being 
anonymous (see-2.12.1). 
 
Conversely, if the defamatory statement is published through a decentralised organism 
or a distributed database, then technically nobody can claim personal jurisdiction
447
 
(see-2.3.4). Even if a state assumes personal jurisdiction, then the question arises of 
what law is available to govern it
448? In common law the choice of ‘applicable law’ 
depends on the place of publication or place of harm
449
. 
 
2.10.5.: Country of origin versus place of harm: 
 
The place of tort and the place of harm are two different concepts because the country 
of origin is not part of a traditional approach (see-6.3.1). It originated with the idea of 
                                                          
444
 Akdnniz, Y., (2002), ‘Anonymity, Democracy, and Cyberspace’, Social Research, Vol 69, issue 1, pp 
223-237. 
445
 Arden, D. M., (2017), ‘Privacy and third parties to criminal proceedings’, The Cambridge Law Journal, 
Vol 76, Issue 3, pp 469-472. 
446
 Hardeveld, G. J., Webber, C., & O’Hara, K., (2017), ‘Deviating from the cybercriminal script: Exploring 
tools of anonymity (mis)used by carders on crypto markets’, American Behavioural Scientist, Vol 61, 
Issue 11, pp 1244-1266. 
447
 Its content are constantly changing as it moves silently around the globe from network to network 
and machine to machine, never settling down in any one legal jurisdiction, or on any one computer. 
448
 It is even impossible in social media i.e. Usenet discussion groups consist of continuously changing 
collections of messages that are routed from one network to another, with no centralized location at all. 
Hence, they exist, in effect, everywhere, nowhere in particular, and only on World Wide Web. 
449
 Sooksripaisarnkit, P., (2014), ‘A common law position for a choice of law in internet defamation – the 
case for Hong Kong’, Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology, Vol 9, Issue 3. 
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unification of conflict of law in the EU
450
. It subjects an individual to the laws of the 
country where the tort originated so online users are only required to comply with the 
regulations of the state, where they are based (see-2.7.1). On the contrary, English 
approach is based on the law of the place where the harm suffered or is likely to occur 
(see-7.16). It corresponds to the law of the injured party’s country of residence (see-
2.7.2). In social media defamation, there can be multiple ‘place of damage’ so the 
originator of the material could be subject to the laws of numerous states. 
 
It would be easy to grant jurisdiction to the state where the website is registered but in 
social networks, users can have many followers from various geographical locations. It 
is also debatable whether in online defamation the defendant but also all other players 
(Usenet hosts
451
, website designers, intermediaries
452
, marketing and sales companies, 
search engines and ISPs
453
) should be sued rather than the individuals
454
. Especially, 
with the extensive use of social media, where posts can be re-tweeted and shared 
globally, international law cannot impose obligations on every user to comply with its 
principles.  
 
Similarly, there could be differences in the reporting of a private and public figure
455
. 
Different principles may be applied to prove defamation for celebrities, media persons, 
sports personalities, religious figures and political persons
456
. A published statement can 
also re-emerge from its lurking-place at a later stage so it is important to grasp the ideas 
of limitation period, single publication rule and double actionability principle.      
 
                                                          
450
 Article 3(1) The Rome II Convention for torts, delicts, or non-contractual relations, Council Regulation 
(EC) No 864/2007, OJ L 199//40 
451
 Internet computers on which newsgroup bulletin boards are stored. 
452
 An operator of a computer system which provides the technical link between internet content 
providers and internet users, whether by hosting, caching or distributing information. 
453
  The operator of a network of interconnected computers, which allow information to be stored, 
accessed and transferred by internet users via the worldwide web, UseNet and e-mail. 
454
 If these website hosts and search engines make billions of pound they become a part of this fabric 
society i.e. these organisations have zero excuses for not fixing a problem. 
455
 Public figures enjoy a right to privacy and there is legitimate public interest in the affairs of public 
figures i.e. they may not enjoy the same degree of protection as citizens not in the public spotlight when 
it comes to defamation online http://webtechlaw.com/2013/02/04/johannesburg-high-court-rules-on-
facebook-defamation-html/[Assessed 8
th
 February 2017].  
456
 The UK laws do not distinguish between public figures and political persons; however, private citizens 
are treated differently for defamation laws: For private individuals, any false statement that harms the 
person's reputation may be unlawful. For public figures, the defamatory statement is unlawful only if it 
was made with actual malice. Therefore, the user who published it knew at the time that the statement 
was false. Otherwise, he acted with reckless disregard as to whether or not the statement was false. For 
public figures, this legal distinction makes a libel case harder to prove and win. 
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2.11.: Single versus multiple publication rules: 
 
The concept of ‘publication’ is interpreted differently across continents (see-2.11.1). 
Under multiple publication rule
457
, each time a communication reaches another person, 
a new publication is established. Every single newspaper or magazine is regarded as a 
separate publication and this rule also applies to a TV program or a radio 
transmission
458
. Similarly, every social media tweet is seen as a new publication 
regardless of whether it is re-shared, followed or forwarded. It is arguable whether those 
who merely re-share/re-tweet a statement can also be at risk; especially, in the absence 
of ‘editorial control’ for those who re-publish a statement459 (see-7.7). There is a 
difference between single and multiple publication rules: 
 
1. According to ‘single publication rule’, any form of aggregate publication is a 
single communication, which can have only one cause of action  (see-2.11.3) 
 
2. According to ‘multiple publication rule’, there will be a new cause of action 
every time defamatory material is uploaded or shared online. It is interesting to 
note that ‘the statute of limitation’ and ‘date of publication’ have no significance 
under multiple rule but they are immensely important under single publication 
rule (see-2.11.6)  
 
The multiple publication rules, established in the Harmer case
460
, have been applied for 
centuries. It allows the limitation period to restart every time the published material is 
re-published
461
. Therefore, in social media libel, the claimant can bring an action, even 
after several years because every ‘hit’ on the web page invokes a new cause of action 
for libel claim
462
. The Defamation Act 2103 modified the concept of publication. 
Section 8 specifically updated the law applied to defamatory publication made via 
cyberspace. It does not affect a court’s discretion to allow any libel claim even after the 
                                                          
457
 Connolly, U., (2012), ‘Multiple Publication and Online Defamation’, Masaryk University Journal of Law 
and Technology, Vol 6, Issue 1, pp 35. 
458
 Duke of Brunswick v Harmer [1849] 14 QB 185. 
459
 Unless, a new rule is proposed anybody who tarnishes the reputation of any individual, in the eyes of 
right thinking members of society, is at a risk to be sued. 
460
 Duke of Brunswick and Luneberg v Harmer [1894] 14 QB 184; the court held that the limitation period 
resets every time the publication is viewed. 
461
 Slipper v BBC [1991] 1 QB 283. 
462
 Connolly, U., (2012), ‘Multiple Publication and Online Defamation-Recent Reforms in Ireland and the 
United Kingdom’, Masaryk UJL & Tech, Vol 6, Issue 1, pp 35-51. 
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lapse of one-year rule. The limitation period for defamation claims is one year from the 
date on which the cause of action accrued (see-2.11.6). Single publication rule is also 
applied in the US but its application is radically different compared to the UK. 
  
2.11.1.: UK versus US single publication rules: 
 
In the US, single publication means that material is published only once
463
, which has 
been applied since the Wolfson [1938]
464
 case. The same rule was applied to online 
defamation in the case of Firth [1998]
465. However, the ‘single publication’ rule is 
applied differently in England because each communication constitutes a separate tort 
with regard to choice of law and jurisdiction
466
. The applicable law may be similar for 
the first publication but will vary for further publications of the same material. If 
material is re-published overseas, the courts can only assume jurisdiction concerning 
torts published in England and there will be no jurisdiction concerning the torts 
established on defamation in other countries
467
. 
 
If defamation partially materialised in both England and another foreign country in this 
scenario, the only applicable law is common law of tort of defamation under English 
law
468
. For example, a French national’s Facebook status is re-shared, re-published, or 
followed in England; this will invoke a fresh tort of defamation in England. However, 
the claimant has the option to sue either in England or in France. If the claimant brings 
an action in England against an EU national the applicable law could still be decided 
using private international law principles
469
 (Brussels I Rules will be applied for EU 
nationals, unless decided otherwise after Brexit 2019) (see-6.7). 
 
 
                                                          
463
 Keeton v Hustler Magazine, Inc [1984] 465 US 770; a defamatory material is published only once.  
464
 Wolfson v Syracuse Newspapers Inc [1938] 254 App. Div. 211; court rejected multiple publication rule 
because, as observed, the period of limitation would never expire so long as a copy of the published 
material remained in stock. 
465
 Firth v State [1998] N.Y.2d 365. 
466
 Pandey, V., (2014), ‘The "Single Publication" Rule Of Defamation On Social Networking Websites’ 
available online at: 
http://www.mondaq.co.uk/india/x/346258/Libel+Defamation/The+Single+Publication+Rule+Of+Defama
tion+On+Social+Networking+Websites [Assessed 21
st
 April 2017].  
467
 Hartley, T. C., (2010), ‘Libel Tourism’ and Conflict of Laws, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol 59, Issue 1, pp 25 – 38. 
468
 Hansard Col 69 WH (17 December 2008); Kennedy, D., (2012), ‘MPs Accuse Courts of Allowing Libel 
Tourism’ The Times (London England 18 December) 27. 
469
 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
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2.11.2.: Single publication rule (EU): 
 
In the EU courts, further publication is called ‘distribution’ rather than a ‘new 
publication
470’. Section 11 of the Irish Act 2009 provides for a single cause of action 
against multiple publications of the same defamatory statement. (The EU rule is beyond 
the scope of this thesis). 
 
2.11.3.: Single publication rule (S8): 
 
Section 8 replaced the common law principle of ‘multiple publication rule’ and 
introduced the single publication rule: “Any cause of action against the person for 
defamation in respect of the subsequent publication is to be treated as having accrued on 
the date of the first publication” (see-2.13.1.2). It may help to prevent indefinite liability 
for online publications because it also includes the material saved in internet archives. 
An article by a Bradford student published in 2017 can only be defamatory till 2018, 
according to the limitation period. If he again republishes the same article on another 
website in 2020, it cannot be actionable defamation because one year has elapsed
471
. 
However, if the same article is re-published by the librarian of Bradford University in 
2020, it will amount to a new claim of tort of defamation (depending on whether an 
injunction has already been granted). Single publication rule is only valid for a user who 
publishes both the first and subsequent articles. However, for the librarian, there will be 
a new limitation period of one-year because he is not the person who published that 
article 'first time'. Hence, if a video, voice recording or any other defamatory material is 
shared/re-published by a different website broadcaster, it can attract a new libel claim 
every time (see-5.3). 
 
2.11.4.: The importance of single publication rule: 
 
Section 8 aims to deter unnecessary litigation. It appears as though the approach taken 
with the 2013 Act is to reduce awards for damages as, surely, multiple actions for 
different statements can cumulatively result in a bigger award – a single action cannot, 
usually, have the same result (see-7.11). It is a longstanding common law rule that it is 
                                                          
470
 Hartley, T. C., (2010), ‘Libel Tourism’ and Conflict of Laws’, International and comparative law 
quarterly, Vol 59, Issue 01, pp 25-38. 
471
 Steedman v BBC [2001] EWCA Civ 1534. 
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no defence to prove that the defendant was only repeating other’s statement472. This 
repetition rule is affirmed in Section 2 (2) of the 2013 Act, which focuses on imputation 
conveyed by a statement to incorporate this rule. Therefore, from the above examples, if 
a different website owner or broadcaster re-publishes / re-broadcasts old material, then 
they cannot rely on the rule because they are not the person who published it first (see-
2.13.1.2). The choice of law rules become increasingly important when judges decide 
social media defamation cases (see-7.13). Besides, ‘jurisdiction’ will remain the main 
issue because the choice of law rules has no effect on jurisdictional law i.e. no matter 
where defamation took place, the English courts have to apply traditional jurisdiction 
laws to assume jurisdiction (see-6.8).  
 
This problem can be resolved by creating a ‘universal communication code’, which is 
applied to all material distributed/communicated/shared/followed or published online. 
Then again, there is a ‘grey area’ in applying ‘universal communication legislation’ to 
social media. Every social network makes its users agree to their terms and conditions. 
The question arises, which law is applicable to social media defamation even if a court 
assumes personal jurisdiction. It is arguable that if users have agreed to follow the terms 
of social networks then the content providers must also be responsible for alleged 
defamation. There can be a further issue if the claimant is based in a foreign state and 
wishes to pursue a claim in England. At this point, the ‘double actionability rule’ 
becomes very important. It allows a foreign claimant to issue proceedings in England if 
the alleged defamation is also actionable in England. 
 
2.11.5.: Double actionability rule: 
 
Defamation is excluded from EU Regulation for the purpose of applicable law, so it is 
governed by a double-action ability rule in England (see-4.2.1.5). Section 13 (1)
473
 
stated that double action-ability rule applies to defamation claims. It requires the 
claimant to show that his claim would succeed in both England and in the law of place 
where the claim arose
474
. It has been widely criticised for being parochial and 
                                                          
472
 ‘A4ID’ Online Defamation Training Transcript (2015), www.a4id.org/wp-content/.../Transcript-of-
A4ID-Online-Defamation-Training.pdf [Assessed 23
rd
 April 2017].  
473
 Section 13, the Defamation Act 1995. 
474
 A tort is only actionable in England if it is civilly actionable under the foreign law of the jurisdiction in 
which the act occurred (usually publication) and, if the act had occurred in England and Wales, it would 
be civilly actionable under English law. 
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chauvinist
475
. The peculiarity of this rule was to insist on the application of both 
principles, requiring that liability be established under both sets of laws, law of the 
forum and law of the place of the tort – thus it is widely known as the rule of ‘double-
actionability’476.  
 
If a libel victim brings a claim in England for the statements published in England, the 
court will apply English law
477
. If the claim is brought based on the statements 
published abroad, then double actionability rule will be applied
478
. It suggests a 
combination of viewing tort as having a public regulatory function as well as being 
concerned with conduct regulation
479. From this rule’s perspective, English law should 
be applied to any tort, regardless of where it was committed
480
 because it also uses the 
place of tort. It is only applied if the limitation period of one year has not lapsed for a 
defamation claim. 
 
2.11.6.: The limitation period:  
 
Under section 32 (A) of the Limitation Act 1980, the ‘limitation period’ to bring a 
defamation claim is one year. It runs from the date, the cause of action accrued
481
. There 
is no absolute maximum limit of limitation period, even if the claim is filed at the last 
minute. LJ Laws
482
 accepted a libel claim, which was issued one day before the expiry 
of the limitation period. David Eady
483
 decided that the service at the eleventh hour of 
the last day of 1 year was valid (see-2.12.2.1). 
 
 
                                                          
475
 Robilliard, B., (2007), ‘Jurisdiction and choice of law rules for defamation actions in Australia 
following the Gutnick case and the uniform defamation legislation’, Australian International Law Journal, 
Vol 14, Issue 14, pp 185-199. 
476
 Lindell, G., (2002), ‘Regie national des usines renault SA v Zhang : Choice of law in torts and another 
farewell to Phillips v Eyre but the ‘Voth test’ retained for forum non conveniens in Australia’, Melbourne 
Journal of International Law, Vol 3, Issue 2, pp 364-382. 
477
 King v Lewis [2005] ILPr 16. 
478
 Red Sea v Bouygues [1995] 1 AC 190; there must be a civil liability for the alleged defemation in 
foreign country.  
479
 Sooksripaisarnkit, P., (2014), ‘A common law position for a choice of law in internet defamation - the 
case for Hong Kong’, Journal of International Commercial L. Tec., Vol 9, Issue 3, pp 129-137. 
480
 Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995; Joint Report of the Law Commission 
(No.193) and the Scottish Law Commission (No.129) on ‘Private International Law: Choice of Law in Tort 
and Delict’ (1990) (supra n 24), at [2.7]. 
481
 Reed Elsevier v Bewry [2014] EWCA Civ 1411. 
482
 Simpson v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 772. 
483
 Howard Kennedy v The National Trust for Scotland [2017] EWHC 3368 (QB). 
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2.12.: The relevant provisions of CPR: 
 
The provisions of CPR rules relevant to this thesis are:  
 
1. Practice Directions part 6 – service of documents  
2. Practice Directions part 7 – how to start proceedings  
3. Practice Directions part 11 – disputing the court’s jurisdiction 
 
2.12.1.: Part 6 – service of documents: 
 
CPR 6 is further divided into two sections:  
1. 6A – service within the UK  
2. 6B – Service out of jurisdiction 
 
2.12.1.1.: When court permission is not required:  
 
Service within the UK: CPR r6.32 explains the procedure of ‘service of the claim 
form’ where the permission of the court is not required (within Scotland and Ireland). 
Service outside the UK: CPR r6.33 explains the procedure of ‘service of the claim 
form’ where the permission of the court is not required to serve a writ outside the 
UK
484
. 
 
2.12.1.2.: When court permission is required:  
 
To request court permission to serve outside England, the claimant must state the 
reasons why r6.32 and r6.33 do not apply. For instance, the defendant is based in US 
which is not part of the Lugano Convention and Civil Judgment and Jurisdiction Act 
1982 does not apply in the US.  CPR r6.36 explains that in any proceedings to which 
r6.32 or 6.33 does not apply, the claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction 
with the permission of the court if any of the grounds set out in paragraph 3.1 apply
485
 
(see Picture-3).  
                                                          
484
 In some cases where the English court has jurisdiction to resolve a dispute, one or more defendants 
may be located outside the court's jurisdiction. The claimant may serve the claim form on the defendant 
out of the United Kingdom where each claim against the defendant to be served and included in the 
claim form is a claim which the court has power to determine under the 1982 Act or the Lugano 
Convention. 
485
 Sime, S., (2016), ‘A Practical Approach to Civil Procedure’, (19
th
 Ed, OUP, Oxford), pp 118. 
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It states that the application form should be served under r6.45 and any documents 
accompanying the application must be provided for each party to be served out of the 
jurisdiction, together with forms for responding to the application
486
. 
 
Picture-3
487
: Method of service 
 
Method of service Step required 
First class post, document exchange 
or other service which provides for 
delivery on the next business day 
Posting, leaving with, delivering to or 
collection by the relevant service 
provider 
Delivery to or leaving the document 
at the relevant place 
Delivering to or leaving the 
document at the relevant place 
Personal service under rule 6.5 Completing the relevant step required 
by rule r6.5 (3) 
Fax Completing the transmission of the 
fax 
Other electronic method Sending the e-mail or other electronic 
transmission 
  
CPR r6.2 determines that a claim form may be served, by any of these specified 
methods: (1) Personal service in accordance with r6.4, (2) First class post and fax. 
However, courts have also used alternative methods to allow service outside
488
 (see-
7.4). Section III, Part 6 also explains special provisions about service  outside  and the 
circumstances in which the permission of the court is or is not required are set out in  
(see-6.9.1). In social media cases, foreign defendants are difficult to trace or approach. 
This may be a genuine reason to authorise permission to serve by a method not 
permitted by conventional rules (see-7.4.2). Hence, it could be a modern adoption of 
                                                          
486
 CPR r6.45 is concerned about translation of claim form or other documents. The translation must be 
in the official language of the country in which it is to be served; or if there is more than one official 
language of that country, in any official language which is appropriate to the place in the country of 
service. 
487
 English Judiciary, available online at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-
rules/civil/rules/part07 [Assessed 6
th
 March 2018]. 
488
 Elmes v Hygrade Food Products PLC [2001] EWCA Civ 121; such order may be made prospectively but 
not retrospectively. 
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technology to the traditional rules if the court allows service using the same network 
where the defamation occurred.  
 
2.12.2.: Part 7 – how to start proceedings: 
 
This section explains the procedure of serving documents and starting a claim process. 
It is interesting to note CPR 6.36 requires the claimant to serve each defendant with a 
separate and original claim form
489
. Failure to comply with this condition will be a 
defective service
490
. 
 
2.12.2.1.: Time for service of a claim form: 
 
1. The defendant is in England:  CPR r7.5 (1) determines that once the court 
issues the claim form it must be served on the defendant within 4 months of the 
date of issue. Service must be completed before 12.00 midnight on the calendar 
day. 
2. The defendant is outside England: CPR r7.5 (2) states that if the defendant is 
not domiciled in England than the period of service is 6 months from the date 
the court issued the form.  
 
In the Kennedy
491
 case, the claimant issued a defamation claim form on 24
th
 (the final 
day of the limitation period). The form was sent by post to the defendant’s office. Sir 
David Eady concluded that the final day on which the claim form received was valid 
(see-7.12.2). The defendant can request court for an extension (see-2.13.1.2). However, 
judge is only permitted to extend time retrospectively if the criteria under r7.6 (3) are 
satisfied. This criterion is based on a “no-fault” regime, which requires a judge to 
consider following
492
:  
 
1. The court failed to serve the claim form 
 
                                                          
489
 Briggs, A., (2015), ‘Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments’ (6
th
 Ed, Informa Law Routledge, England), para 
5.01. 
490
 Bank of Boroda, GCC Operations v Nawayny Marine Shipping FZE [2016] EWHC 3089. 
491
 Howard Kennedy v The National Trust for Scotland [2017] EWHC 3368. 
492
 Ministry of Justice - https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part07 [Assessed 
6
th 
March 2018]. 
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2. The claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply with CPR r7.5 but has 
been unable to do so 
3. The claimant has acted promptly in making the application 
 
If the claimant is unable to fulfil any of the requirements stated above, his ‘service of 
writ’ will become invalid. 
 
2.12.2.2:: When the service is valid: 
 
The service of court documents depends on the interplay between r6.14 (deemed 
service) and r7.5 (actual service). There are different rules for service depending on the 
defendant's location.  
 
Picture-4
493
: Procedure of service 
Title Number 
Where to start proceedings Rule 7.1 
How to start proceedings Rule 7.2 
Right to use one claim form to start two or more claims Rule 7.3 
Particulars of claim Rule 7.4 
Service of a claim form Rule 7.5 
Extension of time for serving a claim form Rule 7.6 
Application by defendant for service of claim form Rule 7.7 
Form for defence etc. must be served with particulars of claim Rule 7.8 
Fixed date and other claims Rule 7.9 
Production Centre for claims Rule 7.10 
Human Rights Rule 7.11 
Electronic issue of claims Rule 7.12 
 
2.12.2.3.: Service of a claim form: 
 
The critical question to discuss here is whether r6.14 fixes the date on which service 
occurs for all CPR purposes i.e. is there a distinction between the actual date of service 
                                                          
493
 Ministry of Justice - https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part07 [Assessed 
6
th
 March 2018]. 
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and the deemed date.  Notably, if the writ is served within the jurisdiction, this issue 
would not arise because CPR rules made a distinction between the wording:  
 
1. CPR r7.5 (1) - deals with service in England. It requires the claimant to 
complete the relevant step within four months of issue 
 
2. CPR r7.5 (2) - deals with service outside England. It requires that the claim 
form is served within six months of issue  
 
Justice Baker
494
 ruled that r6.14 fixes the date for all CPR purposes, including the date 
of service in Scotland. Whereas in the case of Paxton Jones [2017]
495
, the court 
concluded that the ‘deeming provisions’ (r6.14) operate as a means of calculating other 
deadlines i.e. acknowledgement of service within 14 days and defence (see-6.8.2.1).  
 
The above proves the distinction between ‘deemed date’ and ‘actual date’ of service. 
There may be further complications in applying these complex rules to social media 
defamation because there can be different defendants in different jurisdictions. The 
claimant may have to request specific permission to serve every defendant.  
 
Similarly, if some of the defendants are based in England and one of them is outside 
England, the claimant will have to serve all defendants within the jurisdiction and 
outside the jurisdiction. The wording of r6.14 fixes the deemed date of service for “a 
claim form served” whereas no such provision is made for ‘actual date of service’. 
Interestingly, a defendant can only challenge jurisdiction once service is completed.  
 
2.12.3.: Part 11 – disputing the court jurisdiction: 
 
If valid service took place, English court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
foreign-based defendant. The defendant has a right to choose the court where he wishes 
to litigate the matter by disputing English jurisdiction
496
. Both EU and non-EU based 
defendants can challenge English jurisdiction.  
 
                                                          
494
 Brightside v RSM UK Audit [2017] 1 WLR 1943. 
495
 Paxton Jones v Chichester Harbour Conservancy [2017] EWHC 2270. 
496
 VTB Capital Plc v Nutritek International Corpn [2013] UKSC 5. 
 106 
 
If the defendant is an EU national, he has to prove that Brussel Regulation 1215/2102 is 
not properly applied (this is beyond the scope of this thesis). On the other hand, if the 
defendant is a UK national and wishes the proceedings to be brought in Scotland or 
Ireland rather than England he has to show that it will be more convenient if the matter 
is resolved in other state
497
. The normal standard of natural forum is shifted towards 
‘convenience’ and instead of actual service, the applicable rule will be deemed service 
(see-2.12.2.1). The defendant who is neither based in the UK or EU has to prove
498
:  
 
1. CPR r6.36 is not properly applied (see-2.12.1.2)   
2. England is not an appropriate forum (see-2.17.1)  
 
CPR r11 allows a defendant to dispute English court’s jurisdiction499. CPR r11 (1) 
provides that a defendant can apply to the court:  
 
1. Who wants to dispute the court’s jurisdiction500  
2. Who argues that the court should use its discretion to exercise its jurisdiction501  
 
CPR r11 (2) determines that the defendant has to acknowledge service of the claim form 
before applying for an order to dispute jurisdiction
502
, which must be in writing under 
Part 10
503
. Acknowledgement is compulsory because if the defendant is unsuccessful in 
his application, the court may start the proceedings without further delay
504
. However, 
the acknowledgement of service does not mean that the defendant cannot dispute the 
court’s jurisdiction505. CPR r11 (4) provides that any application by the defendant must 
be filed within 14 days
506
, with all the supporting evidence. The defendant can also 
request English courts to grant a retrospective extension of time where appropriate
507
. 
                                                          
497
 Cumming v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail [1995] EMLR 538; the defendant can also object 
England jurisdiction if the proceedings have already started in other part of the UK. 
498
 Standard Bank Plc v Efad Real Estate Company WLL & Ors [2014] EWHC 1834. 
499
 Zumax Nigeria v First City Monument Bank plc [2014] EWHC 2075; Polymer Vision v Van Dooren 
[2011] EWHC 2951 (Comm) as per justice Beatson.  
500
 Bank of Boroda, GCC Operations v Nawayny Marine Shipping FZE [2016] EWHC 3089 
501
 Erst Group Bank AG v JSC “VMZ Red October” [2013] EWHC 2926. 
502
 Mitchell  v News Group Newspapers Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 1537. 
503
 The defendant must fill in form N9, provide the service address and lawyers business address and 
should sign the declaration. 
504
 GMBH v  F&M Bunkering Ltd [2014] EWHC 192 (Comm) as per Mr Justice Blair. 
505
 Peretz Winkler and another v Angela Shamoon and others [2016] EWHC 217.  
506
 The Alexandros T [2013] UKSC 70; as per Lord Clarke made it clear that this time limit of CPR Pt 11(4) 
is not in contrary to Article 27 of the Judgments Regulation. 
507
 Texan Management Ltd v Pacific Electric Wire and Cable Co Ltd [2009] UKPC 46. 
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CPR r11 (5) provides that if the defendant does not make such application, he will be 
considered to have submitted to the court’s discretion508. Even after the lapse of the 
allocated time limit, the defendant may still apply to the court to dispute jurisdiction - 
such an application may be very weak and may be set aside
509
.  
 
2.12.3.1: If jurisdiction is disputed: 
 
If the defendant can satisfy the judge that there is another more appropriate forum, the 
burden then shifts back to the claimant to show that there are special circumstances in 
the interests of justice for the case to remain in England (see-7.12). However, the 
defendant who wants to challenge jurisdiction must follow the relevant procedure
510
 
because failure to comply with stricter rule may result in a waiver of the right to dispute 
the jurisdiction
511
. It is important to note that CPR r11 is not concerned about territorial 
jurisdiction, but the authority and power of the court
512
 (r6.20 and r2.3 are concerned 
with territorial jurisdiction). If a court has territorial jurisdiction, it may allow a claimant 
to serve a claim form on a foreign defendant in any overseas territory
513
, and then the 
defendant can challenge it. Anthony Clarke
514
 stated that an issue related to service 
could only be raised once the territorial jurisdiction is established. 
 
Considering the complex nature of social media defamation this thesis submits that 
traditional CPR provisions can cause “unfortunate tension” between CPR and the 
Defamation Act provisions.  
  
                                                          
508
 It fulfils a legitimate aim to make sure that whether the proceedings are to be tried on their 
substantive merits in England are taken promptly and without unnecessary costs. It also satisfies the 
principle of legal certainty because parties need to know where they stand. 
509
 Hallam Estates v Baker [2014] EWCA Civ 661. 
510
 Newland Shipping and Forwarding Ltd v Toba Trading FZC [2017] EWHC 1416. 
511
 Strickson v Preston County Court [2006] EWHC 3300; the court held that the defendants had waived 
the right to challenge jurisdiction by filing an acknowledgment of service and then failing to apply to 
dispute jurisdiction under CPR 11. 
512
 The definition of "jurisdiction" is not exhaustive – it may be used in 2 meaning: (1) Territorial and (2) 
Authority and power. 
513
 The rules to serve documents outside England and Wales are detailed in practice direction 6 B that 
supplements section IV of CPR r6 – service out of the jurisdiction. 
514
 Hoddinott v Persimmon Homes [2007] EWCA Civ 1203. 
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Chapter 2 
Part C  
The Defamation Act 2013 
 
2.13.: The interpretation of the Act:  
 
This section will discuss the likely practical implications of the Defamation Act 2013. A 
list of all the provisions are attached (see Appendix-VI)  
 
2.13.1.: Relevant provisions:  
 
Sections 1, section 8, section 9 are directly relevant areas for this research.  
 
2.13.1.1.: Section 1 - Serious Harm: 
 
The serious harm threshold is defined: “A statement is not defamatory unless it has 
caused (or is likely to cause) serious harm to the claimant”. This requirement of Section 
1 is in addition to existing definitions of defamatory meaning because claimants have to 
show that the statement: 
 
1. Caused or is likely to cause serious injury to the claimant’s reputation 
2. Tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of his 
community; or substantially affects the attitude of others towards the claimant 
adversely 
  
The purpose of this section is to deter trivial or spurious claims. It may also help to 
entrench the protection of freedom of expression. It is a broad concept but was 
necessary because English defamation law was skewed towards claimants
515
. This idea 
has already been established in the Thornton
516
 case, where the court questioned that the 
harm caused by a publication must be sufficient to establish defamation. However, in its 
short span, the way it works has created significant difficulties for judges
517
.   
                                                          
515
 Mullis, A., & Scott, A., (2012), ‘The Swing of the Pendulum: Reputation, Expression and the Re-
entering of English Libel Law’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly (NILQ), Vol 63, pp 27. 
516
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group [2010] EWHC 1414; it also reaffirmed an old HL decision in Slim V 
Stretch [1936] about existence of seriousness threshold.  
517
 AMT Futures v Marzillier [2017] UKSC 13; It is difficult to establish where serious harm occurred. 
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Based on the problems with this relatively new Act, it can be assumed that it needs to be 
examined carefully. In the Ames [2015]
518
 case the judge highlighted while assessing 
serious harm, “the factors linked to identify serious harm are same which identifies 
whether a tort is real or substantial”. It is not a novel idea because Moloney QC519 
pointed out that this standard had already been devised in the case of Jameel
520
, to stop 
the abuse of defamation process.  
 
Parliament intended to weed out undeserving libel claims by introducing serious 
harm
521
. But it does not involve actual serious harm to reputation or likely serious 
damage to reputation in the future
522”. Similarly, evidence is required to satisfy the 
requirement of ‘serious harm’, which proves a departure from common law principles. 
Traditionally, the defamatory meaning test was purely objective because no evidence 
was needed other than ‘the published statement’ could adduce523. Nevertheless, if the 
publisher publishes an apology, the ‘questionable statement’ fails to fulfil the 
seriousness threshold
524
. This thesis recommends that if the defendant publish an 
apology after publishing the statement, it could still be of serious nature so this 
requirement must be waived (see-2.10.1). The ‘impact of the apology’ can be 
determined at the time of calculation of damages, but it cannot be used at the 
preliminary stage to refuse the claim (see-7.16).    
 
2.13.1.2.: Section 8 – Single multiplication rule: 
 
Section 8 (1) indicates that it applies to a user who publishes the same content. The 
defendant can only take advantage of this section if:  
 
1. He made the first publication (published a statement to the public)  
2. He subsequently re-published that statement or substantially the same statement 
(whether or not to the public)  
  
                                                          
518
 Ames v Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 3409 at [52]. 
519
 Theedom v Nourish Training Ltd [2016] EMLR 10 at [15]. 
520
 Jameel v Dow Jones & Co [2005] EWCA Civ 75; There must be a real and substantial tort, it 
established ‘seriousness threshold’, which is affirmed in S2 of 2013 act as ‘serious harm’. 
521
 Joint Committee (2012), ‘First Report: The Draft Defamation Bill’, HL 203, HC 930-I, pp27. 
522
 Lachaux v Independent Print Limited [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB); as per Justice Warby.  
523
 Groppo, M., (2016), ‘Serious harm: A case law retrospective and early assessment’, Journal of Media 
Law, Vol 8, Issue 1.  
524
 Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75. 
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Section 8 (3) ensures that the limitation period for both these publications runs from the 
date of first publication. Section 8 (4) highlights that single publication rule will not 
apply to re-publication if the subsequent publication is different from the first 
publication
525
. The critical issue for a judge is to consider whether the manner of the 
subsequent publication is materially different. Section 8 (5) provides that there are two 
factors which court will take into account: ‘The level of prominence’ and ‘the extent of 
the subsequent publication. For instance, ‘a new link to a news article, in the publisher’s 
internet archive’; ‘a repeat of a broadcast’;‘ an old obscure article becoming very widely 
read after a newsworthy event takes place and/or the article gets tweeted around the 
world’; ‘a new edition of a book’; will be protected under Section 8. However, if the 
original writer authorised the republication of the statement, he will still be held liable 
for defamation even after the limitation period of one year
526
. Section 8 (6) allows the 
court a discretion to accept a case even if the one-year limitation has lapsed, under 
equitable circumstances. 
 
2.13.1.3.: Section 9 – Jurisdiction: 
 
According to Section 9, if a defendant is not domiciled in the EU, English courts will 
not have automatic jurisdiction: 
  
Section 9 (1) - explains the tort claims against the defendant who is not domiciled in the 
UK or EU
527
 or a state which is for the time being a contracting party to the Lugano 
Convention
528
. 
Section 9 (2) - states that English court will not have jurisdiction to decide a case unless 
the court is satisfied that England is clearly the most appropriate place to decide that 
claim.  
 
A comparison of ‘publication’ will be required between all the places in which the 
alleged statement has been published with ‘publication’ in England. However, the 
English court may still assume the jurisdiction if England is ‘clearly the most 
                                                          
525
 Sec 8, Subsection 4 of the Defamation Act 2013. 
526
 Slipper v BBC [1991] 1 QB 283 – if the author intended the statement to be repeated or where 
repetition is the natural and probable result of the original publication. 
527
 Section 9 (4) (a): A person is domiciled in the United Kingdom or in another Member State if the 
person is domiciled there for the purposes of the Brussels Regulation. 
528
 Section 9 (4) (b): A person is domiciled in a state which is a contracting party to the Lugano 
Convention if the person is domiciled in the state for the purposes of that Convention. 
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appropriate jurisdiction’ for the case. It does not limit the claimant geographically so a 
claimant, with a little connection with England is eligible to initiate libel proceedings, 
regardless of domicile and nationality. Bruno [2015]
529
 is the latest example provided 
by case law. A French national, who lives and works in Dubai, was able to bring 
defamation claim in the UK because his ex-wife was British
530
. Bruno became the first 
case using the Defamation Act 2013 in which court clarified Section 1 (1) and laid 
down general principles of serious harm for future reference
531
. It is important to 
understand that traditional jurisdiction law binds judges to apply the forum suitability 
test, which can also reduce libel tourism.  
 
2.14.: Problems with the 2013 Act
532
: 
 
There are few areas of concerns of the 2013 Act regarding its application to online 
defamation disputes. 
 
1. Magnitude of Harm 
 
Defamation law protects the claimant’s interest in the way third parties think of him. 
What interest, or interests, the wrong of defamation protects is not such a 
straightforward question. The concept of reputation is a problematic legal construct on 
its own. The tort of defamation protects the interest in reputation: If ‘non-serious’ 
injuries can never be redressed through the operation of the wrong, then defamation 
cannot be said to protect the claimant against his reputation i.e. the operation of the tort 
of defamation is subject to defences.  
 
2. Likelihood of Harm 
 
The injury to the claimant’s reputation must always be part of the cause of action. At the 
time of publication via social media, no harm may be caused, but it may cause harm 
                                                          
529
 Bruno Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd : Bruno Lachaux v Evening Standard Ltd : Bruno Lachaux v Aol 
(UK) Ltd [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB). 
530
 Justice Warby considered the meaning of S1 (1) and confirmed that libel is no longer actionable 
without proof of damage. Where “serious harm” is found, the subsequent damage to reputation cannot 
be merely presumed but must be properly proven. 
531
 Lachaux (2015), Judgment on serious harm; A case report available online 
http://www.5rb.com/defamation-2/lachaux-judgment-on-serious-harm/ [Assessed 13
th
 January 2017]. 
532
 Descheemaeker, E., (2015), ‘Three Errors in the Defamation Act 2013’, Journal of European Tort Law, 
Vol 6, Issue 1. 
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after being share or re-share. Therefore, the cause of action may not arise at the time of 
publication. Besides, a publication may change from being non-defamatory to being 
defamatory, and vice-versa. Section 1 (1), it seems that ‘has caused or is likely to cause’ 
no longer means ‘has a tendency to cause’ but rather ‘has already caused or will 
probably cause in the future
533’. The 2013 Act makes it that, ‘to be recoverable’ the 
relevant injury should either have been caused or be ‘likely’ to be caused by the 
previous event (the publication of the statement or injury to reputation). This alternative 
requirement is a difficult one that Parliament seems to have conflated and confused 
within different ideas. The injury complained of by the claimant to have been caused by 
the defendant, issues of likelihood removed through the operation of the ‘balance of 
probabilities’ test i.e. it must be established that it is more likely than not that the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct was the cause of the claimant’s loss.  
 
3. Section 1 versus Freedom of Expression  
 
The right to reputation has been drawn within the scope of Article 8 European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) right to a private life, as affirmed in the court of 
justice and followed by the English courts
534
. The confusion of Section 1 raises the 
question ‘at what stage exactly will reputational harm be considered to be serious 
enough to pass the threshold of seriousness engaging Article 8 of the Convention and 
satisfying the Section 1 requirement of serious harm
535
. Similarly, the Act does not 
mention a cut-off date between past ‘has caused serious harm’ and future ‘is likely to 
cause serious harm’536. It puts an extra burden on the courts before determining 
seriousness of the harm. 
 
4. Interpretation 
 
Courts cannot change the wording of the Act but, of course, they will have to interpret 
it. If some injury has already been caused but it is not yet a serious injury – the wording 
                                                          
533
 McMahon, P., (2013), In J Price/F McMahon (eds), Blackstone’s Guide to the Defamation Act 2013.  
534
 Chauvy v France [2005] 40 EHRR 610; White v Sweden [2008] 46 EHRR 3; Lindon, Otchakovsky-
Laurens and July v France [2008] EHRR 35; Pfeifer v Austria [2007] 48 EHRR 175; Flood v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2012] 2 AC 273; Joseph v Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 All ER 947. 
535
 In Lachaux, S1 was described as ‘a more exacting test than Jameel’ but in Sobrinho the claim was 
struck out on Jameel grounds despite satisfying the section 1 requirement (see-7.16). 
536
 Bean J identified two possibilities: the date of issue of the claim form and the date of the trial (or of 
the trial of the preliminary issue of serious harm). But in the Cooke case former was considered as the 
right approach whereas in the Lachaux case later was approved (see-7.16). 
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of the section would make no sense. An injury, which is deemed to have already 
occurred, cannot be likely to happen in the future. If the (serious) injury to reputation is 
not conclusively established from the publication of the defamatory statement, it 
follows logically that it may or may not have occurred at the point when the action is 
brought. It would be a surprising situation where a claimant might be able to sue 
successfully hence recovering compensatory damages, for a loss that has not yet 
occurred – and of course, might never occur at all. 
 
The above analysis establishes that the Defamation Act is a piece of legislation, which 
protects legitimate interests and the reputation of social media users. It can be described 
as: ‘The aspects of law which support the protection of the value of human dignity, 
online as well as offline
537’. It is relatively a small Act, which maintains a fair balance 
between freedom of speech and privacy rights
538
. The burden lies with the defendant to 
establish that his statement is true or substantially true. It also tries to shift the balance 
between free speech and the right to reputation, in favour of free speech (see-2.17.2).  
 
2.14.1.: What does the Act not do? 
 
The Defamation Act 2013 is not a ‘one-stop’ consolidating Act because the following 
drawbacks remain: 
 
1. With Section 1 and Section 9 strictness, it makes the process of serving a writ 
outside England very complex (see-7.3) 
 
2. Significant parts of 1952 and 1996 Acts also remain in force and can be 
relevant to libel claims (see-7.4) 
 
3. Concerning social media claims, rather than clarifying the current law, the 
judges may have to look at old issues afresh in light of the new statutory 
wording (see-7.5) 
 
                                                          
537
 Roos, A., & Slabbert, M., (2014), ‘Defamation on Facebook: Isparta v Richter 2013 6 Sa 529 (GP)’, 
PER/PELJ, Vol 16, Issue 6, pp 2843-2861.  
538
 All this innovation and citizen empowerment inspired by online communications would be lost if your 
free speech and privacy rights do not apply in cyber-space. 
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4. It does not address the issue of costs, which remains a real practical obstacle 
for prospective litigants (see-7.6) 
 
5. It creates uncertainty for the courts' jurisdictions over England domiciled 
claimants (see-7.7)  
 
6. It does not provide any details of free speech and privacy rights. The 
presumption of falsity remains (the burden is on a defendant to prove a 
statement is true or substantially true) (see-7.9) 
 
7. It does not provide a statutory definition of when a statement is defamatory 
and when the cause of action arises (see-7.14)  
 
8. It does not seek to fully codify the existing law by setting out when a 
statement is defamatory, making provisions about the meaning (see-7.14) 
 
9. It makes it harder for the victims by asking them to show serious harm (see-
7.16) 
 
10. It fails to take into consideration that certain statements published within a 
particular context are intended as ‘meaningless-conversation’ or frivolous 
comments. A publisher cannot use as a defence that his statement was a joke 
and the aggrieved is unlikely to suffer any harm (See-7.17)  
 
11. It does not differentiate between an England based defendant or foreign 
defendant. Similarly, it makes it harder for British claimants (see-7.18) 
 
12. It does not resolve the imbalance of freedom of expression and privacy rights 
(see-7.21) 
 
2.15.: Liability under the Act:  
 
Can social media users be held accountable in the same way as traditional publishers? 
Most of them do not have access to independent legal or editorial advice at the time they 
post/publish or share defamatory comments. Lack of advice also leads to numerous 
allegations of defamation and breach of privacy (see-7.15). However, considering the 
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damages of social media defamation (wide-ranging audience, character assassination 
and confidentiality issues) - any defamatory publisher (a blogger, professional 
commentator, or a random online user) must remain responsible for online postings the 
same as he would be for offline publications.  
 
Can social media users be given immunity when they are not aware of the law or cannot 
get independent advice like traditional publishers? There is an increase in the number of 
social media claims since 2013
539
. In 2017
540
 court heard more libel cases than previous 
years
541
 (see Appendix-1). Therefore, social media users cannot be given immunity. 
Besides, judges even disregarded the argument that the material was published 
mistakenly, innocently, in anger or repeated the statement of a third party
542
. However, 
the success of the claim depends on the readership. If the number of followers of a 
defamatory post is low the claim may fail. It is important to note that the 
readers/followers of a defamatory publication must be from the community/group of the 
claimant
543
. Defamation law is not concerned with the impact of defendant's publication 
on the claimant but the impact of that publication on the people who are in his 
community
544
. If there are no readers the claimant may not win a libel claim
545
.  
 
2.15.1.: Liability of third party/ISP: 
 
If the defendant is not worth suing, the claimant can also involve a third party in his 
claim
546
 (this is beyond the scope of this thesis). The victim of defamation may 
justifiably argue that interactive service providers as well as chat rooms, review 
websites or even complaint sites, should all be liable for publishing a defamatory 
                                                          
539
 Pelletier, N., (2016), ‘The emoji that cost $20,000: Triggering liability for defamation on social media’, 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, Vol 52, pp 227. 
540
 Media and Law, (2017), ‘Overview of Defamation, Privacy and other Media Cases’; Available online 
at: https://inforrm.org/2017/12/29/media-and-law-overview-of-defamation-privacy-and-other-media-
cases-in-2017/ [Assessed 12
th
 January 2018]. 
541
 Wilson, B., (2018), ‘Defamation/ Libel: Defamation claims up by 40% in 2017’; online Url: 
ttps://inforrm.org/ [Assessed 2
nd
 June 2018]. 
542
 Brett, N., & Wilson, I., (2013), Defamed on Social media: Online Url 
http://www.brettwilson.co.uk/defamation-privacy-online-harassment/defamation/defamed-on-social-
media/ [Assessed 21
st
 April 2017]. 
543
 Mullis, A., & Scott, A., (2014), ‘Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013, Modern Law Review, 
Vol 77, pp 87. 
544
 Smolla, A.R., (1983), ‘Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel’, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 1, Issue 18; defamation claim does not provide 
compensation for emotional disturbance, but rather remedies a wrongful disruption in claimant life. 
545
 Lachaux v Independent Print Limited & Ors [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB). 
546
 Seidenberg, S., (2017), ‘lies and libel’, ABA Journal, Vol 103, Issue 7, pp 48. 
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statement on their web pages
547
. However, the law holds to the contrary because the 
Defamation Act and common law do not treat all the parties equally for social media 
defamation claims. For example, in most circumstances, ISPs are immune from such 
claims.  There are circumstances where ISPs may be held responsible for promoting 
defamation. The Delfi [2016]
548
 case hold the ISP liable for defamation because they 
neglected to take technical or manual measures to prevent defamatory statements from 
being made public. The ISP was in a position to know about an article to be published, 
so could predict the nature of the possible comments prompted by it
549
.  
 
Similarly, public figures and celebrities are treated differently. This rule should also be 
upheld for celebrities who are mostly self-publishers
550
. For instance, Katie Hopkins has 
over 600,000 Twitter followers. “It is proper publishing if you have 600,000 followers 
and you are going on the attack against individuals
551” i.e. she becomes a traditional 
publisher.  
 
2.15.2.: Reporting to public and private figures: 
 
The claimant who is an ordinary person just needs to prove that the defendant acted 
negligently (see-7.20). The court applies the ‘reasonable man’ test to see if a reasonable 
person would have understood the defamatory meaning claimed of the material (see-
2.17.3). Bean J
552
 used the phrase ‘right-thinking people’ to identify the actionable 
defamation. 
 
The claimant who is a public figure has to prove actual malice
553. Black’s Law 
dictionary 2
nd
 edition defined actual malice as “The deliberate intent to commit an 
injury, as evidenced by external circumstances”. If a public figure claims that they are a 
                                                          
547
 Oster, J., (2015), ‘Communication, defamation and liability of intermediaries’, Legal Studies, Vol 35, 
Issue 2, pp 348-368. 
548
 Delfi AS v Estonia [2015] ECtHR 64669/09. 
549
 Callamard, A.,  (2017), ‘Are courts re-inventing Internet regulation?’, International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology, Vol 31, Issue 3, pp 323-339. 
550
 Edwardes, C., (2017 ), ‘People see me as a villain-but at least I'm not a victim: She lost a defamation 
case to food blogger Jack Monroe but professional provocateur Katie Hopkins won't say sorry’, Candid 
interview, Evening Standard. 
551
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB); Warby J at 10. 
552
 Cooke and Midland Heart Ltd v MGN [2014] EMLR 31 at [43]. 
553
 Frederiksen, K., & Thomas, A. J., (2003), ‘Celebrities testing limits of right of publicity laws’, Computer 
and Internet Lawyer, Vol 20, Issue 2, pp 11; public figures have to show 'actual malice' that the 
defendant published defamatory content with knowledge of falsity. 
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victim of libel they must prove that defendant lied, on purpose, to hurt their image. This 
idea was generated in the Sullivan
554
 case, where court established that public officials 
must prove actual malice.  It may seem a difficult standard for the celebrities to prove 
that defendant knew that the statement was false
555
. However, once actual malice is 
proved, it becomes relatively easy for public figures to win a claim compared to private 
figures (see-7.20). As famous Harry Potter’s author, J. K. Rowling, won damages and 
an apology from the ‘Daily Mail’ publisher because the allegations were “completely 
false and indefensible
556”.   
 
2.16.: Who is a public figure
557
? 
 
The definition of a public figure
558
 has varied over the years. Somebody who can 
effectively, in a given matter of public interest, influence the determination of the case, 
will be regarded as a public figure
559
. Regarding defamation claims, member of 
Parliament, member of the royal family or a government servant can also be regarded as 
a public figure (see Table-8). Public figures are categorised as public officials
560
 , all-
purpose public figures
561
, and limited-purpose
562
 public figures. Along with celebrities, 
sports personalities and Olympians, there can also be limited-purpose public figures: (1) 
Deliberately participated in a discussion about public controversy (2) Media person who 
can spread his views across. These limited purpose figures can also attract public 
attention during their case trial. They are not actual public figures, but under the 
circumstances, they have to prove actual malice just like real celebrities (see-7.20).  
                                                          
554
 New York Times Co v Sullivan [1964], 376 U.S. 254 No. 39. 
555
 Matthew J. D., (2009), ‘A Newsworthiness Privilege for Republished Defamation of Public Figures’, 
Lowa Law Review, Vol 94, Issue 3, pp 1023-1050. 
556
 Murray v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 1170 (QB). 
557
 Corporations are not always public figures. They are judged by the same standards as individuals. 
558
 Wealthy foreign business people and celebrities using English courts to sue (mainly the US) 
publishers. 
559
 Rooksby, J. H., (2018), ‘Gain insight into preventing, addressing claims of defamation’, Campus Legal 
Advisor, Vol 18, Issue 6, pp 1-5.  
560
 It includes government officials, politicians and public servants. 
561
 An “all-purpose public figure” is someone whose fame or position regularly puts them in the public 
eye. Celebrities, sports stars, and the heads of well-known companies are often all-purpose public 
figures. 
562
 Rukundo, S., (2018), ‘‘My President is a Pair of Buttocks’: The limits of online freedom of expression 
in Uganda’, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, eay009, Issue 0, pp 1–20; Dr 
Nyanzi can be classed as limited public figure because of her 14000 Facebook followers and her 
reputation for tincturing her incisive socio-political analyses with graphic sexual imagery and 
descriptions; a limited-purpose public figure has to prove ‘actual malice’ when a statement applies to 
her involvement in their topic or issue, but not when a statement refers to her personal life. 
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Many commentators
563
 argue that most of the celebrities, sports personalities and public 
figures are the initiators of libel tourism
564
. It has been easier for celebrities to sue for 
defamation in the UK because English laws on libel have traditionally favoured the 
claimants. In the McLibel case
565
, the European Court of Human Rights also 
highlighted that the burden on defendants in English courts was too high. In ‘common 
law’ libel claims, the burden of proof is on the defendant; however, the case of 
Sullivan
566
 changed this traditional feature in the US. Supreme Court decided that if a 
public figure is libelled the burden of proof would be on the claimant. This Chapter 
recommends that a similar provision should be added to the Defamation Act 2013 that a 
public figure must prove actual malice to collect compensatory damages (known falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth). On the contrary, an ordinary user must only prove 
negligence (not using due care) to collect compensatory damages. However, about 
punitive damages, all individuals must prove actual malice. Otherwise, the issue of libel 
tourism cannot be reduced and freedom of speech cannot be guaranteed. 
 
2.17.: Libel Tourism: 
“Any person has the right to the freedom of expression, right which includes the 
freedom of opinion and to receive or communicate information or ideas without the 
interference of public authorities and without taking into account the borders – Art 
10
567”. 
 
The rules of jurisdiction are not there to provide litigators with their preferred forum 
because the intention is to find the most suitable forum. This causes an issue of libel 
tourism because people opt to choose their most favourable forums. It is argued
568
 that 
the UK is unable to protect freedom of expression and free speech because of concerns 
                                                          
563
 Davies, D., (2006), ‘US celebrities 'sue in Britain for better chance of winning’, The Telegraph: Online 
Url http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1525902/US-celebrities-sue-in-Britain-for-better-chance-of-
winning.html [Assessed 21
st 
April 2017]. 
564
 There are many examples: Kate Beckinsale v Daily Express; Russell Brand v The Sun; Tom Cruise v 
Daily Express; all celebrities used English court to bring libel claims. 
565
 Gibson, J., (2015), ‘From McLibel to e-Libel: Recent issues and recurrent problems in defamation law’; 
Online Url: 
http://www.districtcourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Speeches/From%20McLibel%20to%20e-
Libel%20(correction)%20-%20Recurring%20problems%20in%20Defamation%20Law.pdf [21
st
 March 
2018]. 
566
 New York Times v Sullivan [1964] 376 U.S. 254. 
567
 Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1950] - 
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR, 2009) stated that the Internet archives are subject to article 10. 
568
 Libel Tourism, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/mar/10/boris-berezovsky-case-
libel-tourism; MacManus, E., (2009), ‘Will British libel law kill net free speech?’, open Democracy 
http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/email/will-net-free-speech-survive-british-libel-litigation 
[Assessed 13
th 
January 2019]. 
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over libel tourism
569
. The UK had been renowned for defamation tourism because of 
lenient libel laws
570
. For instance, a Saudi claimant
571
, who did not have any direct link 
(contentious connection) in the UK,  successfully sued an American researcher in the 
UK. This claim could not have succeeded in the US because only 23 copies of 
American Writer were bought online. Similarly, there are many English court cases 
against US defendants who would not have succeeded in the US. It caused the US 
authorities to introduce the Speech Act 2010, which makes foreign online defamation 
judgments unenforceable if the decision is inconsistent with US laws. 
 
In the Alvaro
572
 case, a Portuguese national successfully brought a libel case against a 
Portuguese newspaper. Once again the readership of that newspaper was negligible in 
the UK. The English court could not stop this claim on the grounds of libel tourism 
because of EU supremacy and because Portugal is an EU member state. The UK had 
automatic jurisdiction because English judges had to apply ‘law of the place of injury’ 
for EU nationals. However, after the completion of Brexit by 2019, the UK courts may 
be able to cap libel tourism. Even before Brexit, the Defamation Act 2013 may have 
offered a partial approach to help prevent 'libel tourism' under S9 (see-7.8). However, in 
this case, it becomes hard for the British claimant to peruse a claim in England (see-7.8, 
7.12) despite England being the natural forum to bring the proceedings. 
 
2.17.1.: Natural forum: 
 
An English court can only prosecute a foreign defendant if England is the natural forum 
to give judgment otherwise the court will not have personal jurisdiction. The tests to 
find an appropriate forum are detailed later (see-6.9). However, the concept of the 
‘natural forum573’ is based on two terms: 'Forum conveniens' and ‘forum non-
conveniens’ (see-2.72). These terms are important in explaining private international 
law rules related to the service abroad provisions and jurisdictional provisions. The 
                                                          
569
  Alleyne, R., (2008), ‘British libel laws stifle free speech, claims UN’, Daily Telegraph (London) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2556244/British-libel-laws-stifle-free-speech-claimsUN.html 
[Assessed 6
th
 March 2018]. 
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 Brid, J., (2011), ‘The Modernization of English Libel Laws and Online Publication’, Journal of Internet 
Law, Vol 14, Issue 7, pp 3. 
571
 Prince Al-Waleed v Forbes [2014] EWHC 3823 (QB). 
572
 Alvaro Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). 
573
 The natural forum is within which the action has the most real and substantial connection. It resolves 
the dispute for the interest of all parties to the ends of justice.  
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standard of refusing to exercise jurisdiction or displace claimants preferred jurisdiction 
is very high on ‘forum conveniens’ basis.  
 
Concerning online defamation, this idea is also reinforced by Section 9, which requires 
the court to consider all the factors to achieve the twin goals of efficiency and justice. 
The challenge of ‘forum non-conveniens’ is brought early in the proceedings i.e. it 
allows the court to adopt a prudent, not an aggressive, approach to fact-finding
574
. This 
thesis will refer these two terms as 'forum conveniens'; however, there are basic 
differences in the contexts these terms are applied:   
 
2.17.1.1.: Forum non-conveniens:  
 
It is a test for defendants. If proceedings have been commenced against a defendant, 
who is also present in England at the time of trial. It allows the defendant to request the 
court not to exercise its jurisdiction. The foreign defendant can claim that England is not 
a suitable forum to try this case (see-2.7.2). If the defendant challenges court 
jurisdiction using this test, the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that England 
is not a suitable forum (see-6.9.1). The challenge must be lodged in court quickly and 
before the defendant takes any other steps to defend the claim (see-2.12.3). If the 
defendant takes any steps to defend, it will be sufficient to establish that the defendant 
submits to English court’s jurisdiction (see-6.8.2). The court will have to stop earlier 
proceedings and consider the defendant’s challenge (see-6.2.2). The defendant must 
convince the judge that the court has no jurisdiction over him, or even if it has 
jurisdiction, it should not exercise it (see-6.9.1.2). 
 
2.17.1.2.: Forum conveniens:  
 
It is a test for the claimants. It allows a  claimant to request the judge to start 
proceedings against a defendant who is not present in England. The claimant has to 
satisfy the judge that England is most suitable jurisdiction to try this case (see-6.9.1.2). 
The burden is on the claimant to prove a connection between the dispute and England 
(see-6.2.1). This common law criterion of forum conveniens is somewhat subjective 
because courts may only decline its jurisdiction if prosecution in England may prove 
                                                          
574
 Curves International, Inc. v Archibald [2011] NSSC 217; on some occasions, the efficiency and fairness 
considerations at the heart of this forum test will be tied inextricably to the factual issues in dispute. 
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inconvenient, unjust, or ineffective
575
.  The relevant factors
576
 a judge may consider to 
determine forum are:  
 
1. Matters affecting convenience and expenses 
2. The place of domicile of the parties 
3. The place where relevant events occurred  
4. The location of witnesses  
5. The legitimate personal/juridical advantages accessible by the claimant in the 
jurisdiction which would not be available in other states
577
  
 
Therefore, it can be established that jurisdiction in England depends upon the link 
between defendant’s activity, forum, and litigation. However, if the defendant has no 
link in or he is not resident in England, then the factors for personal jurisdiction are
578
:   
 
1. Defendant: Physical presence in England is compulsory  
2. Claimant: Must show that the defendant has been served in England or he 
purposefully directed his activities in England  
3. Court: Must verify if service of a writ is proper. If court uses its statutory 
discretion to assume jurisdiction, it must be by the notions of fair play and 
substantial justice 
 
2.17.2.: The burden of proof: 
 
For an online user who is alleged to have published a defamatory statement, his ‘intent’ 
and good faith become irrelevant (see-7.15). Judges will apply the reasonable man test 
to identify whether other social media users would understand these words as 
defamatory (see-2.17.3). A defamatory article re-shared mistakenly, unknowingly or 
even accidentally would also fall into the same category if the claimant’s reputation was 
harmed (see-7.20). On the contrary, if the shared statement is a ‘statement of fact’ the 
victim cannot succeed in his claim because the alleged statement is true. The defendant 
                                                          
575
 Obdulio, C., (2005), ‘Jurisdictional Problems in Cyberspace Defamation’, International Law, Vol 6, pp 
247-300. 
576
 Roilliard, B., (2007), ‘Jurisdiction and choice of law rules for defamation actions in Australia following 
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  Collins, M., (2005), ‘The Law of Defamation and the Internet’, (2
nd
 Ed, Oxford Uni Press), pp 334. 
578
 Gladstone, J., (2003), ‘Determining Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: The “Zippo” Test or the “Effects” 
test?’, Informing Science, pp 143-156. 
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has to establish that the published statement is a true statement of facts, because the 
burden of proof is on the defendant
579
.  
 
In England, the general rule is that the defendant bears the burden of proof in 
defamation cases (see 5.9.1.1). It is notable that in most common law countries courts 
allow the benefit of the doubt in favour of the defendant. In criminal matters, the 
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond the reasonable doubt. Under 
civil law, the defendant is presumed innocent until the claimant can show liability, ‘on a 
balance of probabilities
580’. The Defamation Act 2013 introduced a reverse-onus feature 
regarding forum test (see-2.17). However, concerning the alleged statement, the 
defendant bears the burden of proof
581
 to prove that his statement is true
582
. Defamatory 
content is presumed to be false until the defendant can prove it is true (see 5.9.1.1). 
However, regarding public figures, the burden of proof is on the claimant as opposed to 
the defendant (see-2.16). As far as the meaning of defamatory words is concerned, the 
courts use the standard of a reasonable man. 
 
2.17.3.: Reasonable man:  
 
According to Greene LJ, a ‘right-thinking’ member of society is only required to have 
an average set of values
583
. The reasonable man is a hypothetical reasonable reader and 
there is no prescription of how such a reader should attribute meanings to words. Sir 
Anthony
584
 established that a ‘reasonable man could read between the lines’. He should 
not select one bad meaning when other non-defamatory meanings are available. 
Tugendhat J
585
 noted that if there are, two possible meanings, the court should 
determine less or more derogatory meaning by reference to what the hypothetical 
reasonable reader would understand in the circumstances. Warby J
586
 noted that the 
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 Samson, E., (2012), ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and U.S. 
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 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818. 
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 Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at [14]. 
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 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) at [66]. 
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judge’s task is not to impose personal views and Clarke587 emphasised that a judge must 
be neutral and cannot lean towards one direction
588
 when identifying meanings (see 
Appendix-V). Laws LJ
589
 held that court cannot assume the position of a reasonable 
reader. It is not for the judge to interpret the meaning as Eady J
590
 concluded that the 
essential core of the libel must be isolated to avoid being distracted by inaccuracies 
around the edge. There is an exception to this rule (when decoding the meanings of 
‘political speech’) but it depends on the judge’s discretion. Longmore LJ591 determined 
that if the speech is political, it does not require any special approach to deciding its 
meaning. The court might have to give appropriate protection to political speech, 
without distorting well-established principles about the meaning of words
592
. 
 
2.18.: Summary: 
 
In social media defamation, a new tort will be committed in every country, where this 
defamation is viewed/re-published i.e. a number of different rules will be applicable for 
a single defamatory publication through social media. This multi-state defamation can 
be resolved by applying the law of the country where the claimant has suffered the most 
damage. However, it may not be convenient unless the choice of law rules are 
harmonised i.e. a Facebook post about degrading Israel can only be appropriately 
resolved by applying Israeli laws because other states’ laws may not provide same 
protection. The internet has posed various unresolved challenges for the application of 
law based on national jurisdictions or international law. 
 
Private international law provides a solution to such international conflicts because it 
allows a dispute to be resolved by applying the proper (foreign) laws. It asks the two 
basic questions: (1) where the defamatory content was published and (2) where it affects 
the reputation the most. However, there can be ideological differences in conflicting 
states’ laws.  
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 Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130; Principle (2):  A neutral approach by Anthony 
Clarke MR. 
588
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 124 
 
2.19.: Research Questions: 
 
From the critical analysis of the relevant literature, the following questions emerged: 
  
(1) HAS CYBERSPACE CHANGED THE APPLICATION OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAWS BY 
DISINTEGRATING THE DOMINANCE OF TRADITIONAL SOVEREIGN STATES? 
 
(2) IS THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH CIVIL DISPUTES 
(DEFAMATION) BASED IN SOCIAL MEDIA?  
 
2.20.: Conclusion: 
 
Anonymity, invisibility and ‘geographic indeterminacy’ give rise to the legal issues of 
‘applicable laws’ and ‘conflicting jurisdiction’. No legal framework is agreed to resolve 
this challenge because the choice of law issues are mostly related to non-commercial 
transactions. The internet was allowed to prosper under the collaboration of 
governments, civil societies and the private sector. Hence, it has developed as an 
economic engine and a social force so an international legal framework for the internet 
depends on the harmonisation of domestic laws and social practices. Similarly, the 
differences in interpretation of local laws have left many gaps in areas of international 
practices. Defamation and privacy, freedom of speech, intellectual property rights, data 
protection and e-commerce are few of these areas. Thus, an agreement for the global 
policing of the internet is made impossible because of cultural and social differences
593
. 
The internet continued to prosper and became a powerful socioeconomic tool. However, 
there has been very little modification in the ‘conflict of laws’. To date, there is no such 
mechanism, which can establish the physical presence of an internet user. This chapter 
concludes that the internet will keep posing unresolved challenges unless the issue of 
national jurisdiction is solved. Based on the fact ‘an act which is illegal offline is also 
illegal online’ the courts may apply existing laws to internet disputes and the 
policymakers can adopt the laws, which need further clarification
594
. However, the main 
issue here is not just jurisdiction, but also government’s role in the governance of 
critical internet resources
595
. 
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CHAPTER 3   
 
JUSTIFICATION OF METHODOLOGY 
 
 
This chapter evaluates academic justification of using ‘black-letter law’as a 
methodology for this thesis. 
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3.1.: Historical Review:  
 “In protecting the Internet presence in our lives, we need to be no less creative than 
those who invented it. There is a need for governance, but that does not necessarily 
mean that it has to be done traditionally, for something that is so very different.”                   
Kofi Annan
596
 
 
In legal facilities, the basic methodology is ‘doctrinal research’597 because it is a 
traditional approach and named ‘black-letter methodology598’. It adopts a legalistic 
approach in which the study is solely based on the ‘letter of the law599’. Researchers use 
personal interpretation to determine the content of a given law at a more fundamental 
level than legal standards
600. It is also associated with ‘positive legal research (law is 
what the law says)’, because traditional legal methodology does not question the 
morality of law but only examines the effectiveness of a particular field of law in a 
given society
601
. It aims to reduce the research on a legal issue to an essential, 
descriptive analysis of a vast number of technical and coordinated legal rules, which can 
be found from the primary sources
602
.    
 
3.2.: The aims of legal doctrine: 
 
Smith
603
 noted that legal research tends to focus on the nature of law, the effect of law 
on society and ‘excels’ at answering the normative question of what law ought to be. 
Therefore, for social media and jurisdiction issues, ‘doctrinal research’ provides a 
systematic exposition of the rules governing a specific area of libel. It analyses the 
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relationship between regulations and identifies difficulties in application. It also helps in 
predicting future developments in the chosen field
604
. It serves three different goals in 
any legal research
605
:  
 
1. The lex lata (law as it exists) 
2. The lex ferenda (what law should be)  
3. Justification (justification for the existing law) 
 
3.2.1.: Description:  
 
One of the aims of using a legal doctrine is that it describes the existing law in a: (1) 
certain field (tort of defamation in this thesis) or (2) concerning an institution (libel and 
freedom of expression). However, this description should be neutral and consistent to 
inform the audience how the law reads. Use of legal research in this thesis describes the 
existing system of law in social media libel (it can be highly creative
606
).  
 
3.2.2.: Prescription:  
 
In any field of law, legal doctrine is not limited to a mere description and understanding 
of existing law. It also comprises a search for practical solutions, which may fit into the 
current system (see-8.5, 9.4). A prescriptive approach reflects normativity of existing 
law, so it is associated with decision makers (legislators, judges and courts), rather than 
the executive
607
.  
 
3.2.3.: Justification:  
 
The third aim of legal research can also serve as a justification for the existing law i.e. if 
a rule does not fit into the system, it is not law (Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013- 
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whether serious harm may have the same meaning in social media as compared to 
ordinary libel cases). Here, the essence of internal perspective comes out best: If the law 
is presented as a self-contained system of mutual reference, the validity of norms can be 
justified by reference to this system
608
. For instance, if the Defamation Act is suitable 
for online libel then it must be applied to modern social media communication. Legal 
doctrine then allows proposing suitable solutions, which may fit in with the system that 
is used by the legal community (see-9.5). 
 
3.3.: Use of legal methodology:  
 
In common law, black-letter doctrine includes the basic principles of law accepted by 
the courts and embodied in the statutes of a particular jurisdiction. Many legal 
practitioners, judges, academics and legal researchers adopt doctrinal legal approach
609
, 
although Conville and Chui
610
 argue that the professional approach must be 
distinguished from the researchers.  
 
3.3.1.: Professionals versus academics: 
 
When judges decide a case there could be various factors, which may have an impact on 
the decision. These factors may include media, pressure groups, public sector, views 
expressed by private organisations, influential society values, foreign policies, political 
agenda and the viewpoint of international institutions
611
. Especially when the decision 
lacks the formal authorisation of international law; for instance, when a case is decided 
on genocide then international conventions and United Nations treaties must be 
adhered. These factors can influence the decision but also increase the legitimacy and 
authority of a particular judgment. Simialrly, a judgment which incorporates the ruling 
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will set a precedent within the 
UK and may not be further challenged in the English Courts. However, being a 
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researcher, such factors should not jeopardise the findings in a thesis
612
 because a 
researcher must not be influenced by ethnic, social or moral values. Moral and political 
discussions must be marginal to the dissertation because a researcher is not under 
judicial pressure as a judge in a court of law could be.  
 
Legal methodology may be ‘doctrinal research’ for judges, jury and academic 
researchers; however, the method of judicial application is not the same because both 
are serving profoundly different tasks
613
. Judge sees things inductively to decide a case 
(considering the arguments provided), whereas scholars play a role in developing the 
system but methodological constraints ideally bind them. Legal researchers are free to 
make suggestions and recommendations for future laws, whereas the judiciary 
implements existing law. Hence, it can be established that practical implication and 
theory of law are different. The judge's task requires vast knowledge and ability to 
organise fragmentary and rebarbative material, whereas legal scholars have to be 
intellectual to analyse and review. Legal practice and research may be using the same 
language but they serve different purposes and they have radically different 
audiences
614
.       
 
Briefly, in black letter methodology, a researcher focuses on law in the statute books 
rather than law in practice. Therefore, the impact of geographical, sociological and 
political implications in the research thesis must be minimal to produce an impartial 
theoretical study.  
 
3.4.: Significance of legal methodology: 
 
Legal research enables the legal system to function effectively because black letter 
methodology aims to recommend solutions to existing societal problems or solve 
problems in an enhanced way
615
. The above analysis explains the use of black-letter 
doctrine in the application of the law and research in the field of law. The academic 
researcher seeks an understanding of how the law works and how it affects society, thus 
                                                          
612
 Rose, K., & Pryal, G., (2011), ‘A short guide to writing about law’, (Longman Publisher, US), pp xv. 
613
 Posner, R. A., (2007), ‘In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 74, 
pp 437. 
614
 Peczenik, A., (2005), ‘knowledge of the law’ in Enrico Pattaro (eds.), A Treatise of Legal Philosophy 
and General Jurisprudence, Vol 4, pp 2. 
615
 Shrestha, M., (2008), ‘Importance of legal research method for legal professionals’, (Kathmandu 
School of Law, LLM dissert.), pp 1. 
 130 
 
piloting a comprehensive study towards drawing valid conclusions and making 
suggestions on how to improve the code in the form of critical pieces of work. 
Similarly, this thesis will adopt this methodology to clarify the current jurisdictional 
confusion where it applies to social media defamation.  
 
3.4.1.: Definition of Black Letter:  
 
There is no standard definition of ‘black-letter law’ as the nature of legal doctrine has 
been studied less because of social science methodologies
616
. The traditional view of the 
‘black-letter’ approach is: “Regard the law as a set of legal rules derived from cases and 
statutes, which are applied by a judge who (theoretically) must act as a neutral and 
impartial referee seeking to resolve a dispute
617”. It is a limited definition because it 
does not seem to accord with the reality of a massive field of law. It has nevertheless 
been remarkably persuasive
618
. This traditional view
619
 refers to such basic principles in 
the field of law that are agreed by the majority of practitioners as being rigid principles.  
 
In short, the legal method would require a researcher to: 
 
1. Identify the relevant source of law (see-4.2.1) 
2. Summarise cases and statutes (see-7.2) 
3. Classify and distinguish between different precedents (see-7.3 till 7.21) 
4. Manipulate the elasticity of existing legal doctrine to rhetorically justify the 
legally correct result (see-9.2) 
 
3.4.2.: Is ‘black letter’ the appropriate method? 
 
BDoctrinal research is a more appropriate methodology for conducting legal research in 
cyberspace. A crucial aspect of ‘legal dogmatic’ approach is that it is able to 
accommodate new developments such as recent case law and legislation against the 
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background of societal change. This thesis will explore whether the Defamation Act 
2013 is suitable enough for the relatively new communication medium of social media. 
If it is, it can be concluded that cyberspace does not outdate jurisdictional defamation 
laws. 
 
3.5.: Justification of legal methodology: 
 
This chapter aims to obtain a better understanding of doctrinal legal methodology. 
Many law schools are merging with ‘business schools’, where scholars adopt social 
science methodologies. This blending of business and law has hindered the growth of 
legal methodology i.e. despite the persistence of using ‘legal research’ we are 
insufficiently aware of its exact nature
620
. There is a misconception that legal approach 
provides a separate mode of thinking about law. This chapter will prove that proponents 
of legal methodology may have too little awareness of its foundations to criticise its use. 
It is only possible if ‘what legal researchers work in law is really about’ is understood 
by other disciplines. The usual counterargument is that the only reason to do this would 
be for the benefit of outsiders, while the argument that legal academics themselves 
know very well what they are doing cannot be accepted. Even if it is true that legal 
researchers know what they do, this knowledge is only very implicit
621
.  
 
To justify the black letter as an appropriate methodology for this thesis, it is necessary 
to compare it with other suitable methods. This comparison is only possible if the terms 
‘methods and methodology’ are defined correctly. 
 
3.5.1.: What is the methodology? 
 
In social science research, methodology is defined as how to collect the data that relates 
to a particular problem, whereas method is the way of collecting that data (see-1.8). For 
instance, in social science,‘qualitative research’ is a methodology, which uses the 
method of ‘interview’ to collect data. Similarly, ‘quantitative research’ is a 
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methodology and the ‘survey/ questionnaire’ are the method. In contrast, the question of 
research method and methodology in typical legal research is very limited
622
 because 
black-letter in itself is a method of legal methodology. Therefore, in conventional legal 
research ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ are the same (see-1.9). 
 
Burton and Dawn
623
 also noted that the term ‘method’ and ‘methodology’ are frequently 
used when discussing legal research but they imply the same meaning. In scientific 
research, they may have different meanings but in legal studies, they are used 
interchangeably. Without using lengthy definitions, the writers
624
 argue that a legal 
method is a single method with a defined characteristic or characteristics, whereas in 
contrast, methodology is used to mean a collection of methods. Hence, black letter 
methodology can be either explanatory
625
, empirical
626
, hermeneutic
627
, exploring
628
, 
logical
629
, instrumental, or evaluative
630
. 
 
3.6.: Types of methodology: 
 
Hutchinson and Duncan
631
 outlined four main avenues of research to consider in legal 
scholarship. These are empirical, non-doctrinal, qualitative and quantitative, and legal 
comparative method
632
. This chapter will highlight other types of methodologies for the 
sake of analysis and outline differences between chosen methodology for this study.  
 
Empirical research : In this research, information is obtained from observation, 
experience or experimentation
633
. Knowledge gained comes from experience rather than 
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from theory or beliefs
634
. In effect, the non-doctrinal law
635
 uses (possibly with other 
methods) empirical means instead of pure doctrinal means. This is most often in 
research requiring mixed research methods
636
 i.e. multi-method research of qualitative 
and quantitative methodologies. 
 
 These methods depend on the type of research whether there is a requirement to use 
statistics to analyse the data. The question to ask is known as “the quantitative versus 
qualitative” question. According to Saunders637, “understanding the research philosophy 
and understanding the factors of quantitative versus qualitative approach, can help 
improve the thought process from which the research focuses their analysis.” In effect, 
using a qualitative approach means the research is viewed more subjectively, whereas 
using quantitative data allows a more objective view to be taken. It can be argued that in 
quantitative research, the viewpoint of the researcher is purely to gain results by 
numbers. If the researcher has any input, the validity of the results may be 
compromised. 
 
 Science and social science researchers (including business researchers) often use 
quantitative methods in their research, as do legal researchers who take part in 
combined studies such as law and economics or law and sociology. However, it is rare 
when studying pure law to use such methods because the nature of law tends not to lend 
itself very well to quantitative analysis (for instance, collecting statistics of the number 
of people who think the 2013 Act is inappropriate for online communication is not legal 
research). Although the law does not use research methods prevalent in other fields of 
study, it cannot be established that it does not have its research methods or indeed its 
own research philosophies
638
. Hence, it is pivotal to understand the primary sources a 
researcher can utilise to conduct legal research because these sources become the 
methods of a legal research approach.  
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3.7.: Primary sources of legal research: 
 
In the legal arena, there is a dilemma of choices that lie between two worlds: ‘Academia 
or practice’, ‘black letter or socio-legal’, ‘doctrinal or empiricism’639. Many fields, both 
in sciences and social sciences, do not recognise traditional doctrinal law methodology 
as a valid methodology
640
. According to legal scholars
641
, black letter is the recognised 
methodology, which helps to fill in the gap in understanding of the ‘law in action’ (see-
1.9.2, 9.4). 
 
A similar line can be argued about primary tools because the primary sources of law are 
cases and statutes whereas this is viewed in science and social science research as 
secondary data
642
. Torstein Eckhoff
643
 postulates that there are many sources of law and 
secondary sources must not be overlooked. As well as taking journal articles and 
travaux preparatoires
644
, for example, into account he added a more comprehensive list 
of secondary resources, which also included “the nature of things”; legal practice and 
foreign law
645
. 
 
In common law jurisdictions, legal rules are to be found in the statutes and 
constitutions, which are crafted in the aftermath of particular problems. These statutes 
are not created to provide a detailed statement of the law for that particular situation
646
. 
Further explanation is ascertained by applying the relevant legal rules to the emerging 
situation under consideration
647
. For instance, Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 
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uses the terminology of ‘serious harm’; however, in social media harm may be in 
different forms (see-7.16). This interpretation of a particular law may only be justified 
by understanding the philosophy of legal research. 
 
3.8.: Philosophy of legal methodology: 
 
Legal doctrine is normative by nature because it is based upon what is considered the 
correct, standard, or “normal” way and researchers look for this in their analysis. Enrico 
Pattaro
648
 outlines the philosophy of legal doctrine that the whole basis of legal research 
is to ensure correct application and more importantly consistent application of the law. 
It is often thought that the doctrinal law is only of use to legal practitioners. Gerald-
Postema
649
 has put forward the view that jurisprudence is a practical philosophy. He 
postulated that ‘philosophical jurisprudence is in the first instance a practical, not a 
theoretical study. It is a branch of practical philosophy; the normative research comes 
from observing people engaging in living and functioning in the world’. It is not about 
what a participant believes about it. Dworkin
650
 argued that legal philosopher differs 
from the practitioner, as the practitioner does not ask the moral question of “what 
should be done”. However, there are similarities in methods as philosophers and 
academic researchers and practitioners are studying by using normative research. In 
effect, all doctrinal research asks normative questions which justifies the application of 
blackletter law in social media libel. 
 
3.9.: Academic justification of legal methodology: 
 
There are several options to consider before choosing the appropriate legal methods to 
use. Again, it is dependent upon the aims of the research. The options include doctrinal 
law, comparative law and mixed methodology as well as using more science-based 
research methods such as quantitative analysis, if appropriate. However, an 
overwhelming number of legal scholars (and practitioners) use doctrinal law. 
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1. Aleksander Peczenik651, doctrinal research influences the actual application 
of the law (judges also use this methodology). Legal academics work on a 
system that is also used in practice so important normative consequences can 
follow from their work 
2. Christopher McCrudden652 described the doctrinal approach as ‘mother’s milk 
to academic lawyers because this is the method through which students learn to 
‘think like a lawyer’  
3. Grant Lamond653 “law is not simply a body of rules. It is a body of reasoned 
doctrines that are interconnected and interrelated”. He wrote that in legal 
research, it is crucial that the law is understood as a system. It would be a grave 
misunderstanding to consider this approach as a mere description of existing 
legislation and case law 
4. Harry Edwards654 raised concern in American legal academia about the decline 
of the doctrinal method and recommended traditional ‘black letter’ as a suitable 
research method for legal study  
5. Edward T Koopmans655 describes that anyone making use of a coherent system 
may potentially propagate a change of the law if this fits in with the system 
itself. For instance, if biologists classify ‘whale’ as a mammal instead of a fish, 
nothing changes in the world of facts. However, if jurists decide that a picture is 
a part of the fixture rather than fitting, it may affect during repossession of that 
house (fixture belongs to the owner and fitting belongs to the bank)  
6. Mark van Hoeke656 argues that the description of any law is undoubtedly linked 
to how the judiciary interprets it. When one describes the law from a scholarly 
point of view, one formulates hypotheses of why that specific rule exists; what is 
its validity; and what is actually meant by the rule 
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7. Mathias and Daith657 argue that new contributions to knowledge are not merely 
a re-jigging of old laws. He makes the general statement that the legal researcher 
when acting as an interpreter is conjoining the legal formants in his distinct 
manner. He further argues that different interpretation of various researchers 
about a single rule is acceptable as long as it is done appropriately to suit the 
purposes of the particular research 
8. Oliver Holmes658 argued that using legal methodology, the researcher places 
himself inside the researched legal system. This feature allows the researcher to 
speak as if they are judges or legislators and to address these official lawmakers 
on their own terms, suggesting alternatives for the outcomes they reach 
9. Paul Chynoweth659 explains legal methodology as forming doctrines by 
analysing current legal rules. He documented that legal rules in common law 
jurisdictions primarily come from statutes and cases which cannot provide the 
law on their own as they only have an application when they are applied to the 
facts. Therefore, the only way to “make sense” of the law is through an analysis 
of cases and statutes concerned with each particular area of law 
10. Phillips and Pugh660 in many other fields of study, what could count as a new 
contribution in the law became, and still is, contested ground. The whole 
purpose of a PhD is to find a new contribution to knowledge 
11. Richard Posner661 is concerned that theoretical and interdisciplinary work 
excessively characterises legal doctrinal approach. He suggested, “Disinterested 
legal-doctrinal analysis of the traditional kind remains the indispensable core of 
legal thought, and there is no surfeit of such analysis today”  
12. Robert Morris662 the new contribution may be incremental and not massive. It 
nevertheless must be substantial and material, not make weight, and it really 
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must be new, and it really must be a true contribution in an objectively and 
globally verifiable way
663”   
13. Slater and Mason664 postulated that black letter approach is a particular way of 
interpreting what is deemed to count as legal research. “Legal methodology is 
not merely a perspective upon, or even a style of articulating, the substantial 
nature of a research topic. It is an interpretive scheme whose overall framework 
operates to both setup and demarcate the very meaning of the research project”. 
In other words, black letter analysis reveals the presence of a series of rules 
based upon a smaller number of general legal principles 
14. Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan665 define legal methodology, “research 
which provides a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal 
category, analyses the relationship between rules, and explains areas of difficulty 
and, perhaps, predicts future developments”. 
 
The statements from above-mentioned authors authenticate the use of doctrinal research 
methodology. Similar statements can be found from various other legal scholars who 
justify the use of ‘black letter’ approach to study jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, as 
an authentic academic method for a PhD thesis. 
 
3.10.: Appraisal of legal methodology: 
 
The thesis is not merely reproducing old statements that others have produced, but it is 
putting its interpretations of either how defamation law works, or indeed how it should 
work in future concerning online communication. In this way, Bell
666
 outlines that legal 
research has the same approach as the interpretive social sciences such as ethnography 
and political science. However, legal research is also normative. It aims to set out norms 
that apply in a particular legal system. Researchers state what ought to be done 
according to the legal point of view in a particular legal system. 
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The thesis does not merely reproduce the beliefs of lawyers about what should be done, 
but gives its best interpretation of the norms of the system, whether or not these 
interpretations can be contested or not. The above discussion can be summarised using 
the statement of Peter Birks
667
, who expressed that, “traditional legal research must 
remain the heart of the law schools’ research because it explains, criticises, corrects and 
directs legal doctrine
668”. 
 
The above analysis would allow the thesis to concentrate on doctrinal research from a 
practical angle to meet the aims and objectives of the thesis. The above analysis has 
been carried out to justify the black-letter approach to research the jurisdictional issues 
in cyberspace. It is established that legal method differs from other methodologies 
because the black letter methodology does not look at the effect of the law or how it is 
applied. It, however, examines law as a written body of principles which can be 
discerned and analysed using only legal sources. On the other hand, there may be a need 
for an additional method to meet those aims and objectives. This thesis will compare 
defamation laws and decided cases from other jurisdictions; therefore, a further process 
of comparative legal approach will be the part of this methodology.  
 
3.11.: Comparative methodology: 
 
The above explanation clarifies that doctrinal approach is the chosen methodology for 
this thesis. However, many choices need to be made in a more explicit way when 
carrying out valuable doctrinal work. The above discussion shows that methodology 
matters more to legal-dogmatic research than it is usually assumed. Only a better 
methodological awareness in standard legal scholarship will reveal the many choices 
immanent in carrying out doctrinal work
669
. Legal scholarship can consist of much more 
than only doctrinal work. The following economic, or comparative work). So, to 
compare different defamation laws from different jurisdctions, comparative method will 
become a part of the legal methodology.  
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 MacCormick, N., (1994), ‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory’, (Oxford University Press, UK), pp 91; 
reality is complex and it will not advance the cause of knowledge to assume that one comes to 
understand reality by stripping away superstructure to get to base. 
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This chapter establishes that the bad reputation of doctrinal work is undeserved
670
. This 
does not mean that alternative approaches to the law are not relevant. But they all have 
to take the doctrinal description of the existing law as a starting point, so they are 
dependent on legal doctrine
671
. For instance, comparative analysis of law would be 
impossible without first knowing what the existing law says.  
 
3.11.1: What is comparative approach: 
 
AResearch by using comparative study includes the comprehensive review and critical 
analysis of collected materials rather description only. It asks how different legal 
systems deal with the same problems and with what degree of perceived success or 
failure
672
. Therefore, elements of critical assessment, analysis and appraisal of relevant 
concepts will be included in the research to compare and clarify the difference in legal 
approaches.   
 
3.11.2: Importance of comparative approach: 
 
1. Zweigert and Kotz673 noted that comparative law is a sub-branch of legal 
research. In this methodology, the normative ambitions of legal research are 
transparent over most of its life. To explain this further, they also outline that 
foreign law, as well as one’s own, must not be taken at face value. It must be 
“stripped of its camouflage”. By this, they mean that there are reasons why a law 
has been introduced and this should be the guiding research aim. This has to be 
pointed out because when merely looking at one’s own law, there is often a tacit 
knowledge that is known by the researcher, which would not be the case when 
investigating the laws of another country. 
 
                                                          
670
 Smits, J. M., (2017), ‘What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Legal-Dogmatic Research’, 
New York Rethinking Legal Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue, pp 207-228. 
671
 Schiavello, A., (2011), ‘Neil MacCormick's second thoughts on legal reasoning and legal theory: A 
defence of the original view’, Ratio Juris, Vol 24, Issue 2, pp 140-155. 
672
 Salter, M., (2007), ‘Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct of Legal 
Research’ (Harlow, Longman), pp 183. 
673 Zweigert, K. & Kotz, H., (1998), ‘An Introduction to Comparative Law’, in Tony Weir (eds.), (3rd Ed, 
Oxford University Press), pp15–18, 58–62. 
 141 
 
2. Bell674 established that “merely comparing texts is not a proper comparative law 
at all.” He further explains that although comparing different legal systems may 
seem like a descriptive task. The purpose of this contribution has been to show 
that, in significant respects, comparative law is an instance of the more general 
form of legal research, but with the researcher’s need to understand the culture 
and social context of the foreign nation
675
. 
 
3. Mark676 argues that comparative legal research demonstrates that even where the 
reasons for one country to have the same laws for the same reasons as a 
neighbouring country, the goals of those laws can be achieved in different ways. 
This can show one of two things: Firstly, the social contexts may be different 
and the societal norms of the country may differ. Secondly, it may be possible to 
learn from the way that other countries seek to answer the same problems and 
whether they achieve those answers either more or less successful than another 
country.  
 
This can lead to arguments about the concept of comparative law. Firstly, it can be 
argued that it is merely a branch of doctrinal law as it still analyses statutes and cases 
albeit in different countries. It cannot be denied though that the objective of many 
comparative lawyers is to achieve harmony and/or unification of laws. This puts it in 
contrast to national law researchers who only consider the law of their states
677
. 
 
 
3.11.3: Comparative approach in this research: 
 
The application of this approach will enable this thesis to analyse existing defmation 
laws in a more systematic and logical way. Noticeably, a comparative study will be 
                                                          
674
 Bell, J., (1987), ‘The Acceptability of Legal Arguments’, in MacCormick, N., & Birks, P., (eds.), The Legal 
Mind, (Clarendon Press, Oxford), pp 48. 
675
 Bell, J., (2010), ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’, (Oxford University Press, 
London), pp 129. 
676
 Mark, E., (2015), ‘Role and Method of Interdisciplinary Contextualisation in Comparative Legal 
Research’ Available online at: http://www.elevenjournals.com/tijdschrift/ELR/2015/2/ELR-D-15-
004_004.pdf [Assessed 19
th 
July 2015]. 
677
 Mathias, M., & Daith, M., (2012), ‘Mapping Legal Research’, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol 71, Issue 3, 
pp 651-676. 
 142 
 
simultaneously made in the analytical study
678
.  It may be argued that the involvement 
of two methods may complicate the research. As a counter argument, various 
researchers conduct research using mix-method approach. Besides using comparative 
study for analysing jurisdictional issues is merely a sub-part of the black letter approach 
because the researcher will still be analysing case laws and statutes. Concisely, using a 
comparative analysis within the legal research would entirely depend on the aim and 
objectives of a particular research topic. The addition of the use of comparative law as 
can be seen from the research questions; the researcher will need to think and act likes a 
scholar who seeks to standardise and unify international laws of the jurisdiction. This 
will be done in accordance with the different mindset required by the researcher to 
consider cultural and social issues and the reasons why the relative differences may 
make it hard to unify the jurisdictional issue
679
.  
 
3.12.: Summary:  
 
During a PhD level research, a methodologically sound doctrinal description requires 
many choices to be made
680
. For this thesis, the important points are as follows:  
 
1. Choice of material: Most technical questions about the choice of materials: 
How to select from all relevant sources. Which court cases will be analysed? To 
what extent are defamation explanatory reports to legislative texts can be 
included as relevant materials? Should all literature written within one 
jurisdiction be looked at, or is it fine to limit oneself only to textbooks? What is 
the role of foreign literature? The present selection of literature is often too 
random
681
. 
 
2. Method of interpretation: The choice of relevant materials leads to techniques 
required to describe the existing law? (If the 2013 Act does not repel previous 
laws, to what extent they can be applied to cyberspace). Similarly, a 
jurisdictional method adopted for libel (may/may not) apply to other systems. 
                                                          
678
 Hutchinson, T., & Duncan, N., (2010), ‘Defining what we do - Doctrinal Legal Research’, (City 
University London, ALT), pp 30. 
679
 Salter, M., & Mason, J., (2007), ‘Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide to the Conduct 
of Legal Research’, (Pearson Longman, UK), pp 19-36. 
680
 Twining, W., (1994), ‘Blackstone’s Tower: The English Law School’, (1
st
 Ed, Stevens & Sons, London), 
pp 131; even the lowest forms of exposition involve interpretation, selection and arrangement. 
681
 Hutchinson, T., (2010), ‘Researching and Writing in Law’, (3
rd
 Ed, Thomson Reuters, London), pp 41. 
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Because every Act defines its jurisdictional methods; for instance, Section 9 of 
the Defamation Act 2013 explains the jurisdiction for foreign-based defendants. 
 
3. Choice of system: The third choice to be made is which conception of a 
‘system’ is used (is it cyberspace or the internet infrastructure which need 
regulation (see-2.2.3)). Next to the elements that make up the system and the 
techniques used to describe it, one needs an idea of when this combination of 
elements and techniques forms a system (libel is a social media conduct, so the 
conduct can be regulated rather than social media).  
 
3.12.1.: Conclusion: 
  
This is a library-based thesis which focuses on case-law, statutes and other legal 
sources. The analysis of old cases would establish that how the traditional rules being 
applied. The analysis of recent cases would confirm if the same rules apply to cross-
border nature of cyberspace. The comparison of both analyses would determine if the 
approach of judges has been changed or the laws are altered/modified for particular 
issue. The opinions of scholars on the issue of jurisdiction will also be evaluated. This is 
an exploratory study in that it involves a search of an array of sources dealing with libel 
and social media use. To stay up-to-date with the pressing issues regarding individual 
reputation affected by new media, this thesis examines unmediated sources such as 
blogs, video blogs, social reviews, European Union institutions and other bodies. 
Contributions by a range of contributors from the Internet scholars to professional 
journalists to law firms to private citizens.  
 
The Defamation Act 2013 is used herein to indicate English laws. Secondary sources 
include books and journal articles, case commentary, as well as online sources of 
traditional news reportage and opinion, online dictionaries and encyclopedia. To 
support particular points, this thesis employs government, non-governmental, 
institutional and social empirical study results. In short, the doctrinal method will 
provide the starting point for this project, which will begin with a critique of the 
existing literature and commentary undertaken in the area of defamation jurisdiction. 
This included, among other things, textbooks, journal articles, conference papers, 
newspaper reports and online information. While these secondary resources are not 
authoritative in doctrinal research, they may be persuasive. 
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3.13.: Vision of this methodology: 
 
This methodology provides a novel vision for researchers who intend to research in any 
field of law. It can be divided into four phases. See Table-5. 
 
Table-5: Vision of Legal Methodology 
 
# VISION OUTCOME THIS THESIS 
 
PHASE 1 
 
Act as a litigant 
Gather initial 
information/build 
a strategy (pros & 
cons) 
 
Ch1, Ch2, Ch3 
 
PHASE 2 
 
Act as a 
Lawyer 
Find legal 
information & 
sources 
 
Ch4, Ch5, Ch6 
 
PHASE 3 
 
Act as a Judge 
Analyse 
arguments and 
conclude 
 
Ch7, Ch8 
 
PHASE 4 
 
Act as 
media/review 
Review the result 
as a layman to 
critique and give 
alternative 
solutions 
 
 Ch9 
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CHAPTER 4 - (PIL) 
 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
(It also named as conflict of law) 
 
  
SECTION 2:  
Understanding of Jurisdiction and Online 
Libel 
[CH. 4; CH. 5 and CH. 6] 
 146 
 
4.1.: Background: 
“Conflict of laws is regarded as an arcane science far removed from real-world 
concerns, and characterised by an esoteric vocabulary; it inevitably attracts speculative 
minds whose forte is not necessarily common sense
682” 
 
Social media users transmit information instantaneously and globally with a mouse 
click and form legal relationships without any physical element
683
. This communication 
poses a challenge to the application of private international law because of its reliance 
on geographical connecting factors (see-7.1). English courts have resolved cross-border 
disputes even before the advent of the internet
684
. English judges are quite famous in 
undertaking the conflicts even when none of the parties is from England
685
 (see-2.17). 
The case law
686
 suggests that judges place increasing reliance on statutory interpretation 
to determine cross-border application of legislation; therefore, there should not be a 
problem in applying traditional rules to cyberspace defamation. However, these disputes 
can only be decided if court has personal jurisdiction.  
 
In the absence of ‘personal jurisdiction’, the court will have to dismiss the claim. The 
court, which is declining the jurisdiction, cannot decide
687
: 
 
1. Which other court can litigate this case 
2. Which court can/cannot exercise jurisdiction 
3. What can be the possible outcome of the case688 
 
In the absence of ‘personal jurisdiction’, English courts have discretionary power under 
CPR r6.36, to exercise its jurisdiction but in certain circumstances
689
 (see-7.8).  
 
 
                                                          
682
 Friedrich K. J., (2000), ‘Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws’, Transnational Classics in International 
Law, (1
st 
Ed, Transnational Pub), pp ix. 
683
 Bigos, O., (2005), ‘Jurisdiction over Cross-Border Wrongs on the Internet’, ICLQ, Vol 54, pp 585-602; 
technically it involves physical elements in the real world in the forms of users and devices 
684
 Davidson v Annesley [1926] Ch. 692. 
685
 The reason could be the English language, awards in damages or arbitrary clauses etc. 
686
 Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] UKSC 23; Dar Al Arkan Real Estate Development Co v Majid Al-Sayed 
Bader Hashim Al Refai [2014] EWCA Civ 715; Office of Fair Trading v Lloyds TSB Bank [2007] UKHL 48. 
687
 Lino, S., (2015), ‘Cyberspace regulation: Cesurist and Traditionalists’,  Journal of International 
Relations, Vol 6, Issue 1, pp 86-99. 
688
 Calster, G., (2013), ‘European Private International Law’, (1
st
 Ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford), pp 1. 
689
 The English court takes into account the interest of the parties, interest of an economical trial, the 
public interest, right to fair trial and forum conveniens. 
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4.1.1.: Discretionary Jurisdiction: 
 
Jurisdiction laws simply guide the claimant where to look for a decision. However, 
these rules cannot decide the merits of a case because jurisdiction is ‘a link’ between 
social media, courts and the litigants
690
. If ‘a link’ within the forum can be 
established
691
, English court can assume discretionary jurisdiction. This link can be the 
gravity of the damage to reputation
692
, which occurred within the state. This pertinent 
question was discussed in the PJS [2016]
693
 case, where court upheld an injunction in 
absence of personal jurisdiction. The required link was that the alleged content was first 
published in England and then disseminated over the internet. For instance, Theresa 
May suffers harm because of a post published in India than English judges may be 
reluctant to assume jurisdiction because similar jurisdiction may also exist in Indian 
procedural laws
694. However, if the damage is sustained ‘only in England’ then English 
judges can exercise discretionary jurisdiction because there may not be any parallel 
jurisdiction available to the defendant.  
 
Even more importantly, if a court assumes discretionary jurisdiction, it still has to apply 
the traditional rules: Is a service of a writ outside possible; what are CPR provisions 
applicable; is it a case involving concurrent proceedings; does this online dispute has an 
arbitration clause; can the foreign proceedings be restrained in an online libel case
695
.  
After applying all the rules, the fundamental question remains: Will the trial of this 
online defamation case takes place in England or abroad? At this point, this chapter 
connects with the subject matter of this thesis that if the social media libel trial takes 
place in England, then, which laws are to be applied.  
 
 
 
                                                          
690
 Rogerson, P., (2010), ‘Private International Law – Jurisdiction’, the Cambridge Law Journal, Vol 69, 
Issue 3, pp 452-455. 
691
  Lord Collins of Mapesbury, (2012), ‘Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws’, (15
th
 Ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London), Rule 34, at para 11.141. 
692
 King v Lewis [2005] ILPr 16. 
693
 PJS v News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26. 
694
 Concurrent jurisdiction is outside the scope of this thesis. However, if a claim is issued for the 
damage suffered only in one country, it will provide a link for discretionary jurisdiction. For global 
damages, any court must have personal jurisdiction. 
695
 Arzandeh, A., (2017), ‘The English Court’s Service-Out Jurisdiction in International Tortious Disputes’, 
Law Quarterly Review, Vol 133, pp 144-160. 
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4.1.2: Synopsis of the chapter: 
 
This chapter will only evaluate the practical issues in exercising jurisdiction for the 
online defamation. There will be a test of the factors, which hinders the application of 
traditional laws to the internet. The thorough analysis of recent case law is conducted in 
chapter 7. This chapter will only evaluate this issue from the perspective of English 
private international law, which will identify how digital communication is 
accommodated by English courts using traditional jurisdiction laws: 
 
1. The structure and content of private international law 
2. The relationship between private and public international law 
3. The interaction between PIL and pertinent aspects of national law 
 
4.2.: What is private international law? (PIL) 
 
The Nielson
696
 case established that private international law rules help to achieve 
consistency in international litigation. It
697
 is a branch of domestic law, which assists in 
matters of private individuals at international law
698
. It is a part of all the sovereign 
states national law
699
. It reminds the fact that there are different territorial jurisdictions 
in the world
700
. These territorial jurisdictions possess different laws so it becomes more 
relevant whenever there is a dispute of transitional level
701
. Its rules have been 
developed to accommodate global activity within the framework of domestic legal 
units. It first came to prominence in English courts towards the end of the 18
th
 century, 
mainly because of conflicts between the laws of England and Scotland. In the 19
th
 
century, its development was enormously accelerated by the rapid increase in 
                                                          
696
 Neilson v Overseas Projects Corporation of Victoria [2005] 221 ALR 213. 
697
 Its rules merely refers to either a competent court, the applicable law, or whether recognition and 
enforcement are possible. These are procedural rules, or perhaps rather as technical or formal rules, 
which are not concerned with the substance of a dispute; Bogdin, M., (2012), ‘Private International Law 
as Component of the Law of the Forum’, The Pocket Books of The Hague Academy of International Law, 
Vol 13, pp 348. 
698
 McClean, D., & Ruiz, V., (2012), ‘The Conflict of Laws’, (8
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 2. 
699
 Schibsby v Westenholz [1870] LR 6 QB 155. 
700
 Bonomi, A., (1999), ‘Mandatory rules in private international law: the quest for uniformity of 
decisions in a global environment’, Yearb Private Int Law, Vol 1, Issue 1, pp 215-247. 
701
 Westlake, A., (1925), ‘Treatise on Private International Law’ (7
th
 Ed, Sweat & Maxwell), pp 1. 
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commercial and social intercourse between England and Continental Europe and with 
the British territories overseas
702
.  
 
Eady J
703
 stated that ‘English private international law has held for many years, in order 
partly to achieve consistency and certainty’. The scale of social media’s global reach, 
which always involves foreign elements
704
, may be beyond the geographical limits. PIL 
is still the quintessential national law of all
705
 because it provides the basis for 
jurisdiction and the system of applicable law
706
. The requisite elements of private 
international law are: 
 
1. Domicile, nationality, residence as connecting factor 
2. Rules governing jurisdiction 
3. Applicable law 
4. Choice of forum 
5. Civil procedural rules 
6. Service outside of jurisdiction 
 
 4.2.1.: Sources of private international law: 
 
Private international law has a variety of sources and can be found in the national 
legislation, civil procedural rules, international treaties and European regulations
707
. 
Interestingly, the objectives of private international law rules do not differ between the 
states because every court must be competent before trying a case
708
. However, the 
substantive law (which identify applicable law) may be used differently along the 
globe
709
.  
                                                          
702
 Lord Collins of Mapesbury, (2012), ‘Dicey, Collins and Morris: The Conflict of Laws’, (15
th
 Ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell), Vol 1, pp 9. 
703
 Iran v Berend [2007] EWHC 132 (QB); the judge assumed jurisdiction but accepted that the applicable 
law was ‘French law’ and refused to apply English law on this issue. 
704
 Svantesson, D.J.B., (2011), ‘Recent Developments in Private International Law Applicable to the 
Internet’, Journal of Internet Law, Vol 15, Issue 6, pp 26-35; the publishers or ISPs are usually based in 
foreign jurisdictions. 
705
 Paul, JR., (1988), ‘The Isolation of Private International Law’, Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol 
7, pp 149. 
706
 Conflict of Laws, http://conflictoflaws.uslegal.com/ [accessed 18
th
 January 2018]. 
707
 Westlake, A., (1925), ‘Treatise on Private International Law’ (7
th
 Ed, Sweat & Maxwell), pp 3. 
708
 Du-Bois, I., (1988), ‘The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the Distinction Between Interstate and 
International Transactions’, Minn. LR, Vol 17, pp 361. 
709
 Ginsburg, J. C., & Sirinelli, P., (2015), ‘Private International Law Aspects of Authors' Contracts: The 
Dutch and French Examples’, Colum. Journal of Law & Arts, Vol 39, pp 171. 
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The general sources of private international law rules are
710
: 
 
4.2.1.1.: Civil procedural rules: 
 
Civil procedural rules defined in Para 6 are one of the main national sources of English 
law (see-6.6, 2.11.6.3) 
 
4.2.1.2.: Judicial decisions: 
 
The main source of choice of law rules in England remains the common law (see-7.2). 
 
4.2.1.3.: Constitutional sources: 
 
The Commonwealth constitution includes some provisions important to private 
international law questions. However, in England, it may only have persuasive 
importance only. 
 
4.2.1.4.: International conventions: 
 
Private international law is about the national law of England. Some of this law has its 
origins in international conventions and only becomes part of the substantive law of 
England if enacted by legislation (see-2.7). UN conventions may try to adopt 
international conventions that introduce uniform legislation (substantive law). The 
Brussels Convention, the Lugano Convention and Hague Conventions did not introduce 
uniform substantive laws, but it introduced a uniform ‘conflict of law’ (see-1.8.1). 
 
4.2.1.5.: EU Directives: 
 
The jurisdiction of English courts over ‘civil and commercial matters’ is governed by 
‘the Regulation711’. England is a part of the EU, whose laws have supremacy over 
English domestic rules (see-2.7.1). The situation may change after the completion of 
                                                          
710
 Jitta, D. J., (1919), ‘Development of Private International Law through Conventions’, Yale LJ, Vol 29, 
pp 497; Dean, W. T., (1950), ‘The Conflict of Conflict of Laws’, Stan. L. Rev, Vol 3, Issue 388; Bayitch, S. 
A., (1954), ‘Conflict Law in United States Treaties’, Miami LQ, Vol 9, Issue 9; Cook, W. W., (1931), ‘The 
Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Laws’, Colum. L. Rev., Vol 31, pp 368. 
711
 Recast Brussel Regulation 2012 replaced the earlier Brussel I regulation. 
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‘Brexit’. Besides, statutory rights claims of defamation, privacy and personality 
breaches are excluded by Article 1 (2)
712
. Therefore, these claims will be decided under 
domestic and common law rules for the purpose of applicable law. As far as jurisdiction 
is concerned, if a defendant is non-EU based, English CPR rules will determine court’s 
competence. 
 
4.2.1.6.: Legislation: 
 
English private international law rules are codified in the ‘Civil Procedural Rules 1998’. 
These rules are based on ‘physical presence’, ‘service of writ’ and ‘forum non 
conveniens’. 
 
4.2.1.7.: Scholarly writing: 
 
Why the courts adopt these rules and why they sometimes have difficulties applying the 
rules. Various authors (Dicey, Morris, Peter Stone, Peter Hay, Adrian Briggs, Uta Kohl, 
Wendy Collins, and Muir Watt) have written commentaries on conflict of law rules 
(see-4.4.1). 
 
4.2.2.: Objectives/rationale of Private International Law: 
 
Why does a court ever apply a foreign law – why not simply apply law of forum? What 
is the policy/theory underpinning private international law? (see Table-6 and Table-7) 
 
Private international law rules will be used to look for the issue in the case not the cause 
of action
713
. Its application will lead to the assumption of personal jurisdiction and 
application of foreign law in the forum. The reasons for applying private international 
law are to fulfil reasonable and legitimate expectations of the parties involved in a 
                                                          
712
 Rome II Regulation does not apply to statutory regime enacted in the Private Internation Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
713
 MacMillan v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc [1996] WLR 387; Staughton LJ noted that in the case 
involving foreign element, it is important to decide what system of law is to be applied, either to the 
case as a whole or to a particular issue. 
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dispute
714. Similarly, ‘choice of law’ promotes certainty, fairness, predictability and 
uniformity by applying foreign law
715
. 
 
If a court disregards the foreign law, it may lead to injustice for the injured party
716
. 
Similarly, if the court does not entertain international claims, it may disregard the 
element of certainty and consistency. International harmony can only be achieved by 
using private international law
717
 because it allows the application of foreign law, which 
produces global judicial harmony
718
. Besides the rules of conflict of laws benefits the 
forum state because it benefits from stability concerning cross-border legal 
relationships
719
. Therefore, the objectives of private international rules are
720
: 
 
1. Consistency 
2. Comity 
3. Particular justice 
 
Table-6: Rationale Of Private International Law 
 
# Meaning Element Jurisdiction Choice of law 
Lex fori The law of 
forum 
Only Local 
element / no 
foreign 
By default By connecting 
factors 
Lex loci delicti The law of the 
place where the 
tort committed 
Foreign element 
is must 
Has to 
determine 
jurisdiction 
By lex causae 
Both are determined under private international law because a domestic claimant may 
have dual nationality. The next step is procedural law see Table-7 
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 Keyes, M., (2008), ‘Statutes, Choice of Law, and the Role of Forum Choice’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 4, Issue 1, pp 14. 
715
 Hook, M., (2017), ‘The "statutist trap" and subject-matter jurisdiction’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 435. 
716
 Clarkson, V., & Hill, J., (2011), ‘The conflict of laws’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp 9-12. 
717
 Mills, A., (2017), ‘The 'Hague choice of court convention' and cross-border commercial dispute 
resolution in Australia and the Asia-pacific’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 18, Issue 1, pp 
1-15. 
718
 Dicey, A.V., Morris, C., & Collins, A., (2012), ‘The conflict of laws’, (Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 5. 
719
 Bogdan, M., (2012), ‘Private international law as component of the law of the forum: General course’, 
The Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, pp 49-70. 
720
 Hook, M., (2017), ‘The "statutist trap" and subject-matter jurisdiction’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 435. 
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4.3.: The procedure of using PIL: 
 
Cyberspace disputes will have links to almost all countries in the world
721
. To solve this 
conflict numerous, varied and contradictory system of national laws may have to be 
applied. This globalisation and extraterritorial claims allow the use of PIL in 
cyberspace. Sir Hersch Lauterpacht stated
722
 that “the purpose of private international 
law is to make possible the application, within the territory of a state, of the law of 
foreign states. This is an object dictated by considerations of justice, and the necessities 
of international intercourse between individuals and indeed, by the enlightened 
conception of public policy itself”. 
 
The procedure of PIL in a cyberspace case would as follow: 
 
1. Assumption of jurisdiction – authority of the court 
2. Characterisation of legal issue – cause of action 
3. Classification of the rule of law – choice of law 
 
4.3.1.: Jurisdiction: 
 
The very first issue a court will have to decide if it has the authority to adjudicate this 
case. In England, the courts must have both the subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction (see-6.6.2). Subject matter jurisdiction ensures that all the proceedings are 
initiated in the appropriate courts
723. For instance, a claimant of ‘privacy breach’ cannot 
turn to the family court for a remedy. Personal jurisdiction is the core theme of this 
thesis, hence discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
721
 Svantesson, D.J.B., (2011), ‘Recent Developments in Private International Law Applicable to the 
Internet’, Journal of Internet Law, Vol 15, Issue 6, pp 26-35. 
722
 Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v Sweden) 
(The Boll Case) 55 ICJ Reports (1958), pp 95. 
723
 Rice, D. T., (2000), ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: which law and forum apply to securities transactions 
on the Internet’, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, Vol 21, Issue 3, pp 
585-658. 
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4.3.2.: Characterisation: 
 
After deciding jurisdiction, the important thing a judge must do is to categorise the legal 
question under a particular legal heading, is called characterisation
724
. It is also known 
as classification
725
, which is one of the crucial stages in the litigation because the 
outcome of any cyber-dispute may entirely depend on the initial characterisation
726
. It 
helps the judge to identify the cause of action, for example, is the dispute relates to 
contract, defamation, tort, privacy or any other online issue.  
 
Let’s The analyses of the Ogden727 case will explain the classification system in private 
international law. A French national of 21, married an English national, without 
obtaining the consent of his parent. The marriage took place in England, where consent 
at the age of 21 is not required, whereas in French law consent is required. This is a 
typical PIL case involving two applicable laws. Under French law, this marriage is void, 
whereas in England it is a valid marriage. The characterisation involves two 
questions
728
: 
 
1. Has some system of foreign law created the right or duty that has been alleged? 
2. Will that foreign-created status or right be recognised and enforced in the 
forum? 
 
The importance of characterisation can be explained by the Raiffeisen
729
 case, which 
involves a marine insurance policy by a French company. The policy was assigned to 
the claimant with the sale of the ship. When the claimant brought the proceedings in 
England, the French company argued that governing law was French. Now, if the 
decision is made according to the English law the assignment of the policy is valid, 
whereas under French law this assignment would be void. This case explains the 
importance of characterisation because in cyberspace even a simple case of defamation 
                                                          
724
 MacMillan v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc [1996] WLR 387; in private international law any 
dispute which involves a foreign element, characterisation is the second step, which reconcile 
differences between laws of different legal jurisdictions and identifies the applicable law. 
725
 It refers to the allocation question raised by factual situation before the court to its correct legal 
category and its object is to reveal the relevant rule or rules for the choice of law. 
726
 Vartanian, T., (2000), ‘Whose laws rule the internet? A U.S. perspective on the law of jurisdiction in 
cyberspace’, International Law Forum, Vol 2, Issue 3, pp 196-201. 
727
 Ogden v Ogden [1908] PN 6. 
728
 Lorenzen, E. G., (1941), ‘The Qualification, Classification, or Characterization Problem in the Conflict 
of Laws’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol 50, Issue 5, pp 743-761. 
729
 Raffelsen Zentral Bank v Five Star General Trading [2001] CLC 84. 
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may have many defendants with different nationalities. Similarly, in some countries 
defamation is dealt with under civil law, whereas in some countries, it could be a 
criminal matter. Hence, the initial characterisation would change the whole outcome of 
a simple online defamation claim. 
 
4.3.2.2.: The process of characterisation: 
 
The process of characterisation identifies the cause of action which then lead towards 
the ‘choice of law730’ i.e. before deciding ‘choice of law’ issue the court has to analyse 
the submissions towards the dispute
731
 or identify the factual aspects the issue.  
 
This process is completed in two steps
732
:  
 
1. A person’s status: (minor, infant, adult, married, single, insane)  
 
It is determined by personal law, which is decided based on domicile and 
nationality (is the defendant domiciled in England or holds British nationality). 
If yes, then English law is applicable (see-4.6.2).  
 
2. Creation of rights and duties: 
 
It is determined by law of the location or where the property is located. In social 
media libel claims, the location of property is not identifiable; therefore, 
governing law is determined differently. For instance, the issues related to the 
tort of defamation will be governed using lex loci actus; the issues involving a 
breach of online contract will be governed by lex contractus; and the dispute 
involved property use lex situs to determine the governing law in social media. 
(The ‘art’ stolen via the internet becomes complicated with the application of lex 
situs; however it is beyond the scope of this thesis). 
 
                                                          
730
 Wang, F., (2010), ‘Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US and China’, 
(Cambridge University Press, UK), pp 7. 
731
 Cheshire (1938), ‘Private International Law’, (2
nd
 Ed, UK), pp 30. 
732
 Allarousse, V., (1991), ‘A Comparative Approach to the Conflict of Characterization in Private 
International Law’, Case W. Res. Journal of International Law, Vol 23, pp 479. 
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The questions related to the person’s status will determine if the defendant is minor or 
not. Similarly, the question related to the allocation of rights and duties will determine if 
he owes the same capacity as an adult. For instance, if a minor is involved in defaming 
President Trump, can the same duties be imposed on that minor as well?  
 
4.3.2.3.: Substantive law versus procedural law: 
 
In cross-border cases, courts have to resolve two different conflicts
733
:  
 
1. Conflict of jurisdiction (either private or public international law)  
2. Conflict of applicable laws (either substantive law734 or procedural law735). 
 
Private international law principles are applied once there is ‘individual foreign 
element’ involved736, whereas public international laws are only applicable if the issue 
involves a state versus private entity. Importantly, the rules relating to the applicable 
law are different from rules of jurisdiction737. Regulations about applicable law are 
substantive (these rules may lead to the application of foreign law in England); whereas 
provisions relating jurisdiction are procedural, (they will decide whether England is 
competent or England has no authority)738. The jurisdiction rules, which are procedural 
or formal rules, are not concerned with the parties involved or the substance of a 
dispute. It can be understood from Table-7. 
  
                                                          
733
 Ahmed, M., & Beaumont, P., (2017), ‘Exclusive choice of court agreements: Some issues on the 
Hague convention on choice of court agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I recast 
especially anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT, Journal of 
Private International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 386. 
734
 Substantive rules explain whether if law of tort, law of contract, property law or family law is applied. 
Court may apply foreign substantive law  or lex causae. 
735
 Procedural rule describe what is civil procedural law, how to collect evidence and calculation of 
damages etc. Procedural rules  will always be the law of the forum/lex fori.  
736
 Mills, A., (2009), ‘The Confluence of Public and Private International Law’, (Cambridge University 
Press, UK), pp 55. 
737
 Mills, A., (2017), ‘The 'Hague choice of court convention' and cross-border commercial dispute 
resolution in Australia and the Asia-pacific’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 18, Issue 1, pp 
1-15. 
738
 Dicey, Morris and Collins (2012), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ in Lord Collins (eds.) (15
th
 Ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London), pp [1–020] & [1–022]. 
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Table-7
739
: Procedure v substance of case 
 
 
Procedural Law 
 
Substantive Law 
 
Private International law 
 
CPR, Evidence, 
limitation period, 1 
year rule for libel, 
calculation of 
damages 
 
 
Law of contract, family 
Law, law of property, 
law of tort- defamation, 
libel 
 
Rules of choice of law, (law of the 
place where the tort was 
committed) 
It will always be the 
law of the forum/lex 
fori. There is never a 
question of an 
English court 
applying civil 
procedure laws of 
any other state 
An English court may 
apply the foreign 
substantive law or Lex 
causae (it is the law 
chosen by the forum 
court from the relevant 
legal systems. 
lex loci delecti and 
lex situs  are rules on choice of 
law i.e. is England defamation law 
or other country’s defamation law 
is applicable 
 
This procedure is not cost effective and may also delay the process of delivering justice 
because social media libel cases may have two conflicts i.e. conflict of substantive law 
and conflict of choice of law. For instance, in the Annesley
740
 case, an English testator 
disowned his son in his ‘will’. He later died in France but had acquired French domicile 
before his death. His son disputed the credibility of his will. Both, English court (his son 
was in England) and French court (the deceased acquired French domicile) had 
jurisdictions. The substantive law of England differs from substantive law of France. 
Under French law, son gets 2/3 of the property whereas, under English law, son gets 
nothing. Now applying private international law rules – under English probate law the 
‘will’ is decided by the domicile (which is French) and under French probate law the 
‘will’ is decided by nationality (which is England). This case represents a ‘choice of 
law’ conflict. 
                                                          
739
 Bogdan, M., (2012), ‘Private international law as component of the law of the forum: General course’, 
The Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, pp 71. 
740
 Davidson v Annesley [1926] CH 692. 
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4.3.3.: Choice of Law: 
 
The 'choice of law' decides the proper or applicable law. It is a process, which helps 
English courts to decide which of the competing laws apply to the case
741
. Defamation 
can take place in various jurisdictions at the same time. Hence, law of the cause would 
determine the characterisation because of the events took place in other jurisdictions 
(see-7-11). However, it is noted that the rules of lex causae are very complex to 
determine choice of law. So, when it will be applied to online cases along with the 
private international law rules, it will become even more complicated (see-7.13). 
Therefore, this chapter suggests the application of the rules of lex fori instead of lex 
causae. Auld LJ
742
 also suggested that it can fruitfully be applied to classify a social 
media libel case.  
 
Lex The forum law deals with the law of the country in which an action is brought (see-
6.4.2). Therefore, if the claim is brought in an English court, it should be dealt under the 
Defamation Act 2013. Obviously, the defendant gets the right to challenge the 
jurisdiction (see-6.8.1). If the defendant submits to the English jurisdiction, then English 
laws must be applied. It may produce certainty and the verdict can be instantaneous. 
The effects of the classification of any dispute are to find a connecting factor. It is 
explained in detail below because it will determine whether if English courts allow 
forum shopping (see-4.6).  Generally, cause of action for tort of defamation is 
determined under the law where the tort occurred.  
 
4.3.3.1: Lex loci delicti: 
 
The traditional rules of lex loci delicti determine the law of the place where the tort 
committed
743
. In the Zhang
744
 case, the defendant was a French company and the 
claimant was domiciled in New South Wales. The court applied French law because the 
tort was committed in France. Nevertheless, the courts are bound to conduct 'forum 
                                                          
741
 Banu, R., (2017), ‘A relational feminist approach to conflict of laws’, Michigan Journal of Gender & 
Law, Vol 24, Issue 1, pp 1-15. 
742
 Macmillan v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc [1996] 1 All ER 585; Staughton LJ stated that if a case 
involves a foreign element, it becomes important to decide what system of law is to be applied (either 
to the case as a whole or to a particular issue or issues). 
743
 Williams v State Farm [1994] 229 Conn. 359; the court held that the substantive rights arising out of a 
tort controversy are determined by the law of the place of (tort) injury.  
744
 Regie National Des Usines Renault Sa v Zhang [2002] 210 CLR 491. 
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conveniens' test, which helps to identify whether the litigants are forum shoppers. The 
forum shopping is not about going and getting a result, but preventing people from 
transferring actions from one system to another
745
. Judge Jerome
746
 refused the 
defendant’s challenge on ‘forum non conveniens’ basis and decided that forum 
shopping means filing an action in a court which favours the claimant (see-2.7.2, 2.17.1, 
6.9.1.2). 
 
4.3.3.2: Practical implications of choice of law:  
 
Undoubtedly, every country has the power to prosecute a foreigner who commits a 
crime, breaches the law or provides illegal service in that country
747
. However, 
cyberspace provides anonymity because it allows the users to obfuscate their identity 
and location, yet there is no mechanism to deny service to such users (see-2.10.2). 
Traditional legal system can only operate properly if the location or the identity of the 
defendant is known
748
. Hence, such internet users should not be provided with the 
service. (It is a broad topic and beyond the scope of this thesis). 
 
The central question is how courts can fit the internet into the traditional legal 
framework of a jurisdiction. Being on social media, the users do not necessarily know 
what laws to follow. They only know the law of their country; however, they may not 
know the laws of the countries they will be interacting using Facebook or Twitter. In the 
case of misconduct, every internet user may want to be prosecuted according to their 
municipal laws. Under a traditional system, even if something is legal in a social media 
user’s domicile,  there is a possibility that he may be  brought into court in a foreign 
country i.e. a user can be fined for something he believed was not misconduct in his 
country (see-7.15).  In this era of social communication, the users can unwittingly open 
themselves to liability by sharing a post against the idea of Greater Israel, sharing 
women in miniskirts photos in Islamic countries, a tweet against the royal family, etc.   
 
  
                                                          
745
 Lord Cooper in the case of Louisa Docherty v Secretary Of State [2015] CSOH 149. 
746
 Sequa Corp v Aetan Casualty & Surety Co [1990] C.A. No. 89-234-JRR.  
747
 Banu, R., (2017), ‘A relational feminist approach to conflict of laws’, Michigan Journal of Gender & 
Law, Vol 24, Issue 1, pp 1-15. 
748
 Rogerson, P., (2017), ‘Economic torts in the conflict of laws’, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol 76, 
Issue 2, pp 240. 
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4.3.3.3.: Methods of choice of law: 
 
The choice of law can be done in three ways
749
: 
 
1. Expressed choice of law750 
2. Implied choice of law751 
3. Oral choice of law (irrelevant for social media defamation) 
 
4.4.: The concept of jurisdiction: 
 
Jurisdiction constitutes an important part of private international law, but this term does 
not have an official definition
752
. Its meaning was enhanced in the Anisnimic
753
 case that 
“it is such an expression which is used in a variety of senses and connotations, and takes 
its colour from its context”. Lord Reid754 noted that it is a term having both broad and 
narrow sense. “It is better not to use the term except in the narrow and original sense of 
the tribunal being entitled to enter on the inquiry in question”. Generally, jurisdiction is 
regarded as the authority within a geographic boundary. It grants a court the power, 
which in terms may be extended to allow: (1) The police to arrest, (2) the claimant to 
serve a foreign defendant, (3) a judge to determine a case, (4) the jury to give its verdict 
and, (5) a judge to impose a penalty.  
 
4.4.1.: Scholarly debate:  
 
1. Akehurst755 - considered jurisdiction from an international rather than an 
internal or constitutional perspective. He distinguished among executive, 
                                                          
749
 Law Commission (1990), ‘Private international law: Choice of law in tort and delict’, ISBN 
0102065918, HC 65; Blom, J., (1981), ‘Choice of Law Methods in the Private International Law of 
Contract’, Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol 18, pp 161-200. 
750
 Ferguson Shipbuilders v Voith Hydro GmbH [2000] S.L.T. 229; the court will take the literal meaning if 
there exists a choice of law clause in any dispute.  
751
 Fentiman, R., (2010), ‘International Commercial Litigation’, (Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp 195; 
court can only infer implied choice if under the circumstances the parties may have added an express 
clause. It is mostly relevant contract cases however can be interpreted where the users agree to the 
terms of a social network not to publish derogatory material.  
752
 It is derived from the Latin terms ‘juris’ and ‘dicto’, meaning  “I speak by the law". 
753
 Anisnimic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1967] 2 All ER 986 at 994. 
754
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 1 All ER 208. 
755
 Michael, A., (1975), ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, British Yearbook of International Law, Vol 46, 
pp 145–257. 
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judicial, and legislative jurisdiction in the sense of the power of a state to deal 
with cases having a foreign element  
2. Bantekas756 - discusses the exercise of jurisdiction among international criminal 
tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and national courts  
3. Bowett757 - explained jurisdiction as a manifestation of state sovereignty. He 
examines the legal and practical grounds for prescriptive jurisdiction. He viewed 
that the territorial, nationality, protective, and universality principles are the 
principle of a state to establish rules of behaviour of that state  
4. Cassese758 - discusses the relationship between the jurisdiction of international 
courts and tribunals and that of national courts, especially the issues of primacy 
and complementarity  
5. Mann759 - he pointed out that jurisdiction is an inherent power of a state to 
determine public international law. He believed that the question of whether 
court or judiciary has the power to decide particular case must be limited to 
public international law. 
6. Mann760 - reaffirms the position of Mann 1964, with a discussion of new 
developments both in theory and in practice 
7. Ryngaert761 - proposed theoretical basis to analyse jurisdiction. He discusses 
territoriality principle and the assertion of extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction.  
 
The above explains that jurisdiction can be studied in various contexts. Lord 
Wilberforce noted, “It is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and 
connotations, and takes its colour from its context
762”. This thesis will view it from a 
legal perspective, which states that jurisdiction defines certain parameters of a court. 
 
  
                                                          
756
 Ilias, B., (2010), ‘International Criminal Law’ (4th Ed, Hart Publication, Oxford), Part 4 - Enforcement 
of International Criminal Law.   
757
 Bowett, D. W., (1982), ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and Resources’, 
British Yearbook of International Law, Vol 53, Issue 1, pp 1–26. 
758
 Antonio, C., (2007), ‘International Criminal Law’, (2
nd
 Ed, Oxford University Press), Chapter 16 -  
International versus National Jurisdiction. 
759
 Frederick, A., (1964), ‘The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law’, Recueil des Cours, Vol 111, 
pp 1–162. 
760
 Frederick, A., (1984), ‘The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after Twenty Years’, Recueil 
des Cours, Vol 186, pp 9–116. 
761
 Cedric, R., (2008), ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’, (1st Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 31. 
762
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] UKHL 6 at 994. 
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4.4.2.: Definition of jurisdiction:  
 
Based on the power of the court, jurisdiction can be divided into two categories: 
‘Specific and general’ jurisdiction763. General jurisdiction is based on the relationship 
between ‘court and defendant’, whereas special jurisdiction is a link between ‘court and 
the facts’ of the case764.   
 
1. Specific jurisdiction is based on a link between the forum and the defendant, 
whose legal rights are involved. It mainly depends on a relationship between the 
court and some particular parts of the issues, which lead to the action
765
. Under 
the specific jurisdiction, the court can only start certain legal proceedings. For 
instance, in a cyber-claim, the issue may involve both defamation and 
cyberbullying; however, the court may only issue the proceedings for 
defamation claim. 
 
2. General jurisdiction allows the court to employ its power to decide cases without 
limitation, adjudicating on any claim brought by or against the porosities
766
. The 
assumption of general jurisdiction over a defendant is irrespective of the legal 
nature of the action
767
.  
 
For cyberspace defamation, this chapter recommends the use of electronic jurisdiction, 
which can be defined for general as well as a specific purpose. 
 
4.4.3.: Electronic jurisdiction:  
 
Electronic jurisdiction can be based on the fact that social media sites should conduct 
the initial hearing and then refer the case to the relevant state court. To use electronic 
jurisdiction for a preliminary hearing, a standard technological setup is required. In the 
absence of standardisation, it poses yet another challenge because of the different 
technological levels in different countries. It depends upon the level of security, 
                                                          
763
 Arzandeh, A., (2017), ‘The English Court’s Service-Out Jurisdiction in International Tortious Disputes, 
Law Quarterly Review, Vol 133, pp 144-160. 
764
 Hartley, T., C., (1984), ‘Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments’, (Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 23.  
765
 McClean, J.D., (1969), Jurisdiction and Judicial Discretion, ICLQ, Vol 18, Issue 4, pp 931. 
766
 Banu, R., (2017), ‘A relational feminist approach to conflict of laws’, Michigan Journal of Gender & 
Law, Vol 24, Issue 1, pp 1-15. 
767
 Kaczorowska, A., (2005), ‘Public International Law’, (3
rd
 Ed, Routledge Cavendish, UK), Ch. 6.   
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reliability and requirement of the laws of that sovereign country
768
. Based on the 
variation in technological difference, for this thesis, the jurisdiction will be taken in the 
following contexts (see-4.4.1): 
 
1. What is the origin of a court’s authority (is it a family, juvenile or domestic 
court). So, ‘jurisdiction rules’ will help in determining if a cyberspace dispute 
can be brought within requested court.  
 
2. What is a proper court for the cyberspace dispute at hand? An online dispute 
may occur in various forms and not every court may have expertise to decide 
cyberspace cases. So, ‘jurisdiction laws’ also help in determining proper court.  
 
3. Does the court have inherent authority to declare a judgment i.e. a cyberspace 
dispute falls in many jurisdictions at the same time? A case can be brought 
against the same defendant in another jurisdiction as well. It is called 
‘concurrent jurisdiction’, so, which court should declare the judgment? Hence, 
the jurisdiction will determine if a court has the inherent authority to hear a 
particular cyberspace dispute. 
 
These points draw a distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘assumption’ of jurisdiction. 
 
4.5.: Existence versus assumption of jurisdiction: 
 
The existence of jurisdiction is pre-condition to assume jurisdiction
769
. Lord 
Hobhouse
770
 established that “a court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. 
If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for 
setting matters right, and if that course is not taken, the decision; however wrong cannot 
be disturbed
771”. To exercise jurisdiction there must exist a personal jurisdiction, for 
example, a county court has the authority to resolve minor disputes, but it cannot 
                                                          
768
 Biegel, S., (2001), ‘Beyond Our Control?’, (1
st
 Ed, MIT press, London), pp 55; for instance, defamation 
is a civil action in England; however, it is treated as a criminal issue in many countries. 
769
 Hill, J., (2016), ‘Clarkson & Hill's Conflict of Laws’, (5
th
 Ed, Oxford University press), pp 116; Club 
Resorts Ltd v Van Breda [2012] SCC 17; a court can only assume jurisdiction if the test of ‘real and 
substantial connection’ is satisfied. If the forum has a real connection with the dispute it implies that 
there exists a jurisdiction.  
770
 Malkarjun v Narhari [1900] 27 IA 216. 
771
 Speedy Trial- Rulings - www.harjindersingh.in, 
https://sites.google.com/site/hsinghjudgmentscom/speedy-trial--rulings [Assessed 18
th
 August 2018] 
 164 
 
assume jurisdiction in cyber-terrorism cases
772
. If the county court gives its judgment in 
cyber terrorism case it will be void because that court does not have the jurisdiction and 
the expertise to resolve cyberspace disputes.  
 
4.5.1.: Jurisdiction versus place of suing:  
 
On the basis of ‘the place of suing’, a court may have pecuniary, territorial and subject-
matter jurisdiction
773
. Now trying a case without any of these jurisdictions will be an 
irregular exercise of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction
774
 and the decision will be void. 
It shows that the ‘place of suing’ is not compulsory to have ‘existence of jurisdiction’. 
The existence of jurisdiction is a statutory power granted to every court; it is a power 
inherently available to the legal authorities
775
. However, this power will only be 
considered appropriate once the court applies the rules of PIL to assume that 
jurisdiction. The claimant can bring a case to any court, but the court has to determine if 
it is the right place of suing. Whereas a ‘place of suing’ can be the locality where776: 
 
1. The dispute occurred  
2. The claimant resides  
3. The defendant is domiciled 
 
If the defendant is foreign-based, the claimant can request the court to allow the 
permission to serve outside the forum. 
 
4.5.2.: Service out of jurisdiction: 
 
If an English court is the ‘place of suing’, it does not allow that court automatic personal 
jurisdiction. A courts ‘personal jurisdiction’ can only be established if the defendant 
                                                          
772
 A court can only have authentic jurisdiction to decide a lawsuit if: (1) It have jurisdiction to try the 
case submitted, and (2) It must also have the authority to pass the order requested for. 
773
 AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier [2017] UKSC 13; the issue of law facing the Supreme Court to decide 
how to determine the proper place of a harmful event; previously courts assumed jurisdiction on the 
basis of ‘actual harm’. 
774
 The Supreme Court decided that the English courts did not have jurisdiction to decide the claim 
because the harm was suffered in Germany and overruled the decision of High Court on the basis of 
place of ‘actual harm’. 
775
 Lord Collins of Mapesbury, (2012), Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws, (15
th
 Ed, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London), Rule 34, at para 11.141. 
776
 Ubi Jus Ibi Remedium – ‘Where there is a right, there is a remedy’; the Common Law Procedure Act 
1852. 
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submits and accept that courts authority (see-6.8.2). If the defendant is abroad, the court 
can follow the CPR rules to allow service outside (see-6.9). English court will have 
personal jurisdiction if (1) the defendant submits to the proceedings or (2) the defendant 
is served with a claim form during his physical presence in England. In the 
circumstance, if a personal jurisdiction cannot be assumed the court has discretion to 
serve proceedings out of jurisdiction, which will provide the required base for 
jurisdiction (see-7.3). 
 
4.5.3.: Bases of jurisdiction: 
 
International law provides following three bases to exercise jurisdiction (see-2.7):  
 
1. Jurisdiction to prescribe - allows a state to apply its legal norms to conduct 
2. Jurisdiction to adjudicate – enables a state to resolve the dispute, where the state 
has authority to prescribe the law that is sought to be enforced 
3. Jurisdiction to enforce - allows a state to induce or compel compliance or to 
punish non-compliance with its rules or regulations (see-6.4.1). 
 
These bases of jurisdiction are mostly relevant in public international law, where a state 
has direct involvement (see-2.8.1). Private International Law provides the foundation to 
exercise jurisdiction for transnational disputes between private parties (see-2.8.3). It is 
part of the domestic civil procedure of England, which also regulates cyberspace 
disputes
777
. The required personal jurisdiction to resolve online defamation claim is 
determined by using traditional English rules under CPR
778. The revolutionist’s 
literature states that traditional methods of jurisdiction are not suitable for the internet 
because of its nature and functioning (see-1.6, 2.9.1). They demand a separate ‘cyber-
law’ for the resolution of cyberspace cases; however, the conservatives argue that 
traditional rules can be applied to exercise jurisdiction in the internet cases (see-1.5, 
2.10).  
 
A uniform and long-term online-jurisdiction solution could be obtained by forming an 
independent organisation.   
                                                          
777
 The Personal Jurisdiction, Choice of law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments are the 
areas of conflict under the law applicable to cyberspace. 
778
 Traditionally jurisdiction is also of three types: (1 ) Legislative, (2) Adjudicative and (3) Enforcement 
jurisdiction. 
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It can analyse both sides arguments to establish an ‘international treaty’ – the findings 
of this organisation must be binding on every country. Domestic laws can be updated 
following the guidelines for cyberspace jurisdiction – which will help in achieving a 
unanimous universal long-lasting solution. It will be time-consuming and challenging to 
implement (see-1.5.1); hence, the focus is still on the traditional rules. 
 
4.5.4.: Traditional jurisdiction bases: 
 
Jurisdiction rules are provided in domestic laws; hence, they differ from state to state 
because of their different legal systems and judicial bases (see-6.4.3). In England, 
traditional jurisdictional rules are based on connecting factors: locus delicti, permanent 
residence, domicile and nationality of the claimant or the defendant (see-4.6).  Before 
the widespread use of social media, there was a relatively established set of 
jurisdictional rules in PIL. Jurisdiction over civil cases involving foreign elements is 
determined by the jurisdiction bases adopted by that state. The ‘bases’ here refer to the 
subject/object of legal relations in civil cases involving foreign elements, or the 
connection between the facts of legal relations and where the court locates. Then, courts 
of a state will have jurisdiction over cases with such “bases.” In other words, 
jurisdictional bases can be regarded as the reason why courts have the authorities to hear 
certain civil cases involving foreign elements
779
. For social media defamation, there 
may be a need to develop another common connecting factor because of dual 
nationalities and the harm suffered in more than one location (see-6.3).  
 
4.6.: Connecting factor:  
 
Currently, there exists no comprehensive treaty on defamation and the rules of private 
international law. Hence, in cyberspace defamation, there can be various applicable 
rules to assess the jurisdiction so the court has to act consciously, either to assume or to 
decline jurisdiction in online defamation cases
780
. The absence of a legal framework 
applicable to cyberspace allowed the courts to adopt the national laws. These laws are 
the same as applied to physical world disputes.   
  
                                                          
779
 Loble, S., (1997), ‘Jurisdiction and Evidence: An English Perspective’, ILSA J. Int'l & Comp. L., Vol 4, pp 
489. 
780
 Guzman, A. T., (2001), ‘Choice of law: New foundations,’ Geo. LJ, Vol 90, pp 883. 
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To test the applicability of PIL to cyberspace conflicts, this study will also analyse the 
existing substantial and procedural provisions regarding jurisdictional issues i.e. a clear 
distinction of the connecting factor is required. There exist three different connecting 
factors
781
: 
 
1. Domicile 
2. Nationality 
3. Permanent Residence  
 
It is arguable that the nationality or domicile; and even the presence of the claimant, are 
not directly relevant to the issue of jurisdiction
782
. This will be a significant advantage 
in assuming jurisdiction in social media defamation, which has may 
defendants/claimants (see-5.5.2.1). However, the physical presence, which also depends 
on the permanent residence of a defendant in cyberspace, could be an issue (see-2.3.1, 
4.5.2, 6.9). 
 
4.6.1.: Domicile or nationality: 
 
Connecting factors which, produces fairness and convenience, are designed on two 
policies: (1) Administration of justice and (2) Predictability in litigation justice
783
. All 
the connecting factors may serve a similar purpose if employed in equal measure, but 
may not be applied in harmony for internet cases. For instance, connecting factor 
determines the jurisdiction and applicable law, but in electronic transactions these 
factors become vague
784
. The internet technological advances demands these 
traditionally applied connecting factors to be reshaped, especially for social media 
communication. In social media libel claims, ‘place of damage’ and ‘place of 
uploading’ of content is vitally important which is independent of the domicile or 
nationality of the litigants? Besides, this informational medium is portrayed as an 
interactive, fluid and dynamic medium (see-2.1). It is penetrated in everyday life by 
revolutionising social relationships, methods of communication and news 
                                                          
781
 Kohl, U., (2017), ‘Conflict of Laws and the Internet’ in Brown sword, Scotford and Yeung (eds.), the 
Oxford Handbook on the Law and Regulation of Technology (Oxford University Press, UK), pp 269-296. 
782
 Hook, M., (2017), ‘The "statutist trap" and subject-matter jurisdiction’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 435. 
783
 Szaszy, S., (1966), ‘The Basic Connecting Factor in International Cases in the Domain of Civil 
Procedure’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 15, Issue 2, pp 436-456. 
784
 Hayward, R., (2006), ‘Conflict of Laws’, (4
th
 Ed, Cavendish Publication, London), pp 3. 
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consumption
785
. Its inherently global nature allows its users, regardless of cultural or 
financial backgrounds, to consume or distribute information around the world easily, 
instantaneously, simultaneously, and permanently and at a low cost (see-2.5.1.2). 
Connecting factor decides what is the proper law (personal law), applicable to the issue 
in hand.  
 
4.6.2.: Personal law:  
 
Personal law may be identified in following three ways
786
: 
 
1. The law of domicile  
2. The law of nationality  
3. The place of the act i.e. lex-actus or the place where the contract concluded i.e. lex-
loci-contractus; the place where the obligations of the contract have been fulfilled 
i.e. lex-loci-solutionis; the place where the subject matter of the dispute belongs to 
i.e. lex-situs; or the place where the dispute arose i.e. lex-fori
787
. 
 
 
It is debatable that why not apply the law of the forum rather than applying foreign law? 
Cheshire and North
788
 highlighted that if the domestic law provides a more convenient 
solution to the problem, according to the expectation of the parties, then English judges 
should give effect to domestic law. On the other hand, where it is necessary to serve the 
interest of the parties and to achieve justice, the foreign law should be applied. In the 
Re-Bonacina
789
 case, the court established that the English courts will apply the Italian 
law to do justice between the parties
790
. However, if the application of foreign law is 
contrary to public policy it may not be applied. Justice Cardozo
791
 noted that a judge 
                                                          
785
 Mehren, V., Taylor, A., (2002), ‘The foundations and emergence of jurisdictional theory’, Collected 
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague Academy of International Law, Vol 295. 
786
 Morris, J., Freund, O., Mann, M., (1979), ‘Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws’, (9
th
 Ed, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd, UK); Dicey, A., Morris, J., (1967), ‘Dicey and Morris on the conflict of laws’, (8
th
 Ed, Stevens, 
UK), pp 138. 
787
 Stewart, D., (2009), ‘Private International Law: A Dynamic and Developing Field’, University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, pp 1121-1131 . 
788
 North, P., Fawcett, J., (1999), ‘Cheshire and North Private International Law’, (13
th
 Ed, OUP, Oxford), 
pp 32.  
789
 Re Bonacina [1912] 2 Chapter 394. 
790
 Fawcett, J., (1991), ‘The Interrelationships of Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Private International 
Law’, Current Legal Problems, pp 39. 
791
 Goodrich, A., (1938), ‘Foreign Facts and Local Fancies’, Law Review, Vol 26. 
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may reject the application of foreign laws if it violates fundamental principles of justice 
or prevalent concept of good morals
792
.  
 
Personal law is one of the connecting factors which provides the base for characterising 
applicable law (see-4.3.2.2). Two different views have crystallised among academics 
and legal practitioners on the application of contemporary physical world-oriented 
connecting factors to disputes arising out of the use of social media. Some of the 
scholars
793
 focus on the opinion that the emergence of this technology suggests a need 
to adopt, often complex, technology-specific connecting factors, whereas others hold 
the opinion that the traditional ‘technology neutral criteria’ which is based on the 
existence of the ‘geographical borders’ and ‘physical presence’ are still applicable to 
online communication. 
 
4.7.: Which Jurisdiction should prosecute? 
 
This chapter identifies that there is a need for a preliminary presumption of jurisdiction 
involving online defamation, to bring consistency to the decision-making process. The 
prosecution must take place in the country where: (1) the majority of the libel published 
or (2) the claimant suffered most of the loss to his reputation
794
. In any online 
defamation, there are some factors, which can affect the final decision. In the claims 
involving celebrities/ public figures, the judge must balance all the factors, both for and 
against commencing prosecution in each jurisdiction.  
 
Some of the factors may require extra considerations
795
: 
 
1. The location of the defendant 
2. The possibility of trial in the jurisdiction where enforcement of decision is 
possible  
3. The capacity of the other competent court  
4. Dividing the prosecution into cases in two or more jurisdictions 
  
                                                          
792
 Monard, G., Paulsen, & Michael, I., (1959), ‘Conflict of Laws’, Columbia Law Review, Vol 56, Issue 7. 
793
 Marton, E., (2016), ‘Violations of Personality Rights through the Internet: Jurisdictional Issues under 
European Law’ (1
st
 Ed, Nomos, Baden-Baden), Ch. 1. 
794
 Annex A - Eurojust Guidelines, Annual Report 2003, Making the Decision - 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/jurisdiction/#an03 [Assessed 12
th
 December 2018] 
795
 Amin Rashid Corp v Kuwait Insurance [1984] 1 AC 50 at 65G; as per Lord Diplock. 
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5. The attendance of witnesses 
6. If an international witness is unable to attend, the possibility of the court 
receiving evidence by alternative means: Written or remotely (by telephone or 
video-link)   
7. Are the witness willing to travel and provide evidence in another jurisdiction  
8. Delay - justice delayed is justice denied  
9. Interests of the claimant 
10. Evidentiary problems 
11. Legal requirements 
 
4.7.1.: Resources and costs of prosecuting: 
 
The costs of the trial, or its impact on the resources, is only a factor in deciding whether 
a case should be prosecuted in one or other jurisdiction. Therefore, competent English 
courts should not refuse to accept a case in their jurisdiction because the case does not 
interest them.  
 
4.8.: Summary:  
 
Private international law principles are used to identify the issue in the case not the 
cause of action
796
, which is determined by classification. The process of classification is 
based on proper law. The proper law is based on the underlying principle of which is to 
strive for comity between competing legal systems
797
. Whereas, jurisdiction is a 
gateway for any grievance to enter the portals of the dispute settlement fora and be 
transformed into litigation
798
. It is described and understood subjectively because there 
is no standard definition of jurisdiction. English courts will have to apply conflict of 
laws to determine whether they have jurisdiction to hear a case and which country’s law 
to apply i.e. classification of cause of action to find the governing law
799
.  
  
                                                          
796
 Caretech Community Services Ltd v Berry and Ors [2017] EWHC 1944 (QB); this case interpreted the 
meaning of CPR r. 6.15(2) whether rule can apply to cases where there are errors of both method and 
place of service, whether the rule applies to cases of ‘Non-service’. 
797
 Dicey, A.V., Morris, C., & Collins, A., (2012), ‘The conflict of laws’, (Vol 1, Sweet & Maxwell, London), 
pp38-43, 45-48. 
798 Hill, J., (2004), ‘Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The Approach of the UK 
Courts’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 53, pp 325-350. 
799
 Fentiman, J., (1992), ‘Foreign Law in English Courts’, Quarterly Law Review, Vol 108, pp 142. 
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4.8.1.: Conclusion: 
 
Private international law rules provide efficient resolution if operated within the 
sovereign physical boundaries. That is where the difficulties arise for decision makers 
because cyberspace disregards physical borders
800
. This leads to various practical 
difficulties once traditional rules apply to social media disputes. Although jurisdiction is 
the major concern, however, it is also not a simple matter to keep a striking balance 
between defamation and freedom of expression. Afia
801
 argued that the required balance 
between defamation protection and the right to free expression is compulsory. It is 
discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter finds that the classification of proper law can be 
constrained by particular distinctions of the domestic law of the competing system of 
law. It concludes that the alleged issue should not be defined too narrowly so that it 
attracts a particular domestic rule under the lex fori, which may not be applicable under 
the other system
802
. Overall, traditional rules are capable enough to be applied to online 
defamation. 
  
                                                          
800
 Goldsmith, J. L., (1998), ‘Against Cyber-anarchy’, The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 65, Issue 
4, pp 1199-1250. 
801
 Afia, J., (2011), ‘Tipping the Balance’, New Law Journals, Vol 376, Issue 7457, pp 161.  
802
 Torremans, P., (2017), ‘Cheshire, North and Fawcett: Private International Law’, (15
th
 Ed, Oxford Uni 
press), part 2 – preliminary topics.   
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Chapter 5 
Part A  
 Defamation Law 
 
5.1.: Overview:  
 
The pre – cyberspace era: Defamatory material could only be produced within certain 
parameters. It was easy to identify perpetrators and trace their locations. Cyberspace has 
changed this world into an information village (see-2.2, 2.6) because any publication 
can be accessed from virtually anywhere
803
. Defamation, libel or slander (see-5.3), is a 
tort that is particularly vulnerable to creating a multiplicity of jurisdictions
804
. Social 
media defamation makes application of existing rules much harder, so the judgments 
cannot be consistent (see-2.7.2, 7.8).  
 
The post – cyberspace era: Defamation claims are difficult to frame805 and cost-
effective
806
. Social media makes its users potential publishers
807
, regardless of their 
intentions
808
 (see-7.15). Online communication is mostly revealing and 
autobiographical but it still carries the risk of libel claims. It can be retransmitted 
because of its global accessibility, regardless of the context in which it was initially 
uploaded (see-7.17). For instance, in the Dabrowski [2014]
809
 case, the wife had to pay 
damages for a Facebook post, which she mistakenly posted, and later deleted (her 
argument about ‘context’ of her statement were rejected). Similarly, Tugendhat J810 
determined that Bercow’s tweet carried a defamatory meaning. Even though, Bercow 
believed her tweet was not defamatory at the time of sharing (with regards to its 
context). This judgment also highlights that a simple autobiographical opinion may also 
                                                          
803
 Sharma, V., (2000), ‘Information Technology – Law & Practice’, (3
rd
 Ed, Universal Law Publishing, IND), 
pp 420. 
804
 Bigos, O., (2005), ‘Jurisdiction over Cross-Border Wrongs on the Internet’, The International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 54, Issue 3, pp 585-620. 
805
 Ahuja v Politika [2015] EWHC 3380; S9 raised the bar for claimants. 
806
 Gibson, J., (2015), ‘From McLibel to e-Libel: Recent issues and recurrent problems in defamation law’; 
Online Url: 
http://www.districtcourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/Documents/Speeches/From%20McLibel%20to%20e-
Libel%20(correction)%20-%20Recurring%20problems%20in%20Defamation%20Law.pdf [21
st
 March 
2018]. 
807
 Elliot v Tomkins [2014] NSWDC 55; if a damage to reputation is caused then intention becomes 
irrelevant. 
808
 Intention does not matter if damage to reputation can established. What matters is ordinary readers 
or viewers understanding of the alleged statement. 
809
 Dabrowski v Greeuw [2014] WADC 175. 
810
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
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be interpreted as defamatory. The context in which information is shared varies once it 
is consumed by a third party
811
. Even revealing social interactions via social media can 
be interpreted from a culturally distinct perspective
812
. Internet service is remotely 
available via smart devices, which makes it even easier to take a photograph, tagged 
with personal information and transmit to other users
813
. In most cases, many of those 
recipients may be unknown to the sender but carry high risks of reputational harm. 
Mark Zuckerberg
814
 also admitted that the internet creates an environment where we are 
aware of speech we would not hear otherwise. Social media communication permits a 
crossing to formerly closed communities because we would not have heard the jokes 
told in male-dominated locker rooms before the internet. 
 
5.1.1.: Changes in defamation laws: 
 
Unlike traditional media, social media sharing does not allow to stop an unfavourable 
post from going ‘viral’ (see-2.10). This unique distribution allows a defamation to cross 
borders instantaneously
815
. This feature was not available for reputational harm caused 
via traditional media, hence the ambit of traditional defences is also uncertain
816
. It also 
makes proceedings as complex as they are expensive
817
 for both parties
818
. It had been 
widely argued that even pre-internet, defamation laws were confusing and most of the 
rules did not make sense
819
 when applied to social media. For instance, the inclusion of 
Section 5 indicates that pre-internet defamation laws were ‘not well suited to dealing 
with the internet and modern technology’820. Including the 1996 Act, most of the other 
laws were not only out of date, but also costly and over-complicated. These claimant-
                                                          
811
 Hoffman v Washington Post Co [1977] 433 FSupp, 600 D. D. C.  
812
 Webb v Bloch [1928] 41 CLR 331 at 363. 
813
 Mickle v Farley [2013] NSWDC 295, As per judge Michael Elkaim, “defamatory publications made on 
social media spread by simple manipulation of mobile phone and computer”. 
814
 Zuckerman, E., (2014), ‘Susan Benesch on dangerous speech and counter-speech, Blog; Online URL 
http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/blog/2014/03/25/susan-benesch-on-dangerous-speech-
ndcounterspeech/ [Assessed 12
th
 November 2018] 
815
 Mills, A., (2015), ‘The Law Applicable to Cross-Border Defamation on Social Media: Whose law 
governs free speech in Facebookistan?’, Journal of Media Law, Vol 7, Issue 1, pp 1-35. 
816
Section 3 (8) of the Defamation Act 2013 abolished common law fair comment defence and 
introduced the honest opinion defence. 
817
 http://www.brettwilson.co.uk/defamation-privacy-online-harassment/defamation/ [Assessed 2
nd
 
May 18].  
818
 Gibson, J., (2014), ‘It came from Cyberspace: Defamation Law and the Internet’, NSW State Legal 
Conference: Session 16. 
819
 Christie, G.C., (1977), ‘Defamatory Opinions and the Restatement of Torts’, Michigan Law Review, Vol 
75, Issue 8, pp 1621-1643. 
820
 Clarke, K., (2012), ‘Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons’, Vol 546, col 177.  
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friendly rules allowed ‘forum shopping’, hence there was a ‘risk of damaging free-
speech without affording proper protection’821. The idea of defamation laws is to 
maintain a fair balance between ‘freedom of expression’, ‘individual privacy’, and 
‘personal reputation’ – which is enshrined in Article 17822.  
 
5.1.2.: The objective of this chapter:  
 
This chapter aims to understand whether the Defamation Act 2013 provides sufficient 
protection to social media users against the loss of reputation. It is only possible with 
the corollary imposition of a duty on social media users not to infringe other’s right or 
interest
823
. This analysis evaluates whether common law rules strike an appropriate 
balance between individuals’ rights to speech and reputation. This chapter will serve an 
obligation to subject the defamation laws to scrutiny and analyse whether application of 
existing law to social media, accords with community standards of justice and public 
policy.  
 
5.2.: The concept of defamation: 
“People should be free to poke fun at one another without fear of litigation. It is one 
thing to ridicule a man; it is another to expose him to ridicule - Neil LJ
824”. 
 
Law of tort seeks to redress injury to person and injury to property
825
.  Injury to a 
person can be physical or non-physical, but defamation is a tort which allows an action 
for non-physical injury
826
. The core of defamation law is to strike a balance between 
protection of reputation and freedom of speech
827
. The roots of defamation laws can be 
traced back to the 17
th
 century, which have been amended according to societal 
needs
828
. The advancement in information technology and over-reliance on social media 
                                                          
821
 Turner, R., (2014), ‘Internet Defamation Law And Publication By Omission: A Multi-Jurisdictional 
Analysis’, UNSW Law Journal, Vol 37, Issue 1, pp 34-64. 
822
 Article 17 of the International Covenant (Civil and Political Right) states: "No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation". 
823
 Descheemaeker, E., (2009), ‘Protecting Reputation: Defamation and Negligence’, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies, Vol 29, pp 608–10 
824
 Steven Berkoff v Julie Burchill & Times Newspapers Limited [1996] Ewca Civ 564.  
825
 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All E. R. 237. 
826
 Section 15, the Defamation Act 2013 defines a ‘statement’ as ‘words, pictures, visual images, 
gestures or any other method of signifying meaning’; which can only cause a reputational harm.  
827
 CSI Manufacturing Ltd v Dun and Bradstreet [2013] IEHC 547. 
828
 English defamation law has been occasionally amended (in 1840, 1880, 1952, 1996 and 2013) by 
legislation; Libel Act 1843, Libel Act 1845,  Newspaper Libel and Registration Act 1881, Law of Libel 
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mean that new guidelines are required to be implemented
829
. A claim for defamation 
arises if a social media user posts something, which contains an untrue imputation of 
another user
830
. Defamation will be materialised if such publication undermines the 
reputation of ‘concerned entity’ in the eyes of right-thinking members of society by 
exposing him to hatred or ridicule
831
. A publication may be in the form of a video, 
sketch, photo, blog, article
832
 or even a statement, which may not have any legal 
justification. Lord Halsbury
833
 noted that a statement is defamatory if it attacks and 
injures the reputation of the person referred and exposes him to hatred and ridicule or it 
causes him to be avoided or has the propensity to injure him in his society, profession or 
calling.  
 
If a defamatory post is uploaded but another user expressly or implicitly encourages 
defamatory comments from other users, he becomes a principal perpetrator (see-718). If 
he impliedly endorsed to publish, repeat or create defamatory statements, he becomes a 
secondary perpetrator
834
. Dixon J
835
 concluded that by repeating publication of 
defamatory material on its website Bauer Media behaved recklessly. Even if social 
media users do not willfully behave recklessly during publishing statements, there are 
still risks. This potential risk is because social media users do not have editors and 
lawyers to check their publication before posts go live (see-7.15). 
 
5.2.1.: Definition:  
 
Defamation is an intentional false communication which injures others respect
836: “A 
false, unprivileged statement of fact that is harmful to someone's reputation and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Amendment Act 1888, Defamation Act 1952, Defamation Act 1996 and Defamation Act 2013; Collins, 
M., (2014), ‘Collins on defamation’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford university press), pp 5. 
829
 Wilson, T., (2015), ‘Twitter and Facebook users need grasp of defamation law’, available online at: 
http://www.mancunianmatters.co.uk/content/290473309-twitter-and-facebook-users-need-grasp-
defamation-law-says-manchester-solicitor [Assessed 24
th
 July 2017]  
830
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521; defamation is primarily a publication of wrong or 
degrading particulars about another person. 
831
 Howard, S., (2007), ‘Defamation of Corporate entities in England’, Bird & Bird, available online at 
www.lexology.com [Assessed 25
th
 July 2017]  
832
 Hiranandani-Vandrevala v Times Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWHC 250 (QB); Jill Bainbridge noted that it 
is important to look at the article as a whole to establish defamation. 
833
 Nevill v Fine Art and General Insurance [1897] AC 68. 
834
 Pritchard v Van [2016] BCSC 686; the user who re-posted the comments was held liable for others 
comments as well. 
835
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521. 
836
 Garner, B., (1990), ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’, 6
th
 Ed, pp 449. 
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published ‘with fault’ meaning as a result of negligence or malice837”. A more modern 
explanation comes from Lord Atkin
838
 where he requested their Lordships to lay down 
the following formal defamation test: “Would the words tend to lower the plaintiff in 
the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?”. 
 
5.2.2.: Examples of defamatory statements: 
 
The law of England allows internet users to express their honestly-held opinions
839
. If 
the shared opinions are based on unfounded claims they can become serious allegations 
and the perpetrator may have to face legal repercussions. The judge will determine
840
 if 
the ordinary natural meaning of the ‘alleged statement’ can damage claimant's 
reputation
841
. A statement which has any of the following may be considered 
defamatory:   
 
1. Alleging another user of disloyalty, corruption or dishonesty 
2. Accusing someone to have committed or suspected of committing something 
illegal  
3. Ridicule other social media user  
4. Nominating somebody in a way which causes that person to be avoided: 
Associating him with a contagious disease or mental illness. 
 
5.3.: Types of Defamation: 
 
Defamation can be sub-divided into three categories:  
 
1. Category according to prosecution – civil and criminal defamation  
2. Category according to publication – online and print media defamation 
3. Category according to legal basis   – defamation of libel and slander 
 
                                                          
837
 Winfield & Jolowicz, (2014), ‘Law of Tort’, (19
th
 Ed, Sweat & Maxwell) Ch. 12, pp 390-461. 
838
 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240; as per Lord Atkin. 
839
 Calling someone dishonest, corrupt, hypocritical, lazy, incompetent, criminal, unfaithful, or financially 
troubled; all are potential defamations unless a viable defence is accepted. 
840
 It includes what ordinary readers or viewers see or hear “between the lines” -  reasonable man test. 
841
 Safeway plc v Tate [2001] The Times LR.  
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Criminal defamation is actionable in countries where it is an offence under the criminal 
law of that country
842
. The alleged defendant (social media or offline), will be charged 
by prosecutors, tried in the criminal legal system. If the defendant is proven guilty, he 
will be convicted and may be sentenced to imprisonment. In England, defamation is a 
civil offence and a private libel action will be brought in civil courts for financial 
compensation or an injunction.  
 
Common law recognises two forms of civil defamation: Libel or slander. The difference 
between these two lies in the means of the medium used to communicate. Traditionally, 
written or printed statements were considered libel and spoken words were considered 
slander
843
. Nowadays, if ‘publication' is in a permanent form, it will be libel. Otherwise, 
it will be a slander. Slander is a transient form of communication (spoken words). Libel 
is a permanent form
844
 of communication (written words) (see-5.6). 
 
5.3.1: Libel: 
 
It is defamation in permanent form and visible as established by Slesser LJ
845, ‘any 
permanent matter capable of being seen by the eye’, including written items, email, 
pictures, statutes or effigies, comments, articles. It is actionable per se and the claimants 
do not have to prove special damage. However, Section 1 introduced the threshold of 
serious harm which implies that the presumption of reputational harm is rebutted
846
. 
Lopes LJ
847
 noted that libels are generally in writing, but this is not necessary because it 
can be conveyed in another permanent form - a statue, chalk marks, wax images, 
caricature, effigy, pictures or signs may constitute a libel. It may be tangibility of the 
statement that matters; however, concerning social networking sites, it has been 
approved that any statement, videos, symbols, recordings or even emoji’s via social 
                                                          
842
 Criminal Libel (Law Com No 84, 1982); the Law Commission Working Paper abolished criminal 
defamation in the UK. 
 
843
 Thorley v Kerry [1812] 12 ER 371; Mansfield CJ identified that a speech in London and an assertion in 
public place is different from what is printed in letter or newspaper.  
844
 Along with common law, the following Acts explain what constitutes publication in a permanent form 
for the purpose of libel [Section 166(1) of the Broadcasting Act 1990, sections 4(1) and (3) and (7) of the 
Theatres Act 1968, formerly Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1952 and the Defamation Act 2013. 
845
 Youssoupoff v Metro-Goldwyn- Mayer Pictures Ltd [1934] 50 TLR 581; words become defamatory if 
they cause claimant to be shunned and avoided. 
846
 Defamation Act 1996 presumes that when a person's reputation is assailed, some damage must be 
resulted. 
847
 Monson v Tussauds [1894] 1 QB 671. 
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media are also libel
848
. Lord Tugendhat
849
 decided that inferences drawn from 
‘emoticons’ used on social media could also have libel meanings.  
5.3.2.: Slander: 
 
Defamation in a temporary or transient form is slander, where publication is in the form 
of spoken words or gestures. Slander is only actionable per se upon the actual damage, 
so the claimant has to prove damage to succeed in slander claim
850
. (It is not within the 
scope of this thesis)  
 
5.3.3.: Special considerations for social media: 
 
1. Libel or slander:  
Social media has blurred the difference between libel and slander
851
. Generally, 
libel is in permanent form whereas slander is spoken
852
. However, for social 
media publication, it is settled that defamatory statements made on the internet 
are to be regarded as libel
853
. 
2. Chat rooms:  
Social media publications and comments via emails or websites are libel. 
Whereas, casual conversations and discussion in ‘chat-rooms’ and ‘bulletin-
boards’ may be considered slanderous854. Interestingly, Smith [2008] 855 decided 
that online casual conversation are not actionable, which drastically deviates 
from the famous ruling in Godfrey [2001]
856
 that Usenet publications were 
defamatory. It has been debated that online communication should be treated as 
slander
857
 (this distinction is beyond the scope; however a relevant analysis is 
conducted in opinion section see-5.5.1).  
                                                          
848
 Seidenberg, S., (2017), ‘lies and libel’, ABA Journal, Vol 103, Issue 7, pp 48. 
849
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB).  
850
 Price, D., & Duodo, K., (2009), ‘Defamation Law: Procedure & Practice’, (4
th
 Ed, Sweat & Maxwell 
eBooks), Part 1 - Slander claims and special damages, pp 25, 72 – 99. 
851
 Nawang, N., Asari, K., (2014), ‘Cyber Defamation: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal Position in 
Malaysia and the United Kingdom’, The International Conference on Information Security and Cyber 
Forensics.   
852
 Kay LJ in South Hetton Coal Company Ltd v North-Eastern News Association Ltd [1894] 1 QB 133. 
853
 Charles, W.M., (2018), ‘Difficulties in Establishing Liability in Online Defamation: Tanzania 
Experience’, International Journal of Law and Public Administration, Vol 1, Issue 1, pp 48-57. 
854
 Nigel Smith v ADVFN Plc and others[2008] EWHC 1797(QB). 
855
 Nigel Smith v ADVFN Plc and others[2008] EWHC 1797(QB); Clift v Clarke [2011] EWHC 1164. 
856
 Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201. 
857
 Reynolds, G., (2007), ‘Libel in the Blogosphere: Some Preliminary Thoughts’, Social Science Research 
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3. Publication: Hyperlinks, emoticons, additional text or hashtag, a tweet or post 
that offers a link to a defamatory publication fall within the definition of 
publication
858
. This is regardless of whether a person is publishing or 
republishing. A user who repeats a defamatory allegation made by another is 
treated as if he had made the allegation himself
859
. However, content providers 
are not publishers
860
. The court stated on numerous occasions that content 
providers had no control over deciding the search terms that were input by the 
search engine users or provided the content in any meaningful sense (see-
5.9.1.1, 7.8).  
4. Emoticons:  A tweet/post suffixed with an emoticon could be defamatory861. In 
the context of postings made via social media sites, individuals can express 
themselves in different ways, such as by posting funny pictures or using 
emoticons in addition to the text that they publish (see-7.18). 
 
5.4.: Characteristics of defamation:  
“Law recognises in every man a right to have the estimation in which he stands in the 
opinion of others unaffected by false statements to his discredit; and if such false 
statements are made without lawful excuse, and damage results to the person of whom 
they are made, he has a right of action - Cave J.
862” 
 
Over the years, defamation laws have been reformed according to societal needs; 
however, its fundamentals have not changed in decades
863
. Traditional principles can 
still be applied to virtual defamation claims arising from social media. Social media 
possess the ability of multiplier effects because a publication can pass from a user's 
friend list to those friends’ friends864. Its adverse effects could be more aggravating if 
defendant’s privacy settings are set to public, where communication is potentially 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Network, Vol 16, pp 1164 – 1166; Ciolli, A., (2006), ‘Defamatory Internet Speech: A Defense of the Status 
Quo’, QLR, Vol 25, pp 853. 
858
 Hird v Wood [1894] 38 SJ 23. 
859
 Safaricom Ltd v Porting Access [2011] EKLR no 167; sharing, re-tweeting amounts to re-publication. 
860
 Metropolitan International Schools v Designtechnica Corporation [2009] EWHC 1765; Google Inc was 
held not to be a publisher of a defamatory statement that could be located through a keyword search 
(for keywords relating  to  a  defamatory  statement)  of  its  search  engine. 
861
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB); ‘innocent face’ or emoticon can be understood by the 
reasonable reader to mean being insincere and ironical. 
862
 Scott v Sampson [1882] 8 QBD 491, at 503. 
863
 Cianci v New Times Pub [1980] 639 F.2d 54; republishing libel may create liability even when the 
statement is attributed to another publisher. It is also applicable to retweeting or resharing via social 
media. 
864
 Laidlaw, E., (2017), ‘Are We Asking Too Much from Defamation Law? Reputation Systems, ADR, 
Industry Regulation and Other Extra-Judicial Possibilities for Protecting Reputation in the Internet Age’, 
University of Calgary law review, SSRN no 3059954.    
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viewable to everyone
865
. This modern method of communication has caused judges to 
raise the question whether traditional principles are suitable enough in the context of 
social media defamation to preserve the boundaries of civil justice (this question also 
reflects objective of this thesis).  
 
There exist state-to-state variations in characterising the objectives of defamation 
provisions. This thesis will use some of the customary characteristics of deformation as 
used within common law countries.   
 
A user may be considered defamed if
866
: 
 
1. A publication is directed towards one or more users 
2. At least one more users, other than the claimant, has noticed the defamatory 
material 
3. A reasonable member of society, familiar with the statement would think less of 
the victim based on what is being posted i.e. lowering the reputation of the 
victim (see-5.5.1). 
 
5.4.1.: The requisite elements: 
 
It is important to note that, if a statement is ‘a truth’, it may be an absolute defence to a 
defamation claim
867
. Hence, the shared statement has to be a false statement of fact and 
it should refer to the claimant and harm his reputation
868. If the alleged material is “only 
published” to the claimant and nobody else accessed it, it will not be defamatory 
because the claimant is not defamed in other’s eyes869. If the defamed person is a public 
figure, he/she must also prove actual malice (see-2.15.2). If a claimant is unable to 
prove actual malice, there are other potential causes of action available including, 
misuse of private information;  breach of confidence - where there has been a breach of 
                                                          
865
 Pritchard v Van [2016] BCSC 686; along with Facebook’s substantial settings menu, it also provide a 
user-friendly guide via vital privacy settings by ‘Click on’ the question mark symbol in the top right page, 
and select Privacy Check-up. Alternately, user can adjust who can see posts, send friend requests, or 
block users by hitting the question mark symbol and selecting Privacy shortcuts. 
866
 Golberg, D., (2013), ‘To Dream the Impossible Dream? Towards a Simple, Cheap (and Expression-
Friendly) British Libel Law’, Journal of International Media & Entertainment Law, Vol 4, Issue 1, pp 32-55. 
867
 Although it may still be difficult and expensive to prove because under Defamation Act 2013 the 
burden of proof is on defendant (see-2.17.2). 
868
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) at [23]. 
869
 Troiano, M. A., (2006), ‘The New Journalism? Why Traditional Defamation Laws Should Apply to 
Internet Blogs’, American University Law Review, Vol 55, Issue 5, pp 1447-1483. 
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privacy or confidence; harassment - it may also give rise to criminal liability
870
. 
Similarly, where defamation action is not viable, cyberbullying and the claim for 
malicious falsehood could be used in conjunction with the defamation claim because the 
courts allow the possibility of running a defamation case in tandem with data protection 
claim
871
. 
 
In a defamation case, the following elements must exist
872
:   
 
1. The A harmful statement concerning the claimant must be published to third 
parties
873
  
2. Publication of the alleged statement must cause claimant public embarrassment, 
professional or financial suffering  
3. The publication is made without adequate research into the truthfulness of the 
statement 
 
If these elements are present and claimant’s honour is reduced in the social estimate of 
his community, a private claim in defamation is possible. 
 
5.5.: The cause of action for defamation: 
 
Cyberspace users should understand defamation laws because their publication on 
social media could potentially form the basis of a defamation action
874
. The onus of 
proof is on the defendant but the claimant has to prove that the alleged statement 
lowered his reputation
875
. It is treated as an action rather than the consequence of an 
                                                          
870
 Conay, J., (2017), ‘Risks of unlawful social media content: Changes in UK defamation landscape and 
what you need to know’, Social Media Law, Bulletin, online in defamation & privacy. 
871
 Prince Moulay Hicham Ben Abdallah Al Alaoui of Morocco v Elaph Publishing Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 29. 
872
 Elizabeth, S., (2013), ‘Internet Defamation Law’, Legal Education Society of British Columbia CLEBC, 
Paper 9.1. 
873
 Modi v Clarke [2011] EWCA Civ 937. 
874
 Karen, E., (2018), ‘Is 'Truthtelling' Online Reasonable? Restoring Context to Cyber Defamation 
Analysis’, McGill Law Journal, Vol 63, Issue 3; in social media boundaries are porous and shifting so data 
becomes global, a cyber-publication in one jurisdiction may be read and reposted anywhere in the 
world, thereby potentially causing reputational harm transcending traditional or national parameters. 
875
 Wilson, T., (2015), ‘Twitter and Facebook users need grasp of defamation law’, available online at: 
http://www.mancunianmatters.co.uk/content/290473309-twitter-and-facebook-users-need-grasp-
defamation-law-says-manchester-solicitor [assessed 24
th
 July 2017].  
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action
876
. The court established in the Dinyer-Fraser
877
 case, that defamation is a tort of 
strict-liability and the defendant will be liable for conveying defamatory words to the 
third party. It is interesting that once a defamatory statement transmitted via social 
media, the defendant will be liable regardless, he acted negligently or intentionally (see-
5.5.2.2), as long as the cause of action can be established
878
.     
 
Under the Defamation Act 2013, the claimant has to prove the following elements to 
establish ‘a libel cause of action’ against an online content879:  
 
1. It must be defamatory by meanings  
2. It must be a false statement of facts 
3. It must refer to the claimant  
4. It must be published to a third person   
5. It must cause serious harm 
 
5.5.1.: The statement must be defamatory: 
 
May CJ
880
 elaborated that it is not the question to argue what the defendant intended by 
his statement. It is important to note what meanings an intelligent and reasonable person 
naturally draws from those words
881. Therefore, word’s meaning and inference have 
more value in deciding defamation cases than defendant's intention. The statement must 
be defamatory in its natural meanings because some words can have more than one 
meaning
882
. In the McAlpine [2013]
883
 case, the court noted that it is the true and natural 
meaning, which counts, not the literal meaning of words. If the true meaning does not 
convey a defamatory sense the claim will be rejected
884
. Lord Selbourne
885
 rejected a 
                                                          
876
 Samson, E., (2012), ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and U.S. 
Defamation Laws & the Dawn of England's Modern Day’, Cardozo Journal of International & 
Comparative Law, Vol 20, Issue 3. 
877
 Dinyer-Fraser v Laurentian Bank [2005] BCSC 255. 
878
 Zipursky, B. C., (2016), ‘The Monsanto Lecture: Online Defamation, Legal Concepts, and the Good 
Samaritan’, Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol 51, Issue 1, pp 57. 
879
 Mullis, A., & Scott, A., (2014), ‘Tilting at windmills: The defamation act 2013’, The Modern Law 
Review, Vol 77, Issue 1, pp 87-109. 
880
 May CJ in the case of Bolton v O'Brien [1885] 16 LR 97 at 108. 
881
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) at [23]. 
882
 Defamatory meaning depends on whether it would tend to have a substantially adverse effect on the 
way that right-thinking members of social media would treat the claimant. 
883
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
884
 Vogel v Felice [2005] C A, 6 Dis, No H024448. 
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libel claim because ‘true natural meaning’ of the words did not convey a defamatory 
message. Arguably, if a statement is shared via social media, it will be accessible to 
many users and someone might find its defamatory meaning. In the Slim
886
 case, the 
court concluded, “The important thing which matters is if the trial judges understand the 
statement bears defamatory meaning”. However, without a jury trial, it is all subjective 
to the judge’s understanding: Some public figures may have billions of followers in 
various jurisdictions so they still can suffer reputational damage without a defamatory 
sense of a statement! 
 
To succeed in a libel claim, the alleged statement must not only be defamatory, but it 
must also bring disrepute to the defendant
887
. In the Liberace
888
 case, the court 
determined ‘natural and ordinary meaning’ and awarded £8000 because it lowered the 
defendant respect. According to Lord Atkin
889, “the statement must tend to lower the 
claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, and in 
particular cause him to be regarded with feelings of hatred, contempt, ridicule, fear and 
disesteem”. 
 
5.5.1.1.: Mere abuse: 
 
Using abusive language may not ‘always’ constitute a claim for defamation. Under the 
2013 Act, it is not a defence to claim that the literal meaning of the statement is ‘true’. 
The defendant cannot rely on that it was a mere abusive phrase or the publication 
‘actually’ does not defame claimant because it depends on conclusions drawn by a 
‘reasonable man’ from that statement890 (see-2.17.2). However, vulgar abuse does not 
amount to defamation
891
 as established by Mansfield CJ
892
 that “For mere general abuse 
spoken no action lies”. Concerning social media, the Queens bench893 changed the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
885
 Capital & Counties Bank v Henty & Son [1882] 7 App Case, at 744-745; the test is whether under the 
circumstances in which the writing was published, reasonable men, to whom the publication was made, 
would be likely to understand it in a libellous sense. 
886
 Slim v Daily Telegraph [1968] 2 Q.B. 157. 
887
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1985. 
888
 Liberace v Daily Mirror Newspapers [1959] unreported; Liberace sued the Daily Mirror, which 
published an article strongly hinting that he was a homosexual (at the time homosexuality was illegal in 
the UK). 
889
 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237; words are only defamatory if they lower the claimant in the eyes 
of right-thinking members of society. 
890
 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] A.C. 234. 
891
 Parkins v Scott [1862] 1 H & C; as per Pollock CB at 158, 159. 
892
 Thorley v Kerry [1812] 4 Taunt 355 at 365. 
893
 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
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traditional concept by deciding that it is not a valid argument that attention-grabbing 
provocative tweets are just ‘mere abuse’. Social media casual communication can be 
held to the same standard as a ‘reputable’ or ‘serious’ publication. Now, friendly 
exchanged remarks and playful statements may also be taken seriously. 
 
Similarly, words, which are prima facie defamatory, are not actionable if it is clear that 
they were merely general vituperation
894
. A similar rule applies to words spoken in 
jest
895. Besides, it will be interesting to apply such rules to ‘social media videos’, 
because it depends on how the listeners understood these words. Similarly, the use of 
‘Emoji’ may deter these general principles because evidence in the form of emoji can 
play an influential role. The malicious intent will play a significant role in deciding 
social media defamation cases because the presence of emoji may not always point to a 
more comic or sarcastic tone
896. ‘Emoji’ provide context by standing in for facial 
expressions i.e. they add emotion by replacing entire words. Sometimes they are critical 
to fully understanding a text phrase or online conversation i.e. they can have significant 
evidentiary value in deciding defamation cases
897
. Courts have started to realise the 
importance of ‘emoji’ and its contextual values in recent cases898. 
 
5.5.1.2.: Innuendo: 
 
Innuendo is the meaning given to defamatory words, in circumstances where the facts 
are known to potential readers
899
. For instance, it is common knowledge that the Queen 
is the head of state. If somebody leaves libellous remarks against the monarch, it will be 
innuendo and defamatory against the Queen. For a successful defamatory claim, the 
claimant must satisfy that the statement is defamatory in its natural and ordinary 
meaning
900
. Innuendo was defined by Greer LJ
901, “ if there is extrinsic evidence, the 
                                                          
894
 McNamara, L., (2007), ‘Reputation and Defamation’, (OUP, Oxford University), pp 254. 
895
 Donoghue v Hayes [1831] Hayes 265; it is not automatically slanderous to call a person a witch, a 
papist or divorced. However, calling someone ‘son of a bitch’ is non-actionable if it is taken as a 
compliment!  
896
 Ghanam v Does [2014] 845 N.W. 2d 128; the use of exclamation points in electronic communication 
is rampant and gives a literal meaning to the quotation attributed to. The exclamation point is like 
laughing at your own joke. 
897
 Browning, J. G., & Seale, G., (2017), ‘More than words - the evidentiary value of emoji’, Computer 
and Internet Lawyer, Vol 34, Issue 1, pp 14-20. 
898
 Piping Rock Partners v David Lerner Associates [2012] WL 5471143.   
899
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) [49]-[55]. 
900
 Fullam v Newcastle Chronicle & Journal [1977] 1 WLR 651. 
901
 Tolley v J S Fry and Sons [1931] AC 333. 
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words will bear to the reader defamatory in its meaning, if such evidence does not exist, 
the words would not be defamatory in their ordinary and natural meaning”902. For 
instance, Warby J
903
 established that second Tweet was based on innuendo because 
Twiter users who read the second tweet could only understand it if they also follow the 
first Tweet. Therefore, without first Tweet, there may not be a defamation claim.  
 
Along with the innuendo, there is also an issue of ‘the context’ in which communication 
is published. The courts seem to have different opinions for ‘context’ and ‘innuendo904’. 
In the Dabrowski
905
 case, wife was held liable for her Facebook post (court disregarded 
the context of the statement (see-7.17)).  
 
Social media comments may not be defamatory prima facia because they may contain 
an innuendo that may be defamatory in meaning. However, it will depend on the facts 
of the case and evidence. This chapter insists that a user must be liable for the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the words he used, whether he foresaw them or 
not (see-7.15). Besides, it may be easier for other users to recognise claimant if they 
have prior knowledge. Lord Devlin
906
 noted that “a derogatory implication…might not 
be detected at all, except by a person who was already in possession of some specific 
information”. Sharp J907 held that both publications must be considered as ‘one 
publication’ to identify defamatory meanings. Similarly, Lord Bridge908  noted that 
determination of meaning must always take into account the whole of the statement that 
contains the particular ‘defamatory words’ i.e. the context in which the words are 
published. It would be interesting to determine meanings of ‘emoji’ because most of the 
followers who comment on a tweet ‘sometimes’ are not aware of the context of the full 
statement.  
 
                                                          
902
 Defamation - Case Law (2007), http://mavrkydefamationcaselaw.blogspot.co.uk/2007/01/tolley-v-j-s-
fry.html [Assessed 28
th
 July 2017]. 
903
 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
904
 Baturina v Times Newspapers Ltd [2011] 1 WLR 1526; the Judge must decide if the words are 
reasonably capable of two meanings.  
905
 Dabrowski v Greeuw [2014] WADC 175; Freeguard v Martlet Homes Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1577 
906
 Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers [1929] 2 KB 331 on 706; the extended meaning through the 
extrinsic facts known to the people to whom the statement is published. Scruton LJ stated that the 
words which would not otherwise have been defamatory can become so because of circumstances. 
907
 Dee v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 924 (QB). 
908
 Charleston v News Group Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 AC 65; the judge must consider the entire context 
in which the statement was made. 
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The context mostly includes the facts, which were general knowledge at the time the 
statement was published. The reasonable reader would use these facts to determine 
defamatory meanings
909
. As detailed above, this is also applicable for using ‘emoji’, 
because hidden meaning is the one that may have different interpretations. However, 
prior general knowledge may be important as compared to social media knowledge. For 
instance, general election of 2010 resulted in a coalition government (an ordinary 
person may have some prior knowledge about elections) it is a well-settled fact. On the 
other hand, a tweet against Theresa May’s Brexit issue may have different meanings if 
it is just circulating via social media (because it is not a concluded fact).  
 
The users who knew the claimant may understand the hidden meaning of ‘words’ 
themselves
910
. Similarly, social media users who usually share or retweet others post 
must be aware that they are just as responsible for their defamatory content as the 
primary publisher is. The only (partial) defence in such situations is ‘context’ because 
the way social sites work means that any publication can appear in different contexts to 
different users. Warby J
911
 highlighted that ‘context’ for which a defendant is not 
responsible cannot be held against him on the meaning. However, if the statement 
causes damage to reputation and bears defamatory meanings then the ‘context’ becomes 
irrelevant
912
. 
 
5.5.2.: The statement must refer to the claimant: 
 
The defamatory statement must refer to petitioner i.e. an individual, organisation or 
legal entity. If it does not relate to the claimant (directly or indirectly), there will be no 
case of defamation
913
. There is no requirement to refer to the claimant by name as long 
as a reasonable man, who knows the claimant, would identify the claimant was 
referred
914. It also applies to the use of ‘cartoons, sketches, fictitious characters and 
                                                          
909
 Jones v Skelton [1963] UKPC 29; a reasonable reader does not need special guidance but only his 
general knowledge; he is not fettered by any strict legal rules of construction but draw meaning from 
the words. 
910
 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234; court will consider the true meaning of the words and 
presume the alleged statements are false until proven otherwise by the defendant.  
911
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) at [39]. 
912
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521; as per John Dixon J. 
913
 If ordinary readers familiar with the person understand the article to be referring to him or her, that 
will be enough to prove defamation. 
914
 J'Anson v Stuart [1787] 1 Term Rep 148; judge established that if the claimant is not named then the 
description must be so detailed that a reasonable person would assume the article was about the 
claimant. 
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emoji’ in a defamatory publication, if a reasonable man can identify the claimant915. 
Importantly, the intent to harm may be a vital element because social media users 
mostly do not know other users i.e. they may not intend to harm other users by their 
words. Lord Kenyon
916
 established that defamation could only be constituted if there is 
malicious intent to defame. However, regardless of intention, it may be difficult to 
prove serious harm of emoji via social media
917
. (Serious harm threshold of Section-1 
may be a bar to this rule).   
 
The accidental or mistakenly shared statement will not offer a statutory defence as long 
as harm can be proved. For instance, A statement by Donal Trump against Sadiq Khan 
will be considered defamatory even though he may not intend to humiliate the Mayor of 
London. He may be referring to another Sadiq Khan. If the Mayor of London suffered 
any harm, it would be sufficient to constitute a libel claim. (Presidential immunity is 
beyond the scope of this thesis). Scrutton LJ
918
 stated that if the words published 
humiliate a claimant, it does not matter if defendant meant to refer it to the claimant 
(see-5.5.1.2). Similarly, if it is proved that the words are defamatory and a reasonable 
man can easily identify claimant, then intention will be irrelevant (see-7.19). It also 
applies to social media users who claim that they do not know claimant. So, a defendant 
cannot use an excuse that his publication was not intended for claimant. As was stated 
by Loreburn LC
919
 intention is no defence ‘however excellent it may be’. 
 
Concerning social media, it is important that other recipients must understand that 
defendant’s comments relate to the claimant. If other users (even wrongly/mistakenly) 
assume/think/understand/believe/identify that defendant’s defamatory comments refer 
to the claimant, it will suffice for libel cause of action. In social media, users may have 
nicknames or use various other names, so it is not necessary that the communication 
relates to the claimant by the original name
920
. As long as, a reasonable man 
                                                          
915
 E Hulton Co v Jones [1910] AC 20 HL. 
916
 Rex v Lord Abingdon [1794] 170 ER 337. 
917
 Pelletier, N., (2016), ‘The emoji that cost $20,000: Triggering liability for defamation on social media, 
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy, Vol 52, pp 227. 
918
 Withers v General Theatre Corporation Ltd [1933] 2 KB 536; the claimant would not had loss of 
reputation if the defendant had not committed the breach of contract. 
919
 E. Hulton & Co V Jones [1910] AC 20 HL. 
920
 Newstead v London Express Newspaper [1940] 1 KB 377 CA; Because defamatory material may be in 
the form of a comment, remark, statement or even factious characters. In social media it can also be an 
‘emoji’. 
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understands it refers to the claimant, it is sufficient
921
. For instance, in an online group, 
sharing a black emoji may be considered referring to the Afro-American user. However, 
it depends on how many other users belong to the same class in that group because a 
‘class’ cannot be defamed.  
 
5.5.2.1.: Defamation of a class: 
 
The case of Alme
922
 established the general rule that ‘a class or group of humanity’ 
could not be defamed. This rule will also apply to social media that individual users of a 
group, which has been defamed, have no cause of action. For instance, if a person 
tweets, dentists in Yorkshire exploit their patients – no particular dentist is identified. 
However, if a member of the group can be identified as an individual, in that class he 
will have a valid cause of action for defamation
923
. For example, if the tweet is about the 
Asian dentists in Bradford University area – ‘an Asian dentist’ is identifiable because 
there are only three dentists in BD7. Willes J
924
 found that “if something is there to 
point to a particular individual” in that class.  
 
Similarly, if there is a very specific allegation against an entire group, each group 
member might be able to claim
925
. If defendant referred to a small group of people, they 
all could bring an action as in the Browne
926
 case, court allowed a defamation case of all 
tenants because the class was referred to a particular building. The HL
927
 later 
reinforced that limited group of people can be defamed; however, size of the group was 
not identified by their Lordships. Therefore, if a professor tweets that “one student” in 
my class is a drug addict and the class has five students, they all can argue that the 
allegation reflected on them. If there are fifty students in the class, they cannot.  
 
 
                                                          
921
 Morgan v Oldhams Press [1971] 2 All ER 1156 (HL). 
922
 King v Alme and Nott [1700] 91 Eng. Rep. 790; it was reaffirmed on several occasions as in Knupffer v 
London Express Newspaper the judge generalised that a member of a group cannot sue because his 
group or class has been defamed. However, as held in the Foxcroft v Lacey, a member of a class can sue 
for defamation of group if group is small enough to reflect upon each member.  
923
 Marcus, E. T., (1983), ‘Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New Look at an Old Rule’, 71 Cal. 
L. Rev., Vol 71, Issue 5, pp 1532-1556. 
924
 Eastwood v Holmes [1858] 1 F&F 347 at 349. 
925
 Knuppfer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116. 
926
 Browne v DC Thomson [1912] SC 359. 
927
 Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] AC 116. 
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5.5.2.1.1: Common law position: 
 
The Common law does not define ‘number of people’ in a group, but in various cases, 
claimants had recovered damages when a group included 25
928
 or fewer people. Despite 
its limitations, if the language is more inclusive, the range of people who can sue 
expands. For instance, ‘Asian MPs’ are corrupt - this accusation may be taken as 
reflecting on each Minister who is Asian. In social media claims, ‘representation’ of the 
defamatory statement will have greater significance in deciding such cases
929
. For 
instance, if Donald Trump has 25 followers on Twitter then tweeting: ‘most followers’ 
are corrupt will be considered defamatory as compared to tweeting ‘one follower’ is 
corrupt. This particular ‘one follower’ cannot be identified out of 25, whereas ‘most 
followers in a group of 25’ are identified. 
 
Concisely, class or social media group of users cannot be defamed unless: 
 
1. Communication-related to a group, which is so small, that other user can 
reasonably understand that it refers to the claimant?  
2. Such publication is shared, which led other users to reasonably conclude that the 
publication is intended for the claimant 
 
5.5.2.1.2.: Modern position: 
 
In the 2013 Act, there is no cause of action available for a member of a class of 
humankind unless that member can be specifically identifiable. This thesis argues that 
with social media where there are groups and many followers of one person, this 
traditional rule lacks the means to vindicate a user’s good name930 i.e. this rule is unfair 
and illogical in cyberspace. This analysis suggests that there is a need to differentiate 
between social media groups and ‘group/class’ for defamation. The rule ‘a group or a 
class cannot be defamed’ should only be applied to traditional defamation. Social media 
‘groups’ are a common place for networking and collect quick information. In such 
groups, individual users can have different nationalities, religious beliefs, colour, race or 
                                                          
928
 In general, for groups bigger than 25, it may be difficult for courts to find that an accusation 
against one person reflects on all. 
929
 Neiman-Marcus v Lait [1952] 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y). 
930
 Marcus, E. T., (1983), ‘Group Defamation and Individual Actions: A New Look at an Old Rule’, 71 Cal. 
L. Rev., Vol 71, Issue 5, pp 1532-1556. 
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ethnicity. Hence, social media group users should also be allowed to proceed by general 
standards of defamation. 
 
5.5.2.2.: Unintentional defamation: 
 
Libel is a tortious act
931
 so the defendant cannot argue that he did not intend to defame 
the claimant. Mostly social media users do not know other users; however, they still 
communicate/publish/reply others comment. Regarding defamation, they may argue 
they do not know if a certain user existed or they intend to defame a particular user. As 
a political activist, Monroe won a Twitter defamation claim against Katie. Even though 
Katie had no intention to defame (she even deleted initial tweets). Warby J
932
 had no 
difficulty in identifying that the actual meaning of her statement bore defamatory 
meaning. He noted, “Due allowance should be made for a forum which has less 
credibility than ‘serious’ media publications”. Lord Kenyon933 noted that defamation 
could only be constituted if there was a malicious intent to defame
934
. However, it is 
only applied where the defamatory statement was based on truth, honest opinion or the 
matter concerning public interest
935
.  
 
Lord Loreburn
936
 concluded that the intention of the defendant is immaterial if ‘libel’ is 
communicated. It depends on the nature of the injury and the harm suffered so the 
intention does not matter if the claimant’s reputation has been harmed. Similarly, the 
intention will be irrelevant (even if the defendant acted in bad faith and wanted to 
defame) where a reasonable man could not identify that defamation was referred to the 
claimant
937
. Similarly, Donald Trumps Tweet against Sadiq Khan will not constitute a 
libel if people are unable to link it to the Mayor of London. In social media, a 
reasonable man could be representative of users who follow the defendant
938
. 
 
                                                          
931
 Barendt, E., (2017), ‘Defamation Law’, Journal of Media Law, Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 291-295. 
932
 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
933
 Rex v Lord Abingdon [1794] 170 ER 337. 
934
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521; malicious intent was proved from repetition of 
defamatory articles. 
935
 Defamation Act 2013; 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/crossheading/defences/enacted [Assessed 29
th
 July 
2017]. 
936
 E Hulton & Co V Jones [1908] All ER Rep 29. 
937
 In defamation, literal truth of the words have no relevance because it depends upon ‘what meanings 
ordinary readers’ take from this publication. 
938
 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
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In common law, the intention has been irrelevant; however, Section 4 of 1952 and 
Sectio2 of 1996 Acts provided a special defence of ‘unintentional defamation’. It 
depends on ‘offer of amends’. If it is proved that defendant acted maliciously, this 
defence may not be available; nevertheless, it may be difficult to prove recklessness of 
social media users. (It is beyond the scope of this thesis).  
 
5.5.3.: Defendant must publish the statement: 
 
The statement must be communicated to a person other than the claimant. If it is not 
communicated or published than there will be no cause of action
939
 because the claimant 
is not defamed in the eyes of right-thinking members of society
940
. However, different 
rules apply to domestic, business or social communications. 
 
5.5.3.1.: Communication between husband and wife: 
 
There have been attempts to protect communication between spouses. The idea was that 
the consequences of this ‘publication’ might lead to disastrous results in social life941. 
However, with the excessive reliance on social media, it is impossible to protect the 
publication of spousal communication. However, the court has taken a strict stance on 
character assassination and revenge porn etc.  
 
5.5.3.2.: Communication during employment: 
 
In common law, there have been many attempts to protect business interests
942
. In 
today's digital arena, multinational companies carry their business transactions via 
social networking. If an employee is alleged of potential defamation, the employer may 
be held to be vicariously liable because defamation is a tort of strict liability (see-5.5). 
There is a general rule, ‘communications during the normal course of employment is 
protected by qualified privilege’943. There is no provision in the 2013 Act to rebut this 
                                                          
939
 Ryanair Ltd v Fleming [2016] IECA 265; without the evidence of publication, jurisdiction for online 
defamation cannot be assumed. 
940
 Barendt, E., (2017), ‘Defamation Law’, Journal of Media Law, Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 291-295 
941
 Wennhak v Morgan [1888] 20 QBD 635 at 639. 
942
 Salmond & Heuston (1996), ‘The Law of Torts’, (21
st
 Ed, Sweat & Maxwell), pp 154. 
943
 Bryanston Finance v De Vries [1975] QB 703. 
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general presumption, so it applies to business and all other good faith relations
944
 
(doctor-patient, lawyer-client, and bank-customer).  
 
5.5.3.3.: Distributors: 
 
The common law protected booksellers and distributors of materials from defamation as 
internet service providers are not held to be the publisher
945
. Similar provisions are 
found in Section-5 of 2013 Act regarding website operators, ISPs and network 
providers. However, it does not apply to distribution on the chat room, communications 
via dialogue boxes and comments left on review websites. 
 
5.5.3.4.: Consent: 
 
About social media users, due ‘consent’ is presumed when they accept the terms and 
conditions of social networks. It may be reasonable for advertisements or promotional 
videos. Nobody gives consent to defamatory ‘words’ at the time of sign up. 
Nevertheless, there are different privacy and user control settings available and by not 
opting to use these settings, valid consent can be assumed.  
 
5.5.4.: Serious harm: 
“A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to result in 
damaging petitioner’s reputation946”. 
 
 
Serious harm or the ‘threshold of seriousness’ requires claimants to prove the degree of 
harm suffered or potential future serious injury to reputation
947
. For years, London has 
been renowned for ‘libel tourism’ (see-2.17). Justice Tugendhat948 introduced 
‘substantial harm’ and recommended a threshold which could consistently interpret 
Article 10
949. In England, there was a need to maintain a balance between ‘freedom of 
expression’ and defamation. Section 1 is a step forward to boost the freedom of speech 
                                                          
944
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
945
 Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996. 
946
 Section 1(1) of the Defamation Act 2013. 
947
 Section 1 (1), The Defamation Act 2013. 
948
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB). 
949
 Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950. 
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and discourage trivial claims, which will also save court time and public funds
950
. In the 
1996 Act, harm was presumed in libel cases; however, section-1 will make claims for a 
Facebook insult or Twitter abuse very difficult unless claimant suffers a grave danger to 
reputation. Bean J
951
 simplified the concept of ‘serious harm’ that it cannot be presumed 
and must be proved. It is interesting to note that social media claimants do not have to 
adduce evidence of serious harm as long as statistics are available to demonstrate some 
users had access to the defamatory material (see-2.13.1). 
 
However, the degree of social media reputational harm must be severe within a 
reasonable social circuit. Moloney QC
952
 clarified that if the claimant has serious, 
defamatory allegations and publication to a relatively substantial audience, there is a 
non-rebuttable case of serious harm. On the contrary, Dingemans J
953
 established that 
the issue of serious harm is not a ‘numbers game’. Further guidance regarding serious 
harm was provided by Warby J
954
 that, on balance of probability, it is necessary to 
prove, serious harm to reputation is caused, or likely to cause because of the 
publication”.  
 
This thesis will not explore if social media has the capacity to alter the course of 
defamation law in England and Wales legal framework. However, it will discuss the 
existing provisions which are still applied in online defamation claims. Here it is 
important to discuss typical structural changes brought by the Defamation Act 2013 to 
identify if it applies to social media defamation as well. 
 
5.6.: Common structure and features of defamation: 
"A reputation once broken may be repaired, but the world will always keep their eyes 
on the spot where the crack was - Hunt
955”. 
 
Unlike traditional media (television, radio etc.), social networking sites are not limited 
to one-way communication because it provides instantaneous two-way communication. 
This facility may create parity between the parties, possibly creating opportunities for 
                                                          
950
 Barendt, E., (2017), ‘Defamation Law’, Journal of Media Law, Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 291-295. 
951
 Cooke and Midland Heart Ltd v MGN [2014] EMLR 31 at [43]. 
952
 Theedom v Nourish Training Ltd [2016] EMLR 10 at [15]. 
953
 Alvaro Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). 
954
 Lachaux v Independent Print Limited & Ors [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB). 
955
 Hunt, P. H., (2013), ‘Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to 
Twibel Claims’, Louisiana Law Review, Vol 73, Issue 2, pp 8. 
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mitigation by the defamed party
956
. Social media allows a victim (whose reputation has 
been defamed) to rebut the defamatory comments online and the claimant will still be 
entitled to a defamation claim
957
. 
 
Hyperbole, opinion, comments and sensational language are common features of social 
media which changed things by making it much easier and faster to spread word around 
(see-2.10.1). There was no such mechanism for teens to make up stories via traditional 
media which could be viewed by millions
958
. Nothing has deterred the authorities from 
applying traditional laws in online defamation cases. It has been noted that defamatory 
words on social media websites tend to be problematic for judges to identify because 
cyberspace blurs the line between traditional media outlets and social media websites
959
. 
 
There are various legal instruments available to apply to both online and offline 
defamation. Despite these various rules, judges have struggled with determining a 
standard to identify which statement amounts to defamation (see-2.10.1). In the era of 
social networking, it may even become difficult because a statement may be viewed as 
defamatory but the same statement may not be defamatory for others. Therefore, judges 
require claimants to show that his reputation has been harmed in the eyes of a defined 
group. Previously this question was decided by jury; however, the 2013 Act has 
abolished trials by jury. Nevertheless, this Act did not fundamentally change the law 
relating to defamation (see-2.13). The basic principals about the nature of defamation 
and its types are same. Even legal rules of the 1996 Act, which defined (1) natural 
meaning of libel, (2) when they lower claimant’s reputation in the eyes of ordinary 
persons; are still applicable to social media as well. 
 
This chapter will only analyse the aspects of social media libel (printed words, cartoons, 
images or sketch) with an emphasis on user-generated content (UGC). It is material 
generated by social media users via a Facebook status, tweets, comments, blogs, articles 
or opinions. UGC may include, online status, comments, tweets, journals, articles, 
blogs, wikis, exchange communication, chats, discussions, reviews, posts, podcasts and 
                                                          
956
 Placid, R., Wynekoop, J., & Feicht, R. W., (2016), ‘Twibel: The intersection of twitter and libel’, Florida 
Bar Journal, Vol 90, Issue 8, pp 32-45. 
957
 David, L., & Zach, S., (2011), ‘Public Figure-hood in the Digital Age’, Journal on Telecomm & High 
Tech., Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 403. 
958
 Seidenberg, S., (2017), ‘lies and libel’, ABA Journal, Vol 103, Issue 7, pp 48. 
959
 Placid, R., Wynekoop, J., & Feicht, R. W., (2016), ‘Twibel: The intersection of twitter and libel’, Florida 
Bar Journal, Vol 90, Issue 8, pp 32-45. 
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modified pictures
960
. Importantly, advertisements, video recordings, audio recordings 
and different types of media that were made by clients of an online framework or 
administration are also UGC which are regularly made accessible via web-based social 
networking site
961
. 
 
5.7.: Eligibility to bring an action for libel: 
 
The Common law allows a natural (dead people cannot sue
962
) and legal person, 
including organisations and companies to bring an action for libel if their reputation has 
been injured online. The threshold of serious harm must be satisfied (see-7.16); 
however, a corporation, which trades for profit, has to prove that libellous words have 
caused or will cause ‘serious financial loss963’. 
 
The eligibility criterion is divided into below groups: 
 
1. Individuals: A person or class of individuals, legal entity, trades union, patients 
and minors are entitled to bring an action.  
2. Local bodies: A public institutes, political bodies, governing bodies964, local 
authorities965, and unincorporated associations are not eligible to bring libel 
claims966.  
3. Officials: Lord Keith967 noted that to admit libel action from government bodies 
will be contrary to the public interest because it may leave an undesirable fetter 
on freedom of speech968.  
4. Political parties: They cannot file a libel claim969; however, politicians and 
government employees can file a claim970.   
                                                          
960
 Erevik, E. K., Pallesen, S., Andreassen, C. S., & Torsheim, T., (2018), ‘Who is watching user-generated 
alcohol posts on social media?’, Addictive behaviours, Vol 78, pp 131-137. 
961
 Schivinski, B., & Dabrowski, D., (2016), ‘The effect of social media communication on consumer 
perceptions of brands, Journal of Marketing Communications, Vol 22, Issue2, pp 189-214. 
962
 R v Topham [1791] 100 Eng. Rep. 931; 4 T.R. 126. 
963
 The Defamation Act 2013; s.1(2). 
964
 Montague v Page [2006] OJ No 331; under common law governments are not allowed to bring 
defamation claims against citizens. 
965
 Manchester Corporation v Williams [1891] 1 QB 94; a local council could not succeed because 
corporations may only sue for libels affecting property not for personal reputation. 
966
 Young, H., (2016), ‘Public institutions as defamation plaintiffs’, Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol 39, Issue 1, 
pp 249. 
967
 Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers [1993] AC 534. 
968
 Law Report: Local authorities cannot institute libel actions; 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/law-report-local-authorities-cannot-institute-libel-actions-
derbyshire-county-council-v-times-1473954.html [Assessed 2
nd
 July 2017]. 
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It is necessary to distinguish that the universities are not local body and they can file 
libel claims971. They may be strictly liable for defamation caused by their students while 
using social media via university internet972. Libel is a tort of strict liability973, which 
remains the same for social media. Libel cause of action can only be analysed after 
understanding nature of social media. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
969
 Goldsmith v Bhoyrul [1998] Q.B. 459. 
970
 Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd [2014] EWHC 2853 (QB). 
971
 University of Salford v Duke [2013] EWHC 196 (QB) 
972
 Keeton, W. P., (1984), ‘Prosser & Keeton on the law of Torts’  (5
th
 Ed, NSW), pp 803 
973
 Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 1156 
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Chapter 5 
Part B  
Libel in social media 
 
5.8.: What is social media? 
“Social media users cannot be subject to arbitrary interference with their privacy…. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference of 
attacks
974”. 
 
Internet-based applications, apps or websites, which are used for social networking, 
social curation and microblogging, are all categories of social media (see Appendix – 
VII). It is a collection of all communication channels, which allow interaction, sharing, 
collaboration and community base input
975. It may be defined as: “A group of web 
pages, developed from the technological foundation of 'WWW', which facilitates 
exchange and creation of user-generated contents
976”. Social media user can consume, 
organise, create and distribute UGC within a second
977
. 
 
In many instances, social media contents can quickly be forgotten, the flow of 
consciousness, or sometimes even go unnoticed.  Equally, postings can be downloaded, 
copied, ‘liked’, ‘retweeted’ and ‘shared’ which can instantly go viral978.  If a defamatory 
content against another user goes viral, it can do significant damage. It can destroy 
reputations quickly within a group
979
. It's commonly renowned characteristics are: 
Easily accessible, interactive nature, participatory culture, two-way communications, 
permanent and importantly, the creator relinquishes control of the contents
980
. On the 
other hand, its use has changed from just being a social network. It has become a remote 
                                                          
974
 Art 1, 3 & 7, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Art 8, European Convention 
on Human Rights 1950. 
975
 Gupta, S.S., Thakral, A., Choudhury, T., (2018), ‘Social Media Security Analysis of Threats and Security 
Measures’, International Conference on Communications, No 12, Comm 8430168. 
976
 Kaplan, A. M., & Haenlein, M., (2010), ‘Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities 
of social media’ Business Horizons, Vol 50, Issue 1, pp 61. 
977
 Thomas F. B., (2012), ‘Social media: The end of civilisation?’, The Warrane Lecture, University of 
New South Wales, Sydney, pp 7. 
978
 Seidenberg, S., (2017), ‘lies and libel’, ABA Journal, Vol 103, Issue 7, pp 48; social media allows 
individuals to be hurt in ways that simply did not previously exist. 
979
 Gallardo, K., (2017), ‘Taming the internet pitchfork mob: Online public shaming, the viral media age, 
and the communications decency act’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Technology Law Vol 19, issue 
3, pp 721-746. 
980
 Online content can last indefinitely because some forums store and index posts from the day the 
forum went up, even preserving libelous postings, as long as the forum lasts. This permanence of shared 
content carries a past injury forward, potentially forever, making an original sin into an eternal one; 
Paul, J. L., (2014), ‘Revenge Porn, State Law, and Free Speech’, Loy. L.A. Law Review, Vol 48, pp 57- 62.  
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supermarket, information centre, advertisement agency and news-agent because updated 
newsworthy information streams across it regularly
981
. For instance, officials, 
academics, governments, journalists and corporations now also use Facebook and 
Twitter. It is a source of real-time information, including politics, celebrity gossip, 
sports discussions, natural disasters and debates over sexual violence
982
.  
 
5.8.1.: The nature of social media communication: 
“How can one court assume jurisdiction while other declines jurisdiction or why two 
courts assume parallel jurisdiction for one online activity
983”. 
 
Social media provides a platform for users to build their social relationships. For 
instance, anybody can follow Bill Gates via Twitter. In this era of smartphones, social 
networks are even larger than before because they provide more ways of 
communication (see-2.1). The smart technology has also radically changed whom you 
communicate with and how you communicate because every social media has a 
different level of communication with different purpose and etiquette. For instance, 
LinkedIn may only be used for professional networking, Skype for wide calling, 
WhatsApp for message sending, Facebook for a status update and Twitter for following 
celebrities etc.  
 
The networking forums resemble with other mediums, including the postal service, 
radio, television, telephone, library or newspapers
984
, however, modern technology has 
additional attributes:  
 
1. Social media networks are web-based and do not recognise geographical 
boundaries 
2. They use hyperlinks which blur the distinction between where one publication 
ends and the next begins 
3. User-generated content is an important feature of social networks985 
                                                          
981
 Michael Wigney in the Geoffrey Roy Rush v Anor [2017] NSD2179 awarded damages to Geoffrey 
because the alleged defamatory publication he has been constantly associated in Australia and 
internationally with the #MeToo movement.  
982
 Placid, R., Wynekoop, J., & Roger W. F., (2016), ‘Twibel: The Intersection of Twitter and Libel’, The 
Florida Bar Journal, Vol 90, Issue 8, pp 32. 
983
 Rosenblatt, B., (1999), Conflicts of Law, available online at 
https://cyber.harvard.edu/property00/jurisdiction/conflicts.html [Accessed 17
th
 January 2017]. 
984
 Obar, J.A., & Wildman, S.S., (2015), ‘Social media definition and the governance challenge: An 
introduction to the special issue’, Telecommunications policy,  Vol 39,  Issue 9, pp 745–750. 
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4. Users are allowed to create their profiles 
5. They facilitate users to connect their profile with an individual or existing 
groups
986
 
6. Any publication can be republished/re-shared to the geographically diverse 
audience 
7. Re-sharing is easy/accurate than publication through traditional means  
 
The social media application domain is ever increasing because various government 
agencies, health departments, educational institutes, dating services, financial traders, 
banks and social services, medical professionals and even political movements are 
linked to social media. However, regardless of professional status, while using social 
media, everyone can be a publisher. The level of liability can be different depending on 
vicarious liability, third party liabilities, ISPs liability, defamation materialised during 
paid work and cases against the content providers (see-5.7). It can be evaluted by 
understanding the nature of online libel.  
  
5.8.2.: Nature of social media Libel: 
 
Post - 20
th
 century, social media furthered changes in cultural society and everyday life 
by the interactions of comments or liking pictures and sharing ideas (see-2.2). Its use 
escalated during the 21
st
 century when various social media channels (Facebook, 
Twitter, Google +) and online commentary sites (TripAdvisor, Yelp and review sites
987
) 
facilitated users to share information. It could be available for other users to read and 
leave their comments. Many social media websites are designed with the idea to 
encourage end-users to share information instantly. However, there is no mechanism to 
regulate the content of shared information i.e. sharing via social media may occur 
without any oversight of the truth of the contents. Even content regulatory bodies do not 
screen for potentially libellous comments. Content shared via social media can also be 
archived in databases forever (See-2.3.2). The legal implication regarding social media 
communication is global because damage can be done wherever content is published 
because it is permanent; it can reach a huge audience; it is quick to influence and its 
                                                                                                                                                                          
985
 Thelwall, M.A., (2014), ‘Social network sites: Users and uses’, Advances in Computers, Vol 76, Issue 4, 
pp 19-73. 
986
 Andreas, M., & Michael, H., (2010), ‘Users of the world, unite!: The challenges and opportunities of 
social media’, Business Horizons, Vol 53, Issue 1, pp 61. 
987
 A doctor sued her patient after she posted negative comments via Yelp and Facebook; BBC news 
(2018) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-44308890 [Assessed 2
nd
 June 2018]. 
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sharing is easy and expeditious (see-5.8). Furthermore, anonymity allows users to post 
their imaginations instantaneously because users assume an entirely different 
personality than they show in the real world (see-2.10.4).  
 
In recent years, there has been a tremendous increase in the risk of libellous material to 
reach a broader audience. This expansion is mostly due to rising of social networks and 
easy access to content aggregation sites, user-friendly apps and online commentary. 
These social networking sites stimulate sharing of contents without fact-checking and 
giving due regard to regulations
988
. For instance, a modified photo posted on Reddit 
may attract a million viewers; many users may ‘like’ a Facebook post against official 
bodies; users may comment on the anti-social status and similarly followers ‘retweet’ 
without due regards to its context (see-7.17). It is relatively easy to share fake news
989
 
or false information about another user or a corporate body
990
.  
 
On the other hand, it will be wrong to assume that social media is unregulated. Every 
website has its anti-social behaviour policies and the shared contents are moderated for 
inappropriate, indecent exposure or pornographic elements
991
. However, social media is 
unregulated for fake news or defamatory contents
992
 so consumers, uploaders and 
potential victims are responsible for understanding the landscape of social media libel. 
 
5.8.3.: Freedom of speech in social media:  
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers
993”. 
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 Bingireki, E., (2016), ‘Defamation in Tanzania’; Available online at 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/defamation-social-media-cyber-legal-perspective-benedict-ishabakaki 
[Assessed 2
nd
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989
 Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M., (2017), ‘Social media and fake news in the 2016 election’, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol 31, Issue 2, pp 211-236. 
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 Balkin, J. M., (2018), ‘Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New 
School Speech Regulation’, Yale Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 615. 
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 Rajan, A., (2018), ‘Martin Lewis seeks damages for 'fake' Facebook ads’; 
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th
 June 2018]; this case is listed for 
hearing but it will clarify the situation with regards to S9 Jurisdiction and whether Facebook is a primary 
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993
 Article 19; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA, 1948. 
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Cyberspace communication enables freedom to express views and comments using 
social media tools. It is easy to post a status being a ‘gay’ as compared to speaking. 
Individuals can choose a favourite name on their profile; LGBTQ people are more 
welcomed in social groups, even when they are fighting for their rights. Similarly, 
harassment, bullying, stalking, trolling, fake news and character assassination are also 
associated with social media sites. The so-called protectors of ‘freedom of speech’ and 
‘social media savvy’ usually oppose defamation cases994. However, it is no laughing 
matter when it can cost someone to lose his job or possibly his life. For instance, 
Mashal Khan
995
 was killed (wrongly) over the blasphemous Facebook status and Sunil 
Tripathi’s996 family was threatened because somebody falsely accused him on Reddit of 
being the Boston Bomber. There are several examples where the victims suffered 
because some social media user has the right to share certain information (see 
Appendix-3).  
 
It is arguable, whether speculations, spreading rumours and intentionally degrading 
statements can be categorised as freedom of expression
997
. Particularly, England is a 
country with diverse communities, where misapprehensions can easily create tensions 
between different ethnic groups. For instance, the web page of a sketch of the last 
Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (ﷺ)998, sparked outrage among the Muslim groups999.  
 
This chapter recommends that social media organisers and ISPs should work together to 
stop certain information from broadcasting. The question remains: Who will monitor 
personal information (if this is the case, security agencies are within their rights to spy 
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 Ash, A., (2017), ‘How the rise of liberal, social media-savvy generation is challenging Chinese Society’: 
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online communication –it is beyond the scope of this thesis). Besides, it has to be 
decided that what can be considered ‘libellous’.  
 
5.8.4.: What constitutes libellous on social media?: 
 
The elements, feature and characteristics of a defamatory statement have been 
established for centuries (see-5.2). It has not been updated for social media (see-5.4). 
However, following changes has been brought in the publication and identification of a 
libellous content: 
 
1. Who uses it: Social media users range from teenage to old age. They all are 
potential publisher and broadcaster but they do not have access to editorial 
service. This lack of advice is a major factor in the increase of various false and 
defamatory allegations and invasions on social media every second1000. A 
libellous statement is more amenable to prosecution than published in traditional 
media, where publication is a one-off phenomenon1001. Information posted online 
remains in a continuous state of publication1002 because social media have bigger 
and instance audience. The law does not presume that by placing material online 
can amount to substantial publication
1003
; besides, the claimant has to prove that 
the statement is viewed by the members of his community (see-5.5.3).  
 
2. How much is used: The over-reliance on social media is giving rise to the 
defamatory content being published at an alarming intensity. With the rise of 
social networks and internet usage, there is high-risk defamatory content to 
reach a broad audience in seconds. These social networks are designed to 
encourage and incentivise the sharing of information without any fact checking 
or regulation. With the growing number of internet users, it, therefore, becomes 
easier to share false information about a person’s life or business, and hence 
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 Heslop, A., (2012), ‘Ignorance Isn’t a Defence Against Sub Judice, available online: 
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 Ed, Oxford 
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possible to defame someone or the business and as a result lowering the 
reputation, trustworthy in the community1004. 
 
3. Gravity of harm: In canvassing the harm that victims need to prove for legal 
actions, it is relevant to consider whether new norms should be adopted for 
characterising the speech on social media. Given the democratisation of online 
speech, which is free, spontaneous, and open cultural expression, it is suggested 
to allocate less probative weight and meaning of such utterances. In pursuit of 
damages, the claimant submits to public scrutiny attached to the civil 
litigation1005. The human sources of communications, so critical to acceptance of 
traditional media accounts, are often suppressed by social media1006.  
 
4. How to claim defamation: Just like offline defamation, a claim of social media 
libel can only be actionable if claimant’s reputation is lowered in the eyes social 
media community/group. The claimant must follow pre-action protocol to 
initiate a libel claim and present himself in open court with proof of alleged 
defamatory material1007.  
 
5.9.: Taking legal action: 
 
The procedure of legal action is explained in two parts. The first part provides the 
details according to the statute, whereas the second part explains the general practice. 
 
Part A: Theoretical strategy 
 
Taking legal action for social media libel is a significant step. It is costly because 
instructing a lawyer in England is expensive
1008
 (see-2.14). The starting point is to 
obtain an injunction to stop the libellous material from further sharing; however, it is 
                                                          
1004
 When online community is outraged by some event, social media users often flood Internet with 
hateful and false comments about the alleged perpetrator, feeling empowered by their numbers and 
anonymity. 
1005
 A.B. v Bragg Communications Inc [2011] NSCA 26; As per Jamie W.S. Saunders J. 
1006
 Karniel, Y., (2008), ‘Defamation on the Internet: A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace’ Journal of 
International Media & Entertainment, Vol 2, pp 215-219. 
1007
 To be able to proceed with a social media libel claim under a cloak of secrecy may be contrary to the 
quintessential features of defamation law. 
1008
 England, C., (2017), ‘Katie Hopkins ordered to pay out £131,000 after losing Jack Monroe libel case 
appeal’, online https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/katie-hopkins-jack-monroe-libel-
case-pay-out-131000-lose-appeal-a7658146.html [Assessed 11
th
 June 2018]. 
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not a simple step. To obtain an injunction, the judge must be satisfied that it is the 
required measure under the circumstances
1009. The injunction is not a ‘standalone’ 
remedy because the claimant can request a full hearing trial, which may be a stressful 
process for the claimant
1010
. 
 
If a victim decides to take legal action, he must instruct solicitors to send a ‘Cease and 
Desist’ letter1011.  This letter explains how the defendant’s conduct is unlawful (see-
5.9.1.2). It warns him if same conduct is continued than police complaint is likely to 
follow
1012
.  Alternatively, compensation and legal assurances that there will be no 
repetition can be sought. Once a claim is forwarded, the claimant must refrain from 
engaging in any further communications or even replying to the defendant’s queries via 
social media
1013
. This communication can be used as evidence. The claimant 
must preserve evidence by taking snapshots/printing of the defamatory remarks and 
submit to the solicitor
1014
. 
 
5.9.1.: Legal strategy for social media libel: 
 
Social media has become an instant means of communication, where statements are 
quickly forgotten or even go unnoticed. It also allows statements to be ‘liked’, ‘copied’, 
‘downloaded’, ‘shared’, and ‘retweeted’ (see-5.1). If a defamatory statement, picture or 
video, ends up ‘going viral’ the damage done can be significant (see-5.8.3). In a 
networking group, reputation can quickly be destroyed so the tort of libel becomes 
actionable if the reputational damage is caused (see-2.10.2).  
 
If the damage is established, the court will ignore the following:  
 
1. Innocently or mistakenly re-sharing someone's post (see-7.15)  
                                                          
1009
 (1) Michael McGrath; (2) Necon Technologies Ltd v (1) Byron Bedofrd; (2) Proeconomy Ltd [2016] 
EWHC 174; a threshold of serious harm must be met. 
1010
 Hiranandani-Vandrevala v Times Newspapers Ltd [2016] EWHC 250. 
1011
 Ardia, D. S., (2013), ‘Freedom of speech, defamation, and injunctions’, William and Mary Law 
Review, Vol 55, Issue 1, pp 42. 
1012
 Ambrose, M. L., (2014),’ Speaking of forgetting: Analysis of possible non-EU responses to the right to 
be forgotten and speech exception’, Telecommunications Policy, Vol 38, issue 9, pp 800-811. 
1013
 Morgan v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2018] EWHC 1725 (QB). 
1014
 Wilson, B., (2017), ‘Libel, privacy breaches and harassment on Snapchat’, Media Law Blog; Online Url 
http://www.brettwilson.co.uk/defamation-privacy-online-harassment/defamation/[Assessed 18
th
 
August 2017]. 
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2. Published something in rage and anger and later deleted that statement (see-
7.17) 
3. Deliberately launching a humiliating attack (see-7.20) 
 
5.9.1.1.: Defamation pre-action protocol:  
 
The ‘Defamation Pre Action Protocol1015’ determines the period prior to issuing the 
proceedings
1016
. It
1017
 is a code of practice which the parties of social media libel must 
follow when litigation needs to be considered
1018
.  This protocol encourages the litigants 
to disclose information at an early stage. It will enable them to understand the case and 
can increase the prospect of ‘out of court’ resolution1019. Importantly, if a claimant does 
not follow this code, the proceedings will be rejected without a hearing trial
1020
. Once, 
the claim proceeds to court, the judge will consider the extent to which the protocol has 
been followed
1021
. CPR 1.4(l)(i) binds the court to identify the facts of the case even 
before trying the preliminary points of law
1022
. CPR 1.4 (2)(e) provides that the case 
management duties of the court are to encourage the parties to use an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the use of 
such procedure. If the parties do not opt for alternative resolution, then the proceedings 
commence. The requirements of the Pre-Action Protocol for Defamation Claims are 
detailed below (see Appendix-IV). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1015
 According to Lord Irvine, it is designed to improve pre-action communication between the parties by 
establishing a timetable for the exchange of information and by setting standards for the content of 
correspondence. It will enable parties to make an informed judgment on the merits of their cases earlier 
than tends to happen today, because they will have earlier access to the information they need 
1016
 Ahmed, M., & Pennells, C., (2017), ‘Online courts take the stage: Pre-action protocols & the briggs. 
online court’, New Law Journal, Vol 167, Issue 18, pp 7746. 
1017
 Its overriding principle is that justice must be done and provides the litigants to have their case 
resolved with reasonable expedition in a manner that invests the process with appropriate sanctions, 
inducements and time constraints calculated to reduce cost. It also streamline procedures to encourage 
early discussion.  
1018
 Halsbury's Laws of England (2015), ‘Civil Procedure Rule’, Vol 11, paras 1–503. 
1019
 Civil Procedure Act 1997, S 1, Sch 1. 
1020
 Cundall-Johnson v Whipps Cross University Hospital NHS Trust [2007] EWHC 2178;  court stayed 
proceedings which had been commenced before the claimants had sent a pre-action letter of claim.  
1021
 Gillen, J., (2012), ‘Everything should be as simple as possible but not simpler: Practice and procedure 
in defamation proceedings’, Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, Vol 63, Issue 1, pp 137. 
1022
 Tilling v Whteman [1980] AC 1; preliminary questions of law should be carefully and precisely 
framed so as to avoid difficulties of interpretation as to what is the real question which is being ordered 
to be tried as a preliminari issue. 
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5.9.1.2.: Letter of claim: 
 
The claimant must notify the defendant of his claim in a letter at the earliest 
opportunity. This letter of claim should  include the following information
1023
: Name of 
the claimant; sufficient  details to identify the publication or broadcast which contain 
the alleged words; the defamatory statement; the date of publication. The letter of claim 
must describe the nature of the remedies sought; the facts or matters which make the 
claimant identifiable in the statement and any relevant details regarding the 
interpretation of the complained words
1024
. 
 
5.9.1.3.: Defendants' response to the claim:  
 
The defendant must provide a response to this letter in a reasonably quick time
1025
. The 
defendant has 14 days to respond; however, it can be extended by communicating with 
the attorney of the claimant. If the defendant does not agree on the cost of claim, he can 
submit his response to the court
1026
. The response must include the following
1027
: To 
what extent the claim is accepted; whether further information is needed; whether the 
defendant accepts the claim in whole or part and the remedies. The defendant must 
include the meaning he attributes to his statement. If he needs more information, it must 
be specified the exact nature of required information
1028
. Under CPR 26.4(2) the 
defendant is entitled to request some time to adopt an alternative method and CPR 26.4 
(3) empowers the court to extend the stay only if it is appropriate. 
 
5.9.1.4.: Proportionality as to costs:  
 
This Protocol requires both the claimant and the defendant parties, when 
communicating to each other must take into account proportionality
1029
. The idea is to 
                                                          
1023
 Paragraph 3 of the Pre-action Conduct and Protocols Practice Direction. 
1024
 CPR, https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_def [Assessed 11
th
 June 
18]. 
1025
 Ahmed, M., & Pennells, C., (2017), ‘Online courts take the stage: Pre-action protocols & the briggs 
online court’, New Law Journal, Vol 167, Issue 18, pp 7746. 
1026
 Section 3(5) of the Defamation Act 1996. 
1027
 Rogers, W., & Milmo, P., (2008), ‘Cat Libel and Slander’, (11
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 
1066. 
1028
 Ministry of Justice, Pre-action Protocol for Defamation - 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/protocol/prot_def [Assessed 8
th
 March 2018]. 
1029
 Higginson Securities Ltd v Hodson [2012] EWHC 1052.  
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limit costs proportionate to the nature and gravity of the case
1030
. The court will judge 
whether costs sanctions are appropriate in line with the principles of pre-action 
protocol
1031
. 
 
Part B: In Practice: 
 
It has been seen that ordinary social media users relinquish a claim for damages if the 
objectionable contents are removed
1032
. Besides, out of court settlements are also 
feasible options from small social media libel claims. However, for corporate entities, 
celebrities, and business organisations damages could be very large because ‘libellous 
words’ reach to millions of users. It is another debate if millions of users would view 
those words. However, it is a fact that internet publication can be larger than all the 
largest broadcast or print media outlets
1033
. In the circumstance, when it is inevitable to 
avoid court, a proper libel claim can be pursued. The following three practical issues 
may arise: 
 
1. Before the claim:  
 
The claimant must seek the answers of the following three questions arise
1034
:  
 
1. Who is the author (see-5.9.1.4) 
2. Who is responsible for the publication (see-5.9.1.5) 
3. What are the steps to be taken to remove this material or bring a legal action 
(see-5.9.2)  
 
2. When the claim is prepared: 
 
Before, preparing a claim, the claimant must know
1035
:  
                                                          
1030
 Order 1 Rule 1 A of the Rules of the Court of Judicature (NI) 1980. 
1031
 Halsey v Milton Keynes General Trust [2004] EWCA Civ 576. 
1032
 Internet Defamation in Cyberspace, online Url: http://www.adlexsolicitors.co.uk/internet-
defamation.htm [Assessed 14
th
 Sep 2017]. 
1033
 Rai, N., & George R. C., (2013), Defamation in Cyberspace; Available online at: 
http://www.legalservicesindia.com/articles/defcy.htm [Assessed 14
th
 Sep 2017]. 
1034
 Mole v Hunter [2014] EWHC 658 QB; to establish a defamation claim, the claimant must have a full 
grasp of all the key facts and set them out fully in its claim form and particulars. 
1035
 Pre action protocol for defamation, CPR r 3.1. 
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1. The content objectionable material 
2. The URL at which the objectionable material is published  
3. Which search engine lists that URL  
 
3. When the claim is forwarded: 
 
If a claim has been forwarded the logical steps for a judge to consider are
1036
:  
 
1. Decide the meaning(s) of the statement applying Sir Anthony Clarke MR1037 
principles (see-5.5.1) 
2. Determine whether the meaning(s) arrived at have a defamatory tendency (under 
common law tests) (see-7.14) 
3. Must consider whether the ‘Serious Harm’ requirement is satisfied (see-7.16) 
4. Make findings of the extent of publication (see-7.19) 
 
However, the main concern for the victim is to identify the right defendant
1038
. 
 
5.9.1.5.: Who do you sue?  
 
In internet defamation the identity of the publisher, in the most cases, is obvious: (1) If 
mainstream media – a journalist, (2) if a blog – an author, (3) if social media – an 
identified user. The claimant can bring an action against these primary defendants, in 
the event of potential defamation. However, in some instances, when the publisher is 
not known - anonymous
1039
, unreachable - ignores the court order (foreign defendant), 
the claimant may sue the secondary publisher (hosts or search engines)
1040
. If the 
defendant is the ‘man of straw’, the claimant’s perspective issue becomes to analyse 
                                                          
1036
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB); As per Waby J at 24. 
1037
 In Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at [14] Sir Anthony Clarke gave this frequently 
cited summary of the principles to be applied when deciding meaning;  See Appendix-V. 
1038
 Gould, K., (2017), ‘Locating a "threshold of seriousness" in the Australian tests of defamation’, 
Sydney Law Review, Vol 39, Issue 3, pp 333-363. 
1039
 A user can sign up to social media sites with fake name, a user in the dark web, or shielded by a 
clock of anonymity by using proxy registrant service or VPN; claimant can request the court for 
‘unmasking orders’ to compel disclosure of the identity of anonymous user. 
1040
 Perry, R., Zarsky, T., (2015), ‘Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation?’, The 
University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue, Vol 82, 162. 
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whether the defendant is worth suing for damages (see-7.18). In the McDonald’s1041 
case, the claimant was awarded £76,000; however, the damages were unrecoverable 
because the defendants were two un-waged people. In such scenarios, the claimant 
would prefer to sue ISP
1042
 or the website operator (Facebook or Twitter), which hosted 
libellous contents. These companies are resourceful to afford damages claims; however, 
most countries protect service providers against such claims
1043
. Search engines may be 
liable for such claims under data privacy and ‘Data Protection Act1044’. Similarly, CA 
concluded that Google could be liable as a publisher for its ‘Blogger platform’1045. As a 
general rule
1046
, a libel claim against service providers will not be deemed a legitimate 
legal option
1047
.   
 
5.9.1.6.: Claim against primary defendant: 
 
The victim must bring libel claim against the entity that lowered his reputation, which 
could be an individual or a corporation (see-6.8). A legal procedure has to be adopted 
and the suit must be filed in a proper jurisdiction (see-6.6). Appropriate court 
determination depends on jurisdictional analysis (see-2.12). In doing so, compliance 
with the pre-action protocol is the key to success (see-5.9.1.1). Primary defendant is 
further detailed later (see-7.18) 
 
5.9.2.: Overview of libel claim procedure: 
 
The starting point for the claimant, whose reputation is harmed, is to confront the 
defendant by sending a legal notice, unless the defendant is not worth suing. The 
defendant may be a foreign nation, so permission to serve out of jurisdiction is required 
                                                          
1041
 McDonalds Corp v Steel (No. 4) [1995] 3 AER 615. 
1042
 Merely providing a customer with an internet access service does not render an  ISP liable for 
defamatory material; Bunt v Tilley & Ors [2006] EWHC 407 (QB). 
1043
 ECD 'Directive on electronic commerce 2000/31/EC (ISPs, like ‘Messenger’, are not content 
providers, therefore, they should not have legal liability); In 1995, Congress passed the Communications 
Decency Act, which protects ISPs and Website Hosts from defamation claims, S5 of the Defamation Act 
2013 also protects ISPs and website operators (see-2.13.2). 
1044
 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez (Case C-131/12). 
1045
 Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 68; Lord Dyson concluded that the ISP (respondent) had merely 
provided the platform. 
1046
 Internet Watch Foundation (IWF); Internet Services Providers Association UK; Evans, J., (2006), ‘ISP 
liability for defamation?’, Periodical Publishers Association, http://www.ppa.co.uk/ [Assessed 8
th
 March 
2018]. 
1047
 ISPs do not have a general obligation to monitor content generated by third parties. 
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(see-6.9, 2.12). If the defendant is unidentifiable, the claimant can apply legal pressure 
to the website operator or the host of that website because they can be convicted for a 
libel claim, in certain circumstances. The victims can also seek the removal of the 
relevant libellous statement from search engines (Google, Hotmail, and Yahoo) or other 
social networks
1048. Using the shield of ‘freedom of expression1049’, search engines do 
not lightly remove material from their natural search results
1050
. However, if they 
receive a detailed and comprehensive submission on the factual/legal basis of the case, 
they may act accordingly
1051
. This thesis understands from the existing literature
1052
 that 
they will comply without the need for court action. Once a notice of removal is served 
to ISPs, they will be bound to act according to the notice. CA
1053
 established that if the 
site operator has already received a notice of defamatory contents, he will not be able to 
avail the immunity of Section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996
1054
 if he failed to follow the 
notice.  
 
5.9.3.: Alternatives to legal proceedings: 
 
There is a massive industry, lawyers, private investigators, PR specialists and computer 
experts, working to take down postings on social media. They are employed to de-mote 
negative comments on search engines. They track originators of the contents and issue 
removal orders. Social media users can hide their identity but for anonymous 
defendants, there is a legal way of identifying them
1055
 by using ‘Norwich Pharmacal 
                                                          
1048
 Gallardo, K. L., (2017), ‘Taming the internet pitchfork mob: Online public shaming, the viral media 
age, and the communications decency act’, Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law, 
Vol 19, Issue 3, pp 721. 
1049
 Erdos, D., (2014), ‘Data protection and the right to reputation: Filling the "gaps" after the 
defamation act 2013’, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol 73, Issue 3, pp 536. 
1050
 Burshtein, S., (2017), ‘The true story of fake news’, Intellectual Property Journal, Vol 29, Issue 3, pp 
397; Most search engines are protected as an interactive computer service provider under Section 
230(c) of the Communications Decency Act. 
1051
 Kerr, J., (2016), ‘What is a search engine?: The simple question the court of justice of the European 
union forgot to ask and what it means for the future of the right to be forgotten’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, Vol 17, Issue 1, pp 217-243. 
1052
 Oster, J., (2015), ‘Communication, defamation and liability of intermediaries’, Legal Studies, Vol 35, 
Issue 2, pp 348-368;  Vamialis, A., (2013), ‘Online defamation: Confronting anonymity’, International 
Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 21, Issue 1, pp 31-65; Data Privacy Laws and right to be 
forgotten. 
1053
 Tamiz v Google [2013] EWCA Civ 68; ISPs will not be held liable for any content uploaded or 
generated by any third party, unless the courts order them to remove or block certain content and they 
fail to do so in the given term. 
1054
 Godara, S., (2013), ‘Defamation in Cyber Space: Who do you sue?’, 8th International Conference on 
Information Warfare and Security (ICIW).  
1055
 Perry, R., Zarsky, T., (2015), ‘Who Should Be Liable for Online Anonymous Defamation?’, The 
University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue, Vol 82, 162. 
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Order’ (see-5.9.3.1). It can only be obtained by applying to court because without this 
‘order’ websites hosting third-party information owe a duty of confidentiality not to 
disclose personal information voluntarily
1056
. It is a discretionary remedy because it is 
intrusive and extraordinary so it is exercised with caution
1057
.  The applicant for this 
order has to show that the information sought is required to permit a perspective claim 
to proceed. It is not compulsory for the claimant to make a firm commitment to start the 
action
1058
. 
 
5.9.3.1.: What is a Norwich Pharmacal Order?  
 
This order, allows a claimant to acquire necessary information to take action against an 
unknown defendant. It requires a third party who is ‘mixed up’ in the wrongdoing to 
disclose information as to the identity of the wrongdoer
1059
.   In the case of Yahoo 
[2017]
1060, it was held that ‘Norwich order’ is issued when a third party is required for a 
potential action to disclose information that would otherwise be confidential.  Justice 
Robyn observed that the following factors apply to an application for a Norwich order: 
 
1. Does the applicant has evidence of a valid claim 
2. Does it appear that the third party is involved in the acts complained of 
3. Is the third party the only practical source of information available 
4. Can the third party be indemnified for any costs, to which the third party may be 
exposed as a result of the disclosure 
5. Do the interests of justice favor obtaining the disclosure  
 
5.9.3.2: “John Doe” action:  
 
It is a legal action against a fictitious individual. It is followed by the registration or 
filing of the case in out-of-state jurisdictions to  webmasters, site administrators and 
internet service providers (ISPs)
1061
. This order request for IP addresses and other 
                                                          
1056
 The Data Protection Act 1998. 
1057
 Norwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Comrs [1974] AC 133. 
1058
 Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 282 v Yahoo! Inc. [2017] ONSC 4385. 
1059
 Norwich Pharmacal v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133. 
1060
 Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 282 v Yahoo! Inc. [2017] ONSC 4385. 
1061
 Larson, R. G., & Godfread, P. A., (2011), ‘Bringing John Doe to Court: Procedural Issues in Unmasking 
Anonymous Internet Defendants’, Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., Vol 38, pp328. 
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account information of alleged defendant. Such a process can become very complicated 
so computer forensic experts are sometimes required to assist with the case
1062
. 
 
5.10.: Summary: 
 
A false statement or an opinion, in the form of words or a graphical image, which 
significantly reduces the reputation of an individual, group, nation, religious beliefs, 
ethnicity, race, government, product or business, in the eyes of right-thinking members 
of a society is called defamation
1063
. Defamation via social media can be a statement, 
phrase, comments, a tweet, forwarding a published statement or uploading such material 
which may contain the defamatory element. The 2013 Act protects an individual’s 
reputation and privacy matters, which are also recognised by human rights instruments 
and British Bills of rights
1064
.  
 
Defamation via social media is one of the most damaging concerns invoked by 
cyberspace because ‘law of defamation’ is at times confusing and seemingly 
illogical
1065
. Justice Abrahamson
1066
 classed it as an area of law renowned for its 
complexity. Defamation is an old concept; however the commercialisation of the 
internet introduced new methods of defamation. To date, there are no specific 
provisions to address cyber libel. Common law countries have adjusted traditional 
defamation norms and international agreements to cope with this challenge. This thesis 
will differentiate between traditional and modern challenges of defamation because the 
ease with which communication flows across virtual borders has made ‘traditional law’ 
application an area of great public concern. For instance, the 2013 Act requires the 
proof of ‘viewership of libellous content’ to establish serious harm. This is not the case 
in traditional approach. Besides, social media publication is not about numbers because 
a single view can have diverse effects. Similarly, publication of content to many users 
                                                          
1062
 Grimmelmann, J., (2010), ‘The Unmasking Option’, Denver University Law Review, Vol 887, Issue 23, 
pp 56. 
1063
 Warshaw, A., (2006), ‘Uncertainty from Abroad: Rome II and the Choice of Law for Defamation 
Claims’, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol 32, Issue 1, pp 270-312. 
1064
 Barendt, E., (2017), ‘Defamation Law’, Journal of Media Law, Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 291-295. 
1065
 Speedie v Sunday Newspapers Ltd [2017] IECA 15; Mullis, A., & Scott, A., (2009), ‘Something rotten in 
the state of English libel law?: A rejoinder to the clamour for reform of defamation’, Communications 
Law, Vol 14, Issue 6, pp 173-183. 
1066
 Denny v Mertz [1982] 106 Wis. 2d 636, 674. 
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may not be sufficiently serious about giving rise to a libel claim. A single statement 
related to one victim can be more harmful than a statement to the whole world
1067
.  
 
5.11.: Conclusion:  
 
This chapter concludes that there are many formalities and pre-action protocols required 
to bring a libel claim. It is a very expansive, time-consuming and stressful procedure. 
The best remedy could be restoring the claimant’s reputation, vindicating his name and 
compensating for the distress caused
1068
. Therefore, the courts must grant an injunction 
to stop the statement from further publication
1069
; however, judges required proof of 
serious harm to grant such an injunction. England is already famous for its claimant- 
friendly jurisdiction because judges already provide incentives to libel victims
1070
. It 
restricts speech liberty and produces an imbalance between freedom of speech and 
reputation rights
1071
. It is recommended that a more flexible approach is required when 
it comes to granting an injunction because there are further issues of meaning, serious 
harm, publication and jurisdiction which can add to the ‘to do list’ of a victim. These 
issues are considered in next chapters, which may allow this thesis to offer some 
suitable suggestions to compensate a victim via simple claim procedure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1067
 Delfi As v Estonia [2015] (Application no. 64569/09), ECHR Grand Chamber, Strasburg. 
1068
 The overwhelming majority of victims find a disturbance in their daily life. The pressure of 
defamation suits, disappointment due to misplaced confidence, shock, fear, feelings of injustice, 
humiliation and a sense of dispossession or lack of control over their data. 
1069
 Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch. 269 CA; without proof of harm injunction may not be granted. 
1070
 Hartley, T. C., (2010), ‘Libel Tourism’ and Conflict of Laws, International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, Vol 59, Issue 1, pp 25-38. 
1071
 Tamunokuro, G., (2016), ‘Limitations on the Freedom of Speech by Defamation in UK Law’, 
Academia.edu; Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/6910942/Limitations_on_the_Freedom_of_Speech_by_Defamation_in_UK
_Law [Accessed 10
th 
June 2018]. 
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Court’s competence 
 
Preliminary issues of personal jurisdiction 
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6.1.: The overview of this chapter: 
“[T]he foundation of jurisdiction is based on power in physical spaces1072”  
Justice Holmes 
 
A libel claim involving a substantial foreign element (non-EU) is quite possible in 
England
1073
 but it requires several complications to be carefully surpassed (see-6.5). A 
few of these obstacles include ‘multiple defendants’, ‘questions of foreign law’ and a 
challenge over jurisdiction which can be lengthy and complex (see-4.3). The claimant is 
required to obtain court’s permission to serve writ, which must be correctly executed 
and any challenges must be dealt with before the court proceedings can be initiated (see-
6.8.2.1). This will be a preliminary hearing, so a full consideration of the merits and 
evidence will not be needed, at this stage. Judge will make the decision based on the 
litigant’s argument and once jurisdiction is decided, the claimant can focus on resolving 
the actual issues (see-5.5, 5.7). This chapter investigates personal jurisdiction rules, 
which apply to a defendant, who is not resident in the UK, the EU, Switzerland, Iceland 
or Norway. These may, of course, be the rules that will apply to all defendants after the 
Brexit.  
 
Whether the court will exercise its jurisdiction depends on the factors explained in the 
following sections:  
  
 
Part A: Principles of Jurisdiction 
Part B: Application of Jurisdiction 
Part C: Overview of English Jurisdiction 
Part D:  Structure of English Jurisdiction 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1072
 McDonald v Mabee [1917], U.S. 90, No 135 at 234; The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.   
1073
 The residence, nationality, domicile or presence of the person bringing the claim is not directly 
relevant to the question of jurisdiction; if a non-British claimant follows pre-action protocol he can 
invoke English jurisdiction (see-5.9.1.1). 
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Chapter 6 
Part A 
Principles of Jurisdiction 
 
In previous chapters, the central question emerged that how courts can coordinate the 
issues concerning social media libel into traditional framework of jurisdiction
1074
. 
Jurisdiction as an issue is even more critical here because during social networking, 
users publish a lot of irrelevant content
1075
 (potentially defamatory) (see-5.8.2). If 
somebody publishes/shares/uploads defamatory material online, he will have to bear the 
liability (see-2.10.1). The victims prefer to sue these publishers in their domestic courts 
(see-5.9.1.1); however, most of the defendants are domiciled in other jurisdictions
1076
. 
For instance, the primary instruments (Twitter/Facebook/Google) for resourcing the 
potential libellous information are based in the US but provide subscriptions globally. 
They operate by the storage of data, which subscribers can download on their networks 
and then access anywhere in the world (see-2.3.2). The subscribers can be anywhere, 
which raises global jurisdiction issues for foreign-based defendants. This ‘global 
jurisdiction’ depends upon the application of ‘choice of law’ rules1077. Section A will 
evaluate the principles of personal jurisdiction in comparison with freedom of speech 
and application of choice of law rules. 
 
6.2.:  Jurisdiction for libel or free speech:  
 
Social media’s meteoric rise has provided vast areas of new opportunities to defame1078. 
Since then, defamation has become a common feature of the legal systems of many 
common law countries
1079
. They allow victims to initiate a libel action for any false 
                                                          
1074
 The social media networks have developed overnight and the legal system has had to react in order 
to formulate new legal principles. This has been achieved in many instances using the reasoning from 
cases ruling on libel in print media. 
1075
 The content on social media Web sites is user-generated, which allows its subscribers to download 
information almost instantaneously. It provides the account holders a tool to disseminate information 
that may damage the reputation of individuals and groups. 
1076
 Elkins, D., (2017), ‘No jurisdiction from social media posts’, Virginia Lawyers Weekly; online at 
https://valawyersweekly.com/ [Assessed 14
th
 August 2018 ]. 
1077
 A.B.A, (2000), ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project: Achieving Legal & Business Order in Cyberspace’, A 
Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, American Bar Association, SEC. Bus. L. 5. 
1078
 Auda, A.G.R., (2016), ‘A proposed solution to the problem of libel tourism, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 12, Issue 1, pp 106-131. 
1079
 Galbally, P. J., (2015), ‘A ‘serious’ response to trivial defamation claims: An examination of s 1(1) of 
the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) from an Australian perspective, Media and Arts Law Review, Vol 20, pp 
213-250. 
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statement (printed, uploaded, shared, published or broadcasted), which diminished their 
respect or defamed their character. It is arguable whether the liberty to start proceedings 
for defamation via social media is a threat to freedom of expression
1080
. Traditional laws 
are unable to maintain a balance between individual user’s privacy and freedom to share 
information
1081
 because of claimant-friendly approach.  England took a step to adopt the 
digital environment by reforming existing defamation laws. Section 1 requires proof of 
‘serious or potential harm’, which caused a reasonable person to have low esteem in 
society
1082. This ‘seriousness threshold’ may provide a shield against trivial 
proceedings
1083
, which can be an important shift in modernising libel legislation to 
protect ‘freedom of expression’. However, since 2013, interpretation of ‘serious harm’ 
has been very confusing because it contradicted existing law (see-7.16). The Theedom 
[2015]
1084
 case, established that it had changed the substantive law and made it harder to 
bring a libel claim
1085
. 
 
Freedom of speech in social media can only be protected if the users have knowledge of 
how communication via social media is regulated and which legal system is authorised 
to regulate it (see-5.8.1). Nevertheless, it is impossible to achieve consistency 
concerning communication freedom because ‘appropriateness of speech’ standards vary 
across borders. The courts in the Western World have attended to the value of free 
speech but its balance in defamation doctrine is not maintained in the third world 
countries (see-5.8.3). For instance, in China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan, much 
greater restrictions are placed on ‘freedom of expression1086’. In such countries, peoples 
opinion may lead to prosecution for treason and considered an insult to the Head of 
State, government or courts. Similarly, Muslim countries have their standard of free 
speech about religion and culture (see-5.8.3). These remotely differing approaches to 
freedom of speech imply that consistency of judgments would not be attainable. In the 
                                                          
1080
 Explanatory Notes, Defamation Act 2013 (UK), c 26 (2). 
1081
 Mullis, A., & Scott, A., (2009), ‘Something rotten in the state of English libel law?: A rejoinder to the 
clamour for reform of defamation’, Communications Law, Vol 14, Issue 6, pp 173-183. 
1082
 Defamation Act 2013 (UK) c 26, s 1(1). 
1083
 Krishan, S., (2013), ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill: Striking a Balance?’, Entertainment Law Review, 
Vol 23, Issue (2), pp 25. 
1084
 Theedom v Nourish Training (t/a Recruitment Colin Sewell) [2015] EWHC 3769.  
1085
 Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). 
1086
 Reang, P., (2004), ‘Freedom of Expression and Right to Information in Asian Countries’, A Regional 
Analysis of Challenges; 
https://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/resources/InternewsEU_ASEAN_FoE_and_RTI_Study_20
14.pdf [Assessed 17
th
 August 2018]; Southeast Asia has the third largest number of internet users in the 
world – a figure that has grown by more than 30%, or 80 million people, in the past year alone. 
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absence of ‘standard speech regulation’, the courts are unduly burdensome to identify 
‘jurisdiction’, ‘applicable law’ and ‘choice of law’, as Kirby J noted that it was not for 
the courts to introduce new rules to govern the internet/social media (see-2.6.2). 
 
6.2.1.: Jurisdiction from claimant's perspective: 
“Scholars who study conflicts of law are used to regulate conflicts - Goldsmith1087”. 
 
Social media users do not know what laws to take into account. They may be aware of 
their domestic laws but unaware of laws of the country with which they interact (see-
5.8.2). Social media being a convergence of publishing and communications, allows 
global interactions but sovereignty based laws may hold publishers into an alien judicial 
system for content, which may be legal in their forum (see-5.8). For instance, 
questioning the president’s integrity may be legal in the west but illegal in North Korea. 
Similarly, religious freedom is interpreted differently in Islamic countries (see-5.8.3). 
Nevertheless, traditional rules allow the claimants to choose a jurisdiction, where most 
favourable judgments can be obtained
1088
. For instance, if a person is defamed in 
Afganistan, then being a victim, he can issue the proceedings in
1089
:  
 
1. The country of the defendant 
2. The country of the claimant 
3. The country where the tort occurred  
4. The country where the injury manifested (injuries may occur in numberless 
countries) 
5. The country where the ISP is located 
6. The country of the co-defendant1090  
 
Traditional jurisdictional legislation allows claimants to bring claim anywhere; 
however, such protection is also available for a defendant to a certain extent (limited 
degree) (see-2.12.3, 2.17.1). 
                                                          
1087
 Goldsmith, J. L., (1998), ‘Against cyber anarchy’, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol 65, Issue 4, 
pp 1199-125 at [148]. 
1088
 Hook, M., (2017), ‘The "statutist trap" and subject-matter jurisdiction’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 435; however, this liberty gave rise to the trend of ‘forum 
shopping’ in online libel. 
1089
 Chen, W., & Goldstein, G., (2017), ‘The Asian principles of private international law: Objectives, 
contents, structure and selected topics on choice of law’, Journal of Private International Law, Vol 13, 
Issue 2, pp 411. 
1090
 Art 7(3), Art 18, Art 19, Art 21 & Art 23 of  Brussels I Regulation (recast). 
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6.2.2: Jurisdiction from defendant’s perspective: 
 
English libel laws are claimant-friendly because the defendant has to prove that the 
allegations are false or his statements/comments are ‘true’. If the defendant fails to 
prevail in the libel claim, he will also bear a high level of costs, including legal fees 
(see-2.14, 5.9). Forum disadvantage to a defendant and selection of forum by a 
claimant, make grabbing trial jurisdiction by the court occasionally and 
unforeseeable
1091
. These uncertainties create conflicts with traditional private 
international law, which emphasises foreseeability and certainty in the determination of 
jurisdiction (see-4.2.2). For instance, some jurisdictions are pro-defendant (France), 
whereas some are pro-claimant (England). In a social media libel case, a defendant who 
resides in pro-defendant venue may transmit information into a pro-claimant venue. If 
the defendant is prosecuted in the claimant-friendly legal system, there is a genuine risk 
of incurring liability. Hence, while communicating via social media; potential 
defendants may restrict their speech to conform to the laws of the most restrictive 
jurisdiction to which they transmit information.    
 
The defendant can always challenge any jurisdiction on the grounds of ‘forum non 
convenience’ (see-2.7.2, 2.17.1). Besides, Section 1 makes it difficult for the claimant’s 
trivial claims to be initiated because ‘seriousness test’ has to be satisfied before issuing 
proceedings. This can favour the defendant.   
 
6.2.3.: Jurisdiction from legal perspective: 
 
A court can only assume jurisdiction over a defendant if it had followed due process of 
invoking personal jurisdiction (see-2.8.1). Every country owes a duty to perform due 
diligence before trying a case involving foreign element
1092
. Courts must have personal 
jurisdiction before issuing a writ on foreign defendant
1093
. Judges are obliged to exercise 
                                                          
1091
 Deripaska v Cherney [2009] EWCA Civ 849; if court allowed a leave to serve out case that the natural 
forum is other than England, it remains open to the court still to find England the “proper forum”. 
1092
 Nuyts, A., (2005), ‘Due Process and Fair Trial: Jurisdiction in the United States and in Europe 
Compared’ in Ronald A Brand (eds.), Private Law, Private International Law and Judicial Cooperation in 
the EU-US Relationship, 2 CILE Studies, pp 27.  
1093
 Elkins, D., (2017), ‘No jurisdiction from social media posts’, Virginia Lawyers Weekly; online at 
https://valawyersweekly.com/ [Assessed 14
th
 August 2018]. 
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moderation and restraint in invoking jurisdiction
1094
. National courts can utilise 
discretion in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants; 
however, they should avoid undue encroachment on other’s sovereignty1095. In the 
ambit of UN agreements
1096
, if a legal authority imposes its power in an overly self-
centered way, it may contravene international laws
1097
. Court of Justice
1098
 noted that 
jurisdiction is an exercise of sovereign power and must not conflict with sovereign 
interests of other states. Therefore, if a court exceeds its limits, its unsophisticated 
conduct can interfere with standard arrangements of the international order established 
by the UN
1099
. If such breaches of sovereign limitation continue in social media cases, it 
may produce political, legal, and economic reprisals.  
 
The start of proceedings without establishing ‘personal jurisdiction’ may also violate the 
sovereignty of the country where that defendant is ordinarily resident
1100
. The lack of 
jurisdiction over a foreign national can hold a court liable for exceeding its statutory 
powers without following due process
1101
. The principle of non-intervention is 
supported by public international law, where jurisdiction is determined by conventions, 
treaties or international agreements
1102
 (see-2.8.1). Therefore, the requirement of 
'personal jurisdiction' reinforces the concept of international non-intervention
1103
 
principles and it also protects the idea of individual liberty
1104
. 
 
                                                          
1094
 Libel, N., (1961), ‘Barriers to expanding personal jurisdiction’, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Vol 29, pp 569-585. 
1095
 Maubourquet v Wyse [1867], 1 Ir.Rep. C.L. 471, 481; subject to its conception of sovereignty, a 
judgment not to be contrary to natural justice. 
1096
 Cassel, D., (2001), ‘A framework of norms’, Harvard International Review, Vol 22, Issue 4, pp 60. 
1097
 Davidson, S., (2008), ‘International considerations in libel jurisdiction’, Journal of the Oxford Round 
Table, Forum on Public Policy, pp 1-28. 
1098
 German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), 2 July 1991, 115 BGHZ 90. 
1099
 Charter of United Nation, San Francisco (1945); 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf [Assessed 18
th
 March 2018]. 
1100
 A state is prima facie free to legislate or regulate with respect to persons or events beyond its 
territory, as long as doing so does not interfere with the same right of states that may have a closer 
connection to those persons or events - Currie, J.H., (2001), ‘Public International Law’, (2
nd
 Ed, Irwin Law, 
Toronto ), pp 299. 
1101
 Eckert, A., (2001), ‘The Non-Intervention Principle and International Humanitarian Interventions’, 
International Legal Theory, Vol 7, Issue 1, pp 49-58. 
1102
 William, G., (2015), ‘Rules for Offline and Online in Determining Internet Jurisdiction, Global 
Overview and Colombian Cases, International Law, Vol 26, pp 13-62. 
1103
 The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of other states is ‘ designed to ensure that each 
state respects the fundamental prerogatives of the other members of the community; Cassese, A., 
(2005), ‘International Law’, (2
nd
 Ed, OUP, UK), pp 55. 
1104
 Ehrenzweig, A., (1956), ‘The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum 
Conveniens’, The Yale Law Journal Company, Vol 65, Issue 3, pp 289-314; Corp. of Ireland v Compagnie 
des Bauxites de Guinee [1982] 456 U.S. 694. 
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6.2.3.1.: How to establish personal jurisdiction: 
 
To establish personal jurisdiction, a court should not confine its analysis solely on 
convenience. In today's technological era, the question of what is ‘fair and appropriate’ 
must be extended to a degree where concerned community's views must be taken into 
account. For instance, Donald Trump, who Tweeted ‘the Muslim are terrorists’ 
(defamation of class, see-5.5.2.1), might have presidential immunity from defamation. 
The US courts must give due regard to the feelings of the Muslim world
1105
 while 
declining jurisdiction based on appropriateness. Such immunity may not be available to 
Donal Trump if the proceedings are issued in Iran; however, Iranian court must have 
personal jurisdiction before initiating litigation process. Interestingly, the court will 
have personal jurisdiction if the claimant is domiciled for the purpose of service of the 
writ. This is based on physical presence (see-2.3.1). In the Bestolov [2017]
1106
 case, the 
Russian businessperson was held to be domiciled in England for jurisdictional purpose.  
 
The above-explained high threshold of the ‘reasonableness’ standard implies that it is 
unlikely that courts may impose jurisdiction over foreign defendants
1107
. The 
assumption of personal jurisdiction becomes an important element in deciding social 
media cases (see-6.4). The importance of jurisdiction lies in the fact that any activity in 
digital cyberspace may have the potential to cause harm to a real person in the physical 
space
1108
. The exercise of jurisdiction and issuing an injunction is the quickest way to 
reprieve victim but without personal jurisdiction, court has to dismiss the case without a 
trial.  
 
6.2.3.2.: Jurisdiction: Direct versus indirect:  
 
In online libel claims, direct and indirect jurisdiction may be treated similarly; however,  
there is some analytical difference in both terms. 
                                                          
1105
 Defamation of a class is already discussed in the Chapter 5. 
1106
 Bestolov v Povarenkin [2017] EWHC 1968 (Comm); this judgment is important for any foreign 
nationals who can be held domiciled in England for jurisdiction purposes even if they are resident and 
tax domiciled in another country. 
1107
 It is arguable that what is sufficient to ‘assume’ personal jurisdiction because a website can be 
accessed at any geographical location. 
1108
 Mills, A., (2017), ‘The 'Hague choice of court convention' and cross-border commercial dispute 
resolution in Australia and the Asia-pacific’, Melbourne Journal of International Law, Vol 18, Issue 1, pp 
1-15; online harm may be in the form of defamation, breach of privacy, violation of personality right, 
hacking, violation of IP rights, bullying or even degrading a person’s character. 
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1. Direct jurisdiction: The court, which decides the case, is called the court with 
‘direct-jurisdiction’. This court refers to the issue of jurisdiction as a 
requirement for adjudicating a libel claim. It is also called rendering court, 
which must have personal jurisdiction to give judgment. Otherwise, its decision 
will be invalid1109.  
 
2. Indirect jurisdiction: This is the court, where the claimant seeks enforcement 
of the rendering court’s decision. It refers to the issue of jurisdiction as a 
requirement for recognition of judgment. It is also called ‘requested court’, 
which recognises and enforces the decision of ‘rendering court’. If the requested 
court finds that the rendering court lacked personal jurisdiction, it will not 
impose that decision1110.  
 
Both the courts are independent because they must be based in different countries
1111
. 
These courts are not bound to follow each other’s standards. For instance, the rendering 
court may justifiably assume jurisdiction under its standard, whereas enforcing court 
can refuse to recognise that judgment under its standards
1112
. The enforcement of 
judgment is one of the prime issues of private international law; however, it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. 
 
6.3.: Issues of jurisdiction in social media: 
 
Determination of jurisdiction for digital communication disputes is a critical legal issue. 
It has become the central form of the battle to ‘establish the rule of law in the 
information society
1113’. Why is it difficult to assume jurisdiction in social media libel 
claims by applying traditional provisions? The answer depends on the degree ‘social 
media’ is different from traditional broadcasting and other means of global 
communication. Publication of libellous material via social media always involves 
                                                          
1109
 EU Regulations (Brussels I Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] 
OJ L 12/1). 
1110
 Lugano Convention (Lugano Convention of 30 October 2007 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2007] OJ L 339/3). 
1111
 If both the courts are situated in one country than there is no need for indirect jurisdiction because 
the court which decides can also enforce its judgment. 
1112
 Brussels Convention (Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [1986] OJ C 298/1. 
1113
 Reidenberg, J. R., (2005), ‘Technology and Internet Jurisdiction’, University Penn Law Review 1951, 
Vol 153, Issue 6. 
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various states (see-2.7.2). The traditional jurisdiction procedure is complex, even within 
a single legal system: There may be distinct subdivisions of a jurisdictional query (see-
2.9.1). In libel claims, the question of jurisdiction is not limited to a single state, so it 
has to be resolved in a comparative or transnational context. Concurrent jurisdiction can 
also be a significant factor because different legal systems conceive jurisdiction in 
different ways (it is beyond the scope of this thesis).  
 
There are many challenges in sorting legal issues of jurisdiction in social media. 
Internet publication, across conceptually amorphous borders, is already befuddling the 
judges in acclimatising conflict of law doctrines to cyberspace. The adoption of 
jurisdictional concept becomes even more complicated and inconsistent in social media 
case
1114
, for distinct reasons: 
 
1. Cyberspace acts as a buffer between the defendant and social media i.e. this 
technological intermediary not only diffuses the defendant’s geographical reach 
but also complicates the defendant’s purpose (see-2.5.1.2). 
2. Defamatory statements mostly lead to intangible harm i.e. it may be impossible 
to predict the place of intangible harm in social media
1115
. 
 
To decide libel claims judges spent more time to understand the uniqueness of 
cyberspace technology, whereas, they should focus on the traits, it shares with other 
technology
1116
. For instance, the internet may not work without a router, modem, 
booster or a device, so the location of the generation of the comments can be used as a 
‘connecting factor’. Whereas, judges assume jurisdiction based on where the 
defamatory conduct occurred. In social media, it may be a wasted argument because it 
diffuses activity across geographical locations. Understandably, conduct occurs where 
the user disseminates defamatory material via the internet, so identifying other 
locations, as salient to jurisdiction seems arbitrary
1117
. 
 
                                                          
1114
 Erbsen, A., (2015), ‘Personal Jurisdiction Based on Intangible Harm, The Journal of Things We Like 
Lots’, Available online at: http://courtslaw.jotwell.com/personal-jurisdiction-based-on-intangible-harm/ 
[Assessed 2
nd
  January 2017]. 
1115
 Alvaro Sobrinho v Impressa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). 
1116
 Reno v ACLU [1997] 117 S., Ct. 2329 – US supreme court labelled internet as a unique medium which 
is located in no particular geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world. 
1117
 Trammell, A., & Bambauer, D., (2015), Personal Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs”,  Cornell Law 
Review, Vol 1129, Issue 100.  
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6.3.1: Place of damage in libel:  
 
The victim may suffer various natures of damages at various locations. The place where 
the damage occurred is not arbitrary. For instance, a celebrity may seem to suffer 
reputational damage at the location where he has many followers as compared to where 
he is less famous. The 2013 Act simplifies this dilemma by defining the serious harm: A 
statement is no longer defamatory unless the claimant can show that its publication has 
caused serious harm to his reputation
1118
. It also reinforces the jurisprudence established 
in the cases of Jameel
1119
 and Thornton
1120
 (see-7.16).  
 
On the other hand, evidence of serious harm does not guarantee personal jurisdiction to 
a single court because harm can be suffered in more than one location at the same time. 
The Maryland court
1121
 highlighted this issue where judge rejected the claim, despite the 
harm suffered in the forum. Court reasoned that there is a lack of personal jurisdiction 
because of the defendant ‘British media company’, based in Kensington, had no ties to 
Maryland. Arguably, there was a direct connection because the website receives 4,600 
article views per hour and 72,600 unique browsers per day in the state. Such decisions 
also challenge the idea of personal jurisdiction based on website connections (it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis).  
 
6.3.2: Place of damage in social media: 
 
There is an argument to be made that the local availability of ‘social media sites’ should 
suffice for personal jurisdiction in the claimant’s home state. For instance, Facebook is 
based in the USA but its subscribers are based in every country (see-7.3). Besides, the 
victim may experience ‘serious harm’ most acutely in his domiciled state. This may be 
straightforward if both the claimant and the defendant are domiciled in the same state. 
Whereas, if the defendant is not domiciled in England, S9
1122
 states: “the court will not 
                                                          
1118
  Alvaro Sobrinho v Impressa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). 
1119
  Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc. [2005] EWCA Civ 75. 
1120
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB). 
1121
 Melania Trump v Mail Media, Inc [2017] Supreme Court NY, Commercial Division, No. 650661/2017. 
1122
 Defamation Act 2013, chapter 26 - Action against a person not domiciled in the UK or a Member 
State etc., section 9, available online at: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/section/9/enacted [Assessed 2
nd
  January 2017].   
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have the jurisdiction to hear a libel claim” (see-2.13.1.3). For instance, judge Burrell1123 
rejected Melania case against a British company because of the lack of personal 
jurisdiction. However, he accepted her other claim against Tarpley.net, for a trial 
because it was domiciled in the home jurisdiction.  
 
English courts may only have jurisdiction if it is satisfied that it is one of the most 
appropriate courts
1124
 to start the proceedings (see-2.17.1). The judges would consider 
many factors, including the extent of any publication in England in contrast to the 
publication outside the jurisdiction
1125
. The court will also evaluate whether there has 
been any substantial damage to the claimant’s reputation within England boundaries 
(see-7.19). This section raises the question that the courts should identify whether the 
defendant ‘aimed’ to cause the harm within the forum1126. This will help minimise the 
application of different rules for public figures and ordinary individuals. In her claim, 
Melania Trump
1127
 presented her case as a model rather than the wife of the president 
Trump, otherwise, she had to prove actual malice (a standard for celebrity claimant) 
(see-7.20). 
                                                          
1123
 Trump v Tarpley [2016] Md. Cir. No V424492; this website by political blogger Griffin Tarpley was 
based in Maryland. 
1124
 There is a distinction between “natural forum”, as the place with which the case had the closest 
connection and ultimately the “appropriate or proper forum”, which a claimant could establish; even if 
England is not the “natural forum” if justice require it becomes the proper forum. 
1125
 Brett Wilson LLP v Person(s) Unknown, Responsible for the Operation and Publication of the website 
www.solicitorsfromhelluk.com [2015] EWHC 2628 (QB), [2015] All ER (D) 78 (Sep). 
1126
 Wilson, I., (2014), The Implementation & impact of the Defamation Act 2013, The Law Society 
Gazette. Online url: http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/legal-updates/the-defamation-act-
2013/5039959.article [Assessed 30
th
 November 2016]. 
1127
 Morse, D., (2017), ‘Melania Trump Reaches Settlement in Libel Lawsuit Against Maryland Blogger’, 
Washington Post [Assessed 28
th
 Nov 2017]. 
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Chapter 6 
Part B 
Application of Jurisdiction 
 
Traditionally, location is used as the prime criterion for jurisdiction
1128
 because it was 
created for geographical bound activities, not for social media transactions
1129
. 
Therefore, geographical principles should not be used to regulate social media because 
application of traditional principles may become incoherent when applied to 
cyberspace
1130
. Jurisdiction deals with the territory, so a court can only assume 
jurisdiction if a link can be established between the transaction and the state; or to be 
more precise, to an actor (person, government) and/or computer
1131
. It is debatable that 
there should be no issues of jurisdiction
1132
 because cyberspace extends to everybody 
and everywhere. Therefore, in online communication, the location of (conduct, 
damages, parties, properties, uploading, downloading and torts) should be irrelevant
1133
. 
There is a need to understand the importance of jurisdiction to apply traditional rules to 
online users who are actually based at a physical location (see-2.3.1.2).  
 
6.4.: The importance of jurisdiction:  
‘[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty within its territory’, ‘No 
State can exercise direct jurisdiction without its territory
1134’. 
 
IThe importance of jurisdiction varies depending on the nature of dispute. This thesis 
differentiates the importance of jurisdiction into the following categories: 
 
1. Nature of dispute (civil or criminal)   
2. The medium used (digital or traditional) 
                                                          
1128
 Midland Bank Plc v Laker Airways Ltd [1986] Q.B. 282. 
1129
 Kohl, U., (2010), ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet Regulatory Competence over online Activity’, (2
nd
  Ed, 
Cambridge Book Online, Cambridge), pp 20. 
1130
 Cameron, B., (2000), ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet’, Computer & Law, Regulating e-Business 
conference, THC Press, pp 28-29. 
1131
 Lodder, A., R., (2015), ‘Analysing Approaches to Internet Jurisdiction based on a model of Harbours 
and the high seas, International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, Vol 29, Issue 3, pp 266-282. 
1132
 Bigos, O., (2005), ‘Jurisdiction over cross-border wrongs on the Internet’, International 
& Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 54, pp 588–9. 
1133
 Tsagourias, N., Buchan, R., (2015), ‘Research Handbook on Cyberspace and International Law’, (1
st
 
Ed, Edward Elgar Publishing, UK), pp 19; Hanssen, S., & Stakemann, H., (2001), ‘Cyberspace Jurisdiction 
in the U.S. (From an Alien's Point of View) - The International Dimension of Due Process’,  Norwegian 
Research Centre for Computers and Law, Vol 5, Issue 1, pp 457. 
1134
 Pennoyer v Neff [1878] 95 US 714. 
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3. Method used (print or social media)   
 
1. Jurisdiction for civil or criminal issues 
 
1. The activities, which threaten national security, fall under international standards 
for jurisdiction. Inciting torture, war crimes, or genocide is treated as a universal 
crime to publicly. Any court can decide these universal offences 
extraterritorially; regardless of the citizenship or location of the alleged 
person1135 (universal jurisdiction is outside the scope).  
 
2. Jurisdiction for civil disputes is essential because it is exercised by following 
due process1136, which restricts the authority of courts within territorial limits of 
its established country1137. An attempt to extend this authority beyond territorial 
limits becomes an illegitimate assumption of power (see-6.2.3). International 
treaties bind state courts, not to abuse their authority1138.  
 
2. Jurisdiction for digital or traditional communication  
 
1. Digital communication, which is global, can be civil or criminal. Whereas 
national laws are limited, so they become incompatible. This dilemma 
contributes to an ‘online environment chequered with different regulatory 
schemes’ thereby, creating legal uncertainty. Online communication needs a 
predictable legal environment when confronted with legal issues1139. These 
networks have reinforced the importance of correct jurisdiction because of its 
convulsive nature1140.  
 
                                                          
1135
 Francis, D., & Roberts, A., (2006), ‘The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction’,  Am. J. 
Int’l L., Vol 100, pp 142. 
1136
 Michaels, R., (2017), ‘Jurisdiction, Foundation’, Elgar Encyclopedia of Private International Law, pp 
28. 
1137
 Maier, C., (2016), ‘Within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500’ (Harvard 
Uni Press, US), pp 72-75. 
1138
 Pennoyer v Neff [1878] 95 US 714; an example of such treaties could be Brussels Convention [1986] 
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
1139
 Salisbury, B., (2016), ′Who Rules the Net: Internet Governance and Jurisdiction′ 
https://www.suffolk.edu/documents/jhtl_book_reviews/Salisbury04.pdf [Assessed 11
th
 November 
2017]. 
1140
 Shaw, R.S., (2017), ‘There is no silver bullet: solutions to Internet jurisdiction’, International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology, Vol 25, Issue 4, pp 283-308. 
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2. In traditional law, the existence of jurisdiction depends upon 'forum conveniens 
test', because of unconstitutional discretions available for courts (see-2.7.2, 
2.17.1, 6.9.1.2). It varies on a case-by-case analysis because it helps maintain the 
standards of justice; however, it reduces judicial predictability and certainty 
because individual cases have different facts.  
 
3. Jurisdiction for social or print media 
 
1. As compared to print media, social media provides ‘freedom of 
communication’, which play a role in political order1141; ‘Arab Spring1142,’ 
‘weaponising’ of cyberspace, the Sony hack, the WikiLeaks, Obama campaign 
2012  and Trump’s presidential election campaign1143. Every day, Facebook 
users alone watch nearly 10 billion videos and upload 300 million photos. Every 
day, 15,000 new blogs appear1144. The numbers are incomprehensibly large and 
getting larger at exponential rates of growth1145.  
 
2. Social media is a ‘non-territorial market’, there may no longer be wearing over 
physical territory itself. In international legal order, there is no separate 
framework for the internet; therefore, jurisdiction becomes even more important 
to maintain sovereignty principles (see-2.1). It may not be easy to attain legal 
predictability in social media cases because of varying facts. 
 
Nevertheless, application of jurisdiction for social media libel depends upon the 
territorial factors, the place of tort and private international law rules. 
                                                          
1141
 Bode, L., Vraga, E. K., Borah, P., & Shah, D. V., (2014), ‘A new space for political behaviour: Political 
social networking and its democratic consequences’, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 
Vol 19, pp 414–429. 
1142
 Wolfsfeld, G., Segev, E., & Sheafer, T., (2013), ‘Social media and the Arab Spring: Politics comes first’, 
The International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol 18, Issue 2, pp 115-137; it began with protests against 
police corruption, violence and intimidation. Later extremist utilised social media to derive power, 
legitimacy and popularity, from dispensing a form of justice in areas where the state is no longer doing 
so effectively, or where justice is perceived to be partial or connected to political, religious, or ethnic 
divisions. 
1143
 Boulianne, S., (2015), ‘Social media use and participation: A meta-analysis of current research’, 
Information, Communication & Society (ASA), Vol 18, Issue 5, pp 524-538. 
1144
 Zephoria (2018), ‘Live stats’; https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics/ [Assessed 
18
th
 March 2018]. 
1145
 Post, D.G., (2017), ‘How the Internet is making jurisdiction sexy (again)’, International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology, Vol 25, Issue 4, pp 249-258. 
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6.4.1.: Territorial factors: 
 
The ‘territoriality principle’ determines jurisdiction in public international law, whereas 
‘location’ determines jurisdiction under private international law (see-2.8.3). This 
location can be associated with either the location of the defendant, location of the tort, 
location of contractual agreement or performance, location of registration of the patent 
or trademark, and location of the server
1146
. For libel, the location of tort should be the 
base to assume jurisdiction, whereas, the courts are concerned with where is the 
defendant domiciled or where the tort initiated
1147
. It is not uncommon for an internet 
dispute to involve users in State A, who commit a wrong via the Internet, causing 
effects in State B, with the services and company incorporated in State C. Potential 
overlaps and conflicts with these territorial criteria demonstrate the difficulty in 
applying laws to cyberspace. However, under private international law, any state can 
use its legislative, judicial, and executive power, to regulate online transactions. 
Therefore, if a social media dispute is not exclusive to domestic disputes, a national 
court’s jurisdiction can be related to the following three aspects1148 (see-6.6.1):  
 
1. Regulatory power of a state (to prescribe and enforce laws) 
2. The physical territory of the state  
3. The right to assume and to resolve transnational disputes (to adjudicate)  
 
Under CPR, jurisdiction is based on physical location, which can complicate the 
determinations of jurisdiction. There can be many physical locations in a libel claim 
involving the locations of litigants, servers, content providers and the registrars or 
registries through which a domain name is registered. This section suggests that the 
denominator of jurisdiction should be the location the ‘place of tort’ and it should be 
used as a standard. 
  
                                                          
1146
 Svantesson, D., (2017), ‘Private International Law and Internet’ (3
rd
 Ed, Wolters Kluwer, UK), pp 6.  
1147
 Guillermo, W., (2015), ‘Rules for Offline & Online in Determining Internet Jurisdiction: Global 
Overview & Colombian cases, International Law, Revista Colombian de Derecho Internacional, Vol 26, pp 
13-62. 
1148
 Kohl, U., (2010), ‘Jurisdiction & the Internet Regulatory Competence over online Activity’ (2
nd
 Ed, 
Cambridge Book Online), pp 65, 122, 165. 
 231 
 
6.4.2.: Place of Tort: 
 
If the place of tort identifies the jurisdiction of a court, then the location of the claimant 
determines where he can bring a libel case
1149
. This location can be of the parties 
involved, conduct, or torts
1150
. The 2013 Act adopted the approach to understanding the 
sequence of events constituting tort
1151
. The tort can be of different types. Therefore, it 
is vital to understand ‘cause of action’, so the appropriate law could be applied1152. This 
is called ‘substance test’, which is flexible enough to take account of a number of 
factors:  
 
1. The nature of the tort alleged to have been committed (defamation or libel)  
2. Its material elements to determine the place of commission of tort (see-4.3.2)  
 
Application of law becomes more natural if a judge applies its domestic laws; however, 
it is only possible if applicable law and jurisdiction coincide
1153
. On the contrary, if for 
every libel claim, the law of the state, with which the issue is closely related, is applied 
instead of place where wrong was committed and place where the claim is brought, it 
will reduce the importance attached to the place of tort and then subsequently place of 
publication
1154
. This would be a one-step short of adopting a proper law doctrine of tort 
for libel because courts may not have to identify applicable law. It may save the time in 
evaluating ‘substance test’, but it will reduce the importance of ‘forum test1155’ because 
the applicability of foreign law is a powerful factor in favour of forum non-conveniens 
dismissal (see-2.17.1). 
  
                                                          
1149
 Bolagsupplysningen OU v Svensk Handel AB [2017] (C-194/16); Jurisdiction lies either where the 
defendant is domiciled or where the harm occurred i.e. the location of defendant is where the claimant 
bring claim. 
1150
 Article 5 (3) of the Brussels I Regulation defines the place where the tort was committed is the place 
where the infringer/defendant is established/domiciled or has permanent residence. 
1151
 S & W Berisford plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 3 W.L.R 688; once the court asserts its 
jurisdiction, it still have to apply choice of law rules to find the applicable body of substantive law; 
Arkwright Mutual Insurance v Byanston Insurance [1990] 3 W.L.R 705; if jurisdiction is assumed under 
the Brussels Convention, the doctrine of forum non conveniens will have no application in England.  
1152
 The place of tort will also help to determine the choice of law, which is important to identify 
applicable law. 
1153
 If the series of events occurred in England and the claim is also brought here, it would be highly 
unlikely that another country would have a closer and more real connection with the occurrence and 
the parties. 
1154
 Carter, J., (1981), ‘Torts in English Private International Law’, Vol 52, Issue 9, B.Y.B.I.L., pp 24. 
1155
 Voth v Manildra flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] 171 CLR 538; even after assuming personal jurisdiction an 
English court decline jurisdiction because there may be another appropriate forum available. 
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There are circumstances, when judges can apply the domestic laws, without any 
substance test (only when both defendant and claimant are within one country). For 
instance, if lex loci delicti and the lex fori
1156
 coincide, the defamation will be 
committed in the forum. The court will apply its domestic law, even though the parties 
are foreign citizens resident and domiciled abroad
1157
. Therefore, if a libel is committed 
in England (both defendant and claimant are domiciled in England), then place of tort 
and action will be within England and judge will apply the Defamation 2013 Act. 
 
6.4.3.: Private international law:  
 
Every sovereign state has developed its system of private international law (see-4.1). 
These rules may be regarded as procedural rules, both technical and formal, and do not 
concern themselves with the substance of a dispute (see-4.2.2). 
 
Cross-border online interactions have the potential to expose internet users to any 
number of foreign legal systems
1158
. Private international law rules are relevant to 
defamation harms when content crosses geographical borders that are the rule in the 
world of the borderless internet
1159
, transient populations, and offshore servers (see-
2.3.2). (Private international law is detailed in Chapter 4). 
 
6.5.: The importance of jurisdiction in social media libel:  
 
Jurisdiction describes the geographical area of the courts
1160
 and identifies the legal 
authority, which may have the power to decide a particular case
1161
. The case of 
Pinner
1162
 defined that, “jurisdiction is the power of the court to deal with a matter in 
                                                          
1156
 Place where the action is being brought - the lex fori. 
1157
 Szalamay-Stacho v Fink  [1947] K.B. 1; English law applies in respect of wrongs committed in 
England. 
1158
 Linarelli, J., (2016), ‘Toward a Political Theory for Private International Law’, Duke J Comp & Int Law, 
Vol 26, pp 299-336. 
1159
 Berman, P. S., (2002), ‘The Globalization of Jurisdiction’, University of Panselvenia Law Review, Vol 
151, pp 131. 
1160
 Campbell, B., (1990), ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’ (6
th
 Ed, West publishing co, US), pp 853 - jurisdiction is 
a term of comprehensive import embracing every kind of judicial action. 
1161
 Wang, F., (2010), ‘Internet Jurisdiction’, (Cambridge University Press, UK), pp 2; the location of the 
court which determines online libe can make a great deal of difference. For instance, this foreign 
location may be inconvenient to instruct lawyers in an unfamiliar country. Similarly, availability of all 
witnesses to attend trial in another country. 
1162
 Pinner v Pinner [1977] 33NC App 204, 234 SE2nd 633. 
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controversy and pre-supposes the pre-existence of a duly constituted court with control 
over the subject matter and the parties involved in the dispute
1163”.  
 
There are various reasons which validate the importance of jurisdiction in cyberspace 
disputes: 
 
1. Lack of confidence: cyberspace cases may have effects in almost all the 
continents – however, the west may not trust the east judiciary system1164  
2. The claimant may want the case to be heard in his home courts 
3. It can minimise the claimant’s part expenses for being in local system1165 
4. It reduces the possibility of forum shopping 
5. Applicable law: choice of forum determines the competence of a court which 
then decides the choice of law and appropriate law 
 
6.5.1.: The importance of competent jurisdiction: 
 
If a libel claim is brought in a wrong court, which does not have proper jurisdiction, it 
will provide the defendant with an opportunity to challenge the jurisdiction (see-2.13.2). 
The defendant had to prove that the court is incompetent to try the case and if the 
proceedings continued, it might cause grave danger to the ends of delivering justice
1166
 
(see-6.8.2.1).  
 
The defendant has a right to fair trial
1167
 hence, he can object to the competence of the 
court and challenge the court’s decision (see-6.8). Nevertheless, in the circumstances 
where: (1) the court takes all the reasonable steps in assuming the jurisdiction and (2) 
the defendant did not contest jurisdiction at the start of the trial. The court’s decision 
cannot be challenged on the grounds of jurisdiction after the case is decided
1168
.  
                                                          
1163
 Rosenoer, J., (1997), ‘Cyber-Law: The Law of Internet’, (1
st
 Ed, Springer-Verlag, NY), pp 227. 
1164
 Because of the irregular cyber-laws or no laws at all. 
1165
 Although, it may increase the cost for the defendants but claimant is the victim party. 
1166
 WPP Holdings Italy SRL v Benatti [2008] Lloyd’s Rep Plus 20. 
1167
 Art 6(1) ECHR (European Convention 1950) for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, 213 UNTS 221. 
1168
 Burger King Corp v Rudzewics [1985] 471 U.S. 462; the court concluded that the defendants 
purposefully availed themselves to the forum state and were, therefore, subject to jurisdiction there. 
The court reasoned that defendants should have reasonably anticipated being summoned into court in 
Florida for breach of contract. 
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Stevens J
1169
 also reinforced this idea that if a defendant has fair warning about 
jurisdiction, he cannot challenge jurisdiction afterwards. It is obvious that if a court does 
not have proper jurisdiction it has to dismiss the case at the defendant’s request. Once 
the court decides a case, the defendant will rescind the right to challenge the court’s 
jurisdiction
1170
. However, the Burnham
1171
 case, established that the judgment of a court 
lacking personal jurisdiction will be void because it did not provide a fair trial to the 
defendant (see-6.8) 
 
The importance of appropriate jurisdiction was also elaborated in the Hutton
1172
 case as:  
 
1. It prevents forum shopping but also serves many other purposes  
2. It allows the defendant to defend himself in a place where he has a most suitable 
connection  
3. It ensures that the locality is most interested in the outcome of the case  
 
6.5.2.: The importance of choice of forum: 
 
The litigants prefer to start a claim in their own country’s judicial systems (see 2.7.2). 
However, lack of agreement on jurisdiction means that online users may have to face 
the possibility of being sued in any foreign legal jurisdiction, wherever their comments 
are accessible
1173
. To avoid global litigation, the parties should include a choice of 
forum clause in their cyberspace transactions
1174
. (Inclusion of choice of forum may not 
be appropriate for social media libel because it depends on the harm suffered at a 
particular location
1175
). As far as choice of forum and choice of law clauses are 
concerned, they do not provide the automatic right of jurisdiction to the chosen court 
                                                          
1169
 Shaffer v Heitner [1997] 435 U.S. 186. 
1170
 Freeman, E. H., (1999), ‘Internet Jurisdiction: Issues of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace’, Information 
Systems Security, Vol 7, Issue 4, pp 20-24.  
1171
 Burnham v Superior Court [1990] 495 U.S. 604.  
1172
 EF Hutton & Co (London) Ltd v Mofarrij [1989] 1 WLR 488 (CA). 
1173
 Pez Hejduk v Energie Agentur NRW GmbH [2015] Case C-441/13; Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 –
Article 5(3) (it is more specific for copyright however can be interpreted for defamation as well). 
1174
 Bygrave, L., & Svantesson, D., (2001), ‘Jurisdictional Issues and Consumer Protection in Cyberspace: 
The View from ‘Down Under’’, Conference on Cyberspace Regulation: e-commerce and Content, Sydney, 
Vol 24. 
1175
 Zaphiriou, G. A., (1977), ‘Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial 
Agreements’, Int'l Trade LJ, Vol 3, pp 311. 
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unless it reflects Art 3
1176
 (it applies to contract only). In the Sonatrach
1177
 case, the 
court rejected the choice of forum clause because of its uncertainty and held that under 
common law a clause will only be upheld if it is identifiable for jurisdiction
1178
. 
 
If online communications involve a choice of forum clause favouring England, which is 
negotiated by both parties equally
1179
, then England will have jurisdiction in that case. 
This dispute can be resolved in the English courts even though England may have no 
connection to that dispute at all. In the Maritime
1180
 case, the contract negotiated in 
Paris between a French and Tunisian company for oil transport
1181
. It was decided that 
the English court was appropriate because there was a clause providing for arbitration in 
London. Similarly, in the Folias
1182
 case, the court assumed jurisdiction in a contract 
between a French company and Swedish ship-owners because the contract contained a 
clause providing arbitration in London. However, it may not be directly relevant for 
social media libel because the users do not agree on a particular jurisdiction. It may be 
relevant to professional libel claims where companies or celebrities include ‘choice of 
forum’ clauses in their statements.  
 
6.5.2.1: Justice versus choice clause: 
 
Judges are duty bound to meet the ends of justice and reprieve the victims. The courts 
have to follow the ‘choice of forum’ or ‘choice of law’ clauses if they are fair to both 
the litigants
1183
. In the Jong
1184
 case, court held that the exclusive jurisdiction clauses 
are not binding but only enforceable when justices require
1185
. However, if choice 
clauses add an insufficiently precise to be a valid choice of jurisdiction or violate the 
                                                          
1176
 Art 3 of The Rome-Convention1980 and Art3 of The Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual-Obligations 1980. 
1177
 Sonatrach Petroleum Corp v Farrell International Ltd [2002] 1 ALL ER 627. 
1178
 Premium Nafta Products Ltd v FWI Shipping Company Ltd [2007] UKHL 40. 
1179
 Iran Continental Shelf Oil Co v IRI International Corp [2002] CLC 372. 
1180
 Compagnie d’Armement Maritime SA v Compagnie Tunisienne de Navigation SA [1971] AC 572. 
1181
 http://www.justcite.com/Document/b2utnZmJmSaaa/compagnie-tunisienne-de-navigation-sa-v-
compagnie-darmement-maritime [Assessed 2
nd
  January 2017]. 
1182
 Europe Atlantique Sud v Stockholms Rederiaktiebolag Svea (The Folias) [1979] AC 685.  
1183
 Banco Santander v Metro Do Porto S.A. [2016] EWCH 465 (Comm); Justice Blair established that the 
provisions of national law cannot be overridden by the addition of choice clause. 
1184
 Jong v HSBC Private Bank (Monaco) SA [2014] EWHC 4165 (Ch.). 
1185
 It is possible to stay the English proceedings against the English defendants as a matter of effective 
case management, rather than on jurisdictional grounds. In the case of Pacific International Sport Clubs 
v Soccer Marketing International [2009] EWHC 1389, at 115, the court only enforced the clause to avoid 
multiple proceedings. 
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process of delivering justice, it will be rejected
1186
. For instance, if a Pakistan national 
includes a choice of forum clause, in a religious dispute, it cannot be accepted. It is a 
common practice that the application of the law is much straightforward in England as 
compared to Asia
1187
. On the contrary, if a country wants to ensure the applicability of 
its mandatory rules, she may allow the personal jurisdiction to her courts
1188
.  
 
6.5.2.2.: Englands’ perspective: 
 
In England, justice is the deciding factor in recognising choice clauses
1189
. Traditional 
rules allow courts to exercise jurisdiction and reject forum clause if the claimant can 
prove that justice may not be obtained in that forum. CA
1190
 established that the 
jurisdictional clause could not be relied on because political and legal changes in 
Angola may deny justice to the claimant. However, in the absence of arbitration clause, 
courts require a connection with England to start proceedings i.e. an explicit 
jurisdictional base is required
1191
. In social media libel, the connection with England 
need not be particularly strong and even a weaker link suffices for courts to assume 
jurisdiction (see-2.3.1.2). Besides, the question arises whether litigants should be free to 
decide jurisdiction, most favourable to their case
1192
. However, international courts 
allow clauses in favour of English jurisdiction because they have efficient conduct of 
the proceedings. Lord Scott
1193
 noted that the English court can efficiently determine the 
issues involving external factors, upon which its decision is sought. It is detailed in the 
overview of English jurisdiction section. 
  
                                                          
1186
 Marzillier, Dr Meier and Dr Guntner mbH v AMT Futures Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 143; the clauses must 
attach special significance to any causal connection between the place where damage occurs and the 
attribution of jurisdiction. 
1187
 Hook, M., (2017), ‘The choice of law agreement as a reason for exercising jurisdiction’, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 63, Issue 4, pp 963-975. 
1188
 By providing that parties cannot opt out of this jurisdiction through a choice of court agreement. 
1189
 Graveson, R. R., (1951), ‘Choice of Law and Choice of Jurisdiction in the English Conflict of Laws’, 
British Year Book of International Law, Vol 28, pp 273-290. 
1190
 Carvalho v Hull Blyth [1979] 3 ALL ER 280. 
1191
 The Brussels I Regulation, refrain courts to disregard a ‘choice of forum’ agreement in order to 
protect mandatory rules unless an explicit jurisdictional base can be established. 
1192
 Hayward, R., (1999), ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 Ed, Cavendish Publishing, London), pp 1. 
1193
 Tehrani v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 47 at [66].  
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Chapter 6 
Part C 
Overview of English Jurisdiction 
 
English law is divided into two broad categories of conflict law: (1) private international 
law and (2) public international law. Private international law remains a part of the 
domestic law as long as there is no foreign element involved (see-2.8.2). In cyberspace 
defamation, if there is no foreign element involved, then the courts would apply the 
appropriate English domestic law (see-6.4.2). The involvement of foreign elements 
makes the courts to implement choice of law rules using private international law, 
which has been used to determine the issues with a cross-border element
1194
. The 
examination of jurisdiction and choice of law is the integral elements to trace the 
various stages of online libel
1195
. Court has to analyse if the litigants have a link with 
England and can they sue or be sued in English courts
1196
 because to assume personal 
jurisdiction a real and substantive connection with the state is required
1197
. These 
guidelines are codified in CPR. 
 
6.6.: CPR – Considerations:  
 
Judges come across an increasing number of online libel cases, which may not solely 
confine to the jurisdiction of England
1198
. Traditional  jurisdictional standard is based on 
‘good arguable case1199’ (see-7.3). For instance, in the Malik [2016]1200 case, the court 
considered Mr Malik (US National) application to serve Mr Trump (US Presidential 
candidate), who was not resident in England. Master McCloud noted that the permission 
                                                          
1194
 Mills, A., (2008), ‘The Private History of International Law’, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, Vol 55, Issue 1, pp 1-50. 
1195
 Hook, M., (2017), ‘The choice of law agreement as a reason for exercising jurisdiction’, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 63, Issue 4, pp 963-975. 
1196 McLachlan, (2004), ‘International Litigation and Reworking of Conflict of Law’, L.Q.R., Vol 120, pp 
580. 
1197
 Club Resorts v Van Breda [2012] SCC 17; if a substantial connection cannot be established court must 
refuse jurisdiction. 
1198
 Kaefer Aislamientos v AMS Drilling Mexico SA [2017] EWHC 2598; the question of whether the court 
had jurisdiction or not depended solely on whether there was a ‘good arguable case’; Brownlie v Four 
Seasons [2017] UKSC 80; Lady Hale stated that the correct test was whether the foreign claimant had a 
‘good arguable case’ against the foreign defendant. 
1199
 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2013] EWCA Civ 785, the CA allowed permission to serve a claim 
out of the jurisdiction, including consideration of the applicable jurisdictional gateway in PD6B because 
England was the appropriate forum. 
1200
 Kamran Malik v Donal Trump [2016] EWHC QB. 
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to serve outside England could only be granted depending on ‘good arguable case’, 
which must fall within one of the jurisdictional gateways set out in CPR r3.1 (see-7.3). 
Mr Malik claimed that he could not sue Mr Trump in the US because of his 
constitutional rights. It did not provide a reasonable prospect of success in England
1201
. 
The court rejected the case because ‘England was not the appropriate forum’ under S9 
(see-7.7). The claimant has the right to choose a jurisdiction to bring a claim (see-6.4.2). 
Once a claim is forwarded, a judge decides if the court has personal jurisdiction to hear 
this case
1202
. There are many factors, which affect the final decision, and this will 
depend on the circumstances of each case (see-6.2.1). Judges should balance all of these 
factors carefully and fairly, as this will weigh heavily on the evidence provided and 
whether it would be in the public interest to do so (especially for public figures) (see-
2.16).  
 
6.6.1.: General principles:  
 
Jurisdiction can be divided into three broad categories
1203
: 
 
1. The jurisdiction to prescribe (or ‘legislative’ jurisdiction)1204 
2. The jurisdiction to adjudicate (or ‘judicial’ jurisdiction)1205  
3. The jurisdiction to enforce (or ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction)1206 
 
The exercise of the type of authority a court may assume depends on the merit of the 
claim
1207
. It is illustrated by following principles of methods, grounds and heads of 
establishing jurisdiction: 
  
                                                          
1201
 The court accepted that in the UK this case is actionable under the Defamation Act 2013, Equality 
Act 2010 and religious hatred Act 2006 because the defendant's defamatory statement affected Mr 
Malik being a Muslim. 
1202
 Wolff, T. B., (2017), ‘Choice of law and jurisdictional policy in the federal courts’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 165, Issue 7, pp 1847. 
1203
 George, B., (1990), ‘In Search of General Jurisdiction’, Tulane Law Review, Vol 64, pp 1097. 
1204
 It refers to the right of a state to make its law applicable to the activities that has taken (physically 
outside) – it deals with extra-territorial jurisdiction (outside the scope of this chapter). 
1205
 It refers to the power of a state to require a defendant to appear before a court and defend a claim 
– in the UK it is based on service of writ. 
1206
  It is more limited than adjudicative jurisdiction – only available if the defendant is legally served 
outside the forum state’s jurisdiction, and he chooses not to enter at court hearings. 
1207
 Kohl, U., (2010), ‘Jurisdiction & the Internet Regulatory Competence over online Activity’ (2
nd
 Ed, 
Cambridge Book Online), pp 65, 122, 165; it depends if the claim is to enforce another court’s judgment 
or the claimant is seeking a remedy. 
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6.6.1.1.: Methods of jurisdiction: 
 
There are different methods, which allow a state to exercise its jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant
1208
: 
 
1. The territory - defendant is domiciled in claimants state  
2. The Active personality - defendant will be prosecuted in the country of the 
nationality of the offender  
3. The passive personality - defendant will be prosecuted in the country of the 
nationality of the victim  
4. Universal jurisdiction - states can prosecute regardless of the nationality of 
litigants and location of offence 
 
6.6.1.2.: Grounds of jurisdiction: 
 
As far as the link to the forum is concerned, the jurisdiction may be justified in common 
law on five grounds
1209
:  
 
1. Personal connection  
2. Property connection  
3. Subject matter connection  
4. Consent  
5. Collateral connection  
 
6.6.1.3.: Heads of jurisdiction: 
 
There are two heads of jurisdiction for damages and remedies as detailed in Article 5 (3) 
Brussels I: (1) ‘the place of the act giving rise to damage’ and (2) ‘the place where the 
damage occurred’. The first head allows claimants to pursue full damage and other 
remedies, whereas, the second head is limited only to local damage in the Member 
State
1210
. 
  
                                                          
1208
 Jurisdiction: Legal Guidance, Crown Prosecution Service; Available online 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/jurisdiction/index.html [Assessed 5th October 2017]. 
1209
 Dicey, Morris & Collins, (2006), ‘The Conflict of Laws’, (14
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 305. 
1210
 Shevill and Others v Presse Alliance SA [1996] HL 26. 
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6.6.2.: Definition and principles: 
 
Jurisdiction means that the ‘law’ provides a court with the power to hear and determine 
a case
1211
. Diplock LJ
1212
 defined that “jurisdiction is an expression which is used in a 
variety of senses and connotations, and takes its colour from its context”. Jurisdictional 
rules will determine an appropriate forum because it is all about power
1213
. Judges 
decide whether social media users, who have a little link with England, may be able to 
sue or be sued in England; or English court has the authority to deal with the issues at 
all (see-2.6.2). The power of a court to decide a case is irrelevant of the activity
1214
, 
whether it takes place online or in the real world, there would be no effect on the 
definition of jurisdiction”.     
 
6.6.2.1: Relevant principles: 
 
Following are some important traditional jurisdictional principles which will form the 
base for analysing social media libel claims after the Defamation Act 2013 (see-7.1.2). 
 
1. Jurisdictional link: English courts may still assume jurisdiction, if there is only 
a limited connection or the service takes place in England because the Laurie1215 
case, held that the writ to the defendant in England produced enough connection 
to England, albeit a tenuous one (see-2.3.1). Similarly, Lord Ackner1216 held that 
the English court had jurisdiction over a Korean company, whose branch was 
operating in London. Even though that branch had no connection with the legal 
dispute - there are different rules for serving individual, corporation and 
partnerships (see-6.8.1.1). This case may not have succeeded in the EU, where a 
company must have a main office in the state to be prosecuted in that state1217.    
 
                                                          
1211
 Briggs & Rees, (2005), ‘Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments’, (4
th
 Ed, UK); Freeman, E. H., (1999), ‘Issues 
of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace’, Information Systems Security, Vol 7, Issue 4, pp 20-26. 
1212
 Anisnimic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1967] 2 ALL ER 986 at 994. 
1213
 Briggs, A., (2012), 'The subtle variety of jurisdiction agreements', Lloyd's Maritime & Commercial 
Law Quarterly, pp 364. 
1214
 Garthwaite v Garthwaite [1964] CA, P 356. 
1215
 Laurie v Carroll (1958) 98 CLR 310; the writ may be personally served on a person who is present 
within the jurisdiction. 
1216
 South India Shipping v Bank of Korea [1985] 1 Lloyds Rep. 413. 
1217
 Article 5(5) Brussels Regulation. 
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2. Libel tourism: London is known as the libel capital of the word1218 because the 
courts can assume jurisdiction in a defamation claim brought be foreign claimant 
against a foreign defendant. This ‘no connection jurisdiction’ may give rise to 
forum shopping and libel tourism (see-2.17). However, such decisions are 
important to preserve the boundaries of justice, besides in the South-Indian 
Shipping case the claimant served the writ in England, which is the general rule 
to invoke personal jurisdiction of the English courts (CPR-r 6.3).  
 
3. Forum shopping: If a claimant is pure forum shoppers, English judges may 
decline jurisdiction on the basis of natural forum (see-2.17.1). In the Michaels1219 
case, the court declined jurisdiction because the claimant had no legitimate 
reputation to defend in England1220. Even, if English court accepts jurisdiction, it 
can only compensate for the loss within jurisdiction, which will be minimal, 
because the number of online readers was very low. Besides, the applicable law 
is determined by ‘choice of law’, so the law of defendant’s residence can be 
applied1221.  
 
4. Choice of law: The assumption of jurisdiction in social media libel would not 
give the English courts an automatic right to apply English domestic laws, 
because choice of law is the next step after assuming the jurisdiction (see-6.5.2). 
The choice of law would direct the courts as to whether the rules of English law 
or the foreign law with which that transaction has a connection is to be 
applied1222. For instance, in the Wildenstein
1223
 case, after assuming jurisdiction 
the English court has to decide whether to apply the law of the forum (or French 
law). Hence, in social media libel, there is a possibility that English courts may 
also have to apply foreign law to solve that legal issue1224. 
 
5. Foreign law: Concerning foreign law, if the forum court just applies its 
domestic laws to cyberspace cases involving external elements, it may be a 
                                                          
1218
 Robertson & Nicol, (2008), ‘Media Law’, (5
th
 Ed, Penguin Books, London), pp 93. 
1219
 Lord Steyn declined to discuss specific issues arising out of the publication of the offending magazine 
via the Internet, suggesting that there had been insufficient evidence before the court to enable the 
issue to be considered adequately. 
1220
 Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 2 All ER 986. 
1221
 Calder v Jones [1984] 465 U.S. 783. 
1222
 Kolden Holdings Ltd v Rodette Commerce Ltd [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 434. 
1223
 Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2QB 283. 
1224
 Dicey, Morris & Collins, (2006), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ (14
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), pp 305. 
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breach of international law1225 (see-6.5.1 and 6.8). In situations where English 
law is also the proper law, then the English domestic law of that particular 
subject matter (libel) will be applied. However, applying defamation laws to 
social media libel generates practical difficulties because of the varying 
standards of defamation. 
 
6.6.3.: Practical difficulties of traditional principles: 
 
Continental jurists have intensively studied private international law since the 13
th
 
century and that the first rule of English conflict of laws is traced back to the late 17
th
 
century
1226. Tensions arise when this field of law confronts the amorphous ‘territory’ of 
the internet. This may be due to the relatively recent emergence of social media as the 
standard medium of communication and dissemination, or perhaps, the fact that PIL has 
undergone significant changes in the past decade (see-4.2). It is still in a relative state of 
flux and quite possibly conflicts experts prefer to observe evolutions
1227
 (legislative and 
jurisprudential) and wait for the legal landscape to take on a more definite shape before 
proffering opinions
1228
 on how the adapted (or new) conflicts frameworks might be 
applied to the online world of social media (see-4.2.2).  
 
The challenge for conflicts lawyers is to apply rules and policies formulated for a 
material world in a non-material environment (see-9.1.1). This non-material 
environment does not comprise sovereign states or clear jurisdictional borders - the 
traditional ‘landscape’ where conflicting issues are played out1229. Many sovereign 
states comprise separate jurisdictions, such as the UK have English, Walsh, Scottish, 
and Irish jurisdictions. Other countries, which are divided into numerous jurisdictions, 
each with its distinct legal system, include the US, Canada, India and Australia (see-
1.6). Lord Collins
1230
 argued that it has not been easy for the conflict of laws to adapt 
                                                          
1225
 Midland Bank Plc v Laker Airways Ltd [1986] Q.B. 282. 
1226
 Lord Collins of Mapesbury (2012), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ in Dicey, Collins and Morris (eds.), Vol 1 (15
th
 
Ed, Sweet & Maxwell), pp 9. 
1227
 Friedrich, S., William, G., (1989), ‘Private International Law. A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws: A 
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws’, (T&T Publisher, Oxford), Ch. 1: The Limits of its Operation in Respect of 
Place and Time. 
1228
 Hoffheimer, M.H., (2016), ‘Conflict of Laws: Examples and Explanations’, (3
rd
 Ed, Wolters Kluwer, 
US), Ch. 3; Personal Jurisdiction: Costitutional Foundations and Traditional Basis. 
1229
 Schultz, T., (2008), ‘Carving up the Internet: jurisdiction, legal orders, and the private/public 
international law interface’, European Journal of International Law, Vol 19, Issue 4, pp 799–839. 
1230
 Lord Collins of Mapesbury (2012), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ in Dicey, Collins and Morris (eds.), Vol 1 (15
th
 
Ed, Sweet & Maxwell), pp 10. 
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itself to the changes in social and commercial life, which the 20
th
 century has witnessed. 
Many of its rules were laid down in the 19
th
 century and seemed better suited to 19
th
 
century conditions then to those of the 20
th
 century. By logical extension, PIL’s 
adaptation to a border-disregarding internet would be fraught with even greater 
difficulties (see-1.5). These difficulties are evaluated in the structure of jurisdiction part. 
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Chapter 6 
Part D 
Structure of English Jurisdiction 
 
There are two types of claims, which may be commenced in English courts:  ‘Claims in 
personam’, and ‘admiralty claims in rem’. The personam claims involve the claimant 
who seeks a judgment, which required the defendant to pay money or refrain from 
doing something, while admiralty claims are directed against property
1231
 (a ship, cargo 
or aircraft). There are several sets of rules for determining the English jurisdiction, 
including, ‘Brussels I Regulations’, ‘Modified EU Rules’, and ‘Traditional Rules1232. 
 
The action in personam deals with the personal disputes between two parties. English 
rules relating to the actions in personam are purely procedural because anyone who can 
serve a claim form to the defendant can invoke the jurisdiction
1233
. The question of 
whether the court exercises its authority depends on the CPR principles. The court will 
have jurisdiction to entertain a petition if the defendant is served a writ in the manner 
prescribed by CPR (see-2.11.6). The claims related to civil or commercial matters, 
which fall within the meaning of Council Regulation EC 44/2001,
1234
 or the Brussels 
Convention 1968, the court has to decide the claims per EU regulations, judgments
1235
 
and conventions
1236
. It is essential to discuss the EU rules because they supersede 
traditional British rules in the cases, which are within its scope
1237
. However, England 
may attain a different framework after completion of Brexit in 2019
1238
. 
 
6.7.: Brussels-Regulations: 
 
In comparison to traditional rules, English court cannot assume jurisdiction over an EU-
domiciled defendant despite the service of claim form because the action must be 
                                                          
1231
 Senior Courts Act 1981, Section 21(5) 
1232
 Traditional Rules also reflect in the Common Law Procedure Act 1852 and Judicature Acts 1873. 
1233
 Fawcett & Carruthers, (2010), ‘Private International Law’ (14
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 353.  
1234
 Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters EC 44/2001. 
1235
 The Judgment Regulation [2001] as amended in 2003 
1236
 Lugano Convention 1982 Act, Sch 3C. 
1237
 Fentiman, R., (2010), ‘International Commercial Litigation’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 8. 
1238
 Ahmed, M., & Beaumont, P., (2017), ‘Exclusive choice of court agreements: Some issues on the 
Hague convention on choice of court agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I recast 
especially anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT, Journal of 
Private International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 386. 
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brought in the court of the country where the defendant is domiciled
1239
. Hence, EU-
regulations only allow English courts to assume jurisdiction if the defendant is 
domiciled in England. Regardless of appropriate jurisdiction, the doctrine of ‘forum non 
convenience’ will have no application1240 in cases involving EU nationals. 
 
Similarly, there is further confusion over the nationals who are non-EU, but their 
countries have adopted Brussel Regulations (Switzerland is not in the EU but it is a part 
of the EEA). There are many non-EU countries which are a signatory of the Lugano 
Convention. This can cause adverse effects on non-contracting nations because online 
libel may involve various defendants of different nationalities. The Queen’s Bench1241 
established that Article 2
1242
 is mandatory even though the competing forum was a non-
contracting forum. Similarly, the claimant’s position is further compromised because 
they may have to bear extra cost, logistic issues and availablility of legal aid in other 
forum. However, the CA
1243
 overruled ‘Berisford1244’ and ‘Arkwright1245’ principles, by 
concluding that forum non-convenience test can be applied to contracting-state nationals 
if it is consistent with Brussels-Convention
1246
. It shows that the application of the EU-
regulation may cause uncertainty considering the complex nature of social media libel 
as Clarkson
1247
 pointed, ‘it is unfortunate that Member States have not amended the 
Brussels regime for the resolution of online jurisdictional disputes’. Nevertheless, 
according to Article 1
1248
, matters other than civil and commercial dispute will be dealt 
with under traditional rules
1249
. This thesis will only focus on libel, which is part of civil 
and commercial disputes. 
 
  
                                                          
1239
 Art 2, Brussels Convention 1968. 
1240
 S and W Berisford Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 2 QB 631. 
1241
 Arkwright Mutual Insurance v Bryanston Insurance [1990] 2 QB 649.  
1242
 Art 2, Brussels Convention 1968. 
1243
 Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1991] 4 ALL ER 334. 
1244
 Berisford Plc v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1990] 3 W.L.R. 
1245
 Arkwright v Bryanston [1990] 2 QB 649. 
1246
 Fentiman, R. G., (1993), ‘Jurisdiction, Discretion and the Brussels Convention’, Cornell Int'l LJ, Vol 26, 
pp 59; English court has the authority to stay, dismiss or decline proceedings in which it assumed 
jurisdiction under Brussels Convention 1968. 
1247
 Clarkson & Hill, (2011), ‘The Conflict of Laws’, (4
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 134. 
1248
 Art 1, Luxembourg Protocol 1971.  
1249
 Art 1 clearly states that Brussels Convention and Brussels regulations are limited to only civil and 
commercial matters, irrespective to the nature of the nature of the court. 
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6.7.1.: English jurisdiction versus EU’s: 
 
In its preliminary ruling, the European  Court of Justice
1250
 ordered English courts to 
decline jurisdiction over EU members. Such rulings have been criticised by British 
authors, lawyers and judges on several occasions
1251
. The reaction in England
1252
 to the 
controversial ruling by the ECJ to decline jurisdictions over EU domiciled defendants in 
the cases of Erich 2003, Turner 2004 and Jackson 2005
1253
 reveal that the EU 
regulations may have adverse effects
1254
. This situation of assuming jurisdiction 
considering EU and traditional rules may become tangled if applied to social media libel 
because (see-2.10.1):  
 
1. Social media users may have multiple nationalities  
2. Libel may be actionable per se in many jurisdictions at the same time 
3. Libel victim may suffer harm in many different states, including the UK and 
EU
1255
 
 
Parallel application of both EU and English rules may lead to further conflicts
1256
 
because the courts might be pre-occupied in establishing a relationship between the two 
systems
1257
. It is necessary to understand a clear distinction in the application of these 
two regimes. Traditional rules increase the possibility of allowing the start of 
proceedings in England because it is based on the defendant’s presence in England (see-
2.11.6). CPR r6.9 states that this assumption is for non-EU domiciled i.e. if a social 
media user who is an EU national commits a tort of defamation then the Brussels rules 
should be applied to assume the jurisdiction.  However, for non-EU domiciled 
                                                          
1250
 Eric Gasser GmBH v Misat Srl [2003] E.C.R. 1-14693. 
1251
 Turner v Grovit [2004] E.C.R. 1-3565. 
1252
 Fentiman, R., (2010), ‘International Commercial Litigation’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford University Press), Para 
11.05. 
1253
 Owusu v Jackson [2005] ECR I – 1383. 
1254
 Jonathan, H., (2008), ‘The Brussels I Regulation and the Re-Emergence of the English Common Law’, 
The European Legal Forum, Vol 4, pp 181 – 189.  
1255
 Collins, L., (2006), ‘Diecy, Morris & Collins the Conflict of Laws’ (14
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), 
Vol 1, Part 3, Ch. 11 in Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments.   
1256
 Both regimes are at root concerned with the same objectives, but give effect to that concern in 
different ways. In English law the mechanism is discretionary, but in Regulation and Convention a simple 
chronological approach is adopted as the only alternative to a discretionary approach; Fentiman, (2006), 
‘Civil Jurisdiction and Third States: Owusu and After’, CML Review, Vol 43, pp 705-732. 
1257
 Ahmed, M., & Beaumont, P., (2017), ‘Exclusive choice of court agreements: Some issues on the 
Hague convention on choice of court agreements and its relationship with the Brussels I recast 
especially anti-suit injunctions, concurrent proceedings and the implications of BREXIT, Journal of 
Private International Law, Vol 13, Issue 2, pp 386. 
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defendants, the English court has discretion whether or not to exercise its 
jurisdiction
1258
. (Non-EU defendants and traditional rules are the subject matter of this 
research). 
 
6.8.: Application of traditional jurisdiction: 
 
English courts must analyse the interests of the involving parties and investigate all the 
relevant aspects to find out whether it is the appropriate forum to adjudicate (see-4.7). 
Regardless, of an appropriate forum, if justice cannot be done in another forum, the 
English court would hear the case
1259
 (see-7.19). In the Tiernan
1260
 case, the court 
assumed jurisdiction to serve the best interests of the parties. On the other hand, English 
courts may not assume jurisdiction if there are countervailing factors, which suggest 
that it should decline jurisdiction in favour of another forum
1261
. Jurisdictional rules 
only decide where litigation is to take place rather than whether it can take place at 
all
1262
.  
 
The right to a fair trial is central to the British justice system and is enshrined in Article 
6
1263
 of the European Convention
1264
. The English court also should not assume 
jurisdiction if it violates fundamental human rights or breaches the right to a fair trial 
(see-6.5.1). The assumption of jurisdiction must also be considered in the light of the 
Human Rights Act 1998
1265
. In the Lubbe
1266
 case, it was argued that if the English 
court stayed the proceedings, it would be a breach of Article 6 on the right of a fair trial. 
Lord Bingham concluded that Art 6 would not affect the already reached a conclusion 
(see-7.6, 7.19). 
 
                                                          
1258
 Spiliada Maritime v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. 
1259
 Irish Shipping Ltd v Commercial Union Assurance Co Plc [1991] 2 QB 206. 
1260
 Tiernan v Magen Insurance Co Ltd [2000] ILPr 517. 
1261
 Lorenzen, G., (1943), ‘The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol 
52, Issue 3, pp 680-683. 
1262
 Cook, W., (1942), ‘Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws’ (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge), Ch. 1 – 3. 
1263
 everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. 
1264
 It was ratified by the UK in 1951 and brought directly into British Law by the Human Rights Act 1998 
– it has however been abolished since the voting for Brexit. 
1265
 Human Rights Act 1998; it implements the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950. 
1266
 Lubbe v Cape Plc [2000] 1 WLR 1545, at 1561. 
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Article 6 protects the right to a public hearing before an impartial court of law but it 
cannot be used as an instrument to escape from the application of the law
1267
. Atkins 
J
1268
 noted that Article 6 is silent where that right has to be capable of being exercised. 
For instance, if a Pakistani user violates online security, he cannot argue on Article 6 
that he may have a fair trial in Pakistan rather than England. Nevertheless, in the case of 
social media libel claims the place of tort will be of utmost importance (see-6.4.2). The 
court can balance Article 6 rights by following the due process (See-4.2, 6.9). A court 
becomes competent to try an action in personam
1269
 if the defendant is served in 
England and he submits to the jurisdiction or the claim-form is served out of the 
jurisdiction under CPR r 6.20
1270
. 
 
6.8.1.: Defendant present in the UK: 
 
If an EU national is domiciled in England, he will be subject to the Brussels I 
Regulation (see-2.7.1). If a non-EU defendant is domiciled in England, the courts will 
have by default jurisdiction under CPR; however, Section 9 of the 2013 Act has 
complicated the standard (see-7.7).  The mere presence of a non-EU defendant will not 
invoke English jurisdiction, the courts can only assume jurisdiction if the claim form is 
served on the defendant in England (see-2.11.6.3). The application of rules depends on 
the type of defendant.  
 
6.8.1.1.: Types of social media defendants: 
 
The defendant may be an individual, a person either linked to a corporation or may 
represent a partnership. It is important to differentiate among different defendants 
because there are different principles depending on the type of the defendant
1271
.  
 
1. Individuals:   As far as the presence is concerned, HL1272 established that the 
English court would have jurisdiction if the defendant happens to be physically 
                                                          
1267
 Clarkson & Hill, (2011), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ (4th edition, Oxford University Press), pp 60. 
1268
 The Kribi [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 76 at 87. 
1269
 Clarkson & Hill, (2011), ‘The Conflict of Laws’ (4
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 103. 
1270
 Fawcett & Carruthers, (2010), Private International Law (14
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 354. 
1271
 http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part06   [Assessed 22
nd
 December 
2017]. 
1272
 John Russell & Co Ltd v Cayzer, Irvine & Co Ltd [1916] 2 AC 298 at HL. 
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present in England at the time of service. Under CPR r 6.5 (6)1273, only a 
personal service is acceptable because service by post is no longer satisfactory 
within jurisdiction. In the Wildenstein1274 case, the court assumed jurisdiction, 
even though the contract was made in France because the writ was served on the 
defendant in England. A passage through English airport, a visit or transit will 
all suffice for physical presence as long as the procedure of the service is 
followed (see-2.3.1). Therefore, a defendant cannot argue that his stay in 
England was brief because in the Colt1275 case, the court assumed jurisdiction 
even though the defendant was staying in London only for one night1276.  
 
The defendant must come to England by his free will without the involvement of 
misstatement or fraudulent trick. Lyell J1277 noted, “there must be the absence of 
fraud inducing the defendant to enter the jurisdiction”. The service will not be 
valid if there was element of fraudulent inducement. Lord Davey1278 established 
that if the defendant is tricked by fraud to come to the forum, the common law 
rule would not apply. Hence, regardless of permissible method of service, the 
traditional physical presence rule will not be applicable if the writ was served 
fraudulently1279. 
 
Multiple-defendants: In social media libel, there may be multiple defendants 
involved in the same publication. It will be straightforward to serve them if all 
the defendants are based in one jurisdiction. If these defendants are based at 
multiple locations, then the ‘necessary or proper party’ gateway can be used1280. 
It often proves useful in multi-party claims. If one of the defendants, who can be 
served within England, or with permission under another of the gateways and 
against whom there is a real issue to be tried, then the court will allow the claim 
to be served on other parties outside the jurisdiction
1281
. However, the claimant 
                                                          
1273
 CPR PD 6B, Section 4, Part 6, explains the methods of proper service of a claim form.  
1274
 Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2QB 283. 
1275
 Colt Industries Inc v Sarlie (no 1) [1996] 1 ALL ER 673. 
1276
 Fawcett & Carruthers, (2010), Private International Law (14
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 355. 
1277
 Colt Industries Inc v Sarlie (no 1) [1996] 1 ALL ER 673. 
1278
 Watkins v North American Land & Timber Co Ltd [1904] 20 TLR 534. 
1279
 Rule of the Supreme Court, Order 10, Rule 1(1) and Order 65, Rule 2. 
1280
 (1) Mark McLaughlin (2) Greg Martin (3) Alan John (Jim) Davies v London Borough of Lambeth (2) 
Mohammed Khan[2010] EWHC 2726 (QB). 
1281
 Standard Bank plc and others v Just Group LLC and others [2014] EWHC 2687. 
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has to prove that the other defendants are necessary or proper parties to the libel 
case
1282
. 
 
2. Corporations:  If a corporation is registered in England1283, then the traditional 
rules will apply1284. Unless the corporation may be present in England without 
being domiciled there1285 (it may not have a fixed place of business1286). Under 
the Companies Act 2006, a company will be classed as established in England if 
(a) it is registered in England1287 (b) it is incorporated outside but has a business 
place in England1288 or (c) it has a place of business in England1289. Similarly, in 
Brussels-Regulations,1290 a company is domiciled where it has the main 
administration. S11391291 will allow the claimant to serve the writ if the 
defendant has any establishment because a company, which has a place of 
business in England, can be sued in England1292. 
 
3. Partnership: As far as partnerships are concerned the writ can be served to any 
of the partners who is presently in England
1293
. If the writ is served to the person 
who controls the firm, then by virtue of CPR r6.4 (5)
 
the service would be 
deemed legally effective for all partners
1294
 unless it was not the main place of 
business subject to the type of partnership i.e. General Partners, limited liability 
or LLP. 
 
                                                          
1282
 AB Bank Limited v Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC [2016] EWHC 2082. 
1283
 Business disparagement is a claim suited for businesses looking to protect their financial rights and 
property, while defamation is geared towards protecting a person’s reputation. 
1284
 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] Ch. 433. 
1285
 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v Vorm Cudell [1902] 1 KB 342; hiring a stand during the a show, the 
defendants were carrying on business i.e. it is resident at a place within the jurisdiction, and therefore 
could be served there with a writ in an action by the claimant. 
1286
 La Bourgogne [1872] L. R. 7 Q. B. 293; the true test in such cases is whether the foreign corporation 
is conducting its own business at some fixed place within the jurisdiction. 
1287
 S725 Companies Act 1985; Ch. 6 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6 [Assessed 22
nd
 
December 2017]. 
1288
 S691 Companies Act 1985; Ch. 6 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6 [Assessed 27
th
 
December 2017]. 
1289
 S695 Companies Act 1985; Ch. 6 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/6 [Assessed 22
nd
 
December 2017]. 
1290
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_cooperation_in_civil_ma
tters/l33054_en.htm [Assessed 28
th
 December 2017] 
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 Section 1139 (2) Companies Act 2006. 
1292
 Overseas Companies Regulation 2009, reg 7 (1). 
1293
 Lexi Holdings Plc v Luqman & Ors [2009] EWCA Civ 117. 
1294
 Service on a partnership, and all its partners, can be effected by ostal service on one of the partners. 
 251 
 
4. Registered partnership: To serve a registered partnership in England, the 
claimant has to follow CPR r7.2 A and CPR PD7, which state that the partners 
must be sued in the name of their firm. The claimant has the option to serve both 
partners individually or the partnership as a whole. However, if the service was 
fraudulent or it was not proper service, then it will invalidate any jurisdiction 
over the partnership as well1295.  If the defendant had an establishment/property 
in England, then according to the Gasque1296 case, England would be its place of 
domicile. This establishment could sue or can be sued in England because CA1297 
established that a company was said to have established a place of business in 
England, if it carried on, part of its business activities there. The main place of 
establishment can receive claim form because the case of Re-Oriel [1986]1298 
held that a specific location in England associated with the main business is 
required.  
 
5. Service of writ: CPR r6.3-6.52 state that a claim form can be served to the main 
business of a partnership in England. The service of claim form will be effective 
even if the partners were not present in England at the time of service
1299
. In the 
Clark1300 case, it was established that if one partner were served properly, then 
other partners would be deemed served on a similar issue. If both partners are 
sued for different issues, an individual process of service is required for 
establishing personal jurisdiction.   
 
6.8.1.2.: After service:  
 
Once the defendant has been served, whether in England or elsewhere, the defendant 
has two options, ‘acknowledge and submit to English jurisdiction’ or ‘acknowledge the 
service and dispute the jurisdiction’. The defendant will have a short period in which to 
challenge the court’s jurisdiction (see-6.8.2.1, 2.12). 
 
 
                                                          
1295
 As per Lord Diplock in Amin Rashid v Kuwait Insurance [1984] 1 AC 50  at 65G. 
1296
 Gasque v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1940] KB 80. 
1297
 South India Shipping v Export-Import Bank of Korea [1985] 2 ALL ER 219.  
1298
 Re Oriel [1986] 1 WLR 1980. 
1299
 Kamali v City & Country Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1879; Wilson LJ held that the service had 
been completed even though the defendant was out of the jurisdiction, at the time of service. 
1300
 Lysaght Ltd v Clark & Co [1891] 1 QB 552. 
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6.8.2.: Defendant Submits to the jurisdiction:  
 
It can be express or implied.  
 
1. Express Submission: CPR r 6.4 (2) state the example of expressly submitting to 
the courts’ jurisdiction:  
 
1. The defendant defends the case  
2. The defendant challenges the liability  
3. A representative of the defendant accepts the service on behalf of the 
defendant  
 
In the Bassam1301 case, the half-brother commenced proceedings in Saudi Arabia, the 
English court granted an injunction to the wife to restrain the proceedings because 
the half-brother had already submitted to English court’s jurisdiction.  
 
2. Implied submission: CPR r20.2. states that submission can be implied, for 
instance, the defendant brings a counterclaim related to the original claim 
against the claimant1302- However, if the defendant has already contested the 
jurisdiction then the implied submission is not assumed.  
 
In the William1303 case, the judge held that if the defendant merely contests the 
jurisdiction, he is not deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction.    
 
6.8.2.1: Defendant objects to the jurisdiction: 
 
The defendant has the right to reject/challenge/refuse the authority of any court. If the 
defendant does not submit
1304
 but wishes to contest the jurisdiction, the 
acknowledgement of service will be ineffective until the court decides under CPR part 
11 (see-2.12.3). The Hoddinott
1305
 case held that the challenge to dispute the jurisdiction 
                                                          
1301
 Al-Bassam v Al-Bassam [2004] WTLR 157. 
1302
 Brealey v Board of Management of Royal Perth Hospital [1999] 21 WAR 79. 
1303
 William & Glyn’s Bank v Astro Dinamico [1984] 1 WLR 438. 
1304
 CAN Insurance Co Ltd v Office Depot International (UK) [2005] EWHC 456 (Comm). 
1305
 Hoddinott and others v Persimmon Homes (Wessex) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1203; a challenge can be 
on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction often involves asking the court to set aside its original 
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would negate any doubts about the defendant’s submission. The Ara Media1306 case 
concluded that the defendant who contests the court’s jurisdiction does not thereby 
submit. After the dispute of jurisdiction is submitted, the court has to stop the 
proceedings; otherwise, it would be a statutory breach of Article 6 (see-6.8). Unless it is 
proved that the defendant has already agreed to submit to English jurisdiction. The 
service will be considered effective, despite the defendant’s challenge1307. For instance, 
a blogger mentions in his blog that in case of a libel action, he wants to be prosecuted in 
English courts (see-6.5.2.1). This statement would be deemed sufficient to pursue a libel 
claim against him in England. In such circumstance, if he is served with the writ, his 
submission to jurisdiction will be automatic and he cannot challenge the court’s 
authority at any stage of the case. Similarly, if the defendant already agreed on a choice 
of forum clause, it will be considered an express submission (see-6.5.2). 
 
The defendant can still contest jurisdiction if there are contravening factors to suggest 
otherwise1308: 
 
1. Medical grounds  
2. Banned from entering the UK  
3. When his entry to the UK may be against public policy 
4. Immigration restrictions 
 
In cross-border  online communication, a defendant can be in any part of the globe (see-
2.5) and might take a while to step foot on English soil. There could also be a situation 
when the defendant was in England when he published libellous statement, then leaves 
England, and does not return. In such situations, it is immensely important that the 
claimant should be allowed to serve the claim form outside the jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
grant of permission to serve out of the jurisdiction. The defendant can challenge each condition that the 
claimant put forward when obtaining permission. 
1306
 Global Multimedia International Ltd v Ara Media Services [2007] 1 ALL ER (Comm) 1160. 
1307
 Texan Management Ltd v Pacific Electric Wire & Cable Company Ltd [2009] UKPC 46. 
1308
 A challenge on these grounds must always include evidence that there is another court of 
competent jurisdiction, which is distinctly more appropriate, and it is not unjust that the claimant be 
deprived of the right to trial in England. 
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6.9.: Service outside the jurisdiction: 
 
, court can allow service out of jurisdiction
1309
. Common law empowers courts to use its 
discretion
1310
.  
CPR r6.3 grants the claimant a right to seek permission to serve proceedings on foreign-
based defendant. The discretionary power is endorsed through CPR r 6.20
1311
 and EU 
regulations
1312
 to allow the claimant permission to serve. This process is not just a 
formality because the claimant has to prove that it is a proper case for which permission 
is needed. In the Parker
1313
 case, it was established that the claimant bears the onus to 
satisfy court that why permission should be granted.  
 
The claimant does not have to satisfy the court beyond reasonable doubt (see-6.9.1). If 
the claimant can prove that England is the most appropriate forum, court should grant 
the permission to serve the defendant. In the Mujur
1314
 case, it was decided that to 
obtain such permission the claimant has to prove that England is the appropriate forum. 
Lord Goff
1315
 also noted that it would be sufficient for the claimant to show that there is 
a substantial issue of law. If the court in another country starts the proceedings, then the 
English court has to withdraw its jurisdiction
1316
. In the Nemours
1317
 case, it was 
established that English approach is not based on ‘first come, first served’.  
 
It is questionable that why the claimant cannot commence proceedings against the 
defendant in the country where the defendant is currently residing (it may not be 
favourable to the claimant considering cost, logistics and evidence issues (see-6.2.2). In 
short, the claimant has to show that his reputation is harmed, which falls under one of 
the headings of CPR 6.20 ‘jurisdictional gateway’, and the court permission is 
compulsory to bring the defendant to justice. 
 
 
                                                          
1309
 Lord Collins of Mapesbury, (2012), ‘Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws’, (15
th
 Ed, Sweet 
& Maxwell, London), Rule 34, at para 11.141. 
1310
 The Common Law Procedure Act 1852. 
1311
 CPR PD 6B, Section 4, Part 6, Para 3.1, enables the court to allow out of jurisdiction service.  
1312
 Art 5 and Art 6 of Brussels I Regulation also provide the same provisions. 
1313
 Parker v Schuller [1901] 17 TLR 299 (CA). 
1314
 Mujur Bakat BHD v Uni Asia General Insurance [2011] EWHC 643.  
1315
 Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank of Iran [1994] 1 AC 438.  
1316
 This approach is not consistent with the EU because Art 27 of Brussels I Regulation allows the EU 
court to maintain its jurisdiction, if the claim was brought in that court. 
1317
 El du Pont de Nenours v Agnew & Kerr [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 585. 
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6.9.1.: Permission under CPR r6.20: 
 
 the EU Regulations assumption of jurisdiction is mandatory
1318
. If English court has 
jurisdiction under the EU, the claim form to the defendant can be served without court’s 
permission. In traditional rules, jurisdiction is discretionary
1319
. HL
1320
 concluded that it 
is based on the assessment of forum convenience. If the defendant has any assets in 
England, it will allow the court an automatic jurisdiction (see-2.3.1, 6.4.1). Otherwise, 
court has to use its discretion under CPR r6.20
1321
. Permission is only granted if 
‘England is a proper place to bring the claim’1322. Over the years, English courts have 
explored the limits of the power to exercise their discretion
1323
. The CA granted a 
worldwide freezing order in a case when the defendant based overseas and he had no 
property in England. In cyberspace libel, such discretionary powers of the courts would 
be very helpful in prosecuting a the defendants worldwide
1324
.  
 
The claimant has to satisfy the court on Lord Goff’ ‘The Spiliada test1325’. HL explained 
the importance of this criterion in the Seaconsar
1326
 case. Lord Collins
1327
  later 
reiterated that every claimant, who is seeking to serve a claim form on a foreign-based 
defendant. It is based of following tests:     
 
1. The Merits test – A serious issue is to be tried   
2. The Forum test – England is the proper forum in which the proceedings should 
be entertained 
3. The Gateway test–  The claim falls within one of the jurisdictional gateways 
Paragraph 6B r3.1 of the practice direction to Part 6 CPR 
 
 
 
                                                          
1318
 Hayward, R., (2005), ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 Ed, Cavendish Publishing, London), pp 47. 
1319
 The El Amria [1981] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 119. 
1320
 The Sennar (no 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 (HL). 
1321
 http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part06#IDA5I3HC  [Assessed 22
nd
 
December 2016]. 
1322
 Civil Procedure Rule r 6.37(3). 
1323
 Derby v Weldon [1990] Ch. 48; CA granted an injunction to prevent the disposal of defendants 
foreign assets even though defendant had no assets in England.   
1324
 Fentiman, R., (2010), ‘International Commercial Litigation’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 9. 
1325
 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987], HL UK. 
1326
 Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank of Iran [1994] 1 AC 438; HL set three rules to be satisfied.  
1327
 Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2012] 1 W.L.R. 1804 at [71] - [88]. 
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6.9.1.1: The Merits test:  
 
It was established in the Opthalmic
1328
 case, that court might not grant permission if the 
issue is inconsiderate. There should be a reasonable prospect of success
1329
. It is obvious 
that to resolve a claim of £50, no one would ask the court’s permission to serve a claim 
form outside the jurisdiction. Court held in the Jackson
1330
 case that there has to be a 
‘real and reasonable’ case to request for permission of service. The central question 
involves: Do the issue contain a substantial question of law or fact
1331
. Therefore, the 
relevant court must consider all the factors on the balance of probability to continue the 
proceedings
1332
. Lord Woolf
1333
 stated in his declaratory judgment that there has to be a 
justification for the continuation of the proceeding.  
 
Defamatory material via social media can be shared without any thought process - it 
does not mean that every case is worth a trial. The claimant has to go through this 
barrier as Lord Hope stated, “it is designed for the cases which are not fit for trial at 
all
1334”. On the other hand, Section 1 is a step forward in collaborating traditional laws 
to social media because it imposes a test of ‘seriousness’ (see-2.13.1.1). Once, the court 
is satisfied that the claimant has a reasonable prospect of success, permission of service 
will be granted. Gross J
1335
 allowed permission to serve in India and stated that the 
matter should be resolved without further delay. 
 
Waller LJ
1336
 noted ‘it could be that one party has a much better argument on the 
available evidence’. If the claimant is a public figure, using moral/religious grounds or 
obtained public support, there is a good chance for him to produce good arguments to 
get permission to serve
1337
. The public support and sound arguments should not be 
considered in their literal meaning (see-7.20). If a claimant can get media support it 
does not mean that he is right because court’s decision will be based on the facts 
                                                          
1328
 Opthalmic Innovations International Ltd v OI International Inc [2004] EWHC 2948. 
1329
 Wilton UK Ltd & Anor v Shuttleworth & Ors [2018] EWHC 911 (Ch); if a permission is refused the 
claimant has an option to rely on r6.15 – Denton Principles (it is beyond the scope of this thesis). 
1330
 Owusu v Jackson [2002] EWCA Civ 877. 
1331
 Seaconsar Far East Ltd v Bank of Iran [1994] 1 AC 438.  
1332
 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Ltd [2005] EWHC 944 (Comm). 
1333
 Messier Dowty Ltd v Sabena SA [2000] 1 WLR 2040. 
1334
 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England (no 3) [2003] AC 1. 
1335
 Swiss Reinsurance Co Ltd v United India Insurance Co [2004] IL Pr4. 
1336
 Canada Trust Co v Stolzenberg [1998] 1 WLR 547. 
1337
 Canada Trust Company v Stolzenberg (no2) [1998] 1 WLR 547. 
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presented. As evident from the Malina
1338
 case, where she had public support for being 
the wife of US president, court still refused her case for lack of jurisdiction. It is the 
merits of the case, which guides judges to allow service of writ outside jurisdiction. In 
the Reinsurance
1339
 case, court held that an issue, which is fanciful, is not a serious 
issue to be tried.  
 
In short, the claimant has to prove his reasonable prospect of success on the merits of 
the case. Clark LJ
1340
 stated that this should not be mere fanciful thought; hence the 
claimant has to provide an affidavit along with his claim form. Cooke-J
1341
 held that 
failure to establish an argument means that permission will not be granted. Colman J 
adopted a similar approach that lack of evidence will deter court to grant permission
1342
.  
 
6.9.1.2: The Forum test:  
 
The second element is about forum convenience which is derived from the case of 
Spiliada
1343
. The claimant has to prove that England is the most appropriate forum to try 
this case in the best interest of the parties and if not; it may cause a grave miscarriage of 
justice. In English law, the existence of jurisdiction by 'forum test' varies on a case-by-
case analysis because it helps maintain the standards of justice; however, it reduces 
judicial predictability and certainty (see-2.17.1). Privy Council
1344
 also reaffirmed this 
approach for allocating proceedings to the most appropriate forum based on forum 
conveniens. English court will determine the appropriate forum in two stages1345:  
 
1. The dispute is closely related to England  
2. Justice will not be done abroad 
 
Lord Wilberforce introduced a test based on appropriateness rather than practical 
convenience and natural forum (see-7.12). The court is obliged to consider the factors of 
the availability of witnesses, legal issues involved, local knowledge of the parties, 
                                                          
1338
 Melania Trump v Daily Mail [2017] SCNY, Commercial Division No. 650661. 
1339
 Swiss Reinsurance Co Ltd v United India Insurance Co [2004] IL Pr4. 
1340
 Clark LJ in Carvill America Incorporated v Camperdown UK Ltd [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457. 
1341
 Bear Sterns Plc v Forum Global Equity Ltd [2006] EWHC 1666. 
1342
 Konkola Copper Mines Plc v Coromin [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 410 (CA). 
1343
 Spiliada Maritime v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460. 
1344
 Aerospatiale v Lee Kui Jack [1987] AC 871. 
1345
 Hayward, R., (1999) ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 Ed, Cavendish Publication, England), pp 15. 
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expenses,
1346
 and forum suitability. Although it is court’s discretion to allow service 
outside the jurisdiction, it has to consider the elements of ‘forum conveniens’ and 
‘appropriate forum’ for both parties to meet the ends of justice’. It is pivotal to know 
that the same test of ‘forum non conveniens’ is applied for the stay of the proceeding; 
however, the burden of proof shifts from the defendant to claimant
1347
. About forum 
shopping, the English courts do not merely focus on the convenient forum, but which 
country’s court is ‘appropriate” (see-7.19.3). the claimant must not only persuade the 
court that England is appropriate but also prove it is clearly so
1348
. 
 
6.9.1.3.: Burden of proof: 
 
If the defendant disputes the jurisdiction, he will have the burden to prove that England 
is not the competent forum to try this case (see-2.14). If the defendant is not present in 
England, the claimant has to satisfy the court that England is the convenient forum
1349
. 
This shift in the burden depends if the claimant is requesting permission of the 
defendant is challenging that permission
1350
. Now, after that, if the defendant wants to 
challenge the jurisdiction on the grounds of ‘forum non conveniens’ the burden will 
shift to him to prove there is another competent forum to solve this dispute (see-2.17.1). 
 
Patten-J
1351
 clarified this situation: “If the defendant can prove that England is not a 
convenient forum the stay will be granted unless the claimant proves other compelling 
circumstances
1352
 (a matter of justice require that the stay should not be granted). 
Concerning, ‘forum non-convenience’ if a stay is refused, it implies that different 
proceedings being persuaded concurrently in different courts
1353
, which can cause delay, 
extra expenses and inconvenience for the litigants. Kealey QC
1354
 set aside a proper 
service and granted a stay despite England was appropriate forum because of concurrent 
proceedings in New York. This judgment reflected English rules on lis-alibi pendis 
                                                          
1346
 Amin Rasheed Shipping v Kuwait Insurance [1984] AC 50 at 72. 
1347
 Samson, E., (2012), ‘The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis of Traditional English and 
U.S. Defamation Laws & the Dawn of England's Modern Day, Cardozo Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, Vol 20, Issue 3. 
1348
 Rosenoer, J., (1997), ‘Cyber-Law: The Law of Internet’, (1
st
 Ed, Springer-Verlag, NY), pp 227. 
1349
 Hayward, R., (1999) ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 Ed, Cavendish Publication, England), pp 16. 
1350
 Fawcett & Carruthers, (2010), ‘Private International Law’, (14
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), pp 354. 
1351
 SMAY Investments Ltd v Sachdev [2003] WL 1202657. 
1352
 SMAY Investments Ltd v Sachdev [2003] WL 1202657; 206 at Para 45. 
1353
 Cleveland Museum of Art v Capricorn Art International SA [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 166. 
1354
 Dr Insurance Co v Central National Insurance Co [1996] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 74. 
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(about choice of jurisdiction – jurisdiction pending somewhere else1355), which are, 
unlike Brussels and Lugano-convention, not based on ‘first come first serve’1356. Under 
the EU law rule, “the first party in time to issue proceedings at court secures the 
jurisdiction of the court in that particular country
1357”. Proceedings involving the same 
cause of action and between the same parties have been brought in England and in 
another state but if the other court also has jurisdiction, the English court must decline 
jurisdiction
1358
. It also helps to avoid concurrent jurisdiction. Lis-alibi pendis rule has 
great importance in private international law because a judgment of court with lack of 
personal jurisdiction will have no effect
1359
. Although lis-alibi pendis is 
discretionary
1360
, however, jurisdiction is mandatory to decide a case (it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis).  
 
6.9.1.4.: The Gateway test: 
 
The third issue to be proved is that the cause of action falls within the scope of CPR PD 
6B
1361
. The most relevant for this thesis are: 
 
1. CPR-6.20 (1): The defendant is domiciled in England but residing abroad at the 
time of commencement of proceedings 
  
2. CPR-6.20 (2): Where an injunction is obtained to stop the defendant doing an 
act within the jurisdiction, leave will not be granted as established in The 
Siskina1362 case, where the claimant had no other course of action 
 
3. CPR-6.20 (3): If a claim is served within/without of jurisdiction but the second 
defendant is outside of jurisdiction. In the case of online defamation, if the 
                                                          
1355
 Campbell, B., (1990), ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’ (6
th
 Ed, West publishing co, US), pp 853. 
1356
 Hayward, R., (1999) ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 edition, Cavendish Publication, England), pp 35. 
1357
 Article 5 of the Brussels Regulation states the court which seized jurisdiction first must not decline it 
because Forum non-conveniens is not a valid argument in the EU courts. 
1358
 Mojolaoluwa O., (2017), ‘Private International Law and the Doctrine of Lis Alibi Pendens’; Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2963914 [Assessed 12
th
 November 2017]. 
1359
 Fawcett, J., (1984), ‘Lis Alibi Pendens and the Discretion to Stay’, The Modern Law Review, Vol 47, 
issue 4, pp 481-486 
1360
 Swakopmund Airfield v Council Of The Municipality Of Swakopmund [2011] NAHC 71. 
1361
 Hayward, R., (1999) ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 Ed, Cavendish Publication, England), pp 17; 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/pd_part06b [Assessed 5
th 
January 2018] 
1362
 The Siskina [1979] AC 210. 
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second defendant is not a proper party to action the grant will not be allowed1363. 
In the Komaneni1364 case, the application of CPR-6.20 was refused because the 
defendant has no real connection with the dispute.  
4. CPR6.20 (8): Grants leave to serve in tort related issues when the damage is 
sustained or resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction. It also 
reflects Article 5
1365
, which intends to mitigate the concerns related to 
establishing the place of tort. English courts may only assume jurisdiction if 
either the damage was sustained or the wrongful act committed in England
1366
.  
 
In the Booth
1367
 case, court held that sustained damage might be physical or economical 
but some ‘damage/harm’ must be sustained in England. Article 51368  also provides 
special jurisdiction because the defendant can also be sued in the country where the 
harmful event occurred
1369
. The tort of online defamation, however, raised the 
contentious issues as discussed in the Jameel
1370
 case, where English courts assumed 
jurisdiction under CPR 6 (20) however, the defendant sought to stay the proceeding
1371
.  
 
These tests were developed for the betterment of the litigants
1372
 because jurisdiction of 
the unfavourable forum might render the victory somewhat pyrrhic
1373
. Similarly, delay 
in judgment may deprive the winning party of the benefits of victory
1374
. These tests 
enable courts to evaluate the suitability issue concerning remedies, recoverability of 
cost, documentary evidence, witness’s availability and neutrality of the forum along 
with other contravening factors before exercising jurisdiction
1375
. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1363
 United Film Distribution Ltd v Cbbabria [2001] 2 ALL ER (Com) 865. 
1364
 Komaneni v Rolls-Royce Industrial Power (India) [2002] IL Pr 40. 
1365
 Art5 (3) Brussels Convention 1968 and Brussels I Regulation. 
1366
 Hayward, R., (1999) ‘Conflict of Laws’, (3
rd
 Ed, Cavendish Publication, England), pp 21. 
1367
 Booth v Phillips and Others [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 457. 
1368
 Art5 (3) Brussels Convention 1968 and Brussels I Regulation. 
1369
 Kalfelis v Schroder, Munchmeyer, Hengest & Co [1988] ECR 5565. 
1370
 Dow Jones & Co v Jameel [2005] E.M.L.R. 16 . 
1371
 Hayward, R., (2006), ‘Conflict of Laws’, (4
th
 Ed, Cavendish Publication, London), pp 20. 
1372
 Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co v Pakistan [2010] UK SC 46.  
1373
 Houtte, V., (2011), ‘What's New in European Arbitration?’, Dispute esolution journal, Vol 66, Issue 1, 
pp 16. 
1374
 Donnelly, B., & Pratt, J., (2011), ‘A Clash of Jurisdiction’, Macfarlanes LLP. 
1375
 http://www.inhouselawyer.co.uk/index.php/litigation-a-dispute-resolution/9656-a-clash-of-
jurisdictions [Assessed 22
nd
 December 2016]. 
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6.10.: Summary:  
 
Why is appropriate jurisdiction essential: It may change the judgments altogether. If the 
case of Jameel had been tried in France, the outcome would be radically different 
because defamation in France is treated as a criminal offence. The logic of ‘civil 
jurisdiction’, other than the practice of assuming jurisdiction, is similar in almost every 
legal system
1376
. This commonality invites to introduce a standardised set of rules for 
assuming jurisdiction in civil actions. Especially, social media libel required 
international jurisdiction because the litigants may have different nationalities
1377
. 
Otherwise, different courts from several countries might have the jurisdiction but the 
international rules of jurisdiction will find a competent court to adjudicate that case
1378
.  
 
6.10.1.: Conclusion 
 
This chapter concludes that if a court decides that it has jurisdiction, it does not mean 
that it will necessarily grant the required remedy to the claimant because the court 
competence to decide a case has no impact on the judgment of that case. Similarly, if a 
court is not competent to hear a case, it does not mean that the claimant may lose that 
case in another jurisdiction
1379
. The determination of jurisdiction is merely a theoretical 
step of the reasoning that must be conducted by any court where the claim is 
brought
1380
. The assumption of jurisdiction rules needs clarity in libel claims. It is even 
harder for lawyers to advise their clients to pursue a claim in a home state because ‘the 
variables’, on which the outcomes depend, vary from case to case1381. Even a claim 
involving social media makes judges interpret traditional laws differently
1382
 to cope 
with technology. As Warby J noted, “Where something is not a matter of common 
                                                          
1376
 Mehren, V., (1994), ‘Adjudicatory Jurisdiction’ in Fentiman, R. (eds.), (Boston University Press), pp 
35, 96.  
1377
 Bernhard, M., (2010), ‘How has the Law Attempted to Tackle the Borderless Nature of the 
Internet?’, International Journal of Law and IT, Vol 18, Issue 2, pp 142-175. 
1378
 Brussels, 14/01/2003, COM (2002) 654 [Commission of EU- Annex 1]. 
1379
 Fawcett and Carruthers, (1999), ‘Private International Law’, (14
th
 Ed, Oxford University Press), Ch. 
11. 
1380
 Mehren, V., (1983), ‘Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and Evaluated’, Boston 
law review, Vol 63, pp 279. 
1381
 Paul, B.C., (1999), 'When Cyberspace Meets Main Street: A Primer for Internet Business Modelling in 
an Evolving Legal Environment', Hastings Comm. & Ent. Law Journal, Vol 22, Issue 97, pp 111. 
1382
 Especially for Twitter & Facebook which are relatively new medium, and not everyone knows all the 
details of how it works: Detailed in Appendix I. 
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knowledge a judge is not entitled to bring his or her own knowledge to bear. The facts 
normally have to be proved
1383”.  
 
This chapter finds that jurisdictional conflicts in social media defamation are reaching 
beyond domestic laws. Online libel can only be determined adequately if the legal 
authorities have special knowledge of computer technology, social media and IT 
systems. Although the medium has changed, the rights of the parties are the same, so to 
assume jurisdiction in cyberspace several special factors have to be analysed 
skilfully
1384
. It is interesting that domestic judges are asked to decide how to regulate 
content outside their borders/how to regulate free speech (see-2.6). Is it not a job for 
policymakers who are democratically elected (see-9.8). Courts are not well equipped to 
shape national policy that touches not only on free expression rights but on foreign 
relations and national IT infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1383
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
1384
 Freeman, E., (1999), ‘Issue of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace’, Information System Security, Vol 7, Issue 4, 
pp 20. 
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7.1.: Synopsis of this chapter: 
 
The transnational nature of social media libel challenges the territorial courts
1385
 
because it complicates the definitional understandings of what is regarded as 
‘published’, ‘content’, ‘publishing’, and ‘media producers’ (see-5.8.1). It has rendered 
some existing legal provisions inadequate by complicating their application
1386
. The 
inability of the Defamation Act 2013 to achieve harmony indicates that the lawmakers 
will continue to play ‘catch-up1387’ (see-1.3.1). There is an argument to be made that its 
provisions may lead to the suppression of genuine claims because there is no balance 
between freedom of speech and individual reputation (see-2.13.1).  
 
The analyses of the previous chapters established that when a foreign element is 
identified in a social media defamation case, it will involve ‘systems of law1388’ rather 
than the domestic/internal law of England. For instance, English courts may have to 
apply English laws as well as foreign laws. For example, to exercise jurisdiction for 
non-EU defendants, English domestic law is applied
1389
; however, the selection of 
applicable foreign laws depends upon the process of classification (see-4.3.2). 
Similarly, in the claims involving EU nationals, the Brussels Regulations are 
applied
1390
; for extradition/comity/enforcement issues, international treaties may be 
applied, and for calculating damages, law of forum is applied. The application of 
different sets of rules for similar disputes may cause inconsistency and disharmony 
(see-1.5).  
  
                                                          
1385
 Dixon, H., (2013), ‘IPad wizardry for beginners’, Judges' Journal, Vol  52, Issue 2, pp 36-39; 
technological innovations by social media has affected how the legal profession operates. 
1386
 Angelotti, E., (2013), ‘Twibel Law: What Defamation and its Remedies Look Like in the Age of 
Twitter’, High Technology Law Journal, Vol 13, pp 433; the rise of social media has increased 
defamation. Social media libel claims have become a significant portion of legal disputes. Legal scholars 
have developed new vocabulary to denote continued influence of social media i.e. Twible, social 
community, cyber world, Facebookistan etc.  
1387
 Mangan, D., Gillies, L., (2017), ‘The Legal Challenges of Social Media’, (1
st
 Ed, Elgar Publishing, UK), 
pp 8. 
1388
 Ahuja v Politika Novine I Magazine & Ors [2015] EWHC 3380 (QB); the court applied traditional law 
to assume jurisdiction and noted that that Serbian, Swiz and Indian law can be applied as applicable law.  
1389
 Szigeti, P. D., (2017), ‘The illusion of territorial jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol 52, 
Issue 3, pp 369-399. 
1390
 The Defamation Act 2013 adopts a dual approach to claims by foreign claimants. Under the Brussels 
Regulation (Articles 2 and Articles 5(3)) and the Lugano Convention the claimant has the choice of suing 
the defendant in the court of the member state in which it is domiciled for all the damage which he has 
suffered through publication throughout the European Union (giving the defendant home advantage 
but an inability to contest jurisdiction). 
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7.1.1.: Objectives of this thesis:  
 
This research aims to evaluate whether ‘Cyberspace outdates jurisdictional 
defamation laws’. To evaluate this objective, this thesis examines the following two 
questions, from the critical examination of the relevant literature (see-1.10 and 2.19).  
 
Question 1: 
“HAS CYBERSPACE CHANGED THE APPLICATION OF PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAWS BY DISINTEGRATING THE DOMINANCE OF 
TRADITIONAL SOVEREIGN STATES?” 
 
Question 2: 
“IS THE EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORK ADEQUATE TO DEAL WITH 
CIVIL DISPUTES (DEFAMATION) BASED IN SOCIAL MEDIA?”  
 
These questions are examining whether the traditional private international law rules 
can be applied to cyberspace defamation with the same consistency as they are applied 
to ordinary defamation issues.  
 
If the answer to these questions is affirmative, this thesis will establish that the 
traditional laws are not invalidated for cyberspace so the existing defamation laws can 
also be applied to social media libel (see-8.6). 
 
If the answer to these questions is negative, this thesis will establish that traditional 
laws are invalidated for cyberspace so the existing defamation laws need to be 
amended/modified for social media libel (see-8.7). 
 
7.1.2.: The process of the analysis:  
 
Question 1 involves ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘choice of law’ rules, which are part of Civil 
Procedural Rules and common law. Question 2 involves the existing defamation laws  
which consist of the Defamation Act 2013.  
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The relevant sections of 2013 Act are Section 1 ‘serious harm’, Section 8 ‘single 
publication rule’ and Section 9 ‘action against a person not domiciled in the UK or a 
Member State’ (see-2.13.1). For simplicity, this analysis process is divided into four 
themes. Theme 1 and 2 answer the first research question whereas theme 2 and 3 
answers the second research question. 
 
Theme 1: The application of private international law rules are consistent 
/inconsistent for both ordinary and social media defamation (see Table-8) 
 
Theme 2:  The application of the traditional rules do/do not disintegrate 
cyberspace (see Table-9) 
 
Theme 3:  The CPR rules can/can not be applied to social media libel (see 
Table-10) 
 
Theme 4:  The Defamation Act 2013 is suitable/inadequate for social media 
libel (see Table-11) 
 
7.1.3.: The interpretation of the themes:  
 
The above-mentioned themes are already practiced for traditional media defamation. 
Analysis of these topics for conventional media has already been conducted; however, 
this chapter will evaluate if they can also be applied, with the same consistency to 
digital media, after the 2013 Act. This chapter will analyse recent case laws to see if 
they are applied to social media libel with the same certainty as to publication in 
traditional media. From the interpretation of existing literature and the analysis of social 
media, defamation and jurisdiction, these themes can be divided into the following sub-
themes, as discussed in the tables below.  
 
7.1.4.: The process of interpretation: 
 
Interpretation must be considered because digital communication was also available 
(blogs, email and articles) before the Defamation Act. However, social media changed 
the nature of digital publication to more casual communication. Hence, a comparison is 
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drawn between print media and internet publication before the 2013 Act with social 
media publication after the 2013 Act. 
 
7.1.5.: Key to the tables:  
 
Application pre Defamation Act 2013  
 
This tab shows evaluation of whether the same rules were applied with consistency 
before the 2013 Act – it reflects back to the analysis conducted under the CPR rule.  
 
Application post-Defamation Act 2013   
 
This tab shows evaluation of the changes brought to existing rules since the 2013 Act – 
this analysis is based on the case Laws decided since 2013. 
 
Modification required  
 
This tab considers whether the existing framework is applicable to social media libel or 
modification is required for digital speech. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The conclusion is drawn from above comparison with regards to freedom of speech and 
statutory reputation rights.  
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Table-8: Private International Law Rules 
 
 
 
Theme-1 
 
 
Sub-themes 
Application 
pre-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
Application 
post-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
For social media 
Modificat
ion 
required 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
The 
application of 
private 
international 
law rules  
Identifying the 
publisher 
 
Applied with 
consistency 
 
7.18 
YES … 
Intentional or 
Actual damage 
Produced 
harmony 
 
7.15 
NO Applicable 
to social 
media 
Actual malice 
in libel 
Modified for 
the internet 
7.20 
7.20.1 
7.20.2 
YES … 
Jurisdiction 
over foreign 
publisher 
Inconsistent  
7.9 
YES … 
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Table-9: Disintegration of Cyberspace 
 
 
Theme-2 
 
Sub-themes 
Application 
pre-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
Application 
post-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
For social media 
Modificat
ion 
required 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
Disintegrati
on of 
cyberspace 
by applying 
traditional 
rules 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Forum non-
conveniens 
 
Applied with 
consistency 
7.12 NO Applicable 
to social 
media 
The extent of 
publication 
 
n/a 7.19 NO Applicable 
to social 
media 
Jurisdictional 
rules (un) 
certainty 
Applied with 
certainty 
7.8 
7.13 
NO Applicable 
to social 
media 
Are courts 
deviating from 
traditional 
defamation 
rules 
A little 
deviation is 
found after the 
online 
publication 
7.9 
7.9.1 
7.9.2 
NO A little 
deviation is 
acceptable 
for social 
media 
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Table-10: Civil Procedural rule 
 
 
Theme-3 
 
Sub-themes 
Application 
pre-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
Application 
post- 
Defamation 
2013 Act 
For social media 
Modifica
tion 
required 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
application 
Civil 
Procedural 
Rules 
Service out of 
the jurisdiction 
 
Applied with 
consistency 
7.3 No Applicable 
to social 
media 
Application of 
traditional 
jurisdictional 
rules 
 
Produced 
harmony 
7.4 YES … 
Service of writ Modified for 
the internet 
7.3 
7.5 
YES … 
Proceeding in 
the defendant's 
absence 
Inconsistent  
7.6 
YES … 
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Table-11: Adequacy of the 2013 Act 
 
 
Theme-4 
 
Sub-themes 
Application 
pre-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
Application 
post-
Defamation 
2013 Act 
For social media 
Modificat
ion 
required 
Conclusio
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 
adequacy 
of the 
Defamatio
n  Act 
2013 
 
Section 1 
Harm 
Threshold 
 
 
Jameel 
Threshold was 
consistent 
 
7.14 
7.16 
7.16.1 
 
YES 
 
Inconsiste
nt since 
2013 Act 
Section 8 
Single 
publication/ca
use of action 
 
Multiple 
publication 
was better 
7.11 
7.13 
Yes Inconsiste
nt since 
2013 Act 
Section 9 
Jurisdiction 
Threshold 
Traditional 
Rules are 
suitable 
7.3 
7.7 
YES Inconsiste
nt since 
2013 Act 
Freedom of 
Speech 
Inconsistent 7.21 No Consistent 
under Art 
10 
Importance of 
context in 
social media 
Context is a 
new idea 
based on 
social media 
7.17 No Applicable 
to social 
media 
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7.1.6.: Analytical method: 
 
Covering every single defamation case is impossible. Therefore, this chapter covers the 
cases heard in the higher courts, which are analysed to observe, ‘How judges balance 
social media and traditional jurisdictional defamation concepts with regards to freedom 
of speech’. Cases were selected by using the following method1391 (see Chapter-3):   
 
1. Cases of ‘defamation’, ‘libel’ and ‘social media’ containing reviews by leading 
authors were searched
1392
;  
2. Only those social media libel cases which fitted within the objectives of this 
thesis
1393
 (Section 1, Section 8 and Section 9) were further analysed;  
3. Those cases, which illustrate how the use of social media can create un-intended 
consequences, are analysed with regard to law reports and legal commentary on 
social media libel
1394
.  
 
7.2.: Application of case laws: 
 
Under common law, there have been few leading authorities
1395
 involving cyberspace 
defamation, which has strongly affected the courts’ decisions in England (see-7.9). 
England introduced the 2013 Act, which is also applicable to social media 
communication. This application of recent case law will demonstrate that the same rules 
are applied in harmony with the constantly changing nature of communication
1396
. Libel 
proceedings are not just about reputation
1397
 so this analysis will evaluate how to strike 
a balance between one’s constitutional right of freedom of speech and else’s civil right 
of reputation. 
  
                                                          
1391
 Lawrence, B., & Chung, M., (2003),’ The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law’, 
University of San Diego, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 55. 
1392
 The cases involving social harm, meaning and jurisdiction involving provisions of the Defamation Act 
2013 always followed by a critical review by media journalists. 
1393
 The selected cases analyse the court precedents for social media libel: What issues they address; 
whether there is a need for future legislation concerning social media libel. 
1394
 Leading articles on Defamation Act 2013 are considered and a comparison of traditional press and 
social media is conducted with other common law jurisdictions. 
1395
 Gutnick, LICRA, King, eDate, Google – these cases are detailed below (see-7.4).  
1396
 Although 1952 and 1996 Defamation Acts are not repelled by 2013 Act hence it is to be seen if this 
newly developed technology demands amending common law precedents. 
1397
 As demonstrated in the New York Times vs Sullivan case 1964, freedom of speech is at stake in this 
type of litigation, which forms the morality and conduct of a society in modern communication. 
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7.3.: Service of the ‘writ’: 
 
The determination of a libel claim becomes complicated when the defendant is foreign-
based or the ‘cause of action’ initiated in a foreign state1398. Common law rules 
determine personal jurisdiction, but for EU-based defendants, only the Brussels 
regime
1399
 is applied (see-6.8.1.1). For non-EU defendants, the CPR
1400
 set out the 
framework for service of the documents outside England (see-6.9.1). It explains the 
rules, which determine whether the claim can be served with or without the court's 
permission and the procedure for effecting service (see-2.12). A claimant has four 
months to serve a claim
1401
, from the date of issue
1402
. This service will give legal notice 
to the defendant of a court's assumption of jurisdiction (see-4.5.2). It enables him to 
respond to the proceedings before the court (see-2.12.3).  
 
CPR also covers service of foreign proceedings in England (see-2.72). It allows the 
foreign-based claimants to start proceedings in England against foreign-based 
defendants
1403
(see-6.9.1.2). If a claimant requires the court’s permission to serve the 
‘claim-form’, he has to satisfy the court on three accounts1404:  
 
1. The requested issue is serious1405 and involves the foreign defendant  
2. There is a ‘good arguable case’ that the claim falls within the ‘jurisdictional-
gateways’(see-6.6) 
3. England is the appropriate forum in which, the court can exercise its discretion 
to grant service outside of the jurisdiction (see-2.17.1). 
 
  
                                                          
1398
 Michelle Foran v (1) Secret Surgery Ltd (2) Powszechny Zaklad Ubezpieczen Spolka Akcyjna (3) 
Wojciech Waclawowicz (4) Emc Instytut Medyczny Spolka Ackyjna [2016] EWHC 1029 (QB). 
1399
 If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State and there is no jurisdiction agreement in favour 
of an EU member state court, English traditional law/common law is applicable. 
1400
 CPR does not cover serving foreign proceedings in another foreign jurisdiction because it is beyond 
the sovereignty principles to dictate proceedings in other forums (see 2.61 and 6.5.1).  
1401
 Where the claim form is to be served out of the jurisdiction, it must be served within six months of 
the date of issue (CPR 7.5 (2). 
1402
 Brightside Group Ltd v RSM UK Audit LLP [2017] EWHC 6 (Comm); Baker J also explained the rules of 
actual service and the difference between r7.5 and r6.14. 
1403
 In traditional media only a tenuous was enough to invoke English jurisdiction; however, since 2013 
Act jurisdiction of English courts depends on the connection with England and gravity of harm suffered. 
1404
 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2013] EWCA Civ 785. 
1405
 The claim must have a real prospect of success. 
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7.3.1.: Service of claim pre-2013 Act: 
 
Traditionally, the claimant has to show that the claim has a serious issue and has a good 
prospect of success in England
1406
. In the Altimo
1407
 case, the judge granted permission 
because the claim had a better prospect of success in England. The above criteria were 
also applicable to ‘online defamation’ before the 2013 Act. In the CJSC1408 case, the 
court decided that a claimant could only serve a foreign defendant by CPR 6.36 (a)
1409
.   
 
The ‘jurisdictional-gateways’ are not modified in the 2013 Act. If the claim does not fall 
within these gateways, it may be rejected. In the Google [2015]
1410
 case, the court found 
that the claim for misuse of private information did not fall within the existing gateway 
for tort claims
1411
. If the court exercises jurisdiction, it can refuse to start proceedings if 
the libel issue does not fall within the identified gateways of CPR. Hence, there is a 
need for an amendment, especially for the communication concerning social media. 
 
7.3.2.: Service of claim post-2013 Act: 
 
The traditional service is based on ‘good arguable case’ and jurisdiction depends on 
‘convenient forum’ (see-6.6). The method of service has not been updated for online 
libel; however, the standard of exercising jurisdiction has been modified after the 2013 
Act. Now, the ‘good arguable case’ becomes even more significant for social 
communication because a statement can be an opinion, a compliment or a 
communication-joke
1412
.  
  
                                                          
1406
 The claimant must prove that there is a serious issue to be tried on the merits of the claim, such as a 
substantial question of fact or law or both. There must be a real as opposed to a fanciful prospect of 
success; the claim falls within one of the jurisdictional “gateways” in CPR PD 6B 3.1 and England is the 
proper place to exercise jurisdiction. 
1407
 Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgz Mobil Tel Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 1084 [71]. 
1408
 AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7. 
1409
 The Claimant may serve a claim form out of the jurisdiction with the permission of the court if any of 
the grounds set out in paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 6(b) apply. 
1410
 Vidal-Hall v Google Inc [2015] EWCA Civ 311. 
1411
  The ‘jurisdictional gateways’ relates to claims in tort where the damage was sustained within the 
jurisdiction or resulted from an act committed within the jurisdiction. If a libel triggered outside 
England, it may not apply. 
1412
 A research conducted in 2016 showed that 46% of 18- to 24-year-olds were unaware they could be 
sued for tweeting an unsubstantiated rumour about another person. Besides, online users are are not 
aware that sharing defamatory posts on social media may be regarded as an endorsement, significant 
enough to trigger legal action. 
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Since, the 2013 Act, the judges have modified their interpretations to adopt social media 
communication. Now if a communication does not fall under the jurisdictional gateway, 
the claimant has to provide solid evidence to get permission to serve outside 
England
1413
.  In the Kaefer [2017]
1414
 case, the court considered the meaning of ‘good 
arguable case’ and explained Section 9 jurisdictional standard, which must be satisfied 
to serve foreign-based defendants. The court refused to assume jurisdiction because the 
claimant did not have a sufficiently arguable case to satisfy the jurisdictional gateway 
under r6.36. In the Brownlie [2107]
1415
 case, Lord Sumption added that the claimant 
must show 'plausible evidential basis
1416
', to apply the relevant jurisdictional gateway. 
In the Zahawi [2017]
1417
 case, the court granted permission to serve a libel defendant 
based in Iran. The court established that the claimants have to convince the court that 
they have 'plausible argument' applicable to the relevant jurisdictional gateway. The 
judge must also be satisfied that the claimant has a persuasive case, relative to the 
defendant if jurisdiction is disputed (see-6.8.2.1). This test of plausibility is the 
reversion to the civil burden of proof, which is shifted towards the claimants under 
Section 9 to satisfy the court that England is the appropriate forum to hear the case. 
 
The above analysis defines a twofold test, which all claimants (both local and foreign) 
must satisfy: (1) A good arguable case that the relevant gateway has been satisfied; and 
(2) They have the better of the relevant jurisdictional argument. These conditions must 
be met even before the ‘seriousness threshold’, and ‘defamatory meaning’ is considered 
by the judge (see-7.16). If any of the tests fail, the court will surrender its jurisdiction 
even if the claimant is a British national. The purpose of Section 9 is to regulate trivial 
claims and libel tourism for foreign claimants (see-2.13.1). However, its requirements 
are extremely onerous, even where, the claimant holds property in England. It shows 
that the bar has been raised too high in respect of very serious online libels originating 
from defendants outside the jurisdiction against claimants in England
1418
.  
 
                                                          
1413
 Sime, S., (2016), ‘A Practical Approach to Civil Procedure’, (19th Ed, OUP, Oxford), pp 118. 
1414
 Kaefer Aislamientos SA de CV v AMS Drilling Mexico SA de CV [2017] EWHC 2598 (Comm). 
1415
 Brownlie v Four Seasons [2017] UKSC 80. 
1416
 The plausible evidential basis is the absolute plausibility test on the basis of the usually limited 
material available at the interlocutory stage. This is a test related to ‘good arguable case’ that if the 
defendant contests the jurisdiction the claimants must have much better argument on the material 
available. 
1417
 Zahawi v (1) Press TV (2) Press TV Limited [2017] EWHC 1010 (QB). 
1418
 Cooke v MGN [2014] EWHC 2831; Bean J noted that S1 has set a very high hurdle for the claimant to 
clear before he will be deemed to have a cause of action. If this threshold cannot be met, it certainly 
seems sensible to establish this as early as possible. 
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7.3.2.: The crossover of S9 versus CPR: 
 
Section 9 obliges the court to consider whether the claim has ‘real and substantial 
connection’, with England. This is the same test, previously applied in ‘natural forum’ 
under CPR (see-2.17.1). Interestingly, both these tests are applied today, but there is 
some overlap in their application
1419
. Under Section 9, the court should consider what is 
the ‘natural forum’ and determine whether England is “substantially connected” to 
exercise jurisdiction. The Act does not clarify at what stage Section 9 should be 
determined, but the crossover of factors with CPR suggests that it is appropriate to seek 
determination alongside permission to serve out.  
 
Interestingly, if the court is satisfied under Section 9 that it has jurisdiction, the CPR 
allows the defendant to challenge the jurisdiction on ‘forum non-conveniens’ or the 
method of service (see-2.11.6). In the Romanova [2015]
1420
 case, the claimant sought 
the permission to serve the proceedings for defamation in Moscow. The court decided 
to exercise jurisdiction under Section 9. The defendant, having acknowledged the 
service, applied for declarations that valid service had not taken place under CPR r3.6, 
so that England was not the proper place to exercise jurisdiction. The court had to 
decline jurisdiction based on ‘service of writ’ issue.  
 
This crossover may present a hurdle to delivering justice because under Section 9 if 
England is shown to be the appropriate forum, then the court must assume jurisdiction.  
Whereas if a proper method of service under CPR r6.36 is not followed, the court’s 
jurisdiction will be considered void. For instance, if a claimant is domiciled in England, 
under traditional laws, English courts will view that England is an appropriate forum to 
bring the action
1421
. CPR allows an English domiciled claimant to invoke English 
jurisdiction (see-6.4.2). Whereas, under Section 9, a claim may only succeed in 
England, if harm has been done in England (see-2.13.1). It can be onerous for British 
claimants, who are temporarily domiciled in another country. This is even more difficult 
when the publication is online and in hardbound. In print publication, even the publisher 
                                                          
1419
 Section 9 is applied for claimants who seek service out of jurisdiction, whereas forum conveniens is 
available for the foreign defendants to challenge the English court’s jurisdiction (see-2.17.1). 
1420
 Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 545 (QB). 
1421
 Schapira v Ahronson [1999] E.M.L.R. 735. 
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may not know to whom the publisher has sold copies
1422
 because hard copies may be 
resold and circulated abroad by a domestic wholesaler.   
 
This theme raises this point that British nationals, who spend much of their working 
lives abroad, will be classed as foreign residents (see-4.6). However, they enjoy 
reputations in one or more countries abroad as significant as their reputations in 
England. There are many such people in business, finance, government, academic life, 
media and entertainment, sport and no doubt other fields of activity. In the Ames 
[2015]
1423
 case, the court stated that there are differences amongst claimants; those 
whose reputation is mainly in England, and those wishing to sue foreign publishers in 
England.  
 
This theme also argues that it should not be part of the function of the court to analyse 
whether an action is 'properly brought' against the defendant outside the jurisdiction. 
The method of service of ‘writ’ should not be a deciding factor to arrive at a conclusion 
as to whether the claimant can pursue a claim against the defendant. It should be enough 
if the claimant can satisfy the court that there is a real issue between the victim and the 
publisher. 
 
7.4.: Alternative methods of service:  
 
The social media communication differs from print media, so the question arises, ‘are 
judges willing to adopt alternative methods of service for social media claims?’ 
Especially, when ordinary methods of service have taken years
1424
 or if traditional 
methods of delivery are not suitable
1425
. The Abela [2013]
 1426
 case acknowledged that if 
the defendant is based in a country where there is no convention or treaty in place, 
service can be complicated and lengthy. Hence, an alternative method becomes 
essential, if the limitation period is about to expire, or the judgment of injunction needs 
to be enforced overseas.  
 
                                                          
1422
 AK Investment CJSC v Kyrgyz Mobil Tel Ltd (Isle of Man) (Rev 2) [2011] UKPC 7; as per Lord Collins. 
1423
 Ames v Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 3409 paras [44]-[47]. 
1424
 Service through foreign governments and British consular authorities for example can take many 
months. 
1425
 The Foreign Process Office at the Royal Courts of Justice estimates that the time for service of a 
claim form in the United Arab Emirates is approximately 8 months. 
1426
 Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44. 
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Service outside of England must follow international standards. CPR r6.40 states that 
the service of judicial documents abroad must follow:  
 
1. The bilateral treaty of the relevant forum 
2. Multilateral conventions 
3. The local laws of the receiving country 
 
The Romanova [2015]
1427
 case highlighted the importance of r6.40 because the 
defendant objected that the claimant did not follow the procedural method of service. 
The court rejected its jurisdiction despite the Section 9 threshold being satisfied. 
However, CPR r6.15 (1) is more relevant for online libel because it empowers judges to 
use their discretion to allow the service of writ using alternative methods. The 
Bayat
1428
 case confirmed this principle, where judge used this discretion to make an 
order for alternative service. It allowed the service of documents by email to US and 
Afghan defendants. Interestingly, the electronic method of service is not a permissible 
method under the US
1429
 or Afghan
1430
 local laws, or under the Hague Convention. 
Similar decisions in the cases of Bacon
1431
 and Ablyazon
1432
 established that the courts 
might make such order with retrospective effect by CPR
1433
 r6.15 (2).  
 
7.4.1.: Have judges altered the method since 2013?  
 
Post-2013 Act, the judges have used discretion for online libel disputes. The Brett 
[2014]
1434
 case established that the service of notice of the change by email was valid. 
In the Olsen [2016]
1435
 case, the court allowed the victim to serve notice of the 
application to the ‘unknown defendants’ by way of messages to their Facebook 
accounts
1436
. In the Clarkson [2018]
1437
 case, Justice Teare asked the claimant to serve 
                                                          
1427
 Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 545 (QB). 
1428
 Bayat Telephone Systems International Inc and others v Lord Cecil and others [2011] EWCA Civ 135. 
1429
 If the defendant is based in the US, US domestic does not validate a service of court document via 
email. 
1430
 England does not have any ‘service treaty’ with Afghanistan i.e. the rules of Hague Convention for 
service out of jurisdiction must be followed. 
1431
 Bacon v Automatic Inc and others [2011] EWHC 1072 (QB). 
1432
 JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov and others [2011] EWHC 2988 (Comm). 
1433
 Abela and others v Baadarani [2011] EWCA Civ 1571. 
1434
 Brett v Colchester Hospital University NHS Foundation Trust [2014] EWHC B17.  
1435
 Olsen v Facebook Inc [2016] NSSC 155; the victims request court for an order requiring Facebook to 
disclose information to assist in identifying the three anonymous authors of the comments. 
1436
 The judge order Facebook to disclose information of anonymous defendant by reasoning that 
Internet anonymity could not be used to avoid liability for defamatory comments. 
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the injunction to the defendant via his email. Justice Nicklin
1438
 also made a similar 
order to use electronic means to serve the defendant in the PML [2018] case.  
 
On the other hand, r6.15 states that the court can only use its discretion to allow 
‘alternative method of service’ if it is reasonable to do so and the claimant follows the 
pre-action protocols (see-5.9.1.1). In the Angela [2016]
1439
 case, the claimant sent the 
service via an email because the 1 year limitation period was about to expire. The judge 
considered it an abuse of the process because the claimant failed to follow standard 
procedure. On the other hand, in the Zed [2018]
1440
 case, the judge allowed the claimant 
to serve the notice of injunction via a text message because the claimant followed the 
pre-action protocol and the claim would probably succeed at hearing trial. 
 
7.4.2.: The basis for using alternative methods:  
 
The most relevant basis for using alternative service are: 
 
1. The Defendant is anonymous: The above cases prove that English judges have 
shown willingness and innovation under CPR 6.37(5)(b)(1). It is a significant 
step forward for social media libel, which may eradicate the issue of anonymity 
in online libel claims. In the Marashen [2017]1441 case, the court considered the 
power to serve proceedings by an alternative method for a defendant outside the 
jurisdiction. However, this case established that this discretion must be by the 
Hague Convention. After Brexit in 2019, English judges will have more liberty 
to use such discretion1442. Besides, Article 1 states that it will not apply if the 
address of the defendant is not known. So, for anonymous defendants, English 
courts can allow the claimants to serve the claim form to the High Commission 
of the country, where the defendant’s IP address can be located. This would 
mean the Embassy of the relevant country may also take part in tracing and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1437
 Clarkson v Person Unknown [2018] EWHC 417; Warby J granted an injunction in a default judgment 
in the absence of the defendant.   
1438
 PML v Person(s) Unknown [2018] EWHC 838 (QB). 
1439
 Anglia Research Ltd v Finders Genealogists Ltd [2016] EWHC 297 (QB). 
1440
 NPV v QEL & ZED [2018] EWHC 703; the terms of the order made by Nicklin J, required ZED to 
disclose his identity and address for service.  These are fairly typical requirements in cases where the 
threat to publish is being made by someone who is hiding behind anonymity. 
1441
 Marashen Ltd v Kenvett Ltd [2017] EWHC 1706.  
1442
 Wherever possible, however, it will still be preferable to serve in accordance with the usual service 
provisions in CPR 6.40, which include service by a method permitted under the law of the country of 
service. 
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bringing the defendant to justice (see-9.3.1). The global use of this method will 
allow every state to come to a collective/common/multilateral/joint/universal 
agreement regarding ‘anonymous-defendants’. It may cause them to at least to 
strengthen their laws concerning social media publications.      
 
2. The defendant is un-known: Judges can also allow alternative service 
processes, where the defendant is unknown and the claimant has taken 
reasonable steps using traditional service (see-7.6). The courts have allowed 
service of legal documents through electronic means, including Facebook, 
Twitter and Linkedin1443. In the Jackson [2017]1444 case, the claimant could not 
find an address for service. The judge permitted service by electronic means. In 
the Zahawi case, the court ordered alternative service by courier and email. 
Similarly, in the Reid [2016]1445 case, where the defendants left defamatory 
statements on his Facebook wall, the court adjourned the preliminary hearing 
and ordered the claimant to serve a notice via email and Facebook.  
 
7.4.4.: Is a modification required? 
 
The 2013 Act does not differentiate between British claimants and the foreign 
claimants. There is no automatic jurisdiction over British nationals in England unless 
the harm is suffered in England (see-7.3). A British claimant also faces the same hurdles 
as a foreign claimant, who may be ‘forum shopping’. It adds more expense and 
complexity at the outset for domestic claimants because they have to overcome the 
problem of service of writ. With a more lenient approach regarding service of claim 
forms, the traditional rules can efficiently be applied to social media libel claims. There 
is a need for a statutory modification to the method of service to make it suitable for 
digital communication. In a social media context, the alternative method of service is 
critical because it may be difficult to find the address of the defendant. Service via 
online means may be the most suitable, cheapest and fastest for the victims. Justice 
                                                          
1443
 Rushton, K., (2012), ‘Legal claims can be served via Facebook, High Court judge rules’, Media, 
telecoms and technology editor, The Telegraph; Knott v Sutherland [2009] Alta.Q.B.M.; Axe Market 
Gardens v Craig [2008] Axe CIV 485-2676. 
1444
 Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB). 
1445
 Reid v Dukic [2016] ACTSC 344. 
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Warby
1446
 also acknowledged that service of writ via the website is sufficient to deem 
proper service.  
 
This theme acknowledges ‘alternative service r6.15’, is available for the claimant but 
only after an initial attempt of ordinary service. The claimant has to attach the evidence 
to obtain a decision on the alternative method, which can be lengthy and frustrating for 
an individual whose reputation is in jeopardy. This theme recommends amending this 
rule to allow service via social media and other electronic means. Besides in the NPV 
[2018]
1447
 case, the court allowed the service of an injunction by text message, which 
reinforces the idea proposed in this theme. Hence, service via electronic means should 
be given statutory authenticity, and the relevant CPR rules updated accordingly. 
 
7.5.: Application of traditional jurisdictional rules:  
 
There has been an increase in the number of libel claims  because of social media(see 
Appendix-1), which involves communication technology via mobile-phone messaging 
and online forums
1448
. Social media also acts as a news-server; allowing users to post 
their criticisms of official, local and government policies
1449
, sharing information 
quickly and inexpensively with the online community
1450
 (see-2.2). The users cannot be 
classed as journalists/authors because they are untrained and potentially oblivious to the 
dangers of defamation claims, whereas journalists obtain the necessary training and 
publish only authentic news
1451
. Traditional media is institutionalised and relies heavily 
on legal advice (see-2.10); however the same laws apply to social media users
1452
. In 
social communication, people may make a mistake or share others’ ideas via a 
                                                          
1446
 Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB); the claimant, however, will have to follow the pre 
action protocol for libel to request the court to exercise its discretion under r3.7. 
1447
 NPV v QEL & ZED [2018] EWHC 703 (QB); this case involves claims for misuse of private information 
and reveals the innovation adopted by English courts in regards to online communication. 
1448
 Angelotti, E. M., (2013), ‘Twibel Law: What Defamation and Its Remedies Look like in the Age of 
Twitter’, High Technology Law Journal, Vol 13, pp 430. 
1449
 Libel on social media is a commonplace because when the online community is outraged by some 
event, social media users flood the Internet with hateful and false comments about the alleged 
perpetrator, feeling empowered by their numbers and anonymity. 
1450
 Batza, C., (2017), ‘Trending now: The role of defamation law in remedying harm from social media 
backlash’, Pepperdine Law Review, Vol  44, Issue 2, pp 429-476. 
1451
 Roberts, H., (1996), ‘Can the Internet be regulated?’, Research paper35; 
https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/r
p/RP9596/96rp35 [Assessed 4
th
 April 2018]. 
1452
 Walsh v Latham [2014] SCV 251041, WL 618995; online communication does not justify the 
application of a different defamation framework. 
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webpage
1453
 but using traditional rules; they will be held liable
1454
. Justice Courtney
1455
 
established that people could be sued for their defamatory comments or those, which 
they allow others to make on their social media pages. 
 
7.5.1.: Can traditional rules be applied to online libel?  
 
Traditional English law is a combination of common law
1456
 and statutes
1457
; however, 
no common law
1458
 exists for social media abuse/offences. Courts have to implement 
existing laws to apply to online communication
1459
. Judges have used traditional 
principles to regulate online defamation
1460
, which at times, raised the issue of certainty 
and harmony. There are few areas of online libel which have confused other common 
law authorities as well:  
 
In the Gayle [2017]
1461
 case, the Australian judge struggled to determine whether 
the actual malice standard required for online defamation of celebrities was 
applicable. It has led to online defamation suits being brought by public-figures 
to the defence-friendly
1462
 forums
1463
.  
 
                                                          
1453
 As per Kirby J in Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
1454
 There is no mechanism to identify at which stage the shared comments become defamatory 
because once a defendant is warned that the comments are defamatory and he remove it, the damage 
might still have done. 
1455
 Wishart v Murray [2015] NZHC 3363; the publisher is liable for direct, vicarious, incitement-of-
defamation and endorsement/adoption as separate causes of action for social media publication. 
1456
 The case law in which publicly decided cases (whether interpreting statutes or building on previous 
case law) form part of a body of law, known as the common law. 
1457
 The 2013 Act did not repel previous Acts hence the precedents of common law can still be applied 
today . 
1458
 Judges decide what the law is when there is no other authoritative statement of the law. A decision 
of an appellate court binds future decisions of the same appellate court on similar facts, and binds all 
lower courts reviewed by that appellate court until there is another authoritative statement of the law 
(by the legislature or a higher court), known as the doctrine of precedent. 
1459
 Ave Point v Power Tools [2013] 981 W. D. Va. 496; Zitter, J., (2000), ‘Annotation, Liability of Internet 
Service Provider for Internet or E-mail Defamation, A.L.R., Vol 5, Issue 84, pp 169. 
1460
 Elkin, J., (2000), ‘Cyber-smears: Dealing with Defamation on the Net, BUS. L. TODAY, Vol 9, pp 22; 
the courts have held that the laws of defamation undoubtedly apply to false statements made over the 
Internet. 
1461
 Chris Gayle v Fairfax Media [2017] NSW SC; Justice Lucy McCallum found malice on the part of Firfox 
and in the absence of any defence decided that the articles were published for an improper purpose. 
1462
 Cippettini, V., (2009), ‘Modern Difficulties in Resolving Old Problems: Does The Actual Malice 
Standard Apply to Celebrity Gossip Blogs’, Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L., Vol 19, pp 221.  
1463
 It is easier for US-based celebrities to sue for defamation in the English courts because in the UK 
actual malice is not a requirement. Many public figures including Tom Cruise, Kate Hudson, Britney 
spears, are among the stars who have successfully pursued claims in the UK; Sweat & Maxwell (2006), 
https://www.sweetandmaxwell.co.uk/about-us/press-releases/270706.pdf [Assessed 18
th
 May 2018].  
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1. In the Trump [2017]1464 case, the US judge concluded that the tweets amounted 
to 'non-actionable opinion' even though the harm to reputation was severe. On 
the other hand, unintentional harm caused via social media publications is an 
actionable libel (see-7.15). It also demonstrates political influence because if an 
ordinary user has published 'opinions', it could be actionable because it caused 
harm (see-7.16).  
 
2. The New Zealand courts are still struggling to choose between the ‘single versus 
multiple’ rule and when a hyperlink gives rise to liability1465.  
 
3. In the Sioux1466 case, the judge pronounced that the basic conventional rules are 
ill-suited for resolving modern communication issues. 
 
4. In a landmark Swiss court ruling in 2017, the judge fined a Facebook user who 
'liked' a post which accused an animal rights activist of being anti-Semitic and 
racist
1467.  It is arguable that by just ‘liking’ a post, a user may become a 
publisher (see-7.18) whereas Google, being a content provider, is immune from 
liability due to a lack of editorial control (see-7.8).  
 
In common law, those with control over or who facilitate or consent to a publication 
become liable for contributing to publication (see-2.11). That is why editors, newspaper 
proprietors and printers have been traditionally held as primary publishers alongside 
journalists (see-5.9.1.5). The question arises ‘do social media users enjoy the same 
editorial controls
1468?’ There is a recent precedent that: ‘When a search is carried out via 
Google, the human input from the content provider is zero’ (see-7.18). Following this 
precedent, when a user likes a comment he does not add anything but likes or shares it 
so he must be immune in the same way as service provider. Blue J
1469
 also held ‘that a 
                                                          
1464
 Jacobus v Trump [2017] No. 153252/16, WL 160316. 
1465
 Wishart v Murray [2015] NZHC 3363. 
1466
 Sioux Transportation v XPO Logistics [2015] W.D. Ark. 20 No. 5; the publishers of online messages 
can be held accountable for them in that very traditional physical place known as a courthouse: The 
transmission of computer files over the internet is no longer an accurate measurement of a website's 
contact to a forum state. 
1467
 Hall, M., (2017), ‘Swiss court convicts man for ‘liking’ defamatory Facebook post in landmark ruling’, 
available online https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/30/swiss-court-convicts-man-liking-
defamatory-facebook-post-landmark/ [Assessed 16
th
 July 2018]. 
1468
 Eady J in Google v Trkulja [2016] [2016] VSCA 333; emphasised that Google had lack of control over 
the entered terms . 
1469
 Duffy v Google [2015] SASC 170. 
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defendant can only ever be a publisher if the defendant authorises or accepts 
responsibility for the publication’. This theme submits that there is a need to modify the 
basic principles for the issues of ‘likes’, ‘shares’ or ‘emojis’ because if the courts want  
to prosecute people for 'likes' on social media
1470
, England may need to triple the 
number of judges for cyberspace claims
1471
.  
 
7.5.2.: Should traditional rules be applied to social media?  
 
The above shows that libel is a ‘grey area’ in various jurisdictions and raises the 
argument of whether the traditional methods are suitable for modern communication. 
On the other hand, traditional principles are stretching its comprehensive view of the 
‘cause of action’ to digital contexts (privacy, character assassination, data breach). Over 
time, this may be seen to relate less clearly to the protection of reputation as 
traditionally understood, and more to statutory data protection with its conceptual roots 
lying closer to privacy law
1472
. The argument is, if the cause of action, which is more 
confusing than jurisdiction, can be applied to online libel than other principles can also 
be applied. There exists inconsistency in English court’s decisions post-2013 Act (see-
7.7, 7.13) but they have managed to cope with the latest technology by using traditional 
laws. In the Hadford
1473
 case, the issue was raised that as there has been no change in 
defamation law, it applies to both print and online media. The law must distinguish 
between defamatory comments made online or in print: Both are equally unlawful
1474
.  
 
The above case laws show that the judges take regulating online speech very serious 
because they are willing to take on board complaints about (casual) social media posts 
(see-7.5.1). There is a mistaken belief that traditional rules are not applicable to social 
media and the users can publish whatever they want, considering themselves to have 
                                                          
1470
 Practically everything is a publication – because it gives rise to a cause of action. Therefore,  a tweet 
or indeed a re-tweet or share on Facebook can technically be covered by the traditional principles of 
defamation. 
1471
 Goldman, E., (2018), ‘Emoji’s and the Law’, Santa Clara University, Legal Studies Research Paper, Vol 
8, issue 17, pp 58. 
1472
 Erdos, D., (2014), ‘Data protection and the right to reputation: Filling the ‘gaps’ after the Defamation 
Act 2013’, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol  73, pp 536 – 569. 
1473
 Hadford & Folwer v Rolling Stone [2017] 16-2465 (2d Cir.). 
1474
 Jackson, A., (2009), ‘Cyberspace…The Final Frontier: How the Communications Decency Act Allows 
Entrepreneurs to Boldly Go Where No Blog Has Gone Before’, Oklahoma Journal of Law and Technology, 
Vol 5, Issue 1, Article 4. 
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impunity
1475
 (see-2.10.2). The court ratified this ‘misconception’ in the Rayney 
[2017]
1476
 case. Judge John awarded maximum damages and warned that people who 
post messages on social media sites should be very careful. Similarly, the Pritchard 
[2016]
1477
 case, sets a new standard for Facebook users who publish comments made by 
others or who post comments that then attract a defamatory response. If the liability is 
extended to the friends/followers of the users, it can have significant repercussions 
concerning the uneasy balance between the right to reputation and freedom of 
expression. This theme demonstrates that the balance is tipping in favour of reputation 
and departing from the concept of freedom of speech. It is yet to be established that to 
what extent this traditional concept of freedom of speech based on a jurisdictional world 
can be applied to a digital world with no boundaries. It may not be possible to apply the 
traditional approach regarding freedom of speech to social media communication unless 
the concept of jurisdictional libel is harmonised or modified for cyberspace (see-7.21).   
 
7.5.3.: Is an amendment required? 
 
Judge Gibson
1478
 gave the reason the law has failed to adapt to social-technological 
communication because there is no time limit on suing for online publication. 
Previously, the limitation period re-started if the content was re-published
1479
. A 12-
month limit applies to print publications (see-2.11.6); however, Section 8 simplified this 
issue with the single publication rule (see-2.11.3, 7.13). This theme agrees with the 
judgment in the Murphy [2017] 
1480
 case, that online libel must be distinguished from 
traditional media because of its potential to damage the reputation of individuals and 
corporations
1481
, its interactive nature, its potential to be taken at face value, and its 
                                                          
1475
 Phelan, D., (2016), ‘Facebook case shows social media has same legal risks as print’; online Url: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/facebook-case-shows-social-media-has-same-legal-
risks-as-print-1.2689615 [Assessed 4
th
 April 2018]. 
1476
 Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No9] [2017] WASC 367. 
1477
 Pritchard v Van Nes [2016] BCSC 686; Justice Saunders extended the liability of individuals not only 
for their Facebook posts, but how their friends react to these posts, whether through comments, 
sharing or otherwise distributing the post. 
1478
 Whitbourn, M., (2018), ‘NSW to review defamation laws as social media claims soar’; available 
online https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/defamation-laws-social-media-rebel-wilson-nsw-
20180321-p4z5e4.html [Assessed 4
th
 March 2018]. 
1479
 Dods v McDonald (No 2) [2016] VSC 201. 
1480
 McNairn v Murphy [2017] ONSC 1678. 
1481
 Zall v Zall [2016] BCSC 1730;  the court found that the nature and reach of a website compounded 
the damage done more than a personal blog or website. 
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absolute and immediate worldwide ubiquity, anonymity
1482
 and accessibility (see-
2.5.1.2).  
 
Nevertheless, the above does not prove that traditional laws cannot be applied to social 
media, although some modification is required in the application of traditional laws to 
social media libel case laws. For instance, to control the massive cost of starting libel 
proceedings (see-7.11), the claimants should be allowed to start proceedings in the 
Magistrates Court, which is cheaper, easier to access and can determine preliminary 
issues quickly. Such innovation in traditional laws will help victims to vindicate their 
position in society because it is not just about compensation but protecting their 
reputation by removing ‘alleged material’ and preventing republication.  
 
7.6.: Proceeding in the absence of the defendant:  
 
The courts are unable to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign-based defendant
1483
 if he is 
physically not present in England (see-2.3.1, 6.9). This problem is propagated by online 
communication because the defendant can be an anonymous user or hidden in the dark- 
web
1484
. Anonymity is a big challenge because chat rooms, message boards and 
websites like Facebook and Twitter
1485
 do not require users to provide their real names, 
which can make finding someone a real challenge (see-2.10.2). These sites do not make 
its user information available to protect their privacy
1486
. It creates a cyclical problem 
because anonymous users think they are protected (see-5.9.3). They write whatever they 
want and continue to defame
1487
 thinking that they are anonymous (see-2.10, 7.4). So 
what happens when a victim cannot locate the defamer, or the defendant refuses to 
respond?  
 
  
                                                          
1482
 Olsen v Facebook  [2016] NSSC 155; Justice Michael Wood decided that anonymity is not available in 
print media. It is another social media feature which demands modification in existing defamation laws. 
1483
 Collins, (1972), ‘Some Aspects of Service out of the Jurisdiction in English Law’ 7LA,ICLQ, Vol  21, 
Issue 4, pp 656-681. 
1484
 Section 5 allows the claimant to bring an action against ISPs; however, it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
1485
 Social media sites, group forums, and message boards do not require a user to input their actual 
name. 
1486
 Delfi AS v Estonia [2015] ECtHR 64669/09. 
1487
 Phelan, D., (2016), ‘Facebook case shows social media has same legal risks as print’; online Url: 
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/facebook-case-shows-social-media-has-same-legal-
risks-as-print-1.2689615 [Assessed 4
th
 April 2018]. 
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7.6.1.: Decisions for anonymous defendants:  
 
The courts have the power to give default judgment
1488
 if the defendant is not present 
(CPR r12.3) or he decides not to attend, despite a ‘proper notice’ being served1489 (CPR  
r12.4). The judge has to make the following considerations where one of the defendants 
is un-known
1490
: 
 
7.6.1.1: The issues the court considers:  
 
1. Can the claimant proceed against a person unknown 
2. Can the matter be processed in the absence of the defendant (or second 
defendant) 
3. Can a judgment be entered 
4. Should an award of damages be made 
5. Should an injunction be granted 
 
7.6.1.2.: Alternatives: 
 
In social media communication, it is imperative that content/blog/statement/post can be 
created, shared, authored or re-posted by a user who is not easily identifiable (see-
2.10.2). The extremely lax verification and regulatory mechanisms utilised by user-
generated content platforms and darknet anonymous services help preserve anonymity 
(see-2.10.4). There are following alternatives available for a claimant: 
 
1. Norwich Pharmacal Order (see-5.9.3.1) 
2. John Doe action (see-5.9.3.2) 
 
                                                          
1488
 CPR r12.1 defines ‘default judgment’ as a judgment without trial where a defendant (a) has failed to 
file an acknowledgment of service; or (b) has failed to file a defence. 
1489
 Section 8 of the 1996 Act enables a claimant to seek judgment and summary; the case of Smith v 
unknown defendants [2016] EWHC 1775 is a useful reminder for the claimants that they can use S8 of 
the 1996 Act to seek the removal of defamatory online statements even when defendant is anonymous 
or un-identified. 
1490
 North Warwickshire Borough Council v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 1603; Judge Worster granted 
an injunction in the absent of the defendant and decide the case against ‘person unknown’. 
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If the claimants rely on any of the above orders, litigation becomes infinitely time-
consuming and expensive because the court has to take statutory steps to first identify 
the un-known defendant and confirm their identity.  
 
7.6.1.3.: The availability of relief:  
 
CPR rules and Section 8 of the Defamation Act 1996 allows a court to enter into a 
default judgment against an unknown defendant. In the case of Smith [2016] and Wilson 
[2015] the court proceeded against unknown defendants (see-7.6.3). The decisions 
against unknown-persons have been acknowledged for a considerable period
1491
. 
Moreover, every social media libel case will have unique merits and circumstances. 
Regardless, a defendant is unknown, the merits of a case must still be proven. If the 
judge finds that the claim is dubious or defences are obvious, he may not grant any 
relief.  
 
Justice Warby
1492
 stated that the person unknown must be described in the claim. He 
can be identified by the description with sufficient certainty (see-5.9.1.2). He concluded 
that the court had jurisdiction to grant interim relief and final relief against persons 
unknown, including a summary judgment basis under CPR r24.2
1493
. The relevant 
procedural safeguards must be respected; and the unknown defendants must be duly 
served and informed about any application for interim or final relief
1494
.  
 
In the Jones [2018]
1495
 case, the judge granted an injunction because the defendant did 
not appear and he was not represented. The court judged the steps taken by the claimant 
to serve the defendant and decided the case. Once the court provides a summary 
judgment in the absence of the defendant, he will not be able to challenge the court’s 
                                                          
1491
 Bloomsbury Publishing Group Plc v News Group Newspapers Limited [2003] 1 WLR 1633. 
1492
 Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2015] EWHC 2628; Warby J commented that the summary 
disposal procedure under DA 1996, S8 and S9 has been little used to date. It is most suitable mechanism 
for online communication cases where a final injunction is needed as promptly and cost-effectively as 
possible. 
1493
 Fox v Graham Group Ltd [2001] CHD 26; where a party fails to appear at the hearing of an 
application the court may precede in their absence. Neuberger J stated that CPR 23.11 grants a power 
that must be exercised in accordance with the overriding objective. 
1494
 Smith Kline Beecham v GSKline Ltd [2011] EWHC 169; Justice Arnold stated that if the defendant has 
sought an adjournment, default judgment cannot be granted. 
1495
 Jerome Jones v Birmingham City Council [2018] EWCA Civ 1189; Lord Justice Irwin rejected the 
arguments of Art 6 – right to free trial and gave a default judgment in absence of defendant. 
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jurisdiction
1496
.  Additionally, the court can order the service providers to reveal the 
defendant’s identity (see-5.9.3); however, it may not be possible where the defendant is 
using the dark web or has changed his IP address by using a VPN service (see-2.4.2), or 
the data is transferred to other jurisdiction (see-2.3.2). 
 
7.6.2.: Judge’s discretion in social media libel:  
 
The 2013 Act does not make any provisions for identifying anonymous internet users. 
However, English judges have used traditional powers to proceed in the absence of the 
defendants. Interestingly, Section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998 prohibits a court 
from granting relief which infringes a defendant’s freedom of expression if he is neither 
present nor represented (see-6.8, 7.19.1). Then again, CPR allows the courts to use its 
discretion if the claimant has taken all practicable steps to notify the defendant
1497
 (see-
7.6.1). In the Novartis [2014]
1498
 case, it was held that the court must exercise 
considerable caution before concluding that it is appropriate to proceed in the absence 
of a litigant. In the Sloutsker [2015]
1499
 case, the court noted that CPR r12 grants 
discretion to provide default judgment, but a judge should only exercise it if compatible 
with the overriding objective. Equivalently, in the presence of any compelling reasons 
the court can use its discretion. In the Middleton [2016]
1500
 case, the court found the 
compelling reason that the defendant was in possession of the claimant’s iCloud 
account containing private photographs. 
 
The court in the Jackson [2017]
1501
 case reinforced this criterion: (1) The applicant has 
taken all reasonable steps to notify the respondent or (2) there are compelling reasons 
that the respondent should not be reported. In the Smith [2016]
1502
 case, the defendant 
refused to attend the hearing. The claimant requested a default judgment in the 
                                                          
1496
 Robins v Kordowski [2011] EWHC 1912 (QB); Tugendhat J held that the jurisdiction to grant final 
judgment is available if the court entered default judgment for damages to be assessed and on a 
summary basis. 
1497
 This discretion under CPR is in itself problematic because if the respondent’s identity is unknown, 
what reasonable steps a claimant can take to serve to the respondent. 
1498
 Novartis Pharmaceuticals UK Ltd v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2014] EWHC 3429 (QB). 
1499
 Sloutsker v Romanova [2015] EWHC 545 (QB).   
1500
 (1) Pippa Middleton (2) James Matthews v Persons Unknown [2016] EWHC 2354 (QB); the court 
granted an injunction against unknown defendant because the claimants iCloud account data was 
hacked – it becomes a serious issue to be tried. 
1501
 Pirtek (UK) Ltd v Jackson [2017] EWHC 2834 (QB). 
1502
 Smith v Unknown Defendants [2016] EWHC 1775 (QB). 
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defendant’s absence because the seriousness criterion was satisfied. Justice Green 
established that in the absence of the defendant the judge must be satisfied that:  
 
1. The defendant had received proper notice of the hearing and the matters to be 
considered at the trial 
2. The available evidence as to the reasons for the litigant’s non-appearance, 
supplied a reason for adjourning the hearing 
 
The judge can also give default judgment if the defendant fails to file a notice of 
defence (r12.1). In the Conquest [2015]
 1503
 case, the court entered into default judgment 
because the defendant did not intend to defend the Twitter libel claim. In the 
Reid [2016]
1504
 case, the defendant expressly refused to take part in the proceedings so 
Mossop J, trialled the claim in his absence. The judge used this discretion in the Wilson 
[2016]
1505
 case because the defendant failed to appear without giving a reason. This is 
an important decision because in social media libel it may be evident that one or two 
defendants may be hidden or choose not to attend the hearing. If the defendant is unfit 
and unable to participate, a written explanation of medical reason/GP note may be 
enough to adjourn the hearing
1506
 (see-2.12.3). 
 
The decision in the Smith [2016]
1507
 case has opened the door to unlock potential 
anonymity in online defamation. In this case, the unknown defendant had responded to 
pre-action documents online before the first hearing but was absent to protect his 
identity. The judge awarded a default judgment, as he was satisfied that the court had 
jurisdiction to rule on the case. It may be a welcome judgment for content providers, 
who may become hosts to defamatory material (see-2.10.4).  
 
7.6.3.: Should judges proceed for anonymous defendants? 
 
The right to 'fair trial' is central to the British justice system (see-6.5.1). It is the 
constitutional right of an individual to be present at their trial hearing (see-6.8). Section 
                                                          
1503
 Bertwistle v Conquest [2015] QDC 133. 
1504
 Reid v Dukic [2016] ACTSC 344. 
1505
 Brett Wilson LLP v Persons Unknown [2016] EMLR 2 [14]-[16]. 
1506
 Smith v Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [2017] EWHC 3622 (Admin). 
1507
 Smith v Unknown Defendant, Pseudonym 'Likeicare' & Ors [2016] EWHC 1775 (QB). 
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12 (2)
1508
  prohibits the court from using CPR discretion unless the respondent is 
present or represented
1509
. This theme raises the question that if the claim is for an 
injunction to stop defamatory material from further publication, it may not affect a 
defendant’s statuary rights to be processed in his absence. Besides, the defendants have 
the right to challenge the court's decision by jurisdiction and forum conveniens (see-
6.8.2.1). This means the claimant should be given the right to request default judgment 
because his reputation has been harmed. If an injunction is not granted, defamatory 
content can be published and republished, which can further damage the victim’s 
reputation. Also, if the defendant is not physically present or holds no property in 
England, he may choose to ignore court orders. The massive costs and complexities in 
starting proceedings against a foreign publisher mean that the defendant must be 
discouraged from wasting the court’s time.  
 
This theme also recommends modification in the libel laws. The claimants should be 
allowed to request the court to stop the publication of alleged material before the start of 
the preliminary hearing. It can be simplified by making an online judiciary for social 
media, where the claimants can request an initial assessment of alleged contents. The 
claimants would not have to take traditional preliminary action and could simply initiate 
a process via social media where their reputation is being harmed. These online units 
can make the initial assessment of the issue and then forward the case to the appropriate 
court for further hearing. This will save the cost of bringing proceedings and may also 
save valuable court time in satisfying the requirements of jurisdiction and pre-action 
protocol issues.  
 
7.7.: Jurisdiction under S9:  
 
The 2013 Act brought many internet-friendly reforms in the law
1510
. The most 
conflicting change relates to Section 9 because it raised the bar for claimants concerning 
                                                          
1508
 If a default judgment granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of 
expression. 
1509
 Interestingly, even if a defendant fails to show up to defend the case, the merits of a case must still 
be proven. If judge finds that the claim is dubious or defences are obvious, he may not grant any relief. 
1510
 Delfi v Estonia [2015] ECHR 586; Section 5 provides immunity to secondary publishers of defamatory 
statements, including content hosts and service providers. 
 292 
 
jurisdiction
1511
. In deciding appropriate jurisdiction in online libel, along with Spiliada-
principles
1512
, the court has to consider (see-4.7):  
 
1. The extent of the claimant's reputation in England 
2. The extent of publication in England compared to publication abroad 
3. The location of the parties and witnesses  
 
Michael Tugendhat
1513
 noted that Section 9 made no reference to different categories of 
the claimant or to any specific link to England that a claimant might have or lack. It 
applied as much to a claimant who had never resided in England as to one who was 
resident or domiciled there
1514
. In the Huda [2017]
1515
 case, the judge noted that, where 
it applies, the effect of Section 9 is to subtly change the test for libel claims.  
 
7.7.1.: The purpose of S9:  
 
The English parliament declared
1516
 that Section 9 is designed to address 'libel tourism'. 
It relates to the courts readily accepting jurisdiction merely because a claimant frames 
his claim to focus on damage sustained in England (see-2.17). There may be situations 
in which claims against non-EU domiciled defendants arising out of their foreign 
publications will go ahead in the English courts, even under Section 9. This mainly 
occurs where an international publication was principally produced or distributed in 
England as well as in other jurisdictions.  
 
Claims in defamation may essentially be brought against non-EU defendants by their 
presence in the territory (either physical presence of an individual or a fixed place of 
business for corporations)
1517
 or on the basis that the tort occurred in England. For 
jurisdictional purposes, this might again mean either the defamatory material being 
                                                          
1511
 Collins, M., (2014), ‘The Law of Defamation and the Internet’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford Uni press, UK), paras 
25.51 to 25.89. 
1512
 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] A.C. 460. 
1513
 Ahuja v Politika Novine I Magazini D.O.O. [2015] EWHC 3380 (QB). 
1514
 The effect of Section 9 is to oblige the court to consider all the jurisdictions where the defamatory 
statement had been published. To determine whether the domestic jurisdiction was clearly the most 
appropriate place in which to bring the action. 
1515
 Huda v Wells and Ors [2017] EWHC 2553 (QB) at [84]-[85]. 
1516
 The Defamation Act 2013; Explanatory notes 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/notes/data.pdf (Assessed 14
th
 March 2018), para 10 01 
to 10.31. 
1517
 Maharanee of Baroda v Wildenstein [1972] 2 QB 283; Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 2 WLR 657. 
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published in England or the damage to reputation occurring in England
1518
. It may also 
include consequential loss being suffered in England
1519
. If English courts are the most 
appropriate place for the litigation, these claims may include damages arising out of 
publication in England, but also around the world
1520
. Similarly, analysis can be 
conducted if libel is published via a website. Jurisdiction can be exercised even though 
the defendant’s website is located in the foreign country, if the republication of the 
defamatory material is in England.  
 
If the claimant has a reputation in England, English courts will have to assume 
jurisdiction under Section 9 even though defamatory content is posted elsewhere.  
 
7.7.2.: CPR jurisdiction versus S9 (2): 
 
Section 9 affects the claimant’s ability to bring a defamation claim in England. If a 
statement is published online and read in England by a relatively small number of 
people, whereas it is read in other countries by a much more significant number of 
people, then English courts will not have jurisdiction to hear the claim (see-2.13.1). It 
also includes where the publication is made/read/uploaded/downloaded in England.  
 
Under traditional rules, a claimant had to show a serious issue to be tried on the merits 
and a good arguable case (see-7.3).  The question of whether England is the most 
appropriate jurisdiction becomes relevant at the discretion stage. However, with Section 
9 in place, a judge cannot reach the point of considering whether to grant permission to 
serve out (and the questions of discretion that would apply to that decision) unless 
Section 9 (2) is satisfied. It implies that England must be 'clearly the most appropriate 
forum to bring an action'. If Section 9 (2) threshold is satisfied it will be inappropriate 
for the court to refuse permission to serve out. If this threshold is not satisfied, English 
courts may not have jurisdiction for English nationals
1521
. This is in contrast to 
Australia, the US and EU, who assume authority for their citizens. The Coleman
1522
 
case proved that the Irish courts would have jurisdiction if the defendant was domiciled 
in Ireland, or the imputation took effect within Irish borders. Similarly, in the Jackson 
                                                          
1518
 Berezovsky v Forbes [2000] UKHL 25. 
1519
 Cooley v Ramsey [2008] EWHC 129; ABCI v Banque Franco-Tunisienne [2003] EWCA Civ 205. 
1520
 Duncan & Neill (2015), ‘The law on Defamation’ (4
th
 Ed, LexisNexis, UK), para 9.03 to 9.04. 
1521
 James and McMahon, (2013), ‘Blackstone's Guide to the Defamation Act 2013’, (1
st
 Ed, Oxford 
University Press, UK), pp 32. 
1522
 Coleman v MGN [2012] IESC 20; the court decided under Section 11 of the Irish Act 2009. 
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[2018]
1523
 case, Paddy Jackson launched a defamation action against a senator for social 
media comments he posted after the acquittal in Ireland.  
 
Section 9 overrides the orthodox position in common law - each actionable publication 
constitutes a separate tort, which must be considered separately when deciding if the 
English court has jurisdiction to hear that claim
1524
. The justification for this rule is that 
it is the alleged publication in England by the defendant that justifies the English court 
to exercise jurisdiction regarding that publication. It is abusive for a claimant who has 
obtained jurisdiction over a foreign-domiciled defendant on that basis to then subject 
him to claims for foreign publication(s) for which the court would not otherwise have 
accepted jurisdiction. 
 
7.7.3.: Is S9 suitable for social media libel?  
 
Judge McIntyre
1525
, in a YouTube defamation claim, acknowledged that social media 
had affected many ordinary people, who are defamed in publications, which are 
accessible to readers all over the world. Some private individuals are subjected to 
defamations that can be read/viewed/downloaded via social media by millions 
globally
1526
. The requirement of Section 9 (2) for ordinary victims to gather the 
necessary evidence relating to all the jurisdictions where the defamatory statement has 
been published might interfere with the claimant’s right of access to the court (see-6.5.1, 
6.8). It becomes unfair to the victim who may not be a man of substantial means. He 
may not have access to worldwide legal and technical professional advice.  
 
Section 9 (2) treats all claimants equally, either British or foreign. It would be a better 
option to use for non-EU claimants, who are not domiciled in England
1527
. Nevertheless, 
it does not purport to change the rules under the Regulation and would be ineffective as 
a matter of EU law if it tried to do so. The Jackson
1528
 case established that EU-
                                                          
1523
 Jackson v ROI Senator [2018] http://www.citybelfast.com/paddy-jacksons-lawyers-launch-
defamation-against-roi-senator/[Assessed 20
th 
August 2018]. 
1524
 It was re-affirmed by the House of Lords in Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004. 
1525
 Scali v Scali [2015] SADC 172. 
1526
 Beynon v Manthey [2015] QDC 252. 
1527
 This section puts barriers in the way of claim against persons domiciled in states, which are not 
signatories of the Lugano Convention and not EU Member States. Using a colloquial expression, one 
could describe the policy behind this section as ‘dodgy’. 
1528
 Owusu v Jackson [2005] QB 801 C-281/02; any EU claimant can sue the defendant ‘as of right’ – 
wherever the claimant is situated or any other EU state for the damages suffer throughout EU. 
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defendants can be sued ‘of-right’ so Section 9 cannot be applied to any claims where 
jurisdiction has been taken under the Regulation or the Lugano Convention (see-2.7.1). 
This was reaffirmed in the Page [2015]
1529
 case, which concluded that the proceedings 
might be brought against any English domiciled defendant for any defamatory act 
published by them anywhere in the world.  
 
7.7.4.: Is modification to law required?: 
 
Let us understand the application of Section 9 in a social networking example. 
TripAdvisor.com is a website, which is domiciled in the US but accessible globally. 
Any unidentified/anonymous user can start a review about any business, which then 
allows further comments to be added. British businesses are also reviewed on 
TripAdvisor so anybody can post a bad review and damage the reputation of a small 
business, which may lose its substantial revenue. However, Section 9 states that a small 
company damaged by an anonymous user has to sue in the US courts because 
TripAdvisor is based in the US.  Practically, it means that the owner of the business has 
no remedy.  
 
This theme argues that in most circumstances, especially in social media, where all the 
family members, relatives, and friends are linked to the claimant. It is not just the 
claimant who will face difficulty under Section 9 because of his global reputation. The 
claimant may be part of an elite family business in another country, but owns property 
in England. These businesspersons add to the economic benefits so it may also be in the 
public interest that their reputation is not unlawfully damaged. There is already criticism 
that English defamation law does not protect businesses registered in England
1530
. This 
theme recommends modification in the law: There should be a by default jurisdiction 
for English claimants and Section 9 should only apply to the foreign claimants, who 
may be forum shopping. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1529
 The Bussey Law Firm PC v Page [2015] EWHC 563; the court awarded damages because publication 
was calculated to cause serious harm to the claimant. 
1530
 McKeogh v John Doe [2012] IEHC 95. 
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7.8.: Jurisdictional uncertainty in cyberspace:  
 
The 2013 Act changed traditional concepts, which have been reasonably well 
established in common law, including  ‘jurisdiction’, ‘single publication’, ‘Thornton 
threshold’, and ‘real and substantial tort’. Replacing the common law position with a 
statutory scheme created uncertainty
1531
 because the extent to which the detailed 
principles developed under the old law still apply is not well defined. The question of 
which disputes can be heard in English courts is quite distinct from what is unlawful 
under English law.  For instance, an English court can entertain an action in respect of 
overseas publication
1532
 (see-7.3). Alternatively, disputes in a foreign court over 
publication in England may also apply the English governing law. The logic behind the 
approach adopted in the 2013 Act to address issues through substantive or jurisdictional 
measures is unclear (see-7.7, 7.16).   
 
David Post
1533
 holds the view that whenever the world of cyberspace with no 
boundaries collides with the world of jurisdiction with physical limits, it causes 
uncertainty in the application of the law
1534
. This uncertainty is felt sharply in the area 
of online libel law, which is further extended by social media (see-2.5.1.2): 
 
1. It creates a predicament for traditional jurisdictions because it uses connecting-
factors
1535
 to assume jurisdiction; whereas, in digital communication, it is 
difficult to ascertain nationalities/domicile/physical presence of the litigants. 
 
2. It provides anonymity which makes the identification of the defendant difficult. 
It may be possible to understand the existence of specific content and its impact 
                                                          
1531
 Tench, D., (2014), ‘Defamation Act 2013, A Critical Evaluation: Part 1, General Concerns’, 
International forum for Responsible media blog, Inforrm’s blog; www.inforrm.org [Assessed 22
nd
 July 
2018]. 
1532
 Subject to the substantive law of the country of publication. 
1533
 Post, D.G., (2017), ‘How the Internet is making jurisdiction sexy (again)’, International Journal of Law 
and Information Technology, Vol 25, pp 249–258. 
1534
 Defamation law is already struggling to maintain an appropriate balance between free press, 
individual privacy, protection of reputations and freedom of expression. 
1535
 Connecting factors are physically related to a certain jurisdictional area: Nationality, domicile, 
mutual consent and lex rei sitae are regarded as determining factors in traditional jurisdictional 
principles. 
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on others, but it may be impossible to identify the user who uploads such 
content
1536
. 
 
3. Unrestricted and gratis availability of social sites makes it an open and 
independent system to every individual because it does not require users to 
provide their (accurate) identification to access these websites (see-7.6). This 
was acknowledged in the Kelly [2016]
1537
 case, that relations between countries 
and the users of social media are incredibly fragile.  
 
4. The different and contradictory approaches, adopted by courts in developed 
countries
1538
 including the EU, Australia, Canada, the US and the UK, also 
engender this uncertainty/inconsistency to online defamation
1539
. Kourakis 
CJ
1540
 highlighted this complex jurisdictional uncertainty problem by concluding 
that a new cause of action arises whenever Google’s search results are 
published. Google was held liable for defamation in Australia whereas Google 
would have immunity in the US. Similarly, the 2013 Act abolished the multiple-
publication rule, so this case would also be decided differently in England (see-
2.11.1). 
 
7.8.1: Uncertainty since the Defamation Act:  
 
A different type of uncertainty emerged with the 2013 Act about the accessibility and 
downloading. The worldwide accessibility of social media content does not turn every 
online publication into an international publication if it is not downloaded globally. 
There is no clarification of how much downloading is required to consider it published. 
In the Berg
1541
 case, the court decided that it is not possible for an online publisher to 
geographically restrict publication on the internet. With regards to damages and 
                                                          
1536
 Joyce, D., (2017), ‘Data associations and the protection of reputation online in Australia’, Big Data & 
Society, Vol 4, Issue 1, pp 10. 
1537
 Kelly v Levick [2016] QMC 11. 
1538
 With the rapid advancement of technology, the development of online defamation law has been left 
far behind, with little to no development. Courts have struggled to decide whether the standards and 
rules applied in traditional defamation cases apply to social media. 
1539
 Shaw, S.R., (2017), ‘There is no silver bullet: Solutions to Internet jurisdiction’, International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology, Vol 25, pp 283–308. 
1540
 Google Inc v Duffy [2017] SASFC 130. 
1541
 Macquarie Bank Limited & Anor v Berg [1999] NSWSC 526; Simpson J was adamant that an 
interlocutory judgment does not pre-empt rights and one seeking to restrain a party from publishing 
matter would 'unduly override the rights of publisher and pre-empt the resolution of legitimate issues. 
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enforceability, a global injunction to stop defamatory material means the superimposing 
of English law is beyond its sovereign boundaries
1542
 (additionally, it could not be 
enforced in the jurisdiction where some big data companies are based because of 
immunity). Even where the claimant only seeks monetary compensation, the courts face 
a considerable challenge in quantifying which part of the damage has been caused by 
the accessibility of the content within their jurisdiction. 
 
The occurrence of a tortious act is sufficient basis of jurisdiction
1543
, but it becomes 
more complicated in social media due to the difficulty in determining the place of tort. 
The problem arises when the defendant is anonymous (see-2.10.2). Current technology 
cannot efficiently locate online users
1544
, for example, if he commits the tort on a public 
computer
1545
, it is futile to locate the computer
1546
. In this situation, the courts can 
assume personal jurisdiction by allowing service to the Embassy of the defendant’s 
domicile state (see-7.5). This theme finds that banning anonymous and pseudonymous 
posts
1547
 may offer consistency because the defendant would be traceable. If traditional 
laws
1548
 are applied to social media, then the immunity of ISPs and content providers 
becomes challengeable. Hence holding ISPs liable as the primary publisher may 
quicken the process because they may show more willingness to regulate/control online 
communication.  
 
7.8.2: Uncertainty under S8: 
 
Traditionally, republication of a defamatory statement constitutes a fresh cause of 
action. To maintain this position for social media libel may not be a rational thing to do 
                                                          
1542
 Kohl, U., (2000), ‘Defamation on the Internet: A duty free zone after all? Macquarie Bank & Anor v 
Berg’, Sydney Law Review, Vol 22, Issue 1. 
1543
 Modern international law adopts the jurisdiction rational loci as the primary principle in determining 
jurisdiction whereas the border lines between different countries and the concept of “territory” have 
vanished in cyberspace. 
1544
 Applause Store Productions Ltd and Firsht v Grant Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB); a defamatory 
fake Facebook profile was created a computer with defendant’s IP address i.e. using a computer at the 
flat where he then lived. He denial responsibility but the judge held him liable for putting up the false 
profile.  
1545
 The Internet cafe, library or information centre; with the exact IP address the relevant Embassy can 
be involved but in the dark web the users can rotate IP addresses using tor.  
1546 Mills, A., (2014), ‘Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law, British Yearbook of International Law, 
Vol 84, Issue 1, pp 187-239. 
1547
 The easiest way to identify a defendant is to find out the details of the computer that was used to 
publish the statement or publish. The IP address will provide the required details.  
1548
 In print media defamation, the editor can also be sued: If publishers in conventional libel, who 
perhaps were not involved at the manuscript stage of defamatory publications, are not excused. 
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bearing in mind the uniqueness of the internet (see-2.5.1.2). Section 8
1549
 modified this 
longstanding traditional rule. Claimants can no longer sue in respect of statements first 
published long ago that remain accessible in online archives, even where new facts have 
since emerged that change the complexion of the statement (see-2.11.3). However, 
Section 8 allows the court to revert to the traditional-multiple rule, which can produce 
further inconsistency (see-7.13). This is one of the points where this thesis finds that 
traditional rules should be altered because the multiple-publication rule would amount 
to unending litigation on the same substance.  
 
In social media, a mere click of a button can make a person a defendant for 
republication (see-4.1). Therefore, there is a need to add the ‘actual malice phenomenon 
just like for public figures’ to the subsequent publications (see-7.20). A modification in 
the law will protect both the victims and the innocent defendants. The single publication 
rule unnecessarily diminishes the opportunity for libel victims to be compensated, if 
their reputation can be harmed in future. There is a need to modify the standards for 
finding initial publication (single publication rule) and republication on social media 
(multiple publication rule) to maintain a balance between protecting libel victims and 
not hindering online publication or freedom of expression. This theme recommends that 
it would be better to introduce ‘malice’ for future subsequent publications. If the 
claimant can establish malice on the part of the defendant then the single publication 
rule can be ignored and re-publication can be dealt with as a publication of the 
defamatory content.  
 
7.8.3: Is a change needed for social media? 
 
This theme demonstrates that the application of traditional laws to cyberspace requires 
modification concerning social media. For instance, the concept of ‘site of 
publication
1550’ is maintained as a base for jurisdiction. However, with the statutory 
clarification, the place of upload or place of download can be established as the place of 
publication and relieve the test of jurisdiction. Similarly, for social media the concept of 
                                                          
1549
 The single publication rule established that aggrieved persons would have only a year from the time 
when an offending statement first became publicly accessible to bring a claim. 
1550
 Harrods v Dow Jones (2003) EWHC 1162; the court followed Gutnick, principle to conclude that 
online article was deemed to be published where Internet users downloaded, read and comprehended 
the article. 
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‘download’ needs clarification because downloading levels are not defined in terms of a 
sufficient level for appropriate assertion of jurisdiction. 
 
Concerning connecting factor’s inconsistency, the significance of nationality for social 
media libel is considerably low. With the increasing population mobility, ‘nationality’ 
as a connecting factor is weaker than before (see-4.6.1). It is reasonable to use a 
territorial connecting factor because of its certainty and uniqueness in physical space. 
As suggested, the place of publication should be used for jurisdiction. In the longer 
term, the courts must warn the technology giants (Google, Yahoo, Facebook and 
Twitter) to make changes to ‘control’ downloading of material (if the content providers 
demand immunity, they should provide more control to the actual publishers).  
 
The publisher (potential defendant) should be given the right to target which country’s 
user can download. As a quick fix, extra privacy settings can be installed just like 
Snapchat, where the sender should be able to limit who can view the information they 
share. That alteration would offer the potential libel defendants a little more control over 
who has access to their content. Nevertheless, so long as cyberspace is ubiquitous, it 
will create uncertainty in jurisdiction that is geographically bound.  
 
7.9.: Are courts deviating from traditional defamation rules? 
 
The central theme of this thesis relates to the feasibility of applying private international 
law rules to cyberspace torts. Considering the mutual dependence between traditional 
rules and the territorial world, there is a risk that this symbiotic relationship may be 
weakened by the growing importance of a border-disregarding internet
1551
. The situation 
is further complicated by the incidence of ubiquitous infringement, made possible by 
the pervasiveness of social media
1552
. The application of the 2013 Act to cases 
involving social media is complicated by the fact that social media differs markedly 
from traditional forms of media. However, English judges have been applying these 
rules to online libel claims.  
 
                                                          
1551
 The use of social media platforms increase, the lawsuits alleging defamation via social media 
platforms will continue to increase (see 9.1). 
1552
 Shaw, S.R., (2017), ‘There is no silver bullet: solutions to Internet jurisdiction’, International Journal 
of Law and Information Technology, Vol 12, Issue 8, pp 685-695. 
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7.9.1.: Has the value of PIL diminished in cyberspace?  
 
Claims of the tort of defamation have been the subject of litigation for years (see-5.2).  
Before the internet, defamation claims involved ‘old-media’ (books, newspapers, 
magazines, radio and television). With the advent of digital communication, defamation 
claims involve ‘new-media’ (social networking sites, web portals, search engines, 
online publications, and blogs). Social media communication has become the preferred 
method for youth
1553
. It is burdensome to navigate the application of long-standing libel 
principles
1554
 because courts do not give due regard to the concepts of ‘intention and 
mistake’ in online libel (see-7.20): 
 
1. Social media libel is a ‘strict liability tort’; therefore, someone negligently 
posting defamatory material to a third person becomes liable for defamation 
(see-7.15). It was established in the Laurentian
1555
 case, that a defendant would 
be liable, regardless of their intention. 
 
2. Most users, who publish online in the heat of emotion or for the sake of 
argument, wrongly believe that they will remain anonymous
1556
 (see-7.5.2). In 
the Olsen [2016]
1557
 case, the court noted that online anonymity could not be 
used to avoid liability for defamatory comments and ordered Facebook to 
disclose the defendant’s information 
 
3. Digital communication forges a false sense of intimacy because users believe 
they are communicating with a well-known group of individuals
1558
. The 
Pritchard [2016]
1559
 case established Facebook postings as a form of ‘venting’ 
because the defendant
1560
  can be held liable for his defamatory statement, for 
                                                          
1553
 Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other forms of social media are becoming the dominant 
communication tools in today’s political and social discourse, often entirely supplanting traditional 
media’s role in public commentary. 
1554
 Research conducted in 2016 showed that 46% of 18- to 24-year-olds were unaware they could be 
sued for tweeting an unsubstantiated rumour about another person. 
1555
 Dinyer-Fraser v Laurentian Bank [2005] BCSC 255. 
1556
 Social media users must be aware that their posts will not be held behind a cloak of anonymity 
should the posts contain defamatory content. 
1557
 Olsen v Facebook Inc [2016] NSSC 155. 
1558
  Any social media post given the Internet's huge worldwide audience, the effects of a statement 
made on social media could reach millions, if not billions, of people instantly. 
1559
 Pritchard v Van Nes [2016] BCSC 686. 
1560
 The defendant's defamatory statements becomes an implied authorisation for republication was 
inherent in the nature and probable result of his statements on Facebook. 
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the repetitions and republications, and for the comments to the defendant's 
Facebook page by other users 
 
4. A published statement on the internet can cause damage all around the world, 
which cannot be reprieved because courts have localised the place of 
damage
1561
. Even before the 2013 Act, the English courts
1562
 were hesitant to 
issue injunctions against online publications of defamatory content where their 
jurisdiction was based on only a part of the overall publication having been 
accessed in England.  
 
7.9.2: How Jurisdictions approach social media libel: 
 
Approach to jurisdiction and choice of law and the resulting multiplication of fora and 
applicable laws are often justified by the idea that someone who distributes content via 
the internet or offers a service online does so to reach a worldwide audience
1563
. This 
would mean, they have no reason to complain about being subject to the jurisdiction of 
courts and the application of substantive laws from all around the globe
1564
. Firstly, 
there is an unprecedented range of entities who use the internet to provide services, 
goods or information to users and many of them are not professionals
1565
. Secondly, the 
mere fact that someone uses the internet is not evidence of an intention to target a 
worldwide audience
1566
. Of course, in some cases, it is possible to restrict publications 
and other online services to particular jurisdictions
1567
. This is particularly true of 
services that are based on paid subscription or registration (see-2.6.1). However, it is 
seen differently in different countries. Contrasting approaches to defamation claims by 
various jurisdictions reflect not only different cultural values concerning freedom of 
speech, but fundamentally, highlights their historical relationship to fixed geographical 
territories: 
 
                                                          
1561
 King v Lewis [2005] ILPr 16, at [2]. 
1562
 Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones [2005] EWCA Civ 75. 
1563
 King v Lewis (n 43) [2005] [33]–[34]. 
1564
 Svantesson, D., (2015), ‘The Holy Trinity of Legal Fictions Undermining the Application of Law to the 
Global Internet’ International Journal of Law & InfoTech, Vol 8, pp 219, 220. 
1565
 Reymond, M., (2013), ‘Jurisdiction in Case of Personality Torts Committed over the Internet’, British 
Year Book of Private International Law, Vol 14, pp 205, 210–11. 
1566
 Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl GmbH KG (C-585/08); Hotel Alpenhof v Oliver Heller (C-144/09); in its 
Judgment of the Court, Grand Chamber decided in 2010 that a websites global accessibility does not 
makes its users a subject to global jurisdiction. 
1567
 Bigos, O., (2005), ‘Jurisdiction over Cross-Border Wrongs on the Internet’, ICLQ, Vol 54, pp 585-602. 
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1. Godfrey1568 [England] 
 
This was the first English case involving online defamation. Justice Morland held that 
Demon Internet was not the publisher; however, under the 2013 Act, they would be 
classed as a publisher because the claimant notified Demon-Internet that defamatory 
post has been published.  
 
2. Gutnick1569 [Australia] 
 
This case is considered of utmost importance because it applied traditional rules and 
exercised jurisdiction to determine alleged defamation on the internet
1570
. It was the first 
judgment of final appellate court on the jurisdiction issue in an international online 
defamation case. It is a landmark ruling situated at the intersection between private 
international law and internet torts
1571
. It does establish an important rule for the 
localisation of online defamation, with implications for both jurisdiction and choice of 
law. To this day, it is the highest ruling anywhere in the world to consider the issue of 
jurisdiction for publication of defamatory material on the internet.  
 
3. LICRA1572 [France]   
 
The LICRA filed suit in France asserted that Yahoo’s auction website, located in 
California, displayed Nazi memorabilia in violation of the law of (France). It was 
another ground-breaking case with regards to private international law involving 
jurisdiction and applicable law. It remains a leading authority; however, in France, most 
jurisdiction cases are dealt with under EU Regulations. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1568
 Godfrey v Demon Internet [1999] 4 All ER 342; Eady J exercised case management powers and 
refused to allow the defendant to rely on any posting made before a certain date. In Burstein v Times 
Newspapers Ltd [2001] WLR 579 at para [27] May LJ described the decision as being ‘based on causative 
provocation in exceptional circumstances’. 
1569
 Dow Jones v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56. 
1570
 Collins, M., (2003), ‘Defamation on the Internet After Dow Jones & Company Inc v Gutnick’, Media & 
Arts Law Review, Vol 8, Issue 3, pp 181. 
1571
 Collins, M., (2001), ‘The law of defamation and the Internet’, (Oxford University, OUP), pp 21. 
1572
 League against Racism and Antisemitism v Yahoo [2001] 145 F. Supp. 2d 1168, Case No. C-00-
21275JF; the French court order YAHOO to ‘take all necessary measures’ to dissuade access to the 
‘objectionable Nazi objects’.  
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4. Zippo’s Test [The US] 
 
The court adapted the minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction in 
internet cases. A ‘sliding scale’ test was developed for determining whether a 
defendant’s conduct over the internet allows a state to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over him. It still applies in the US regarding internet jurisdiction. 
 
5. eDate Advertising and Oliver Martinez [The EU] 
 
CJ decision remains a valid authority involving foreign law. Court considered whether 
Oliver could take a claim under French law against a UK-based newspaper. The 
contribution of CJ illustrates the ‘partially unsettled’ condition of the law in this 
complex area but provides a useful indication of the allocation of online jurisdiction. 
 
6. Duffy v Google [New Zealand] 
 
Court held that Google, concerning the auto-complete issue is a publisher, which is a 
big step forward for social media libel and privacy. Once again, jurisdiction was 
assumed using traditional methods.  
 
The above-explained case laws can be seen as part of an ongoing process of adapting 
existing legal principles to a new environment, in both a national and international 
context, involving foreign-based defendants. It is interesting to note that the reputation 
of ordinary claimants is local, not global, so in most defamation cases, there will be a 
strong correlation between place of publication, local audience and domestic 
jurisdiction. Under the 2013 Act only local damages can be covered. Hence judgment 
would only be of value if it could be enforced where the defendant held assets. 
Barendt
1573
 noted that obtaining a judgment is valueless unless it is enforceable. This 
theme recommends that the judges should decline jurisdiction if there is another 
appropriate forum, which will also help minimise ‘forum-shopping’ and the issues of 
‘enforcement’.  
 
                                                          
1573
 Barendt, E., (2013), ‘Freedom of Speech and Internet: The Problem of Global Communication’, 
Chatham House International Law Discussion; the courts must analyse that what international aspect 
that decision would make for the public in another country. 
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7.10.: Is there a need to modify jurisdictional rules for social media? 
 
By declaring cyberspace a single jurisdiction
1574
, or treating it as an international 
space
1575
, the issues of jurisdiction and choice of law can be eradicated
1576
. This may 
still involve changing the existing rules of private international law. It was debated at 
the Hague Conference
1577
 that the jurisdictional rules should be changed to combat 
cyberspace cross-border issues. Lawrence Lessig
1578
 raised the point that individual 
regulations may be a threat to liberty of cyberspace and proposed the idea of a ‘uniform 
code’ to resolve online disputes. Johnson and Post1579 also reinforced this idea by 
claiming that geographic boundaries are inappropriate and archaic. Kohl
1580
 argued that 
traditional jurisdictional rules do not provide consistent outcomes and require legislative 
reforms.  
 
7.10.1.: Existing jurisdictional rules are convenient for social media 
 
The internet is continually evolving and requires specific rules to cater for new forms of 
communication but not based on jurisdiction
1581
. Any complications arising from the 
application of national regulations to increasingly mobile wrongdoers are not new
1582
 
because they existed before the internet context. Gray
1583
 wrote that traditional notions 
of jurisdiction had made a relatively smooth transition into cyberspace; therefore, no 
new rules are necessary. Although the internet is a new forum, litigants, as always, exist 
                                                          
1574
 Edeshaw, A., (2003), ‘Web services and the law: A sketch of the potential issues’, International 
Journal of Law  & Information Technology, Vol 11, pp 251- 272. 
1575
 Casey, E., (2010), ‘The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History’, (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, US), pp ix. 
1576
 Longworth, E., (2000), ‘The possibilities for a legal framework for cyberspace including a New 
Zealand perspective’ in T Fuentes-Camacho (eds.), ‘The International Dimensions of Cyberspace Law’ 
(Ashgate Hampshire and UNESCO, Paris), pp 38. 
1577
 Haines, AD., (2002), ‘The impact of the internet on the Judgments Project: Thoughts for the future’, 
(Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document No 17. 
1578
 Lessig, L., (1999), ‘The law of the horse: What cyber law might teach’, Harvard L Rev, Vol 117, pp 
501; Johnson, David R. & Post, David G., (1996), ‘Law and Borders - The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’, 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 48, pp 1367. 
1579
 Johnson, DR., & Post, DG., (1997),  ‘The Rise of Law on the Global Network’ in B Kahin and C Nesson 
(eds), Borders in Cyberspace: Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure (3
rd
 Ed, MIT 
Press, Cambridge MA), pp 6-12. 
1580
 Kohl, U., (2002), ‘Eggs, jurisdiction and the internet’,  ICLQ, Vol 51, pp 557. 
1581
 Location of wrongs committed on international flights or sea-voyages was an issue of discussion for 
centuries, McNair, L., (1964), ‘The Law of the Air’, (3
rd
 Ed, Stevens & Sons, London), pp 260-281. 
1582
 Duckworth, L., (1930), ‘The Principles of Marine Law’, (4
th
 Ed, Pitman & Sons, London), pp 30. 
1583
 Gray, T., (2005), ‘Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: The Classic Jurisdiction Analysis in a New 
Setting’, Journal of High Technology Law , Vol 1, pp 85-86; Surprisingly, our conventional notions of 
jurisdiction have adapted well to this new cyber-environment. 
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in physical space. Sadaat
1584
 also mentioned that the judgments in leading cases 
strengthen the idea of applying traditional law to cyberspace.  
 
Despite predictions of the demise of cyberspace
1585
 after the Gutnick case, nothing has 
yet happened, and even more media and entertainment bodies are placing content 
online. The CA
1586
 also established that the relatively new technology of the internet is 
manageable by the application of traditional wrongs. Chris Reed
1587
 stated that the 
intentional flexibility of cyberspace allows all resources to be available anywhere and 
everywhere, so domesticating internet conduct becomes a meaningless concept in this 
context. Goldsmith
1588
 stated that cyberspace transactions are no different from ‘real-
space’ transnational transactions. Cyberspace involves people in real space in one 
jurisdiction communicating with people in real space in other jurisdictions. He stated 
that this communication often does well, but sometimes causes harm. The case of 
Pritchard
1589
 made it clear that courts are becoming more comfortable in adopting new 
realities of social media and defamation. Stein
1590
 mentioned that digital communication 
is available on a large scale but the internet is still no different from other mediums. 
Halsbury Laws
1591
 of England noted that concerning the law of defamation, the internet 
raises no novel issues of principle. Cyberspace is merely a natural extension of existing 
forms of communication technology, rather than a novel way requiring sui generis 
laws
1592
. So, even though the internet provides a myriad of new platforms, if someone is 
defamed, traditional principles of personal jurisdiction can be applied
1593
. Therefore, 
reformulation of jurisdictional rules to deal with cyberspace libel is not compulsory. 
 
                                                          
1584
 Saadat, M., (2005), ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet after Gutnick and Yahoo!’, Journal of Information 
Law & Technology, Vol 1, pp 32. 
1585
 Waldmeir, P., (2002), ‘Borders Return to the Internet’, The Financial Times [Assessed 13
th
 April 
2018].  
1586
 Pro-C Ltd v Computer City [2001] 205 DLR 574 (Ont CA). 
1587
 Reed, C., (2000), ‘Internet Law: Text and Materials’, (Butterworths Publication, London), pp 7-11. 
1588
 Goldsmith, J., (1998), ‘Against Cyber Anarchy’, Chicago Law Review, Vol 65, pp 1239. 
1589
 Pritchard v Van Nes [2016] BCSC 686. 
1590
 Stein, A.R., (1998), ‘The unexceptional problem of jurisdiction in cyberspace’, Intl Lawyer, Vol 32, pp 
1167. 
1591
 Halsbury's Laws, (2018), ‘Infromation Technology Law of England’, (Vol 57, Lexisnexis), Civil and 
Criminal Wrongs in an Online Context, Defamation, pp 725.  
1592
 Reed, A., (2000), ‘Jurisdiction and choice of law in a borderless electronic environment’, in Y Akdeniz, 
C Walker, and D Wall (eds) The Internet, Law and Society, (1
st
 Ed, Pearson, Essex), pp 79. 
1593
 Burdick Superior Court of Orange City [2015] Case No. G049107; it confirms that social media has not 
stripped us of the due process rights and provides a helpful roadmap to navigate the issue of personal 
jurisdiction in online defamation cases by applying traditional rules. 
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This theme agrees with Goldsmith
1594
 that ‘threat of multiple regulatory exposures 
exists’ but rejects the arguments that the use of traditional laws is affecting the 
development of the internet
1595
. Since the advent of cyberspace, England has used 
common law rules for assuming jurisdiction, which has not prevented the enormous 
growth of e-commerce in the 21
st
 century. Similarly, America still uses the ‘sliding 
scale test’ and ‘minimum contacts1596’, which offer even less clarity in the assertion of 
jurisdiction compared to traditional English rules. Hence, the traditional rules of 
jurisdiction are appropriate to apply to social media libel claims. 
 
7.11.: Cause of action versus S8:  
 
Common law has always held that the cause of action crystallises on publication
1597
. 
The tort of defamation does not require ‘proof of special damage’ to be actionable1598; 
however, the element of harm suffered is compulsory to establish the cause of 
action. It
1599
 arises at the time of publication (see-5.5) so, English courts can have 
jurisdiction to hear the claim against an English-domiciled defendant because 
defamatory content is published at the place where it is read, heard or seen (see-7.13.1), 
and not where the material was first placed on the internet
1600
. In the Bata
1601
 case, it 
was established that English courts have traditionally taken the approach that 
defamation takes place where the material is received and read (for online libel, where it 
is downloaded). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1594
 Goldsmith, J., (2000), ‘Unilateral Regulation of the Internet: A Modest Defence’, EJIL, Vol 11, pp 147 
1595
 The Internet World Stats; http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm [Assessed 14
th 
January 
2017]. 
1596
 American Bar Association supports the minimum contacts standard for determining jurisdiction on 
the Internet - the minimum contacts standard, with its sliding scale approach, does indeed result in less 
aggressive assertions of jurisdiction than in countries, where minimum contacts does not exist. 
1597
 Kumar, S., (2003), ‘Website Libel and the Single Publication Rule’, The University of Chicago Law 
Review, Vol 70, Issue 2, pp 639-662; Braun, O., (2002), ‘Internet Publications and Defamation: Why the 
Single Publication Rule Should Not Apply’, Golden Gate UL Rev, Vol 32, pp 325. 
1598
 Post, R. C., (1986), ‘The social foundations of defamation law: Reputation and the Constitution’, Cal. 
L. Rev., Vol 74, pp 691. 
1599
 Cause of action is not relevant to the 'serious harm' threshold because it may be patently a barrier 
to bring an action upon publication. 
1600
 Hartley, T., (2010), ‘Libel Tourism and Conflict of Laws’, ICLQ, Vol 59, pp 25. 
1601
 Bata v Bata [1948] 92 SJ 574. 
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7.11.1.: Cause of action after the 2013 Act: 
 
There has been no modification for cause of action under the 2013 Act. In the Cooke 
[2014]
1602
 case, the court reaffirmed that the cause of action arose at the point of 
publication. Parkes QC
1603
 maintained that the cause of action arose at the time of the 
act, when the defendant created a fake and defamatory Facebook profile. The judge 
found that anyone searching for the claimant would find the defamatory material 
without difficulty. However, the ‘seriousness threshold under Section 1’ may prove a 
confusing dilemma because if the cause of action arises at publication, then there is no 
need to prove ‘seriousness of harm’ at the preliminary stage because cause of action 
must be crystallised at the point where harm is (or more likely) suffered. Section 1 may 
raise the issue of ‘certainty’ as to when cause of action arises (see Table-12)  
 
Table-12: Uncertainty of Cause of Action 
 
Cause of action Traditional approach Modern approach 
When crystallised At publication At uploading 
Action  Where it is read Where it is downloaded 
Legal requirement Jameel abuse Section 1 
Harm requirement Harm is presumed Serious harm 
Suitable for social 
media 
Yes  Un-certain 
 
Besides, at what point does Section 1 criteria have to be met to determine whether 
serious harm to reputation would be suffered or was likely to be suffered.  
 
 
7.11.2.: Modern or traditional approach: 
 
Interestingly, Section 1 does not overrule the traditional concept of ‘publication’ 
because if  Parliament intended to abolish this, it could have expressly done this
1604
. 
However, in social media a statement can be shared, retweeted and more serious harm 
                                                          
1602
 Cooke & Anor v MGN Ltd & Anor [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB). 
1603
 Applause Stores Productions Ltd v  Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB). 
1604
 Explanatory Notes (2013), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/notes [Assessed 4
th
 April 
2018]. 
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can be suffered at later stages but the limitation rule may cause the claimant to bring an 
action after 1-year (see-2.11.6). In the Starr [2015]
1605
 case, it was established that the 
defamation remains time-barred by the limitation period, whereas, defamatory material 
can re-emerge via social media at any point. Lord Hailsham
1606
 held that if defamatory 
matter ‘emerges from its lurking-place at some future date, the claimant deserves extra 
damages, which are sufficient to convince a bystander of the baselessness of the charge 
(see-7.8.3). It is more likely to be shared to a wider audience than the original 
recipients; the internet’s vast memory capacity allows it to be re-discovered and re-
posted
1607
 and ‘search functionality’ of social sites encourages that kind of re-discovery 
(see-2.5.1.2).  
 
Many search engines and social media sites have some form of search functionality 
built into them
1608
. Facebook is an important example; Facebook search is attempting to 
challenge Google by linking search to real people and their preferences
1609
. The 
prospect of discovery-by-search has already impacted an assessment of damages
1610
. It 
is arguable that the prospect of a massive damages award will have an unjustifiably 
subduing effect on freedom of expression on the internet
1611
. 
 
7.12.: Convenient forum: 
 
Under Section 9, jurisdiction and forum have become important threshold questions for 
social media libel issues (see-6.5). The value of protecting reputation endorses a broad 
interpretation of jurisdiction and forum conveniens, which aims to achieve efficient and 
fair resolution of libel claims (see-6.5.2).  
 
 
                                                          
1605
 Starr v Ward [2015] EWHC 1987 (QB). 
1606
 Cassell v Broome [1972] UKHL 3;Lord Reid stated that ‘bad conduct of the claimant may also enter 
into the matter, where he has provoked the libel, or where he has libelled the defendant in reply.  
1607
 Even if a post is taken down, it may have been cached. If the post was not cached, it may still have 
been copied or forwarded by an original recipient. 
1608
 Karapapa, S., & Borghi, M., (2015), ‘Search engine liability for autocomplete suggestions: Personality, 
privacy and the power of the algorithm’, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 
23, pp 261-289. 
1609
 Erdos, D., (2014), ‘Data protection and the right to reputation: Filling the ‘gaps’ after the Defamation 
Act 2013’, Cambridge Law Journal, Vol 73, pp 536-569. 
1610
 Google v Trkulja 2016; Bleyer v Google 2014; Dow Jones v Gutnick 2002 (these cases are detailed 
above). 
1611
 Cheer, U., (2005), ‘Myths and Realities About the Chilling Effect: The New Zealand Media’s 
Experience of Defamation Law’, Torts Law Journal, Vol 13, pp 259. 
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7.12.1: Traditional forum test: 
 
Under traditional English law, a transnational defamation claim is heard within the 
territory or location of the defamation
1612
, or where the claimant suffered damages to his 
reputation (the law of the place of the wrong)
1613
. Anyone who republishes a defamatory 
statement, or facilitates its republication via social media, may be liable for per se 
damages for injury to reputation
1614
. The principle of ‘forum non-conveniens’ allows a 
court to dismiss a libel claim
1615
 where an appropriate and more convenient alternative 
forum exists (see-6.9.1.2).  
 
7.12.2: Modern forum approach: 
 
The 2013 Act did not abolish the traditional forum test. If jurisdiction is established 
under Section 9, the defendant can request the court to reconsider whether the claim is 
being brought to the appropriate forum
1616
. In the Goldhar [2018]
1617
 case, the court 
refused to assume jurisdiction in an internet libel claim on forum issue because the 
appellant and most witnesses were in Israel. In the Garcia [2017]
1618
 case, the court 
established that all factors and concerns must be weighed together, with the overall 
burden on the defendant, had to prove that there is another forum in a better position to 
efficiently decide this claim. In the Araya [2017]
1619
 case, the judge determined that the 
factors included access to a witness, documents, costs as well as the justice system of 
other forum. Similarly, it was decided in the Vecto [2017]
1620
 case that the factors 
relevant to convenience, expense, the relevant applicable law and where the parties have 
their places of business must be considered. 
 
                                                          
1612
 Novus Aviation Ltd v Onur Air Tasimacilik [2009] EWCA Civ 122. 
1613
 Kohl, U., (2007), ‘Jurisdiction and the Internet: Regulatory Competence over Online Activity’, 
(Cambridge University Press), pp 112-113. 
1614
 Brown, R., (2013), ‘Brown on Defamation’, (2
nd
 Ed, Carswell, Canada), Ch. 1.  
1615
 The potential chilling effect of ‘libel tourism’ on social media expressions may give adjudicators 
pause: if jurisdiction were presumed in Internet libel cases, the fact that Internet publications can occur 
anywhere increased the threat of suit in far-flung locations, which risked chilling free expression. 
1616
 The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction when the 
comparative convenience or expense to the parties and witnesses calls for the case to be adjudicated 
elsewhere. 
1617
 Haaretz.com v Mitchell Goldhar [2018] SCC case no 37202. 
1618
 Garcia v Tahoe Resources [2017] BCCA 39. 
1619
 Araya Wolde-Giorgis v Ken Fetter [2017] No 15-15580 (9
th
 Cir). 
1620
 Vetco Gray UK Ltd and Vetco Gray Inc v FMC Technologies Inc [2007] EWHC 540 (Pat). 
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In the Kennedy [2017]
1621
 case, the court suspended the action in England because 
Scotland was the more appropriate forum. Sir David rejected the argument that the only 
jurisdictional competition was between the courts of Scotland and England (both are 
internal courts) because the material was republished outside of the UK, which 
constituted an ‘international element’ sufficient to take the case out of the ‘purely 
domestic’ category1622. It also rejected the element of the EU regulation by suggesting 
that EU laws would only apply if: (1) The defendant is resident in the EU and sued in 
England; or (2) The claimant had petitioned more than one defendant, based in different 
jurisdictions (see-6.7). The Cook [2015]
1623
 case ruled that the issue of convenient 
forum may not add any value in England if the applicable law is under EU 
Regulation
1624
. If the Kennedy case was trialled in England, the recovery of global 
damages (i.e. damages in respect of all harm across multiple jurisdictions) would be 
available
1625
 (because the harm was suffered in the UK and EU
1626
).   
 
7.12.3: Tradition forum versus S9 (3): 
 
In contrast to Section 9 (3) – appropriate forum, the traditional concept of forum 
conveniens includes, the domicile of the litigants (see-6.9.1.1).  This difference may 
prove very important on the way a claim is articulated. Under Section 9, the courts can 
only grant a remedy for the harm suffered in England only. If the harm is suffered at 
another jurisdiction, the courts have to refuse jurisdiction, unless the claimant changes 
the claim for the loss suffered in England only. Whereas, under traditional forum test, 
the continuation of the case in England will not strike-out of global damages and the 
claimant would not have to change the claim fundamentally
1627
. Forum non-conveniens 
                                                          
1621
 Kennedy v National Trust for Scotland [2017] EWHC 3368 (QB). 
1622
 The Regulation was therefore not engaged, and the court instead referred to the Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Act 1982.  
1623
 Cook v Virgin Media Ltd and McNeil v Tesco plc [2015] EWCA Civ 1287; the question for the CA was 
whether the English court had the power in a purely domestic case to stay or strike out a claim on the 
ground that the natural and more appropriate forum is Scotland. The court decided that where there is 
no international element and the competing jurisdictions are England and Wales, Scotland, or Northern 
Ireland so the court has power to stay a claim on the ground of forum non conveniens. 
1624
 Arzandeh, A., (2017), ‘The origins of the Scottish forum non conveniens doctrine’, Journal of Private 
International Law, Vol 13, Issue 1, pp 130-151. 
1625
 This approach was adopted by the CJEU in Shevill v Press Alliance [1995] 2 AC 18 to the UK’s internal 
jurisdictions. 
1626
 All jurisdictional matters should be governed by the Brussels Recast Regulation 2012/2015 or under 
domestic provisions should be enforceable within the EU member states. 
1627
 Hooper, D., (2016), ‘How the court will interpret whether England is the most appropriate place to 
bring a libel action, Entertainment Law Review, Vol 27, Issue 3, pp 102. 
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remains, according to the English formulation, a powerful tool for parties seeking to 
resist jurisdiction (see-2.17.1). Claimants must, for example, produce cogent evidence 
that they will not be able to access a remedy in other territorial court to satisfy an 
English court that it should accept jurisdiction. Judges are always ready to accept that 
territorial ‘rule of law’ creates problems in cyberspace1628 because it creates barriers to 
victims obtaining substantial justice. This theme finds that Section 9 and traditional 
forum conveniens rules can, in harmony, satisfactorily be applied to social media libel 
claims.  
 
7.13.: Choice of law versus S9:  
 
Social media communication raises the questions regarding the adjudication of a claim 
and the applicable substantive law (see-4.3.2.2). The issues of judicial competence are 
essential and have a significant impact on the resolution of applicable law but the choice 
of law raises distinct concerns for cross-border defamation
1629
. It presents some of the 
most difficult issues in applying private international law to social media 
communication because its classification may impact significantly on the balance of 
rights and protection (see-4.3.3). Even before the 2013 Act, choice of law in defamation 
has proved to be a particularly challenging subject, so it demands reforms
1630
 for online 
libel.  
 
Section 8 introduced a single publication rule, which abolished a precedent of 150 years 
(see-2.11.3). However, it provides an exception where English courts can revert to the 
traditional ‘multiple rule’, if the subsequent publication is ‘materially different’ from 
the manner of the first publication (see-2.11). Accordingly, merely viewing the 
potentially libellous content online would again be considered a publication in England 
and harm is presumed to have occurred (see-2.11). Therefore a libel claim could then be 
initiated in England. Interestingly, regardless of the defendant (EU or non-EU), the 
‘choice of law’ rules in England are still regulated under EU Regulations (see-2.7). 
                                                          
1628
 Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell [2017] EWHC 89 ; Lungowe v Vedanta Resources Plc [2016] EWHC 975; 
England will be a by default appropriate forum if there is a risk of injustice in other states.   
1629
 Mills, A., (2015), ‘The law applicable to cross-border defamation on social media: whose law governs 
free speech in ‘Facebookistan’?’, Journal of Media Law, Vol 7, Issue 1, pp 1-35. 
1630
 At present it remains excluded from both UK and EU statutory rules concerning choice of law in tort. 
Even the Defamation Act 2013 neglected to reform this area of applicable law. 
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However, defamation is regulated by common law
1631
, which has been excluded from 
reforms in the field of ‘choice of law’ in tort.  
 
7.13.1.: Choice of law and law of the place of tort: 
 
In applying law of the place of tort to communications which take place online, the 
courts have determined that where the material is published through the internet, the tort 
occurs where it is ‘downloaded’ (at the location of the reader or recipient) (see-4.3.3, 
6.4.2). The case of Chadha
1632
, involved US publishers, where very low distribution of 
their magazines in England constituted a distinct English publication, meaning that 
under English choice of law rules the only law applicable to a defamation claim arising 
from those English publications is English law
1633
. A single webpage may thus easily 
give rise to a hundred distinct torts. In the Loutchansky
1634
 case, an English court held 
that articles read on a website constituted ‘publication’ of the material they contained, at 
the time and place of downloading. Similarly, Justice Eady
1635
 ruled that the tort arose 
at the place of download. He decided that the alleged material was downloaded in 
England, which makes it natural forum because the claimant had a reputation to protect 
in England. 
 
 7.13.2.: Position after the 2013 Act 
 
Since, 2013 Act, the claimant cannot rely on traditional presumption of damage, so 
evidence of harm is required. In the absence of evidence, the court will presume that 
foreign law is the same as English law.  
 
The 2013 Act essentially established a two-stage test for determining the law applicable 
to a tort. 
 
                                                          
1631
 Which law will apply? - England and Wales; Online Url, https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_which_law_will_apply-340-ew-en.do?member=1 [Assessed 29
th
 March 
2018]. 
1632
 Chadha v Dow Jones [1999] ILPr 829. 
1633
 Berezovsky v Forbes [2000] UKHL 25. 
1634
 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers Ltd (No.2) [2001] EMLR 36. 
1635
 King v Lewis [2004] EWCA Civ 1329; the allegedly defamatory nature of text uploaded to a website in 
the US state of California. It was subsequently downloaded in England. 
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1. Section 111636 set the general rule, ‘the applicable law is the law of the country 
in which the events constituting the tort occur’. Essentially, the basic rule 
adopted here is the law of the place of the tort (see-6.4.2)  
 
2. Section 12 provides for a flexible exception, under which a different law may be 
applied if this appears substantially more appropriate by comparing the 
connecting factors between the tort and different countries (see 4.3.3) 
 
Stage 1 – Section 11 
 
As a general rule
1637
, through the application of the law of the place of tort, the flexible 
exception allows the court to determine that a dispute, or an issue in a dispute, is more 
appropriately regulated by a different law. This includes cases where the issue concerns 
questions of loss allocation between parties whose relationship is centred in a different 
legal system
1638
. However, that legal system must be the natural forum based on the 
harm suffered. In the Jackson [2015]
1639
 case, English court ruled that the harm was 
suffered entirely in the US, which became the appropriate forum.  The judge held that 
English court also had jurisdiction over the defendant but refused to assume jurisdiction 
on the grounds of forum non conveniens (see-2.17.1).  
 
Stage 2– Section 12 
 
This test is more concerned about double-actionability which requires the claimant to 
prove that the libel is actionably under the law where the case is brought  and the law 
where the action is committed (see-2.11). If the claimant had satisfied the ‘double 
actionability’ rule, the Jackson case could have been decided in England. The claimant 
needed to show that the words in question were actionable both in the UK and in the 
country where the tort occurred
1640
.  
 
                                                          
1636
 Section 11(2) offers further guidance in how that law should be determined where “elements of 
those events occur in different countries”. 
1637
 Church of Scientology of California v Commissioner of Metropolitan Police [1976] 120 SJ 690. 
1638
 Article 4 (1) specifies that a tort is generally governed by the law of the place of the tort, which is 
defined as the place in which direct damage is suffered. 
1639
 Owusu v Jackson [2005] 1 QB 801, ECJ. 
1640
 Tsang, K., (2017), ‘Double actionability: An outdated rule in modern times’, UMKC Law Review Vol 
86, Issue 1, pp 73-110. 
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This is also in accordance with Section 13
1641
 that the claimants must prove that the 
publication is actionable in the law of the country where the tort was committed as well 
as by English law. The Godfrey
1642
 case was the first defamation action involving the 
internet to reach a judicial decision within this jurisdiction, where the material was 
published through ‘Usenet’. The English court held that material originating from the 
US, but distributed online through an English news server, constituted a publication in 
England.  
 
7.13.3.: The impact of the tests: 
 
The above tests demonstrate that exclusively English law will only govern the tort if it 
occurs in England and the damages based on harm to an English reputation may be 
claimed under English law
1643
. A claimant may only be claiming in respect of English 
publications, but they will frequently ask the court for an order regarding future 
publication of the defamatory material
1644
. The claimant with a reputation in multiple 
locations could potentially bring proceedings in English courts for local damages. The 
harm based on foreign downloads, give the claimant an option to sue the defendant in a 
country with the laws most favourable to their claim. They can also bring multiple suits 
in different jurisdictions in respect of the damage suffered in each jurisdiction 
individually
1645
. 
 
This theme insists that where defamation proceedings are brought in England relating to 
foreign conduct, whichever legal system has the higher standard of freedom of speech is 
applicable
1646
. The above analysis establishes that with Section 9, the application of 
traditional English law may be problematic for social media claims, when only a small 
minority of the recipients of an online communication download it in England. Even if, 
the Section 9 criterion is satisfied, the small number of English publications should 
                                                          
1641
 Section 13 of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995. 
1642
 Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd (Application to Strike Out) [2001] QB 201. 
1643
 Carter, P.B., (1996), ‘The Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995’ Quarterly 
Law Review, Vol 112, pp 194. 
1644
 Svantesson, D., (2012), ‘Time for the Law to Take Internet Geolocation Technologies Seriously’, 
Journal of Private International Law, Vol 8, pp 473. 
1645
 Hooper, D., (2016), ‘How the court will interpret whether England is the most appropriate place to 
bring a libel action, Entertainment Law Review, Vol 27, Issue 3, pp 102. 
1646
 Mills, A., (2009), ‘The Confluence of Public & Private International Law’, (Cambridge University 
Press), pp 5. 
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mean a relatively low damages award, based on the application of English law
1647
. 
Similarly, claims arising out of downloads in other jurisdictions may be tried in England 
if the ‘most suitable’ condition is satisfied. However, the applicable law will be based 
on foreign law, not the external projection of English standards. The case of Lewis 
[2018]
1648
 may be a ground-breaking decision, which will decide if Facebook is a 
publisher and its subscriber around the world can sue in England. While the hurdle for 
suing a non-EU defendant is high, Martin’s strong connections with England will put 
him in a strong position in the event that Facebook seeks to argue that England is not 
the most appropriate jurisdiction. This judgment will also clarify the impact of Section 9 
for non-EU claimant concerning online libel
1649
. 
 
7.14.: Meaning of ‘defamatory content’: 
 
A statement is defamatory if the words, ‘lower the claimant in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society ‘causing them to be shunned or avoided’ (see-5.2). Justice 
Warby
1650
 established that in the defamation law ‘defamatory meaning’ can be divided 
into two categories: ‘natural and ordinary’ and ‘innuendo’. The innuendo will only 
convey something to a reader who knows some relevant facts, which are not matters of 
common knowledge (see-5.5.1.2). The natural and ordinary meaning is to be determined 
by assessing the entire publication, including headlines, pictures or highlighted 
quotes
1651. It is important to note that for social media defamation cases ‘meaning’ is a 
question of fact not a question of law
1652
. Hence, if a statement does not bear a 
defamatory meaning according to the reasonable reader, the claim will be set aside
1653
. 
The court dismissed the claim in the Bukovsky [2018]
1654
 case because the words 
                                                          
1647
 Shevill v Presse Alliance [1995] ECR I 415. 
1648
 Martin Lewis v Facebook [2018] HC. 
1649
 Fantato, D., (2018), ‘Martin Lewis to sue Facebook over adverts’, The Financial Times Ltd, 
FTAdviser.Com; Mark Lewis the lawyer leading this case said that Facebook is not above the law – it 
cannot hide outside the UK and think that it is untouchable. 
1650
 Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2018] EMLR 5 [12]-[15].  
1651
 Charleston v News Group Newspapers Limited [1995] 2 AC 65; it is possible for a series of 
juxtapositions, prominent headlines or single inappropriate sentences to significantly elevate the 
meaning of an article beyond that which the publisher intended. 
1652
 Alsaifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB) [39]-[40].  
1653
 Lord McAlpine of West Green v Sally Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342; Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers 
[1929] 2 KB 331. 
1654
 Bukovsky v Crown Prosecution Service [2016] EWHC 1926 (QB). 
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complained of never conveyed defamatory meaning. In the Sube [2018]
1655
 case, the 
court refused the claim at the preliminary hearing on meaning because the articles did 
not bear a defamatory meaning.  
 
7.14.1.: Common law position of meaning: 
 
English libel law is not directly concerned whether the defendant’s statement is 
false
1656
. It focuses on the publication of false allegation regarding the claimant (see-
5.5.2). The analysis of ‘meaning’ becomes an essential starting point in libel claims. 
Common law applies a ‘legal fiction’ of ‘reasonable man test’ to identify ‘natural and 
ordinary’ meaning. For online libel it is called a ‘reasonable reader1657’ (see-2.17.3). 
Justice Mcdonald
1658
 concluded that in determining the meaning arising from the 
internet, the question must be determined by reference to the understanding of an 
ordinary reasonable reader. Tugendhat J
1659
 stated that the reader will not select the bad 
meaning, whereas Sharp LJ
1660
 believed that the reader will not select the less 
derogatory meaning.  
 
The general principles
1661
 that apply to the determination of meaning are well 
summarised by Anthony Clarke
1662
(see Appendix-V). These principles apply to both 
‘online and offline’ publications in the same way.  But for the online publication, the 
court will also take into account the ‘matters of ordinary general knowledge’ and ‘the 
matters known to the reader’. The statements published via bulletins and discussion 
boards are considered slander and may be understood to be vulgar abuse or not 
                                                          
1655
 Sube v News Group & Express Newspapers [2018] |EWHC 1234; Warby J concluded that ‘alleged 
articles’ did not convey any defamatory factual imputations. They did contain derogatory comments or 
opinions which did not harm claimant’s reputation. 
1656
 The courts are not concerned with what the author or publisher intended, nor with what any actual 
reasonable reader may have understood. 
1657
 Antoniou, A., & Akrivos, D., (2017), ‘Indecent images and defamatory meaning in late modern 
societies: Taking ordinary, reasonable readers outside their ivory tower’, JM Law, Vol 9, Issue 2, pp 155-
172. 
1658
 Google Inc v Trkulja [2016] VSCA 333. 
1659
 Lord MacAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB) [66]. 
1660
 Elliott v Rufus [2015] EWCA Civ 121 [11]. 
1661
 (1) The governing principle is reasonableness (2) The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naive (3) 
Over-elaborate analysis is best avoided (4) The intention of the publisher is irrelevant (5) The article 
must be read as a whole, etc. 
1662
 Jeynes v News Magazines Limited [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at [14]. 
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considered seriously
1663
. Just as the court decided in the Acobus [2017]
1664
 case that Mr. 
Trump’s tweets were ‘non-actionable opinions’. 
 
7.14.2.: Position since the 2013 Act: 
 
Traditional threshold of seriousness, required ‘tendency’ to affect adversely the attitudes 
of others towards the claimant, to a ‘substantial’ extent1665. Section 1 adds to this 
traditional test by introducing the requirement to show ‘potential harm’. The matters 
which previously discussed in libel claims, at the stage of quantification of damages, are 
now considered at preliminary stage. It also gives extra benefits to the defendant 
because he does not have to respond unless the claimant can establish a serious 
harm
1666
. In the Smith [2015]
1667
 case, it was held that the statement of fact conveyed an 
opinion rather than a factual allegation. Now the claimant bears the burden to prove that 
the words are defamatory, which is an extra hurdle under Section 1. Bean J
1668
 accepted 
that S1 raised the bar to its maximum heights because under traditional law the words 
could be presumed defamatory (see-7.19). 
 
7.14.3.: Social media cases of defamatory meaning: 
 
This section uses the following examples to elaborate above point: 
 
1. In the Jack [2017]1669 case, the court considered defamatory meanings of Twitter 
statements. At the trial the court established that the answers to two questions 
were compulsory before the ‘hearing trial’. Do the tweets bear a defamatory 
meaning at common law and did the tweets cause (or were they likely to cause) 
serious harm to the reputation of the claimant? The court found that the second 
tweet contained innuendo which was understood by those who also followed the 
first tweet.  
                                                          
1663
 Smith v ADVFN plc [2008] EWHC 1797 (QB) [13] to [17]. 
1664
 Acobus v Trump [2017] No 153252/16,  WL 160316, at 2.  
1665
 This case reaffirmed the Reynolds checklist established in (Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 
2 AC 127 at 205) i.e. it is also applied to foreign defendants if the choice of law is proved to be England. 
1666
 Mohamed Ali Harrath v (1) Stand for Peace Ltd (2) Samuel Westrop Reference [2016] EWHC 665; the 
similar does apply to internet, Facebook, twitter and other social media websites. 
1667
 Baglow v Smith [2015] ONSC 1175. 
1668
 Cooke v MGN Ltd [2014] EWHC 2831; S1 has set a very high hurdle for the claimant to clear before 
he will be deemed to have a cause of action. If this threshold cannot be met, it certainly seems sensible 
to establish this as early as possible. 
1669
 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017]. 
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2. In the Wilson [2017]1670 case, a tweet about Ms. Wilson’s classmate and its 
further publication in the media resulted in the biggest damage award in 
defamation history. ‘Everything she said about her life is a lie… what a liar (sic) 
she has become”, was considered defamatory. As she was a successful actress, it 
caused her to lose leading roles within the TV industry.   
 
3. In the Alsaifi [2017]1671 case, Warby J found that the words complained of were 
“clearly capable of defaming Mr Alsaifi” and awarded substantial damages.  
 
4. In the Westrop [2016]1672 case, the claimant who had an Islamic social website 
was sued for libel for the defamatory article written by another defendant. He 
was held liable for editing the words, which bore defamatory meaning.  
 
5. In the Hardie [2016]1673 case, the statements “Hardie is a brothel Madam; she 
runs a brothel club” were held to be defamatory because an ordinary online user 
would understand that Ms. Hardie runs a brothel.  
 
6. In the Dods [2016]1674 case, the court concluded that the statements ‘Dods did 
not contribute to Cassidy’s death; Dods was a dedicated police officer and had 
responded within the limitations of his training” were defamatory. The court 
concluded that considering the full context an ordinary user would feel that 
Dods killed Cassidy. However, if the defamatory meaning cannot be assumed 
with regards to the ‘ordinary reader’ the claim for damages may not succeed.  
 
7. In the Dank [2016]1675 case, the football manager claimed defamation when he 
was accused of giving a dangerous substance to his players. The judged awarded 
zero damages because he concluded that the defamatory statement contained a 
universal truth. A substance not tested for therapeutic use by humans can be 
harmful and must not be given to footballers.  
 
                                                          
1670
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd & Anor [2017] VSC 521. 
1671
 Alsaifi v Amunwa [2017] EWHC 1443 (QB). 
1672
 Mohamed Ali Harrath v (1) Stand for Peace Ltd (2) Samuel Westrop [2016] EWHC 665 (QBD). 
1673
 Hardie v Herald & Weekly Times [2016] VSCA 103. 
1674
 Dods v McDonald [2016] VSC 201. 
1675
 Dank v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 295. 
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8. In the Cripps [2015]1676 case, Mr. Cripps was critical of Israel and the defendant 
posted “Hitler’s disciples: The new racism of the political left”. The court found 
that criticising Israel does not make the claimant anti-semite; however, 
portraying the claimant to be a racist like Hitler is defamatory. 
 
9. In the Hockey [2015]1677 case, the court considered the actual tweet, along with 
the hyperlinks to the full articles and placards of public protest to conclude that 
it bore the defamatory meaning.  
 
In all the above cases the ‘defamatory meaning’ was trialled at preliminary hearings. 
The increase in the use of social media networks means that the allegations will 
increase. Hence, it is a good method to understand the meaning as early as possible to 
reject the ‘joke trials’. The courts’ approach to analyse the meaning as a preliminary 
trial is considerably important to develop the libel law for online communication. This 
theme acknowledges that the assessment of ‘meaning’ at the preliminary trial is the 
appropriate method. This should be assessed in tandem with the serious harm threshold 
i.e. does the defamatory meaning damage the victim’s reputation? The courts can reflect 
back on the initial assessment at the time awarding damages. This will allow the judge 
to decide whether the case is likely to succeed at the early stage. It may also save the 
cost of a full hearing and also save valuable court time. 
 
7.15.: Intention to harm via social media: 
 
Defamation is an unjustified attack on another's reputation but social media 
communication presents challenges in determining whether something is 
defamatory
1678
. It is also a challenge to distinguish between 'defamatory words' and 
'mere opinion'
1679
. An opinion cannot be classed as harmful because, as in the Trump 
case, the judge ruled that there is no remedy for ‘opinions’ (see-5.5.1.1). Similarly, mere 
insults and mindless communication via social media cannot be regarded as 
defamatory
1680
; however, the injured person may have other options (harassment, 
                                                          
1676
 Vakras v Cripps [2015] VSCA 193. 
1677
 Hockey v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited [2015] FCA 652. 
1678
 Burkell, J., & Kerr, I., (2000), ‘Electronic Miscommunication and the Defamatory Sense’, Canadian 
Journal of Law and Society, Vol 15, Issue 1, pp 81. 
1679
 Parkes, R., & Mullis, A., (2017), ‘Libel and Slander’, (12
th
 Ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London), para 12.7. 
1680
 Gill v Anagnost, Crews and Grenier [2017] US; in a libel action the New Hampshire state court 
concerning the posting of defamatory statements on a billboard by mortgage broker Gill. 
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trolling etc.). Liability in libel cases depends on the facts regarding 'defamatory 
material
1681
' because the intention of the defamer becomes irrelevant if harm is 
satisfied
1682
.  
 
7.15.1: The intention arguments: 
 
The motive or intention of the publisher will not be considered in libel claims
1683
. In the 
Aviva Insurance
1684
 case, the judge noted that ‘the motive of the person publishing the 
libel’ would have no bearing. Likewise, the argument ‘the publisher did not intend it to 
have libellous meaning’ was also rejected by Cave J1685 because the intention of the 
publisher is irrelevant. In the Axel [2014]
1686
 case, the court found that the statements 
about the intentions of a third party are to be categorised as ‘value-judgments’ rather 
than factual assertions lending themselves to proof. In the Wilson [2017]
1687
 case, where 
articles mistakenly published stated that Wilson lied about life events; the court 
considered that the defamation is not concerned with an honest mistake if the meaning 
and harm theorem are satisfied.  In the Lachaux [2017]
1688
 case, the defendant claimed 
that she was unaware of the defamatory conversation going ‘viral’. The court rejected 
her argument that at the time of publication she had no intention to cause Facebook 
defamation. In the Rolling Stone [2017]
1689
 case, the court rejected the argument that 
magazine is run for university students and there was no intention to cause character  
harm. In the Rayney [2017]
1690
 case, the court rejected the ‘publication by mistake’ 
argument and in the Jack [2017]
1691
 case, the judge also refused the evidence that the 
defendant did not intend to create continual harm by the Tweets. The Malina [2017]
1692
 
                                                          
1681
 Newstead v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1940] 1 KB 377; the defendant admitted publication but 
denied that they were intended to the claimant. The judge noted that it is established law that liability 
for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer but on the fact of the defamation. 
1682
 Smolla, A. R., (1983), ‘Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libel’, U. PA. 
L. REV., Vol 132, Issue 1, pp 18; defamation does not provide compensation for emotional disturbance, 
but rather remedies a wrongful disruption in the ‘relational interest’ that an individual has in 
maintaining personal esteem in the eyes of others. 
1683
 Yeo v Times Newspapers Ltd [2015] 1 WLR 971 at [88] and [89]. 
1684
 British Columbia Medical Association v Aviva Insurance Company of Canada [2011] BCSC 1399. 
1685
 Mir Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Limited & Fayaz Ghafoor [2015] EWHC 2917; preliminary 
issues trial considered meaning of the words and whether they consisted of assertion of fact or the 
expression of opinion. 
1686
 Axel Springer AG v Germany (No.2) (Application No.48311/10) [2014] ECHR 745 at [63]. 
1687
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521. 
1688
 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1334. 
1689
 Elias, IV, Hadford and Folwer v Rolling Stone Case [2017] CV 2465. 
1690
 Rayney v The State of Western Australia [No9] [2017] WASC 367. 
1691
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
1692
 Melania Trump v Daily Mail [2017] SCNY, Commercial Division No. 650661. 
 322 
 
case held that if the injury is caused, the apology cannot reverse the initial damage; 
however, the judge may consider it during the quantification of costs.  
 
7.15.2: Intention versus harm: 
 
The intention of the defendant to cause harm is irrelevant
1693
. Similarly, the courts will 
also reject a claim where coincidence causes defamation. Judge Gremillion
1694
 rejected 
the argument that the defendant was unaware of the existence of the claimant as the 
words were understood as defamatory by the people who knew the claimant. The 
‘intention’ must be distinguished with actual malice because in the case of public 
figures intention and actual malice are essential elements (see-7.20). Chris Gayle
1695
 
succeeded in his defamation claim against Fairfax Media. The judge rejected the 
defence because actual malice was found on the part of Fairfax. 
 
This theme highlights that defamation is a tort of strict liability. In a social media libel 
claim the court will consider the tendency and consequences of the publication. The 
judge will disregard motive or intention of the defendant unless the claimant is a public 
figure. Social media users cannot use the defence that they shared the post by mistake, 
unaware of its defamatory nature.  
 
7.16.: S1 ‘Seriousness threshold’:  
 
The explanation of Section 1 and its impact has already discussed (see-2.13.1.1). This 
theme will evaluate if S1 is inconsistent for social media libel. 
 
7.16.1.: Traditional position:  
 
Under common law, if a statement is defamatory and refers to a claimant it becomes 
actionable because harm to reputation is presumed under traditional law
1696
. The test 
related to meaning was objective and there was no requirement to produce evidence of 
                                                          
1693
 Independent Newspapers v Ireland [2015] ECHR 28199/15. 
1694
 Allen v Thomson Newspapers, Inc [2005] No. 04-1344 CA; It is immaterial whether the defendant. 
intended the defamatory statement to apply to the claimant. 
1695
 Chris Gayle v Fairfax Media [2017] NSW SC. 
1696
 Knupffer v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1944] UKHL 1, [1944] AC 116 [120]. 
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actual harm
1697
. This presumption could open a floodgate to claims against online 
publications. However, since the advent of online publications the courts balanced the 
presumption of harm and actual damage by developing the ‘Thornton threshold1698’. 
Justice Tugendhat noted that this threshold will prove a connection between substantial 
harm and common law presumption of damages (see-2.13.1). This traditional threshold 
allowed courts to strike out frivolous claims because if there was very little at stake the 
judges could reject the claims
1699. Even before that the courts used the term ‘Jameel 
abuse’ against trivial claims. In the Jameel1700 case, the court established that there is a 
need for a ‘real and substantial’ tort within the forum for a defamation claim to be 
made. The rules in Thornton and Jameel represented two independent mechanisms but 
very useful to eliminate trivial claims
1701
. 
 
7.16.1.1: Modern position:  
 
The traditional concept of harm was brought into doubt by the 2013 Act, which requires 
that the harm must be “serious” before it is actionable. It is arguable if the claimants 
will have to prove serious harm? However, the ‘Jameel threshold’ is most recently 
applied in the Linford [2015]
1702
 case. The defendant argued that the claimant had no 
significant reputation in the jurisdiction because the extent of publication was minimal. 
The court concluded that there is no substantial harm to reputation so this claim is an 
abuse of ‘Jameel process’. Section 1 now requires proof of ‘serious harm’ but Warby J 
held that the 'Jameel principle' is still applicable because it was not abolished
1703
. The 
2013 Act balances out and modernises English libel law by introducing a ‘seriousness 
                                                          
1697
 Gillick v BBC [1996] EMLR 267; Neill LJ noted that a statement should be taken to be defamatory if it 
would tend to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally, or be 
likely to affect a person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people generally. 
1698
 Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB). 
1699
 This requirement of the threshold was also confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Cammish v Hughes 
[2013] EMLR 13. 
1700
 Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc [2005] EWCA Civ 75. 
1701
 The distinction between the two principles lay in the objective or subjective nature of the 
assessment - Thornton was a purely objective standard whereas Jameel doctrine was based on the 
assessment of the negative impact on the claimant by the alleged statement. 
1702
 Craig Ames v Stephen Linford [2015] EWHC 3408; this is the first case to consider the serious harm 
test alongside ‘Jameel abuse’. Warby J established that where the serious harm test is satisfied, it will be 
unusual for that claim to fall foul of the principle in Jameel. 
1703
 The requirement that serious harm had been, or was likely to be inflicted took precedence over the 
requirement that a 'substantial or serious tort' had occurred. 
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threshold
1704’. The modern update introduced under S1 is likely to harm the reputation 
(see-2.14). 
 
7.16.1.2.: S1 (1) – likely to harm: 
 
The term “likely” covers situations where the harm has not yet occurred at the time the 
action for defamation commences. There is need for further clarification because at face 
value, the meaning of S1 (1) is unclear
1705
. This theme assumes that this term refers to 
the possibility of some future event occurring or to the nature of the statement being one 
that is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant
1706
. There has also 
been inconsistency in the application of the ‘seriousness threshold’ since 2013 as is 
evident from the interpretation of S1
1707
 in recent cases:  
 
1. In 2014, Bean J1708  gave the first decision on S1 by clarifying that ‘serious’ is 
an ordinary common word but evidence is required to satisfy the serious harm 
test
1709
. He concluded that S1 involves a higher threshold than substantial harm 
and Parliament intentionally removed traditional substantial tests to avoid 
‘uncertainty and litigation over what difference may exist between the two 
terms’. He also considered S1 (1) ‘likelihood’ and ‘future harm’: 
   
i. Backwards - from the date of publication to see if 'substantial harm' has 
already been caused 
ii. Forward - from the date of issue of proceedings to see if substantial harm 
is likely to be caused  
 
                                                          
1704
 Section 1: A statement must have caused or be likely to cause 'serious harm' to the claimant's 
reputation in order for it to be actionable in the courts. 
1705
 Gould, K., (2017), ‘Locating a "threshold of seriousness" in the Australian tests of defamation’, 
Sydney Law Review, Vol 39, Issue 3, pp 333-363. 
1706
 The rejection of the Thornton “tendency” test by the Parliament means that the latter interpretation 
seems unlikely. 
1707
 Cooke 2014, Alvaro 2015, Theedom 2015, Ames 2015, Lachaux 2015, Lachaux 2017 (CA) Monoro 
2017. 
1708
 Cooke v MGN [2014] EWHC 2831 (QB); the Sunday Mirror article published that the housing 
association, had significantly benefited from the misery of occupants, most of whom were on benefits, 
living in properties said to be in a state of disrepair. 
1709
 Some statements were so obviously likely to cause serious harm to a person’s reputation that 
likelihood could be inferred. 
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He held that the ‘harm test’ is to be assessed at the issue of proceedings (as 
opposed to the point of publication). 
 
2. In 2015, Warby J1710  concluded that the intention of S1 (1) was to create a new 
and stiffer statutory test requiring consideration of actual harm. He was of the 
view that it displaced the common law presumption of damage, so the claimants 
have to show on the balance of probabilities that the words caused (or will 
cause) serious harm.  
 
3. Warby J endorsed his judgment in the case of Ames [2015]1711.  He noted that 
'the actual or likely harm' to reputation is too slight to justify a claim. It should 
preferably be tried as a preliminary issue rather than be the subject of a 
strikeout/default application. He noted that the 'issue of meaning' should be 
determined alongside the issue of serious harm because separating the two is 
“inherently undesirable” (see-7.14). 
 
4. In 2015, Moloney QC1712 gave a different interpretation of S1. He concluded 
that if a claimant can prove serious defamatory allegations and publication to a 
fairly substantial audience, harm can be inferred. The claimant has all the 
ingredients for an inferential (but rebuttable) case on serious harm.  
 
5. In 2016, Dingemans J1713  found that serious harm could not be inferred from the 
facts, albeit the allegations were just as grave and there was similar publication 
regarding numbers. The total readership in England was a mere 55; however, he 
noted that ‘seriousness’ is not a number game. If a publication is limited but 
causes serious harm, it is sufficient to meet the required threshold. 
 
6. In 2017, LJ Davis1714 overruled Warby J that ‘harm test’ is not a primary issue. 
The claimants do not need to prove at an early stage that they have suffered (or 
likely to suffer) harm. It also reaffirmed the position that even where defamatory 
                                                          
1710
 Lachaux v Independent Print Limited & Ors [2015] EWHC 2242 (QB). 
1711
 Ames v The Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] EWHC 127 (QB). 
1712
 Theedom v Nourish Training Ltd [2015] EWHC 3769 (QB). 
1713
 Alvaro Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EWHC 66 (QB). 
1714
 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1327. 
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statements are published in different publications, each libel becomes actionable 
if it causes distinct damage to reputation. 
 
7. In 2018, the Supreme Court1715 accepted the appeal to decide the serious harm 
threshold. 
 
7.16.2.: Traditional concept versus S1: 
 
Concerning freedom of social media communication - it is a question of fact to identify 
at what stage a claimant's reputation, in terms of what people think of him should trump 
or silence the freedom of others to be able to publish statements about him. Concerning 
freedom of expression, traditional English law allowed a claimant to sue a defendant 
who posted anything, which makes others think less of him, without having to show that 
what was said is untrue, that it caused them harm or that the publisher was unreasonable 
(see-2.14). Arguably, traditional law provided less protection to freedom of speech but 
the 2013 Act provides more protections to speech. S1 ensures that only the most 
egregious cases are brought by ‘seriousness threshold’. Justice Jay1716 held that the 
claimant having his name linked to forgery was a serious libel.  
 
However, the central question remains that when to satisfy the S1 threshold: 
  
1. At the time when the cause of action arises 
2. At the time when the claimant seeks permission to serve outside the jurisdiction 
3. At the time when the issue of meaning is determined 
4. At the time when the damages are calculated  
 
There is no such requirement under CPR because in traditional law ‘the cause of action’ 
for libel is actionable per se on publication (see-7.16). Since the 2013 Act, a cause of 
action may remain incomplete until serious harm is caused/probable. The case of Cooke 
[2014]
1717
 considered the 'seriousness test' alongside the Jameel abuse process and 
Warby J concluded that the issue of serious harm is better dealt with as a preliminary 
                                                          
1715
 Lachaux v IPL [2018] 2 WLR 387; Supreme Court has to decide if: Parliament had created a separate 
factual test, or simply raised the objective threshold in Thornton from ‘substantial’ to ‘serious’ harm. 
1716
 Umeyor v Nwakamma (Rev 1) [2015] EWHC 2980 (QB). 
1717
 Cooke v MGN [2014] EMLR 31. 
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issue. In the Anor [2016]
1718
 case, the court also maintained that ‘harm’ is a preliminary 
issue and useful if dealt with 'meaning'; however, in the PJS [2016]
1719
 case, the court 
dealt with S1 at the stage of damages. The Lachaux [2017]
1720
 case, held that S1 raised 
the threshold from substantiality to seriousness but did not require proof of actual 
damage to reputation. There is an appeal pending in the Supreme Court on this issue.  
 
Accordingly, Davies LJ
1721
 held that Section 1 only raises the threshold ‘from one of 
substantiality to one of seriousness: ‘No less, no more but equally no more, no less’, the 
words ‘likely to cause’ denote a “tendency” to cause serious harm. Davies LJ rejected 
Warby J’s conclusion that the traditional presumption of damage is abolished. He 
clarified that Parliament intended to raise the threshold of harm, which is nevertheless 
compatible with the presumption of damage, so harm still can be presumed. 
 
7.16.2.1.: Is S1 appropriate for social media libel? 
 
The decision in the Ames [2015]
1722
 case is significant as the second to give detailed 
consideration to S1 in social media context. With regards to damage to reputation via 
social media, it is not possible to demonstrate how much harm is caused. Therefore, it 
should be presumed that the victim can suffer an injury to the reputation which is not 
actual (there might be an application for an injunction rather than damages). Whereas, 
in the event of actual harm (a person was fired because of libel), the libel claim becomes 
a matter of damages. The courts have considered defamation on Twitter on a number of 
occasions
1723
. The case of Jack [2017]
1724
 is a Twitter libel trial, post-2013, where the 
court considered if tweets bear a defamatory meaning in common law and when they 
are likely to cause serious harm. Concerning social media, there are some special 
features of publication:  
 
1. It can be limited or very large, compared to a traditional “mainstream media” 
case. The number of publishers may be difficult to ascertain. It was also 
                                                          
1718
 Undre & Anor v The London Borough of Harrow [2016] EWHC 931.  
1719
 PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26. 
1720
 Lachaux v Independent Print [2017] EWCA Civ 1334. 
1721
 Lachaux v Independent Print [2017] EWCA Civ 1334. 
1722
 Ames & Anor v The Spamhaus Project Ltd [2015] EWHC 127.  
1723
 In the case of Cairns v Modi [2012] EWHC 756 (QB), the claimant recovered £90,000 damages in 
respect of a defamatory tweet published to 65 immediate publishees. 
1724
 Jack Monroe v Katie Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
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concluded in the Brisard [2016]
1725
 case that the claimant cannot rely on any 
“presumption of publication” 
 
2. The publisher may be familiar with the views of the claimant1726 and may be 
sympathetic with their views, so it is unlikely that much “actual damage” to 
reputation may be caused  
 
3. There is also the issue of the context; for instance, Twitter restricts a tweet to 
140 characters and the users have to express their views in short sentences. It is 
arguable, if these short tweets should be considered as vulgar abuse
1727
 rather 
than statements of fact.  Harm may, therefore, be more difficult to establish in 
comparison to a “serious media publication”. Justice Nicklin1728 also noted that 
it was difficult to imagine “serious allegations” are enough to cause serious 
harm  
 
Based on above analyses, this theme suggests that if the harm is not actual, the claim 
should be dealt under the ‘Jameel threshold’. Otherwise, it would cause the claimants to 
incur substantial costs at an early stage of proceedings by obtaining and preparing 
essential evidence.   
 
7.16.3.: Assessment of likely harm: 
 
Concerning S1 (1), the courts are unable to clarify at what point the likelihood of future 
serious harm should be assessed. The assessment of ‘likely harm’ is a similar process to 
the question of S1 serious harm, which is only relevant if ‘serious harm’ is not caused at 
the date of the hearing. To explain S1 (1), Bean J preferred the date on which the 
proceedings are started, whilst Warby J favoured the date of the hearing relating to 
serious harm. This theme recommends that Warby J’s approach is more logical because 
‘serious harm’ should have been established prior to the hearing. It is more suitable for 
social media libel because at the start of proceedings the claimant might not have 
suffered any actual harm but with the further publication and re-sharing future harm 
                                                          
1725
 Amoudi v Brisard [2006] EWHC 1062. 
1726
 If they follow them on social media: The claimant’s followers are unlikely to pay attention to the 
defendant’s views and the defendant’s followers are unlikely to have a high opinion of the claimant. 
1727
 McGrath & Anor v Dawkins [2012] EWHC B3 (QB) [52]. 
1728
 Anbananden Sooben v Eshan Badal [2017] EWHC 2638 (QB). 
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may occur. It is questionable to what extent the limitation period and ‘single 
publication’ can have an impact on ‘likelihood’ of harm.  
 
7.16.4.: Should S1 test be modified: 
 
The analysis of initial case law has started to delimit the serious harm test because the 
judges gave contradictory rulings in each case. The unpredictability of the harm test 
may cause a deterrent for potential victims trying to protect their reputation because of 
the uncertainty of a claim succeeding. The above analysis proves that if ‘serious 
threshold’ is dealt with as a preliminary issue, it will be unnecessary for the defendant 
to file a defence before it is decided i.e. if the threshold is not satisfied then the claim 
will fail before the hearing trial. This offers a potential saving in both time and costs. 
An argument can be made that the judges unjustifiably steered away from what 
Parliament intended when introducing the S1 threshold.  
 
Where it stands: S1 can no longer be seen as marking a significant departure from the 
traditional position because courts establish that it is merely a modification of the 
common law ‘Thornton test’. The final verdict is yet to come in the Supreme Court1729, 
which will provide a binding ruling on this unpredictable issue. This thesis would 
recommend where it is appropriate to infer serious harm. It would be burdensome and 
expensive for the claimant to  attend an interim hearing to provide further evidence to 
prove serious harm. This would go against the grain of one of the stated purposes 
behind the reforms to the law of defamation: to reduce, rather than increase, costs. 
 
7.17.: Importance of ‘context’ in social media libel:  
 
The determination of context
1730
 becomes crucial
1731
  in online libel because trial by 
jury is abolished and the ‘meaning’ is defined by a ‘reasonable reader’ (see-2.17.3).  
Besides, the change of communication medium changes the world around us, the 
                                                          
1729
 Lachaux v IPL [2018] 2 WLR 387; Supreme Court has to decide if Parliament had created a separate 
factual test, or simply raised the objective threshold in Thornton from ‘substantial’ to ‘serious’ harm. 
1730
 The context in this section is considered concerning publication as a whole whereas the meaning of 
context may be different with regards to employment, free speech, fiduciary relation and domestic 
relations.  
1731
 The Internet users are aware of obvious illegal activities: Piracy, hacking and child pornography. 
There is a remarkable lack of awareness when it comes to defamation, which could carry equally harsh 
penalties. The social media users do not analyses information before sharing and they might not have 
the editorial/legal expertise to understand the consequences of their comments. 
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content must be interpreted in regard to this changed world
1732
. In social 
communication, context includes material/emoji’s/pictures/headlines/hyperlinks in the 
same ‘publication’1733: Online users have been sued for emojis1734  and hashtag1735.  
Google has been sued for the auto-complete option. A libel will be established if a 
published statement reasonably implies false and defamatory facts. A false report may 
not be actionable if the contextual factors demonstrate that true meanings, as understood 
by the reasonable reader, are something other than what the words alone may 
suggest
1736
. Hence, the statement that a claimant has to prove false to succeed in libel 
action is not the 'literal phrase' published: But the meanings a reasonable reader with 
prior knowledge draws. This test may be different from traditional publication. Warby 
J
1737
 acknowledged that the mode of publication can affect the way in which the 
ordinary reader absorbs information, including the amount of time they devote to 
reading or viewing it.  
 
7.17.1: Position since the 2013 Act: 
 
The 2013 Act did not amend the well-established rules, which may be easy to apply to 
printed publications
1738
. However, for more dynamic and interactive social 
communication, the determination of 'context' becomes important. Court of Appeal
1739
 
noted that statements made on social media could not reasonably be interpreted as 
factual statements based on their distinctive 'content, tone, and context'. For instance, 
Twitter characters limit for one tweet is 140. It became a norm of pithily expressed 
information in short bursts. Hence, a single tweet rarely exists in isolation from 
others
1740
. A tweet that is said to be libellous may include an innuendo. It may have to 
be read as part of a series of tweets, which the ‘ordinary reader’ will have seen at the 
same time.  
                                                          
1732
 Mcluhan, M., (1964), ‘Understanding Media’ (NY, McGraw Hill), pp 9. 
1733
 Jones, A., & Lidsky, L.B., (2016), ‘Of Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a 
Networked World’, Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law, Vol 16, Issue 2, pp 29. 
1734
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
1735
 Ave Point v Power Tools [2013] 981 F. Supp. 2d 496 WD; the court analysed a series of hashtags to 
understand the alleged defamation  that the plaintiff claimed were designed. 
1736
 Farah v Esquire Magazine [2013] No. 1:11-cv-01179. 
1737
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
1738
 It includes books, newspapers, magazines, static online publications, blogs or information on 
websites. 
1739
 Giduck v Niblett [2014] No. 13CA0775, WL 2986670. 
1740
 Hansson, S., (2013), ‘Defamation in 140 character or Fewer – The case of McAlpine v Bercow ’, CTLR, 
Vol 19, Issue 6, pp 172. 
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The Seldon
1741
 case proposed that a court has to analyse each separate publication to 
draw the defamatory meaning. Similarly, the courts might have to analyse the 
conversational dialogue to determine the extent of harm
1742
. It is arguable that the 
defendant may delete the first tweet before publishing the second tweet. However, 
Dingemans J
1743
 established that this might only affect the calculation of damages rather 
than the meaning of ‘defamation’ (see-7.20). It is arguable that the conversation via 
social media is meant to be personal, but if it is conveyed to another reader, it will be 
considered ‘published’1744. In the Stocker [2016]1745 case, the wife sent a libellous email 
to her husband. She also made comments on Facebook (she was unaware of her privacy 
settings) during a conversation with her new partner, which were also visible on her 
friend’s Facebook. Arden LJ found her liable because the exchange of Facebook 
communication was visible to her friends. The court considered full context and other 
conversations to establish defamatory meanings. In the Bussey [2015]
1746
 case, Eady J 
awarded £10,000 to the claimant after considering the context because the comments 
were made via Google Maps and later published on a review website. Moloney J
1747
 had 
to consider an online petition started at school and the subsequent conversation via 
social network to assume the defamatory sting of the alleged statement.  
 
In short, for social media, the context includes
1748
 (1) Matters of common knowledge 
and (2) Matters that were put before the users. This theme focuses on the legal 
repercussions of social statements: Which are often not understood by individuals. 
Social media users still think that online communication is like sending an SMS to 
others, rather than publishing something for the general public. The above discussion 
proves that the courts will analyse the full picture to understand if the shared words 
contain defamatory meanings. 
                                                          
1741
 Seldon v Compass Rest [2012] No. 03050/11, WL 5363518; the judge held that the ordinary reader 
would understand the defamatory meaning after reading the online and email article written by the 
defendant.  
1742
 Yew, K., (2015), ‘Reputation and Defamatory Meaning on the Internet-Communications, Contexts, 
and Communities’, Singapore Academy Law Journal, Vol 27, Special Issue, pp 694. 
1743
 Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EMLR 12 at [46]. 
1744
 Pullman v Hill [1981] CA 1891; a claimant dropped a letter in an open card containing defamatory 
matter. It was held the card was likely to be read by somebody else and therefore he effectively 
published the information containing the defamatory statement. 
1745
 Stocker v Stocker [2016] EWHC 474 (QB). 
1746
 Bussey v Jason Page [2015] EWHC 563 (QB); reviews of businesses that appear on Google Maps can 
be posted on the site and are accessed through the search engine. Their reputations have been 
vindicated following the republication through the medium of an online review site. 
1747
 Tardios v Linton [2015] EWHC 2552 (QB). 
1748
 Yew, K., (2015), ‘Reputation and Defamatory Meaning on the Internet-Communications, Contexts, 
and Communities’, Singapore Academy Law Journal, Vol 27, Special Issue, pp 694. 
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7.18.: Identifying the defendant:  
 
In social media libel the author, the editors or the legal entity may be responsible for the 
publication (see-5.9.1.1). The critical question arises, who should be sued, who is the 
defendant, who is the publisher because if the wrong defendant is sued, the case may be 
dismissed
1749. The traditional English concept defines ‘primary and secondary 
publisher’1750. It clarifies that a person who is responsible for the publication of 
defamatory material can be sued
1751
. The victim can sue more than one primary 
publisher to claim damages/costs
1752
. For instance, defamatory comments made during 
television-interviews allows the victim to sue all primary publishers; the interviewee (as 
author) and broadcaster (as commercial publishers). However, in social media 
publication, it is sometimes difficult to locate the defendant/publisher (see-7.6), because 
it may involve primary
1753
 and secondary
1754
 publishers.   
 
7.18.1.: Primary or secondary publisher: 
 
An individual who deliberately publishes the defamatory material will always be liable 
as a primary
1755
 publisher (see-5.9.1.5). The  2013 Act defines that an individual, who is 
aware of libel publication only becomes accountable as a secondary publisher, if he 
chooses not to remove it
1756
. Interestingly, if a secondary publisher exerts some control 
over published content, he becomes a primary publisher
1757
. He can also be sued as a 
secondary publisher
1758
  if he passively made the content available to others
1759
. In the 
Fevaworks [2013]
 1760
 case, the court established that the content providers can be 
                                                          
1749
 Richardson v Facebook [2015] EWHC 3154 (QB); Warby J rejected the appeal because Facebook was 
the wrong defendant. 
1750
 This includes writer, producer, director, editor, interviewee, broadcaster, even, in the case of a book, 
the printers or the newsagents or booksellers. 
1751
 Byrne v Deane [1937] 1 KB 818; it established this old English concept; where the Golf secretary and 
club owners both were held responsible for defamation for failure to remove defamatory article from 
their noticeboard.  
1752
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB). 
1753
 The author, editor and commercial publisher of the defamatory publication. 
1754
 ISPs, Printers, websites or book sellers, may only be sued if it is not "reasonably practicable" for the 
claimant to sue a primary publisher. 
1755
 Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521. 
1756
 Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd [2017] EWCA Civ 1334. 
1757
 Shakil-Ur-Rahman v ARY Network Limited [2016] EWHC 3110 (QB). 
1758
 Dr Yeung, Sau Shing Albert v Google [2014] HKCFI 1404. 
1759
 Duffy v Google Inc [2015] SASC 170. 
1760
 Oriental Press Group v Fevaworks Solutions [2013] HKCFA 47 [75]. 
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secondary publishers if they could control content and could prevent that publication 
(see-5.6).  
 
The courts have adopted few standards to identify primary publisher:  
 
1. The knowledge criterion1761 
2. The control criterion1762 
 
7.18.2.: Position since the 2013 Act:  
 
The 2013 Act has not modified the definition of publisher
1763
 hence, based on the above 
criteria, any user/provider/website operator can become liable as a primary publisher 
(see-5.9.1.2). Common law cases
1764
 suggest that judges are reluctant to hold the service 
providers to be primary publishers. Eady J
1765
 decided that Google could not be deemed 
as a publisher of material on its blogger platform. Similarly, Google-Australia
1766
, 
Google-UK
1767
, Google-NZ
1768
 and Google-Spain
1769
 judgments also suggest that 
Google is not a publisher but a mere data collector because the operation and control of 
the Google search engine reside with Google-US. Therefore, being subscriber of Google 
Inc., they become the distributor rather than a publisher. For social media 
communication, there is a need to differentiate between distributor and publisher
1770
 
because different rules may apply to each
1771
.  
 
                                                          
1761
 Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB) [21-22]; did the defendant foresee the gravity of harm. 
1762
 Oriental Press Group v Fevaworks Solutions [2013] HKCFA 47 [76]; did the defendant had control.  
1763
 It leaves unchanged the significant existing intermediary defences at section 1 of the Defamation Act 
1996 and Regulations 17 to 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (the 
“Regulations”). 
1764
 Bunt v Tilley [2006] 3 All ER 336; Godfrey v Demon Internet [1999] 4 All ER 342; Metropolitan 
International Schools (Train2Game) v Digital Trends [2010] 3 All ER 548 considered; Davison v Habeeb 
[2011] All ER (D) 205. 
1765
 Tamiz v Google Inc [2013] EWCA Civ 68. 
1766
 Rana v Google Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 60. 
1767
 Richardson v Facebook [2015] EWHC 3154 (QB). 
1768
 A v Google New Zealand Ltd [2012] NZHC 2352 at [44]. 
1769
 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and Mario Costeja 
Gonzalez (Case C-131/12). 
1770
 Section 5, the Defamation Act 2013 immunes both content providers (Yahoo, Google, Facebook, 
Twitter) and service providers (ISPs); however, they may be liable in different circumstances. 
1771
 Descheemaeker, E., (2015), ‘A man must take care not to defame his neighbour: The origins and 
significance of the defence of responsible publication’, University of Queensland Law Journal, Vol 34, 
Issue 2, pp 239-264. 
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A distinction between content providers and service providers is also needed to 
establish the primary publisher. In the Defteros [2017]
1772
 case, Google denied being a 
publisher of defamatory content by claiming that they do not exert any control over 
content.  
 
7.18.3.: Traditional versus social media publisher: 
 
Traditionally, if a reporter writes a defamatory article, the newspaper-publisher is sued 
because he has editorial control. Google argued that it is not a publisher but a content 
provider so should be immune from claims just like ISPs
1773
. However, they can also 
become primary publisher upon receiving a notice about the publication of alleged 
material (see-5.9.3). If they do not remove the material within a reasonable time, they 
could be sued as publisher of the content complained about
1774
. For instance, Twitter 
has empowered its users to express their views and shape events i.e. everyone is a 
potential publisher on social media. Influence has shifted beyond traditional media to a 
more democratised concept and where traditional media have shied away from naming 
an individual or company, for fear of legal reprisal, social media have stepped in to 
'restore justice'
1775
.  
 
There is not enough case law to understand recent legal developments. The liability of 
providers becomes crucial because of the increase in subscriber-based networks, which 
use cyberspace as a vehicle of defamation. The law reached critical mass in the case of 
McAlpine
1776
, where the defendant's defamatory tweet, was posted to the members of 
her network. The court found that the use of symbols (image or emoji) makes the user a 
social media publisher.  
 
This theme argues that when a libellous remark is made by a contributor or interviewee 
in a program the channel/broadcaster are held responsible as commercial publishers of 
the libel. Similarly, social media sites offer design layouts to their users. It provides the 
required services to enable ads to be placed. It has the power and capability to remove 
                                                          
1772
 Defteros v Google LLC & Google Australia Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 158. 
1773
 Google Inc v Trkulja [2016] VSCA 333. 
1774
 Google Inc v Trkulja [2016] VSCA 333. 
1775
 Pelletier, N., (2018), ‘The Emoji that Cost $20,000: Triggering Liability for Defamation on Social 
Media’, Wash. U. J. L. & Policy, Vol 52, pp 227. 
1776
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB); ‘innocent face’ or emoticon can be understood by the 
reasonable reader to mean being insincere and ironical. 
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or block access to the material concerned. They make the users agree to their terms and 
conditions, which state that no defamatory/terror/anti-government content will be 
shared. Then they should remove it or be held liable for libel (see-7.8).  
 
7.19.: Extent of publication: 
 
The ‘extent of publication’ is another traditional concept applied by judges1777  in 
traditional media defamation cases. However, previously it was applied while assessing 
damages, as Bean J
1778
 stated ‘the extent of publication’ is a well-established 
phenomenon, which helps in the assessment of damages. It is also used to find the 
jurisdiction based on downloading as the Gutnick
1779
 case held that the place of 
publication is the jurisdiction, where the material was published and received. In the 
Richardson
1780
 case, the court stated that it was published at the point at which it was 
capable of being comprehended by a third party.   
 
7.19.2: Extent of publication versus S9 (2): 
 
Under Section 9 (2)
1781
 ‘the extent of publication’ is considered at the beginning of 
proceedings when a claimant requests service out of jurisdiction. It has become a 
preliminary issue just like harm and forum conveniens. S9 (2) requires the courts to 
consider the extent of publication by making the claimant to bring before the court the 
fullest reasonably available evidence as to publication in all places where the words 
complained of have been published. S9 must, therefore, be read and given effect under 
Art 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which must be compatible with the claimant’s 
right to access a court (see-7.6, 6.8).  The only problem in online libel is the typically 
                                                          
1777
 Ghannouchi v Al-Arabiya [2007] EWHC 2855 (QB); Veliu v Mazrekaj [2007] 1WLR 495; Campbell-
James v Guardian Newspapers [2005] EMLR 24; This test allows compensating the claimant for damage 
to his reputation, vindicate his good name and take account of the stress, hurt and humiliation which 
defamatory publications cause. 
1778
 Turner v MGN [2005] EMLR 25. 
1779
 Dow Jones & Co Inc v Gutnick [2002] HCA 56; defamatory statements are actionable in the 
jurisdiction of publication and damage to reputation. 
1780
 Richardson v Schwarzenegger [2004] EWHC 2422 (QB), the English court reinforced Gutnick’s 
findings that an internet publication takes place in any jurisdiction where the relevant words are 
downloaded. 
1781
 Section 9(3): The claimant will need to adduce such statistics in relation to republications and any 
statement conveying the same, or substantially the same, imputation as the statement complained of. 
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limited extent of publication and the inherent evidential difficulties where no record of 
“hits” is available1782. 
 
The first case to consider S9 (2)
1783
 was Ahuja [2015]
1784
, which established that the 
judges have to take into account such matters as the amount of damage to the claimant’s 
reputation in England in comparison with other jurisdictions
1785
. Lorna Skinner
1786
 
established that the extent of publication is another preliminary step
1787
 and puts an 
extra burden on claimants because courts are bound to consider the extent to which 
publication was targeted at a readership in England as compared to elsewhere. The 
claimants are forced to seek expert evidence by analysing Twitter/Facebook activity to 
provide the detailed information required by the court.  In essence, online publications 
have to be examined from their geo-profiling (where a Twitter user had indicated their 
location) or for other indications of their geographical status. This evidence will show if 
the extent of the activity and the majority of people posting, commenting or re-tweeting 
are based in England or other jurisdictions. It is debatable what evidence the claimant 
has to bring to prove ‘extent of publication’. Does he have to produce the stats of the 
users downloading the defamatory material; or the statements of witness that the 
claimant suffered harm will be sufficient to justify evidence. Previously, the context of 
publication could be proved using admissible evidence of real and actual numbers of 
readers of the offending content
1788
. 
 
The case of Ames [2015]
1789
 concluded that the claimant has the liberty to call witnesses 
to support his claim on serious harm, which can satisfy the extent of publication 
requirement. However, it may also go against his understandable desire not to spread 
the libellous content. The claimant has to take the risk of asking individuals if they have 
read ‘the content’ and what they think of him? What if the persons who think badly of 
                                                          
1782
 Applause Stores Productions Ltd v  Raphael [2008] EWHC 1781 (QB). 
1783
 Tugendhat J observed that the effects of Section 9 make the judges to consider all the jurisdictions 
where the defamatory statement has been published to determine whether England is clearly the most 
appropriate place (see-2.11.2). 
1784
 Ahuja v Politika Novine I Magazini D.O.O. [2015] EWHC 3380 (QB). 
1785
 Simpson v MGN Limited [2015] EWHC 77. 
1786
 HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz A Saud v Forbes [2014] EWHC 3823. 
1787
 The Defamation Act 2013 abolished trial by jury. It gives judges greater scope to achieve early 
resolution.  Previously some issues could not have been decided until it was known whether the trial 
would take place before a jury. 
1788
 Leech v Green & Gold Energy Pty Ltd and Anor [2011] NSWSC 999. 
1789
 Ames v The Spam house Project [2015] EWHC 127 (QB) at paragraph 55. 
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the claimant are not likely to co-operate in providing evidence. Dingemans J
1790
 
highlighted the fact that there might be difficulties in getting witnesses to say that they 
read the words and thought badly of the claimant. The extent of publication is here to 
prove it also causes damage. Hence, republication may be an interesting fact to examine 
with regards to Section 8 which limits the liability of the defendant in further 
publication. Bingham LJ
1791
 stated that in online defamation, it is immaterial to 
conclude that the damage caused by the publication began and ended with publication 
by the original publisher. Similarly, in the Hopkins [2017]
1792
 case, ‘the context of 
assessing how many times a tweet had been viewed’, the judge noted that ‘precision is, 
of course, impossible, but nor is it necessary’. It is enough to present a sound 
assessment of the overall scale of the publication. In the Zahwai [2017]
1793
 case, the 
court also considered if the words complained of were published and republished to a 
large number of readers in England. The court accepted the claimant’s evidence: (1) the 
nature of the Press TV website; (2) the extent of website republications; (3) the extent of 
social media republications; (4) approaches made to the claimant following publication.  
 
7.19.3: Extent of publication for service outside: 
 
This theme is co-related to the theme with service of claim form (see-7.4, 7.5). It 
highlights that the victims who require permission for service out, are required to 
produce statistics on publication. These figures must be obtained regarding all forums 
with which the claimant has any connection.  These statistics can also be submitted on 
the bases of the 'extent of publication', which may become the appropriate alternative 
means by which to bring the claim. However, this requirement of S9 (2) is time-
consuming and may also increase the difficulty and cost to the victim because along 
with the ‘published-figures’, expert witnesses may also be required. In social media 
libel, it becomes complicated because it is not simply a closed coffee shop among 
friends, it publishes to thousands of other users
1794
. The McAlpine [2013]
1795
 case also 
highlighted this difficulty of gathering evidence. The claimant’s lawyer presented the 
examples of a couple of 'high-profile Tweeters' - they have hundreds, or even thousands, 
                                                          
1790
 Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing [2016] EWHC 66 (QB) at [46]-[50]. 
1791
 Slipper v BBC [1991] QB 283 at 300. 
1792
 Monroe v Hopkins [2017] EWHC 433 (QB) at [58]. 
1793
 Nadim Zahwai v Press TV Ltd [2017] EWHC 1010 (QB). 
1794
 Halliday, J., (2013), ‘Sally Bercow denies 'trivialising' public apology to Lord McAlpine’, online Url 
www.theguardian.com [Assessed 2
nd
 April 2018]. 
1795
 McAlpine v Bercow [2013] EWHC 1342 (QB). 
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of followers. For celebrities, it becomes even more difficult and proving actual malice is 
another hurdle (see-7.20); which was also highlighted in the Page [2015]
1796
 case. In the 
Rai [2015]
1797
 case, it was established that the internet had given publication new force, 
which creates the potential for libel to spread ‘virally’ when ‘shared’, ‘reposted’ or 
‘retweeted1798.’ 
 
7.19.4.: Current position concerning Section 9 (2): 
 
Given the strictures in Ahuja
1799
 case, it is compulsory for the claimant to submit 
evidence of the extent of publication (see-7.1, 7.7). Such evidence must be provided to 
demonstrate that his reputation is substantially in England rather than abroad. If the 
claimant is unsuccessful in obtaining this evidence, the courts must consider whether 
the claimant would receive a fair trial abroad. In this scenario, courts need explicit proof 
that the defendant enjoys any special status. It was accepted in Zahawi case that the 
defendant in Iran was a state-affiliated media outlet and the court accepted that any case 
would be likely to suffer significant delays through administrative and judicial/political 
interference. There could be scenarios where the defendant has political affiliation and 
would not receive a fair and neutral hearing abroad
1800
.  
 
The claimant’s burden can be satisfied by proving to the judge that there exists a risk 
that justice could not be obtained in an overseas court because of incompetency, 
corruption, political influence or independence
1801
. There is no rule that the English 
court cannot examine the question of
1802
 whether the international court or the foreign 
court system is corrupt or lacking in independence
1803
. Lord Diplock
1804
 stated that it is 
                                                          
1796
 The Bussey Law Firm PC v Page [2015] EWHC 563 (QB), at [14].  
1797
 Rai v Bholowasia [2015] EWHC 382 (QB), at [173]. 
1798
 Perry, S. J., & Marcum, T. M., (2016), ‘Unmasking the anonymous online speaker: Balancing free 
speech and defamation, Labour Law Journal, Vol 67, Issue 4, pp 529; Perry, R., & Zarsky, T. Z., (2014), 
‘Liability for online anonymous speech: Comparative and economic analyses’, Journal of European Tort 
Law, Vol 5, Issue, 2, pp 205-256; Vamialis, A., (2013), ‘Online defamation: Confronting anonymity’, 
International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Vol 21, Issue 1, pp 31-65. 
1799
 Ahuja v Politika Novine I Magazini D.O.O. [2015] EWHC 3380 (QB). 
1800
 AAA v Unilever Plc [2017] EWHC 371 (QB). 
1801
 Pertoldi, A., Neill, J., (2017), ‘Cross-border Litigation Perspective’, Herbert Smith Freehills, Issue 3, 
pp18-22; when deciding disputes over jurisdiction, courts are sometimes faced with arguments that 
justice could not be obtained in a particular foreign jurisdiction due to issues concerning politics, 
corruption or other obstacles to justice. 
1802
 The rule is that considerations of international comity will militate against any such finding in the 
absence of cogent evidence. 
1803
 Berezovsky v Michaels [2000] 1 WLR 1004 at 1032. 
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possible that in some countries, there is a risk that justice will not be obtained by a 
foreign litigant
1805
. There must be cogent evidence to prove this because the difference 
in foreign courts and English courts procedures and methods will not be accepted by the 
courts
1806
. However, expert evidence is often central
1807
. The courts required positive 
and cogent evidence as to the risk of injustice
1808
 and find the location where the case 
may be tried suitably for the interest of all the parties and the ends of justice
1809
. 
Similarly, the judge must also consider such factors as the convenience of witnesses and 
the relative expense of suing in different jurisdictions
1810
. 
 
7.20.: Actual malice: 
 
Actual malice is an American concept, which emerged in the case of Sullivan
1811
 and 
defined a parameter of practical knowledge of recklessness in libel claims brought by 
public-figures
1812
. It is based on the actual and reckless thinking, which made the 
defendant publish the defamatory words
1813
. There is no requirement of ‘actual 
knowledge’ for the claim brought by ordinary persons, so public-figure defamation 
cases differ from private-figure defamation cases
1814
. Private claimants have to show 
that a reasonable person would have researched the statement before publishing it, 
whereas public-figures have to show that what the defendant did, a ‘reasonable person’ 
would not have done (see-2.16). Therefore, when famous people sue over lies, they 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1804
 Owners of the Las Mercedes v Owners of the Abidin Daver [1984] AC 398; ideological or political 
reason, the experience or inefficiency of the judiciary, excessive delay in deciding case or the 
unavailability of appropriate remedies are the reason s of injustice. 
1805
 Pertoldi, A., Neill, J., (2017), ‘Cross-border Litigation Perspective’, Herbert Smith Freehills, Issue 3, 
pp18-22. 
1806
 Dawnus Sierra Leone v Timis Mining [2016] EWCA Civ 1066; the foreign courts procedure does not 
become improper or unjust because it is not the procedure of the courts of England 
1807
 Diamond v Sutton [1866] L.R. 1 Ex. 130. 
1808
 Ahmed v Khalifa [2017] EWHC 1198; the court does not need to be satisfied on the balance of 
probabilities that a risk will eventuate, it simply needs to be satisfied that there is a real risk. 
1809
 Sim v Robinow [1892] 19 R. 665; Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460  
1810
 It also confirms that even where there is such evidence the publication must be real and substantial 
in order to ground jurisdiction. 
1811
 NY Times Company v Sullivan [1964] 84 S.Ct 710;  actual malice is defined in the defamation context 
as ‘knowledge, by the person who publishes a defamatory statement, which is false or reckless disregard 
about whether the statement is true. 
1812
 There is no such requirement if an ordinary/natural claimant brings a claim against ‘public figure’ i.e. 
the normal rules of libel as discussed in CH.5 will be applied in this scenario.  
1813
 Jones, A., and Lidsky, L.B., (2016), ‘Of Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a 
Networked World’, Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the Law, Vol 16, Issue 2, pp 29. 
1814
 Long, A. B., (2016), ‘The Lawyer as Public Figure For First Amendment Purposes’, Boston College Law 
Review, Vol 57, Issue 5, pp 1543-1597. 
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must show that the defendants lied on purpose
1815
 and the judge has to consider the 
string of responses by the claimants and the defendants to come to a sound 
conclusion
1816
. 
 
There is a huge difference in British and American actual malice requirement for public 
figures (see Table-13). The only similarity is that the public figures have to show that 
the false statement was made with actual knowledge. In England, it is still the defendant 
who has to prove that the statement is based on ‘truth’1817. The interactive nature of 
social media may prove difficult in determining when a statement will meet the 'actual 
malice' standard. If this standard is not met, it will become a non-actionable opinion
1818
.  
 
Table-13
1819
: Nature of Actual Malice 
 
Type of claimants Actual Damages Punitive Damages 
Public Official/Public 
Figure and Public  
Concern 
Actual Malice Actual Malice 
Private Figure and 
Public Concern 
At least Negligence Actual Malice 
Private Figure and 
Private Concern 
Negligence (potential strict 
liability) 
No requirement of Actual 
damage 
 
7.20.1.: English or US standard: 
 
This thesis argues the importance of a globalised system of defamation law; however, it 
does not approve that there is a need for England to adopt the US-Sullivan standard, 
                                                          
1815
 Messenger, A., (2015), ‘False statements and actual malice: Courts rethink what’s required to 
protect free speech; Communications Lawyer : Publication of the Forum Committee on Communications 
Law, American Bar Association, Vol 31, Issue 3, pp 6-9. 
1816
 One of the reasons for the higher standard of “actual malice” or reckless disregard when the 
defamed is a public figure is that they generally had greater access to media and other outlets to 
respond to any defamatory statements. 
1817
 In English libel law a defamatory comment is assumed to be false unless it can be proved to be true 
by the person who made it. This is somewhat of a reversal of the traditional criminal law where the 
burden of proof lies with the accuser. 
1818
 Acobus v Trump [2017] WL 160316; the court considered the culture of social media and established 
from the conversation via tweets that the discussion was mere non-actionable opinions. 
1819
 Royster, L. K., (2017), ‘Fake news: Potential solutions to the online epidemic’, North Carolina Law 
Review, Vol  96, Issue 1, pp 271 at 282. 
 341 
 
which would require public claimants to prove actual malice to be successful in libel 
cases. Besides, for the claimants, Section 1 threshold has already raised the 
requirements to prove harm (see-7.16). However, actual malice can be used as a 
‘threshold’ for subsequent publications by the same author in accordance with Section 8 
of the 2013 Act.  
 
If the claimant has already developed a lousy reputation, will the defendant still be 
liable for his comments? Warby J
1820
 stated that it is not safe to assume that a sarcastic 
remark will not harm a claimant's reputation because he had already developed a bad 
name. However, it depends on S1 requirement as Dingemans J
1821
 clarified that unless 
serious harm to reputation can be established an injury to feelings alone, however grave, 
will not be sufficient. In the Barron [2016]
1822
 case, the judge held that the issue is not 
the actual state of mind of the defendant but the feelings of the claimant. Have the 
claimants suffered an additional injury to his feelings because of the defendant's 
outward behaviour?  However, the court failed to establish to what extent a pre-existent 
bad reputation is acceptable? A person can have a low opinion of another, and yet the 
other's reputation can be harmed by a fresh defamatory allegation. It proves that if a 
public figure is hated for a particular act, it does not imply that any other allegations 
cannot defame them. 
 
7.21.: Free speech or social media defamation: 
“Freedom of speech is a principal pillar of a free government; when this support is taken 
away, the constitution of a free society is dissolved, and tyranny is erected on its ruins - 
Benjamin
1823”. 
 
Freedom of expression is a fundamental right of every individual (see-5.8.3). This 
liberty is crucial for individual dignity because it forms essential foundations for 
democracy, the rule of law, peace, stability and participation in public affairs
1824
.  
The right to freedom of opinion is enshrined in Article 19
1825
 to allow: 
                                                          
1820
 Barron v Collins [2017] EWHC 162 (QB) at [56]. 
1821
 Sobrinho v Impresa Publishing SA [2016] EMLR 12 at [46]. 
1822
 Barron v Vines [2016] EWHC 1226 (QB) at [22]. 
1823
 One of the founding fathers of the United States, Benjamin Franklin. 
1824
 EU (2014), ‘Guidelines on freedom of expression online and offline’: Online Url 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/170703_eidhr_guidelines_single_02_freedom_expres
sion_on_off_0.pdf [Assessed 19
th
 May 2018]. 
1825
 Articles 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Puddephatt, A., (2011), ‘The Importance of Self Regulation of the Media 
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1. The right to seek and receive information 
2. The right to impart all kinds of information, regardless of media or frontiers 
 
7.21.1.: Article 10:  
 
Art 10
1826
 also obliges the states to respect, protect and promote this fundamental-right 
but it is subject to some qualifications in member states
1827
. Every sovereign nation 
adopts different standards concerning freedom of speech
1828
; in England, these are more 
constrained than other countries
1829
. Gross LJ
1830
 prosecuted a group of people who had 
shouted slogans to British soldiers: “burn in hell”, “baby killers” and “rapists”. He 
defended their prosecution because it was not a breach of their right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10. In the Reynolds case, the court established that protection 
of reputation is a matter of public interest, which now allows the interest in reputation to 
compete on a broader ground with free speech
1831
. Lord Nicholls
1832
 stated: ‘reputation 
is an integral and important part of the dignity of the individual. It also forms the basis 
of many decisions in a democratic society which are fundamental to its well-being.   
 
In the ‘Twitter Joke Trial1833’, Paul tweeted about airport closure in cold weather and 
caused a flight being delayed. His tweet did not cause fear in those who read it. The 
High Court concluded that the 2013 Act did not create an exception to freedom of 
speech so its traditional standards must be upheld. The court
1834
 pointed out that 
freedom of expression does not provide a license to ruin reputations. A user hidden 
behind the cloak of anonymity can share a post and consider himself to be free of any 
                                                                                                                                                                          
in Upholding Freedom of Expression’, UNESCO, Communication and Information Debate Series, No 9, 
BR/2011/PI/H/4.  
1826
 The Human Rights Act 1998, Ch. 42, Schedule 1, Part I, Article 10 - Freedom of expression. 
1827
 Handyside v the UK [1976] ECtHR Jud No. 49; ideas that may be regarded as controversial by the 
authorities, including views that may shock, offend or disturb is defined subjectively.  
1828
 Not all speech is protected by freedom of expression rights, and not all protest is legitimate in the 
eyes of the state. People cannot say whatever they want and get protection for their comments by 
tacking on a couple of qualifying words (protection, freedom, Art rights). 
1829
 In the US “hate speech” is generally protected under the First Amendment to the US Constitution. 
1830
 Munim Abdul and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] EWHC 247 (Admin). 
1831
 Barendt, E., (2009), ‘Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom under the Human Rights Act 
1998’, Indiana Law Journal, Vol 84, Issue 3, pp 4. 
1832
 Reynolds v Times Newspapers [2001] 2 AC 127; explains freedom of expression in terms of the public 
interest, in receiving and imparting information in the context of a democratic society. 
1833
 R v Paul Chambers DPP [2012] EWHC 2157, the judge concluded that sending a message of a 
menacing character by means of public electronic communications on ‘Twitter’ is contrary to Section 
127(a) of the Communications Act 2003. 
1834
 Seguin v Lentini et al [2010] ONSC 6364. 
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possible liability for defamation
1835
. That assumption is incorrect because the court will 
weigh the conflicting interests to see if an action is available for the victim. The court 
can ask the content provider to reveal the identity of the authors of defamatory posts 
(see-5.9.3.1). This will balance one’s right to protect his or her reputation against the 
recognised concern for personal privacy and the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression.   
 
7.21.1.: Social media changes:  
 
Traditionally, different media and communications were regulated by different norms 
and principles (see-2.10.1). These separations of media are less relevant for cyberspace 
because all forms of communications are also available online. Online communication 
infrastructure, itself is converging and is increasingly interdependent because every 
communication commonly utilise the spectrum used for television, radio, 3g and 4g 
networks. The users in these fields are interdependent, from telecommunications 
providers to social media providers and content generators, like traditional news 
companies. This convergence has created a chaotic arena, which is difficult to define, 
understand and appropriately regulate. The changes social media has brought to the 
traditional concept of freedom of expression can be understood from an idealistic 
viewpoint (see Picture-5). 
 
The Key: 
The blue arrow           means ‘leads to’ 
 
Picture-5: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1835
 Gerrie, W., (2018), ‘Say What You Want: How Unfettered Freedom of Speech on the Internet Creates 
No Recourse for Those Victimized’, Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology, Vol 26, Issue 1, 
pp 64. 
Connected world     Freedom of speech                                
Freedom of opinion     Public forum (Internet)         social media 
(Twitter, Facebook)   Reviews, information & fake news           
Public disorder     Judiciary and courts strict response                                    
Strict public policy             Further restrictions on social media users 
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7.21.2.: Social media challenges: 
 
The challenge presented by social media is to understand how this new environment 
shapes freedom of speech (see-2.5.1.3). Traditionally, it always has focused on who 
controls content, regardless of the technology that carried that content (see-2.10.4). For 
instance, the type of camera or printing press to convey content was never important 
because the device could not change/edit the content. The only content controllers were 
journalists, editors, publishers or censors. However, in social media everybody has the 
authority to change or edit their message (see-5.8).  
 
7.21.3.: New tools for freedom: 
 
The newly invented devices and applications allow the encrypted and secure exchange 
of data between users, who maybe unable to access such information via offline 
communications. There are following tools help promote freedom of expression (see 
Table-11): 
  
 Table-14: Tools for Freedom of Expression 
 
Tool Type  Freedom to express 
Remote Mobile, tablet, camera 
devices 
Stream information directly 
via the internet 
Bluetooth  Audio portals, wireless 
connections, hotspot  
This technology can 
exchange data from a 
single server  
Encryption software Tor, VPNs, RSA Ensure high degrees of 
privacy for 
communications 
Digital media Social media, Sound cloud, 
Ushahidi platform 
Records evidence of ill 
treatment or abuse or share 
content, video or audio 
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Defamation law potentially affects everyone and getting it right is crucial for the society 
we want to live in. It must balance the interests of everyone and discourage those with 
power from using defamation law as a weapon
1836
. The right to freedom of speech 
cannot be used as a shield to publish whatever an individual thinks is right, which may 
go against British societal values and privacy (see-7.21). The correct balance of free 
speech, freedom of expression, privacy and reputation can only be obtained by making 
the publishers accountable for their actions, which fall outside the sphere of 
reasonableness
1837
. It may force social media users to efficiently vet their sources and 
not publish remarks that come from dubious sources, whether they write about public or 
private persons. It will provide the defendants with an ability to demonstrate that their 
publication is substantially 'true', if the matter reaches the courtroom. It is the true 
meaning of freedom of speech balanced against individual reputation.  
 
7.22.: Summary: 
 
The unreliability of the interpretation of Section 1 is resulting in uncertainty of libel 
judgments, which may discourage potential victims from issuing proceedings. It can be 
a further deterrent for small businesses because Section 1 (2) demands proof of 
'financial loss', which may be costly to prove. The certainty which parliament intended 
to bring balance to online defamation has not yet achieved by the 2013 Act. However, 
there is an appeal pending in the Supreme Court, which will provide the desired 
stability. So the social media libel claimant/defendant can rely on this Act to produce 
predictable results. 
 
7.22.1.: Conclusion of Theme-1: 
 
Section 9 narrows English courts’ jurisdiction for non-EU domiciled defendants over 
libel claims relating to online publication. The analysis envisaged in Section 9 is very 
similar to a traditional “forum non-conveniens” analysis. The burden has been shifted to 
the claimant to prove England is the ‘convenient forum’. There is not enough case law 
to explore the relationship between Section 9 and the traditional forum test. This theme 
                                                          
1836
 Powerful figures accused of corruption can pay the mafia to attack dissident websites. Software can 
be built to screen out free expression information from its search results (through software installed on 
users’ computers that blocks access to certain Web addresses). 
1837
 Watson, R.,  Roldan, R., & Faza, A., (2017),  ‘Toward Normalization of Defamation Law: The UK 
Defamation Act of 2013 and the US Speech Act of 2010 as Responses to the Issue of Libel Tourism, Vol 
22, Issue 1, pp 63. 
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endorses that private international law rules have made very smooth transition to 
cyberspace transactions. However, there is a need of slight modification in the process 
of identifying publishers and adding actual malice criteria for subsequent publication by 
the same publisher. The Civil Procedure Rule Committee must include these relevant 
factors of Section 9 as a part of CPR to avoid confusion between forum test and 
jurisdiction consideration. 
 
7.22.2.: Conclusion of Theme-2: 
 
The issue of the applicable law raises problems, but this theme contests that these 
problems are not genuinely new because cyberspace publication amplifies pre-existing 
matter. In social media, many ‘causes of action’ can arise simultaneously because the 
material can be downloaded anywhere. If a single court assumes jurisdiction of claims 
arising out of defamation in multiple domains, the claimant may still need to prove the 
content of the applicable law in each place his reputation has been damaged to be 
adequately compensated, which may be prohibitively expensive (see-2.11.5). The 
difficulties in resolving these questions mean that online defamation, a twenty-first-
century problem, is regulated by a nineteenth-century rule. However, with a little 
modification, these rules can be applied with more consistency. We live in a physical 
world with geographical boundaries. Social media networks make us the residents of 
'Socialistan/Faceebookstan/Twiterstan'. Legal protection in the physical world and 
freedom of speech is also needed in the digital world. Hence, the law must adopt the 
'choice of law' rule, which looks to the law, common to all parties in both worlds. It is 
only possible if ‘choice of law’ is defined, using a connecting factor based on 
nationality
1838
, where it is used to register on these networks. This theme recommends 
that application of traditional rules do not dis-integrate cyberspace.  
 
7.22.3.: Conclusion of Theme-3: 
 
If the claimants are successful in their application to serve outside jurisdiction, the 
amount of time and expense necessary to satisfy Section 9 (3) requirements will 
inevitably prove too much for other claimants. Seeking to determine that no other 
jurisdiction is appropriate out of all the possible domains in the age of social media can 
                                                          
1838
 Menthe, D., (1998), ‘Jurisdiction in cyberspace: A theory of international spaces’, Michigan 
Telecommunications Technology L Rev, Vol 4, pp 69. 
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be an  extremely onerous task. If the defamatory material is published online as well as 
in hard copy, the task would be impossible for a claimant. The information would be 
likely to be available only to the publisher who put the material into circulation
1839
. In 
the faster medium of communication, this is a backwards step in preserving the 
boundaries of justice in the digital era so this process must be straightforward and 
simplified. This theme suggests that a defendant's knowledge that his statement can 
cause harm to other's reputation should be sufficient to support personal jurisdiction. 
This theme recommends that civil procedural rules need modification when serving 
outside jurisdiction. It also recommends that courts should proceed in the absence of 
anonymous defendants to stop defamatory material being re-published 
 
7.22.4.: Conclusion of Theme-4: 
 
The application of Section 9 to social media publications imposes an unreasonable and 
disproportionate restriction on a claimant's right to access court specifically when the 
number of downloads in England is low. Similarly, S1 creates difficulties for individual 
claimants to satisfy 'serious harm' to reputation. It may also be true when the harm to 
reputation is grievous but it is difficult to provide evidence or witnesses. Raising the bar 
for English claimants cannot guarantee protection for freedom of speech because if a 
claimant suffered less harm in England, he may still have the right to bring a case in 
England. This theme rejects the argument that S9 will reduce libel tourism because a 
resident of England must have the right to start proceedings in English courts. However, 
this bar could be upheld for foreign claimants who merely abuse the system for 
favourable circumstances. For the argument, that Section 9 will also only allow the 
claims which have a stronger link in England: Common sense suggests that the more 
tenuous the connection with England, the harder it will be for the claim to survive 
application of the traditional rule
1840
. If the claimant has no ties with England, he may 
not suffer any damage in England so if a foreign-based claimant wins a case in England, 
the damages will be limited to England
1841
. Besides, it allows every individual a right to 
a fair trial
1842
 because local victims can start proceedings in England.  
                                                          
1839
 This thesis acknowledges that even the publisher may not know, because hard copies may be resold 
and circulated abroad by a domestic wholesaler to whom the publisher has sold copies. 
1840
 Eyre v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [1967] N.Z.L.R; without the proof of substantial harm, court may 
award very minimal damages, which will be fair for both claimant and defendants. 
1841
 Flymenow Ltd v Quick Air Jet Charter GmbH [2016] EWHC 3197 (QB); as per Warby J  – the claimant 
succeeded but recovered damages of only £10. 
1842
 Bin Mahfouz v Ehrenfeld [2005] EWHC 1156 (QB). 
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This theme recommends that the Defamation Act 2013 need updating, especially 
section 9 and section 1. However, if traditional test of ‘Jameel abuse’ is continued to 
apply, it may produce fairness for both claimants and defendants. Similarly, to maintain 
‘freedom of speech’ via social media courts must give regards to the context in which 
initial publication was made. 
 
7.23.: Conclusion: 
 
This chapter concludes that the Defamation Act 2013 (somehow) balances free speech 
and personality rights and it can be applied along with CPR rule to cyberspace 
defamation. This chapter rises following questions:  
 
7.23.1.: Question to policymakers:  
 
England can curtail freedom of expression
1843
 on the basis of ‘national interest, public 
health and security, morals, and territorial integrity’ to prevent public disorder and 
combat crime. Can policymakers allow freedom of speech and endanger national 
sovereignty? Freedom of speech is a tool that has been aiding ISIS and Al-Qaeda in 
recruiting teens to fight in Syria, so if it is a matter of national security is it not better if 
freedom of expression is compromised? (See-9.7). 
 
7.23.2.: Question to lawmaker:  
 
Why go to such lengths to tighten defamation laws because the claimants in publication 
cases can retain the right to bring a claim under the Data Protection Act
1844
. Will 
strictness of the system not cause people to seek other solutions and open a floodgate of 
case law
1845
? (See-9.8.). 
 
                                                          
1843
 Dulgheriu v London Boroughof Ealing [2018] EWHC 1667. 
1844
 HH Prince of Morocco v Elaph Publishing [2017] EWCA Civ 29; the court applied Tugendhat J 
principle from the Society v Kordowski [2011] EWHC 3185 case that it is appropriate to plead under the 
DPA in addition to a claim in libel/harassment. The different causes of action are directed to protecting 
different aspects of the right to private life: The relevant provisions of the DPA include the aim of 
protection from being subjected unfairly to distress. LJ Simon concluded tha Data protection claims can 
be 'linked to' claims in defamation. 
1845
 This tightening up of English defamation law has driven creative litigation because areas of privacy, 
character assassination and data protection emerged. Similarly, the claim of malicious falsehood is also 
providing fertile ground. 
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7.23.3: Question to governing bodies:  
 
The concept of freedom of expression comes from traditional world whereas it has not 
been updated for digital communication. Why the courts are unable to describe to what 
extent they can allow free speech via social media? (See-9.9). 
 
7.23.3.: Question to content providers: 
 
ISPs, media platforms and social networks demand immunity in the event of legal issue; 
however, they allow anonymous users to use this privilege. Why content providers 
cannot develop a policy where they block anonymous transactions? (See-9.10). 
 
7.23.4: Question to social media users:  
 
Every social media user wants the security of his reputation but also has an interest in 
free speech. The law intended to balance these interests is so complicated because it is 
not even understood by the people to whom it applies. Why users cannot raise this issue 
to their respective platforms? (See- 9.11). 
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8.1.: Preview of the thesis:  
“Cyberspace should not be seen only from a technological perspective, but as 
phenomena that have already had and will continue to have an ever-greater impact 
throughout our daily lives and functions of our societies
1846”. 
 
Previous chapters evaluated that social media users will always be subject to ‘conflict of 
laws’ rules because cyberspace has no clear jurisdictional and geographical parameters. 
However, inventing an entirely new legal order for cyberspace is not necessary because 
the complications related to ‘jurisdiction rules’ are overemphasised and can simply be 
resolved by using traditional laws. Besides, whatever transaction is taking place in 
cyberspace, it takes place in a physical location by real users. The only difference is 
there are often more chains in social media. Social media reinforces the idea of freedom 
of expression and freedom of speech but the dynamic feature of instant forwarding 
implies that there is a need for a legal privacy plan for every individual user
1847
.  
 
Over time, it becomes difficult to balance freedom of speech with reputation because 
there is a very fine line, which demarcates one’s freedom of social media use and the 
violation of others. For instance, the drawing of a sketch may be a bit of fun for a 
society but it can also degrade the followers of a religion. For example, a substandard 
and disagreeable act of drawing a cartoon sketch of the Muslim Prophet (saw) by a 
Danish publisher. It may not be defamatory in all jurisdictions, but it can be accessed 
anywhere via social media
1848
. Freedom of expression is the most important 
constitutional freedom so it has to be evaluated whether it is threatened by religious and 
political critics. Besides, the accessibility of social media is a privilege, which is 
unrestricted: It disregards religion, region or geography but depends on the network, 
protocols and modem. This privilege upholds the promise of Article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights - access to information irrespective of frontiers (see-
2.3.2).  An argument can be made that this privilege is at the expense of fundamental 
human rights of privacy and reputation.  
 
                                                          
1846
 Challenges of Cyberspace, online available at, http://www.gcsp.ch/News-
Knowledge/Publications/Future-Challenges-in-Cyberspace  [Assessed 27
th 
May 2017]. 
1847
 Most social networking sites contain built-in moderation tools, special social relevance ranking and 
privacy settings. Public setting will allow everybody to follow. Comments-box enables user to comment 
on contents, which may be shown in public news feed; however, a message can be sent privately. 
1848
 A cartoon/sketch/emoji is a harmless way of having fun but offence may be taken by the concerned 
person because hate speech, racist remarks and religious sentiments have different meanings for 
different people. 
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8.1.1.: Design of this chapter: 
“The internet is so instant; people have a thought, write it and publish. But it's not just 
limited to their friends seeing it; I think people forget that aspect
1849”. 
 
This chapter will acknowledge the outcomes and findings of previous chapters and then 
offer suggestions and recommendations. It is elaborated in Table-15: 
 
Table-15: Design of Review  
 
# OBJECTIVE DERIVED FROM WHAT IS ACHIEVED 
 
8.2 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
Literature review 
This thesis agrees with the 
established ideas identified 
via selected literature 
 
8.3 
 
Findings 
 
Previous 
conclusions 
This thesis reviews the 
important concepts already 
drawn from the conclusion 
of previous chapters 
 
8.4 
 
Suggestions 
 
Critical review 
It suggests how to improve 
the concept already 
acknowledged at 8.2 
 
8.5 
 
Recommendation 
 
Application of 
cases 
It offers solution to modify 
and improve the concepts 
of the findings at 8.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1849
 http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/what-was-first-facebook-defamation-case-means-to-you-
and-me-20150105-12ib74.html [Assessed 20
th
 August 2017]. 
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8.2.: Acknowledgement: 
 
This research acknowledges that:  
 
1. Cyberspace is a functional place where information links and websites are 
posted for the public at large
1850
. Although it is not located at any particular 
location yet, it is available to everyone around the globe
1851
. It is the most 
prominent way of conveying information and communicating views and 
opinions, which makes every social media user a potential publisher. Thus, the 
freedom of speech and expression is curtailed because of the fear of suit for 
defamation, which has become very common. This thesis urges that religious 
and political beliefs should be disregarded in social media publications to reduce 
the number of claims. A test of motive/intent must be introduced to balance it 
with freedom of speech because religious and cultural beliefs should not be 
allowed to dictate casual communications.  
 
2. This thesis acknowledges that traditional libel laws are unable to keep pace with 
the strident changes imposed by heterogeneous social cyberspace. These laws 
were principally framed at either a time when most defamatory publications 
were spoken or the product of unsophisticated printing. There are practical 
limitations in the application of the principles derived since the 18
th
-century 
cases to social media disputes that arise in the 21
st
-century (see-2.10.2). 
However, it recommends to continue using traditional laws with little 
modifications (see-7.10). 
 
3. Social media has become a liability landmine because these content aggregation 
sites carry the risk of libel reaching a broad audience. The designing of social 
sites encourages online sharing even without any fact-checking. Users are 
incentivised to fake popularity and unprecedented fame hence they disregard any 
regulation or morality. For instance, a negative Facebook status, a political 
Tweet, a searing Yelp review and an edited photograph posted on Reddit may 
receive many views, likes and comments. This thesis urges that the media 
organisations must spread awareness among its subscribers to avoid sharing 
                                                          
1850
 Menthe, D. C., (1998), ‘Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces’, Michigan 
Telecommunications & Technology Law Review, Vol 4, Issue 1, pp 69-103. 
1851
 Djavaherian, K., (1998), ‘Reno v ACLU’, Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol 13, pp 371-388. 
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content without authentic source. If a defamatory content/article is shared via 
social media, its recovery and damage control is not easy to handle; besides, the 
process is time-consuming (see-5.9.3). 
 
4. The existence of a website at a particular location cannot be used as a ground to 
assume jurisdiction because by the location of a website a court cannot 
determine the behaviour of its user (see-5.6). The user’s response is not directly 
dependent on the area of a website, which is accessible at various locations 
simultaneously (see-2.10.2). It is urged that if a user has displayed interest to 
reach the audience at a particular location then ‘location of the website’ may 
suffice to trigger the personal jurisdiction. A user will be considered to display 
the intent to reach a particular audience by: 
 
a.    Advert in that location 
b.    Targeting the subject matter in that forum 
c.    Interacting by way of exchanging information in that location 
 
8.3.: Findings: 
 
This research finds that:  
 
1. It may not be practical to make new statutes and treaties for cyberspace because 
it may take decades. However, individual provisions can be created for the areas 
where cyberspace has fundamentally built new issues. This thesis finds that 
social media libel is one of the areas that required modification. It is suggested 
that libel laws must be harmonised globally to avoid the issue of jurisdiction and 
choice of law (see-7.13). 
 
2. The authorities want to use traditional laws even though the internet revolution 
demands a redefinition of several key legal terms, especially for social media 
libel (see-2.10.1, 8.3.3). Although the conventional rules assist in establishing 
internet jurisdiction but the length of time, concurrent jurisdictions, delays in 
justice, enforcement of judgment and forum shopping are factors, which not 
only raise concerns about legal uncertainty but can also diminish the confidence 
of cyber-users. Online transactions are now a necessity of the commercial world 
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and the future of International trade. This facility will only encourage trading 
organisations if businesspersons are assured of a satisfactory outcome in case of 
a conflict (see-2.10.2). 
  
3. The 2013 Act tried to control/abolish ‘libel tourism’ by making it compulsory 
for the claimant to prove that there is a real and substantial connection in 
England. It may be difficult/almost impossible to determine a real and 
substantial connection with ‘a single forum’ (see-7.19). The over-reliance on 
Facebook, Twitter and other social networking communications make it even 
harder to determine jurisdiction in online libel cases. This complication can also 
affect public policy because multinational websites may deliberately choose 
English law to reduce litigation costs
1852
. The judiciary must specify the 
claimants who need to prove ‘real connection’ (see-7.3) or Parliament must 
amend the 2013 Act for British claimants. 
 
4. The law of defamation seeks to protect the legitimate interest of a person’s 
reputation within society. It is an aspect of civil law, which supports and protects 
the value of ‘human dignity’, regardless of being in virtual space1853. The 
Defamation Act 2013 is a breakthrough for libel victims: A defamatory e-mail 
sent to a wrong address, something tweeted inadvertently, or a Facebook post 
mistakenly shared are all potential defamation (see-2.10). Similarly, re-sharing a 
post, which has already been published, cannot be a defence because every 
publication is considered a separate libel (see-2.11.3). The most prominent 
challenge, after social media expansion, remains to maintain a balance between 
freedom of speech and preservation of privacy. The 2013 Act contains elements 
to cover online libel. There may be individual provisions, which are unable to 
cope with the ever-changing dimensions of social media communication (see-
7.21). However, with further interpretation from the judiciary legal harmony is 
achievable.   
  
                                                          
1852
 Wolff, T. B., (2017), ‘Choice of law and jurisdictional policy in the federal courts’, University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 165, Issue 7, pp 1847. 
1853
 Oleg Petrovich Orlov & Human Rights Centre Memorial v Russia [2016] No. 48557/10 ECHR. 
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8.4.: A few modest suggestions: 
 
The findings discussed above allow this study to offer some suggestions for improving 
current legal framework. 
 
1. Taking legal action against ‘what is being published’ is not the best approach to 
moving forward concerning social media libel because merely re-tweeting/liking 
a post should not invoke legal action. Online communication requires awareness 
and a sense of respect and harmony. Hence, social networking sites must inform 
their users about the consequences of using certain words, without any proof of 
'truth' (see-5.8.2).  
 
2. There must be a uniform treaty for ‘choice of law1854’ for social media 
defamation cases, which would pave the way for an easy solution. The users 
may be aware of their local laws but do not know the laws of the countries 
where they interact using social networks. Hence, ‘choice of law’ treaty will 
make sure that a user is prosecuted under the laws of their domicile state, the 
laws they are aware of or the laws they prefer to be prosecuted by (see-4.3.3).  
 
3. English judges want the continuity of their Victorian private international law, 
which can adequately be maintained for cyberspace defamation if the criterion 
for jurisdiction is further simplified (see-7.7). Different sets of procedural rules 
also exist for EU and non-EU litigants. Once the UK is out of the EU by 2019, it 
will by default be clarified because the courts do not have to apply the EU 
system for member state domiciled users. However, meanwhile, a logical 
assumption of jurisdiction may allow existing traditional laws to serve social 
media defamation disputes efficiently and predictably. The defendants must be 
considered resident of cyberspace so a discretionary jurisdiction can be assumed 
for every social media user to prosecute the matter on an urgent basis (see-
4.1.1). 
 
 
                                                          
1854
 Hill, J., (2004), ‘Choice of Law in Contract under the Rome Convention: The Approach of the UK 
Courts’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 53, pp 325-350. 
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4. It is also suggested that international efforts to introduce more predictable 
methods of determining jurisdiction such as a universal code would avoid the 
problem of determining jurisdiction. The rapid development of cyberspace has 
made national borders seemingly irrelevant. There is no doubt it would be much 
easier to make cyberspace more peaceful by inventing a universal jurisdictional 
code unrelated to physical boundaries. Still, sovereign states have and will 
continue to focus on physical borders with distinct priorities i.e. political will 
(see-2.5). Even the EU, which claims to be a borderless ‘United States of 
Europe’, reflects national priorities when it comes to jurisdiction in cyberspace. 
This thesis suggests, after foreseeing, the impossibility of a universal cyber-
code, that the criticism of applying traditional jurisdictional rules is unjustified. 
Therefore, Parliament must authenticate the CPR rules and avoid adding 
different jurisdiction provisions with every Act (See-1.11, 2.6.2).   
 
5. The main issue for social media libel is if the time-limit rule, for bringing 
proceedings can expire (see-2.11). Under Section 8 single publication rule, 
distribution of the material by the same author will not initiate a fresh cause of 
action (see-2.11.3). There is no recent case law to show whether the material had 
been downloaded in the year preceding the proceedings would be a question of 
fact for the judge to decide. It is suggested that the limitation period should be 
changed to 3 years for social media libel and put a stop to unlimited liability in 
social media. The judges must have the discretion to extend it if the harm 
suffered after that limit because in social media content can be re-generated at a 
later stage (see-7.13) 
 
6. The 2013 Act may not be regarded as an excellent piece of legislation as it 
provides a critique of previous law, yet it has nothing unique to guide libel law 
in an era of expanding forms of expression. It also retains the hierarchical 
approach to libel where traditional news media represent the pinnacle of free 
speech; a remarkable notion when one considers the exponential growth of 
social media platforms (see-2.13). This thesis suggests that S1 and S9 can be 
further modernised concerning changes brought by social media defamation 
(see-7.7 and 7.16). This amendment would allow judges to respond to the 
complications occurring due to modern technologies by maintaining defamation 
rules applicable to the offline world.  
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7. The 2013 Act provisions seem tighter but not rigid; although they become more 
complicated when applied to social media based libel. It is suggested that it 
should be maintained for foreign claimants because public figures prefer 
England’s repressive libel laws to get more compensation (see-7.20). However, 
there is a need to simplify this criterion if the claimant is a British 
national/domiciled/resident or holds property in England (see-7.8).  
 
8. The libel laws should be sufficiently flexible to apply to all media and maintain 
harmony between freedom of expression and personal reputation. However, the 
time required to satisfy court at the preliminary stage may make the claimant 
suffer further irreparable harm (see-7.1). It is even immense if a business 
reputation is at stake. The judges have to analyse a balance between privacy 
rights and freedom of speech, which may waste valuable time (see-7.21). It is 
suggested that an injunction must be granted at the initial hearing, on the balance 
of probability. It can be revoked if the libel condition is not satisfied, however it 
may save the victim any further distress. 
 
9. The thesis challenges the qualities of hypothetical referees in defamation cases 
and suggests that they need to be determined based on a realistic rather than an 
idealistic view of late modern, multi-mediated societies (see-7.14 and 5.5.1). 
There is no mechanism to test ‘the nature or degree’ of any anger, which the 
published words provoke in some of their readers, assist in deciding, what they 
mean. Similarly, the hypothetical reader must implement the context of 
publication. 
 
10. To save court time and avoid pre-action protocols, this thesis suggests using an 
online dispute resolution centre, which can work like eBay or PayPal resolution 
services. This online service must be in addition to court hearing; however, the 
litigants must be given a chance to resolve their issue online without involving 
another party. It should be a quick process and if any of the litigants are 
unhappy, they can proceed towards the pre-action protocol leading to court 
proceedings. 
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8.5.: Recommendations: 
 
These recommendations are based on the fact that social media publishers know that 
their activity is available to everyone without any geographic restrictions.  
 
1. The recent growth of cyberspace has re-emphasised the relevance of jurisdiction 
in international law. If more emphasis is added in simplifying rules for 
establishing authority, parties may be tempted to consider out of court 
settlements because jurisdiction will consistently determine outcomes of 
cases
1855
. Regardless of jurisdiction criterion, the country which has the prime 
advantages including the availability of witnesses, technical assistance, 
economic benefits or the involvement of international organisations in regulating 
a conflict should be granted jurisdiction because it is in that country’s interest to 
resolve the matter more efficiently 
1856
(see-6.9.1.2). 
 
2. The advancements in smartphone-stimulated technology allow subscription to 
social networking anywhere, which makes the publisher bound to take account 
of the law of every country on earth (see-5.8.4). If there are defined boundaries 
in cyberspace, the publisher could efficiently prevent anyone, anywhere, 
downloading the information, it put on its web server. Hence, in the absence of 
boundaries, a website can be present in every jurisdiction so a defendant’s mere 
approach to a website should not be sufficient to prove a substantial connection 
with that forum (see-5.6). It is recommended that the claimant must show that 
the defendant directed or intended to direct his libellous communication in that 
particular forum
1857. The claimant must explain how the defendant’s conduct 
relates to the substance of the asserted libel claim. Nevertheless, the judge must 
ascertain whether the defendant had reasonable knowledge that his activity could 
affect the forum concerned.   
  
                                                          
1855
 Timothyy B. N., (1998), ‘Personal Jurisdiction and Cyberspace: Establishing Precedent in a Borderless 
Era’,  Common Law Conspectus, Vol 6, pp 101. 
1856
 Gray, T., (2015), ‘Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace: The Classic Jurisdiction Analysis in a New 
Setting’, The Journal of High Technology Law, Vol 1, pp 85-86. 
1857
 Robertson, Burke, and Charles, (2017), ‘The Business of Personal Jurisdiction’, Case Western Reserve 
Law Review, Vol 68; Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-11, pp 775.  
 360 
 
3. The law of defamation pre-dates the social networking era. Its provisions are 
considered flexible enough to cover any form of communication. That is why 
judges have satisfactorily applied traditional principles for establishing liability 
in online libel cases (see-7.9). However, internet technology and social media 
have changed how a defamatory article can be republished. There are various 
instances, where the traditional law could not be applied to address some of the 
new ways of communication to cause harm to others (see-7.8). Judges are 
recommended to hold an international conference to grasp the global views of 
the judiciary. It may allow English judges to give due regard to foreign 
'applicable law' and harmony can be achieved. 
 
4. This thesis recommends a modified judicial practice for cyberspace defamation 
cases, in which judges dis-credit the question of whether traditional ‘private 
international law’ rules have any relevance in cyberspace at all. This judicial 
preference must impose traditional reasoning onto social media libel, without 
thinking further about how social media technology works i.e. court judgments 
should be based on equity and fairness rather than on ‘doctrinal research’.  
 
5. This thesis recommends that only selected judges, who undertake social media 
training, could prosecute cyberspace cases. Overtime, judges are either curious 
or maybe uninformed regarding social media and are unable to balance their 
capabilities with legal principles that evolve incrementally. Uncertainty in 
decisions proves that judges often prefer to resolve libel issues focusing on 
traditional constitutional beliefs that do not consider new forms of sociability 
brought about by social networks and our interaction with them (see-2.6.2). 
 
6. Libel has evolved in social media so traditional standards of messaging and 
elements of proof may vary in discrete forms of digital correspondence. It is 
recommended that traditional literary or grammatical standards of interpretation 
for social communications and digital texting should also depend on the ability 
of perpetrator (a nine year old cannot be held liable for sharing libellous 
remarks) (see-5.10). Similarly, the 2013 Act must be updated to adopt social 
networking technology i.e. professional and ordinary users must be treated 
according to the damages suffered rather than everybody treated under the same 
law. Due regard must be given to the ability, literary skills, available editing 
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resources, the device used and legal advice made available to individual 
defendants. 
 
7. Educational and awareness programs for youth are recommended. Service 
providers and content providers must take on a responsibility to make the users 
understand a uniform behavioural code before they can upload their profiles. 
Their subscriptions to social networking sites could only be allowed if they fully 
appreciate pro-active, self-regulation and inter-disciplinary mechanisms. This 
approach justifies the immunity granted to the ‘content providers’. It may also 
help in eradicating the socially offensive conduct of youth. It will also train 
young users to keep themselves safe from ISIS and Al-Qaeda online-agents who 
groom children for their purpose (see-2.1). 
 
8. It is also recommended to only allow social media accounts after facial 
recognition rather than email and SMS code confirmation. This can produce 
instant accountability and trace the perpetrators. Similarly, social media for 
‘under 16’ should be separated from adults to protect teens. 
 
8.6.: Answer to 1
st
 research question:  
 
The technological advances presented by the internet and cyberspace do not radically 
challenge the application of private international law rules. This research affirms the 
appropriateness of applying traditional laws to cyberspace transaction. However, 
alternative methods of service should be adopted to speed up the preliminary process (It 
is detailed further: See-9.2.1). 
 
8.7.: Answer to 2
nd
 research question 2: 
 
This thesis approves that the 2013 Act is a step forward in adopting social media 
communication. It is, however, recommended that more clarity is needed in the 
application of S1 and S9 especially when it is applied to social media transactions (It is 
detailed further: See-9.2.2). 
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Chapter 9  
 
CONCLUSION AND SOLUTION 
 
Resolution and Concluding Remarks 
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9.1.: The finale: 
“Cyberspace should not be seen only from a technological perspective, but as 
phenomena that has already had and will continue to have an ever-greater impact 
throughout our daily lives and functions of our societies”1858. 
 
 
‘Personal jurisdiction’ grants a court the statutory power to prosecute a defendant based 
in other geographic locations (see-4.1, 6.2.2). To date, there are no universal rules of 
jurisdiction concerning cyberspace-based activities. Conventional rules of private 
international law are still applied but not without practical difficulties. The law that 
relates to social media technology requires additional judicial skills to analyse complex 
communication. It is not just the legal skills to adopt the technology but also the lack of 
statutory guidelines, which produces uncertainty. This inability to understand the 
structure of the internet means courts provide their interpretation, which causes 
traditional rules to be altered to suit the circumstances (see-7.9). It becomes even harder 
for social media based libel, which provides instant re-sharing because (see-2.5.1.2): 
  
1. Social media networks are growing, over time these traditional rules may 
become radically different 
 
2. It is difficult to follow the precedent of previously decided cases because of the 
evolving nature of social media
1859
 
 
The growth of jurisdictional law, which is very unsatisfactory when compared to 
instantaneous social networking, has challenged the traditional concepts of the 
allocation of court power (see-2.6.2, 2.7.2). The operational realities of cyberspace 
disputes, the issue of jurisdiction and the necessity of making suitable policies to cope 
with these matters present a significant challenge to lawmakers (see-2.5). Concerning 
common law rules on jurisdiction, legislative bodies have to make sure that legal 
authorities are equipped with technological skills and the required resources to handle 
cyberspace disputes. 
  
                                                          
1858
 http://www.gcsp.ch/News-Knowledge/Publications/Future-Challenges-in-Cyberspace  [Assessed 27
th 
February 2017]. 
1859
 These networks allow ‘anonymity’-which makes it difficult to trace defendant.   
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9.1.1.: Judiciary response to social media challenges: 
 
Constant evolution of social media poses its own unique difficulties for judges and 
presents a myriad of challenges for the courts. The judiciary responded to these 
challenges efficiently. Despite the possible vast range of issues, this thesis focused 
principally on the following: 
 
9.1.1.1.: The application of jurisdictional rules: 
 
Social media has challenged the current legal system, but the courts have tried to 
minimise this challenge regarding lack of physical presence by developing various tests 
(see-7.10). English courts have developed from ‘the intent’, ‘purpose’, and other factors 
of the website’s accessibility to assume jurisdiction (see-7.15). Similarly, in social 
media based libel, various tests (actual malice and harm threshold) have been designed 
to assume jurisdiction over a foreign defendant (see-7.16, 7.20). 
 
9.1.1.2.: The applicability of different set of laws: 
 
There are different sets of laws available for the courts to resolve a single online 
transaction, which produces legal ambiguity and judicial uncertainty (see-7.8). The 
analysis of the 2013 Act shows that it is primarily left to judges to decide jurisdiction 
where a conflict of law does not play a constructive role (see-7.7, 7.11).  
 
On the other hand, the evaluation of traditional rules reveals that the existence of the 
rule of law in cyberspace depends upon the ability of ordinary courts to resolve complex 
social media libel claims (see-7.4). The court's power is limited to geographical 
parameters while cyberspace is not localised but international. This lack of congruence 
between the geographic limitations of courts and the global nature of cyberspace is 
proving an obstacle in civilising cyberspace through law
1860
.  However, English courts 
responded to this challenge by allowing alternative methods of service and proceeding 
in the absence of the defendants and challenging anonymous defendants (see-7.5, 7.6, 
7.18)  
 
                                                          
1860
 Kahin, B., & Nesson, C., (1997), ‘Borders in Cyberspace’ (The MIT Press, London) , pp 165. 
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9.1.1.3.: The advancement of communication technology:  
 
Smartphones and built-in social networking are rapidly changing according to the needs 
of international commerce. It is not possible to create a uniform code because if the 
nature of transactions changes then applicable laws need to be changed (see-2.1). The 
internet continues to be a growing realm that continuously creates complex issues for 
courts because there has been a behavioural shift in social media (see-2.5). In today's 
social media world, it has become more comfortable and rewarding than ever to share 
false information about anything because the material published via social media is 
unregulated (see-2.10). The judiciary minimised this issue by confronting anonymity 
and maintaining a fair balance between freedom of expression and reputation (see-7.21). 
The addition of ‘actual malice’ will prove fruitful in regulating endless prosecution 
under Section 8 (see-7.19) 
 
9.2.: The conclusion: 
 
This thesis concludes that private international laws have been reformed for centuries 
and cannot be abolished. Jurisdictional laws can still be applied to social media to 
ascertain court’s competence. Civil procedural rules need some amendments to 
overcome the ever-changing behaviour of social media networking sites. The 
assumption of jurisdiction in common law is only possible after the proper service of 
the writ.  In social media, there could be situations where libel could cause immense 
foreseeable harm or where an urgent injunction is required to stop libellous publication. 
If it is impossible to serve a claim form to a foreign defendant or only the location of the 
ISPs is known then the embassy of defendant’s country should be served to start 
proceedings in the forum (see-7.8.1). Regardless of jurisdiction, the forum courts should 
be empowered to grant an injunction to stop such transactions and embassies should 
provide every possible help during this process. High Commissions can argue that they 
have enough work already but to facilitate prosperous social communication they also 
have to play a role so that the problems of jurisdiction may be reduced i.e. they should 
develop a mechanism to trace the defendant through their IP address in conjunction with 
relevant authorities of the defendant’s countries.  
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This thesis concludes its arguments by explaining the answers to the research questions: 
 
9.2.1.: Explanation of answer 1: 
 
Cyberspace cannot fulfil its promise if online communication continues to be subject to 
hundreds of different procedural and substantive rules only because the material can be 
accessed in every nation of the globe. Social media is part of the common heritage of 
humanity. Access to its benefits is a legitimate right for all people. Its benefits can only 
be enjoyed without drafting comprehensive legislation, or by harmonising the municipal 
laws, which exist here and there. To wait for legislatures or multilateral international 
agreement to provide solutions to the legal problems presented by cyberspace libel is an 
‘agonisingly slow’ process of law-making.  The Ministers can take a long time to debate 
the need for an urgent reform in the area of cyberspace libel. Hence, judges are urged to 
address the immediate need to piece together a coherent transnational law appropriate to 
the ‘digital millennium’. However, the international legal cooperation of ‘Bar regulatory 
authorities’ is required. The new regulations would need to respect the entitlement of 
each legal regime not to enforce foreign legal rules contrary to binding local law or 
essential elements of domestic public policy. Nevertheless, within such constraints, 
common law would adapt itself to the central features of the internet, namely its global, 
ubiquitous and reactive characteristics. In the face of such traits, to apply old rules, 
created on the assumptions of geographical boundaries, would encourage an 
inappropriate and usually ineffective grab for extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
 
9.2.2.: Explanation of answer 2: 
 
Since the launch of the Defamation Act 2013, the traditional burden mechanism has 
shifted towards the claimant, which provides an unfair advantage to a defendant. This 
Act makes it compulsory for the foreign claimant to file a legal action in England when 
the subject matter has 'a real and substantial connection' in England. The analysis of 
social media defamation explained that it is almost impossible to determine a real and 
substantial connection with any forum. The over-reliance on Facebook, Twitter and 
other social networking communication prove it even harder to establish jurisdiction in 
online libel cases. In the current political environment, every country may want to 
prosecute its citizens within its legal system. However, once a proper protocol, as 
established in English private international law, is followed, English court can assume 
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jurisdiction over any internet user. The same can be noted by the US and Chinese 
private international law provisions. On the other hand, conviction of internet users 
anywhere in the world, for their actions on the internet may also be against the founding 
principles of sovereignty. If it is accepted that global liability exists for social media 
libel, it implies that the value of the domestic law is diminished.  
 
9.2.3.: The vision of this research: 
 
This thesis provides a roadmap for libel victims to find preliminary information 
regarding their claims. It interprets the 2013 Act provisions and recommends an urgent 
update to accommodate CPR rules along with defamation laws. This thesis gives a 
vision to the lawmakers to encourage the technology giants (Google, Yahoo, Twitter, 
Facebook etc.) to update technology in such a way as to allow the defendant/publisher 
the freedom to choose: 
 
1. Who can download the content 
2. Which geographic locations cannot open published  
 
If voluntary action by social media companies is insufficient, governments should 
consider direct regulation. The purpose of legislation should not limit the right to access 
but only to eliminate all abuses of that right. This legislation must also ensure a proper 
balance between freedom of expression and an effective fight against the dissemination 
of all views of a racist or humanly demeaning nature. It must respect privacy and 
anonymity as essential values, any abuse of these values must be dealt with 
unequivocally. In internet defamation cases, a fair balance must be struck between the 
domestic tort law and rights of free expression. Until the content providers create new 
software, they must also be held liable.  
 
Meanwhile, the 2013 Act is a step in the right direction for resolving the problem of 
libel tourism. Rules that were not fit for the internet have been updated so that 
unfavourable decisions will not be made. However, the flexibility permitted in both the 
jurisdiction (S9) and choice-of-law (S8), to revert to traditional rules respectively is 
worrying. There is not enough case law to show how the English courts have responded 
with the discretion provided. This thesis nevertheless submits that this approach does 
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not go far enough in resolving the problem of libel tourism and that more can, and 
should, be done. 
 
9.3.: Contributions to existing literature:  
 
This thesis questioned the desirability of tailoring a common law decision to suit a 
particular social media publication. This research identified that doing so presents 
problems where the latest developments rapidly overtake social media sites. New 
features are designed to attract more users. A legal rule created for social media libel 
will very soon be out of date. 
 
1. The thesis seeks to harmonise conflict rules, which must be distinguished from 
the harmonisation of substantive law (see-2.8.3). The argument adds to existing 
literature which says that it is more efficient to have one single set of conflict of 
law principles to reduce the cost of litigation and to increase the certainty and 
predictability of the outcome (see-4.3.2.3) 
 
2. A uniform code is impossible to create because political preferences1861 are 
substantial obstacles to achieving a harmonised approach to jurisdictional issues 
in online communications. Meanwhile, to avoid conflicting interpretations, the 
courts have to reduce political involvement when dealing with online disputes 
(see-8.4.4)  
 
3. The judges must use the laws of ‘comity’ in deciding social media libel to 
protect freedom of speech and avoid the issue of enforcement. This requires the 
authorities, when developing laws or making decisions that may impact on other 
jurisdictions, exercise due care and respect for the other's law. In this way, a 
judgment can be binding across the globe and other nations’ laws can also be 
preserved (see-4.2.2, 7.1).  
 
4. Traditional grounds of ‘domicile’, nationality’ or ‘the place of publication’, for 
assuming jurisdiction in online defamation are not suited to social media (see-
1.3.1, 4.5.4). This thesis contributes by proposing that the ‘knowledge of the 
defendant that his publication is accessible worldwide’ can be used as a ground 
                                                          
1861
 The political will is against the idea of the universal code. 
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to establish jurisdiction (see-4.6). Cyber-users must be considered citizens of 
cyberspace, regardless of their worldly status, which may allow the judge to 
assume authority on a discretionary basis (see-4.1.1). 
 
5. Before passing any judgment on foreign social media users, courts must analyse 
what international implications their decision would have on the public in other 
states. If their decision is against the public policy of other jurisdiction, the 
judges must decide based on equal-laws
1862
. This review may help in the 
application of foreign judgments within those jurisdictions.  
 
6. Local courts must be equipped with relevant IT skills and judges should work in 
line with the changes in evolving cyberspace environments. This means that 
courts should be empowered to amend rules accordingly (see-2.6.2) 
 
7. Can domestic courts be allowed to decide and regulate content outside their 
borders? The judges are not well equipped to shape national policy that touches 
not only on free expression rights but also on foreign relations and national IT 
infrastructure
1863
. However, courts are being forced to do in cases about online 
content that violates the national law (see-8.5.5)  
 
9.4.: Fill in the gaps: 
 
Cyberspace could be centralised as a single organisation, governed by elected managers 
who would have complete control over online content, pricing, publishing, 
communication. Similarly, all other matters relevant to cyberspace must be firmly dealt 
with by this independent body of online tribunal, which may have no political influence. 
This independent control unit may have permanent and temporary memberships, which 
could be created by using the UN equivalent – it could operate independently while 
retaining harmony among domestic laws. All countries should agree on it and every 
foreign embassy could accept claim forms to help bring the defendant to the desired 
forum so that justice can prevail.  
                                                          
1862
 If blasphemy is illegal in other jurisdiction then a decision in England may not be upheld in that 
jurisdiction and the victim may be left with no remedy at all. 
1863
 Keller, D., (2018), ‘Global Content Regulation And Jurisdiction: Who Decides?’, Stanford Law School, 
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/06/global-content-regulation-and-jurisdiction-who-decides-0 
[Assessed 18
th
 August 2018]. 
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This thesis fills in the gaps:  
 
1. A separate private legal system for cyberspace should be introduced, 
independent of individual government interference. This system should be 
outside the existing private international laws and public judicial systems. The 
internet is a network of networks, therefore, for internet disputes; international 
law of private international laws should be agreed. This private international law 
must be a standard code acceptable to all domestic courts, which must 
incorporate domestic CPR rules.  
 
2. For social media libel, if a defendant is anonymous, the right approach is defined 
under CPR 23.11 (1) - the courts should proceed with the claimant’s 
unchallenged particulars of the claim (see-7.6). The evidential examination at 
the preliminary stage involves an unnecessary expenditure of time and 
resources, which is contrary to the overriding objective of justice and fairness 
(see-2.10.3).  
 
3. If a user is an unidentifiable, unknown or hiding identity, the relevant high 
commission of the country of the geographic (based on IP address) should be 
served with a ‘summons’. Embassies must have cyberspace-monitoring units, 
which should identify anonymous users (see-7.4.2). Proceedings should begin 
even if the defendant cannot be located and relevant high commission must be 
held responsible along with the ISP and website operator. 
 
4. No law can provide compensation for the emotional disturbance caused by 
defamation. However, this thesis fills in the gap by recommending  the courts 
remedy the unfair disruption in victims ‘relational interests’, by making 
defendants write an apology to the victim, on the same forum. In addition to this, 
the claimant must be given the right to give a reply of the defendant’s 
allegations and the content providers must publish it on the same forum.  
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9.5.: The solution: 
 
Considering the flexible approach adopted by judges, it can be established that the 
traditional laws have made a relatively smooth transition into online defamation. 
Common law jurisdictional concept has adapted convincingly well to the arena of 
cyberspace. This thesis summarises that most of the rules from the traditional physical 
world can still be applied to cyberspace libel disputes.  
 
Briefly, this thesis answers the question: Does cyberspace outdate jurisdictional 
defamation laws – ‘NO’, it does not. This study establishes that “the common law 
jurisdiction concept has adapted convincingly well to the arena of cyberspace”. 
Therefore, traditional jurisdiction laws can also be applied to social media libel. There 
are some suggestions to improve the practical method of assuming jurisdiction and 
reforming pre-action protocols to apply existing rules with certainty.  
 
9.6.: Future reforms: 
 
Most traditional practices are capable of being implemented without the need for reform 
to content published/shared via social media. There are specific areas in which 
customary law produces uncertainty and requires urgent changes – publication, ISPs 
liability, defamation classes, remedies and applicable law. However, a few reforms may 
be mandatory concerning social media publications:  
 
1. This thesis offers a future reform to divide social media based on continents. For 
instance, Asia, Africa, EU, Australia and the US. A service provider can only 
provide service within specified geographical continents. Online passports (or 
perhaps passwords) can be created to cross online borders. Service providers 
must issue warning signs if a user crosses a border without a password. It may 
slow down the communication; however, limit the abuse, fake news, spam 
adverts and other improper issues. This can only be created for users who use 
social media for leisure. Again, a profile can only be created by facial 
recognition and specific IP address. It will also eliminate anonymous 
transactions. 
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2. In future, provisions that are more explicit are needed to clarify the legal 
positions of ISPs and when they can be held liable for social media libel claims. 
 
3. In future, along with financial compensation, strict remedies must be imposed to 
vindicate victims’ reputation online. Courts must global removal orders1864 and 
universal injunctions to give notice to content providers. 
 
4. There is an urgent need to simplify 'choice of law rules' because the applicable 
law, substantive rights and liabilities are determined by places of publication, 
regardless of the court in which proceedings are brought and trialled (see-4.3.3).  
 
9.7.: Duties of policymakers:  
 
The infinite cyberspace spans the fragmented patchwork of domestic jurisdictions. This 
online space does not regard any geographical borders. In social media communication, 
conflict of jurisdiction is directly proportional to internet connectivity. Online conflicts 
pose a threat to the established Westphalian system and challenge the traditional modes 
of legal cooperation to resolve online disputes. The application of conventional 
territoriality rules concerning sovereignty could put the digital world on a dangerous 
path if traditional norms are exerted on cyberspace globally
1865
. Social media is open to 
misuse because breaches and violations can be easily committed through social media 
(see-2.5.1.1). This justifies security agencies act of monitoring online communication. 
But this thesis encourages the policymakers to regulate online content in the interests of 
the public at large, the necessity of which cannot be denied.  
 
The policymakers hold the responsibility to (see-2.5.1):  
 
1. Control the illicit online behaviour by preserving the global nature of cyberspace 
 
2. Secure human rights and digital economy by maintaining international legal 
cooperation  
 
                                                          
1864
 Equustek Solutions Inc. v. Google Inc [2015] BCCA 265. 
1865
 Szigeti, P. D., (2017), ‘The illusion of territorial jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol 52, 
Issue 3, pp 369-399. 
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It is only possible if the institutional gaps in internet governance are minimised by 
neglecting the Westphalian international system and jurisdictional limitations i.e. for 
specific issues international cooperation is required.  If the policymakers continue to 
esteem sovereignty, then there will be many pieces of legislation applicable to 
cyberspace disputes
1866
. For example, the Computer Misuse Act, Communication Act, 
Website (Operators) Act and Defamation Act 2013 (the 1996 Act is still applicable, as 
are EU Regulations). In the presence of many pieces of legislation, court cannot be the 
right place to decide because judges are burdened with applying pre-internet protocols 
and post-internet policies to determine digital communication conflicts using black 
letter jurisprudence.  
 
9.8.: Duties of lawmakers globally: 
 
Every country has a different set of legislation, which is applied simultaneously. Social 
media users cannot be expected to give due consideration to every piece of legislation. 
These various laws may not fragment cyberspace, but they cannot be substantively 
compatible. Each sovereign nation will have concerns because each state may want its 
laws to govern cyberspace cases
1867
. Therefore, there is a global duty upon politicians to 
find a comprehensive solution. Traditional societies have accepted social developments 
of digital communication so lawmakers must also move towards global evolution of law 
and norms. 
 
9.9.: Duties of governing bodies:  
 
The judiciary is requested to urgently clarify whether hitting a ‘Like’ button during 
casual conversation carries the same weight as other forms of speech more commonly 
cited in libel claims. For social media communication, judges must differentiate 
between casual conversations with formal negotiation. Similarly, there must be leniency 
where the defendant merely ‘like or shared’ or used emoji to express, unless an intent to 
cause harm can be established (see-7.5). It always depends on what a ‘like’ means and 
what someone was aiming to achieve with it. A ‘like’ does not always mean that 
                                                          
1866
 Chapelle, B., (2014), ‘Multi-stakeholder Governance - Principles and Challenges of an Innovative 
Political Paradigm’, Wolfgang Kleinwachter Editorial, The Collaborator Steering Group, Edition 1, Series 
1. 
1867
 Szigeti, P. D., (2017), ‘The illusion of territorial jurisdiction’, Texas International Law Journal, Vol 52, 
Issue 3, pp 369-399. 
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someone likes the content of a post because the ‘like’ is the standard option. People may 
like a terror video just to show their sympathy to the victims. Similar can be stated 
about ‘emoji’s’, ‘sad’, ‘wow’ or ‘angry’ faces. Besides, these emoticons do not change 
the inherent ambiguity of what someone means to say with it. 
 
The judiciary must update its training systems according to new technological advances. 
It must also include social media and digital communication. The Bar councils and 
solicitor authorities must seek international cooperation on these issues and the judges 
must give/take briefings to modernise the overall system to accommodate digital 
communication. 
   
9.10.: Duties of content providers:  
 
This thesis firmly rejects the idea that ISPs/content providers should be allowed to 
regulate clients’ communication. It may lead to content providers monopolising online 
communication, especially considering a recent breach of consumer privacy by the 
Facebook-Cambridge data analytical scandal
1868
. Besides, if these private bodies 
exercise some control over communication, they become primary publishers. But when 
it comes to accepting liability, they insist that they are mere content providers and 
demand immunity. Just like spy agencies and security firms, if they regulate the content, 
they must also accept responsibility for what they allow. It is a longstanding saying that 
‘you wouldn't sue the newsstand vendor’, however, if they exert control over 
communication, they are not merely distributors but publishers. Besides, allowing these 
private networks the right to edit/censor their user's communication can restrict freedom 
of speech and privacy. There is a need for clear guidance on what content is permitted 
and what should be banned. This research recommends content providers to take more 
responsibility and spreading greater awareness to their users. They should educate them 
by explaining the consequences of their communication. 
 
9.11.: Duties of social media users: 
 
Considering the risks involved, today’s youth must get awareness and training so they 
start taking responsibility for their online activities. They must be aware of global 
                                                          
1868
 BBC (2018), ‘Cambridge Analytica: Facebook data-harvest firm to shut’ online 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-43983958 [Assessed 11
th 
June 2018]. 
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prosecution if they harm others reputation. Freedom of expression is a statutory right 
but other users deserve privacy and respect. It is not only about publishing but 
‘reposting’ and ‘retweeting' can also carry potential liability.  
 
“Concluding Remarks” 
 
This is a democratic world and cyberspace is a commonplace. Certain governments 
(China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, India, Israel and 
Pakistan) are crafting independent policies to content restrictions which undermine 
speech freedom and restrict freedom of accessibility. Religious, cultural, political and 
national priorities cannot be allowed to compromise social media communication. 
These rights of freedom of speech and freedom of information have been bestowed 
upon us by our forefathers in the name of individual liberty, freedom and right to access 
to information. This was the vision behind the creation of the internet to allow freedom 
of information.  
 
This thesis demands that it is the time to move suggestions to the right forum to avoid 
fragmentation of cyberspace. It invites foreign ministries to come together and create a 
universal foreign policy and make cyberspace a ‘lowest common denominator’ subject 
to the sum of all countries laws. It will authorise courts to give worldwide effect to their 
decisions without undermining sovereignty of other countries.    
 
These arguments conclude the thesis.  
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 B.4.: Relevant Websites 
 
1. Acts of the UK Parliament 
2. Administrative Codes and Registers, Internet Rules  
3. Anderson's Directory of Law Reviews and Scholarly Legal Publications 
4. ASIL Guide to Electronic Resources for International Law (on Topical research) 
5. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook 
6. Committee on the Judiciary, Committee Documents 
7. Comparative & Foreign Law Guides 
8. Council of Europe 
9. Council of the European Union 
10. Court Rules, Forms and Dockets 
11. Court Web Sites (National Center for State Courts) 
12. Courts.net 
13. EU Court case law 
14. www.curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm 
15. EUR-Lex (in English) 
16. European Court of Human Rights 
17. European Court of Justice 
18. FindLaw Legal News 
19. FindLaw Legal Subjects 
20. Hein Online 
21. Information Sources for Legislative Research (THOMS) 
22. Info sources Publishing, Law TRIO 
23. Institute of International Commercial Law 
24. International Court of Justice 
25. JSTOR 
26. Law and Technology Resources for Legal Professionals (LLRX) 
27. Law by Source: Global 
28. Law Lists 
29. Legal Associations and Organizations 
30. Legal News (Law.Com) 
31. Legal News (FindLaw.com) 
32. Legal Research sites 
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33. LexisNexis Academic 
34. National Law Journal 
35. Online Directory of Law Reviews and Scholarly Legal Periodicals 
36. ProQuest 
37. Public and Private Laws 
38. SSRN (Social Science Research Network) 
39. Statute Law Database, United Kingdom 
40. Treaties and International Agreements Online 
41. U.K. Parliament 
42. U.K. Statute Law Database 
43. U.K. Statutory Instruments 
44. U.N. - Index to United Nations Documents and Publications 
45. Web of Knowledge 
46. West Legal Directory 
47. Westlaw 
48. World Trade Organization 
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List of Appendixes 
 
Appendix – 1: RISE IN LIBEL CLAIMS 
 
 
Claims 
issued 
in 
London 
(QB) 
Defamation 
Claims Issued in 
London 
% of all London 
(QB) Claims issued 
£15-50k £>50k No 
Value 
Stated 
2017 4,319 156 4.00 37 113 6 
2016 4,123 112 3.00 42 60 10 
2015 4,869 135 3.00 40 71 54 
2014 5,417 227 4.00 52 119 56 
2013 5,186 142 3.00 37 56 49 
2012 5,549 186 3.00 65 60 61 
2011 4,726 165 3.49 28 61 76 
2010 4,864 158 3.24 27 47 84 
2009 5,694 298 5.23 52 62 184 
2008 5,173 259 5.00 43 77 139 
2007 4,794 233 4.86 43 45 145 
2006 4,246 213 5.02 24 39 150 
2005 3,841 252 6.56 43 70 139 
2004 4,292 267 6.22 30 31 206 
2003 3,514 190 5.41 22 15 153 
2002 4,394 128 2.91 1 1 126 
2001 5,122 220 4.30    
2000 5,599 241 4.30    
 
Source info: https://inforrm.org/2018/06/26/judicial-statistics-2017-issued-defamation-
claims-up-by-40-highest-for-three-years/ & 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/714286/civil-justice-statistics-quarterly-jan-mar-2018.pdf [Assessed 16
th
 July 
018] 
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Appendix – II: REFERENCING / HOUSE STYLE 
 
This thesis explored legal themes using ‘doctrinal research’. There referencing style is 
based on the recommended referencing system of Bradford university law school using 
footnotes and traditional bibliography (Harvard Brad 2012). The same system is 
adapted to cite court cases. This thesis also used this system to reference persuasive 
cases of other foreign court judgments. Judges are referenced with their in-court title at 
the time of making or writing the statement, for example, Queens Council (QC), Mr 
Justice (J) or Lord Justice (LJ). Direct quotations have been used to re-emphasised a 
particular issue with proper acknowledgment of the authors. This referencing style is 
uniformly applied throughout this thesis for quoting the work from, websites, blogs, 
articles and other scholarly writings. Newspaper and other online publication titles are 
non-italicised in the text. Similarly, hyperlinks have been removed to make the thesis 
read well. The dates to assess the websites have been updated and re-assessed according 
to the visit date. 
 
Appendix– III: SOCIAL MEDIA VICTIMS 
 
1. Steven Rudderham1869 received death threats after Facebook accusations that he 
was a paedophile and he committed suicide 
2. Sarah Richardson1870 was killed for changing her Facebook status to 'single'. 
3. Mashal Khan1871 was killed in a Pakistan University because someone accused 
him for a blasphemous Facebook status 
4. Anita Sarkeesian1872 was accused of being a fraud on a website. Her family 
received death and rape threats from anonymous users.  
5. Sunil Tripathi’s1873 family was threatened because somebody falsely accused 
him on Reddit of being the Boston Bomber 
                                                          
1869
 Webb, S., (2013), ‘Father 'Driven to Suicide After He Was Wrongly Accused of Being a Paedophile on 
Facebook’, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2329453/Father-driven-suicide-
accusedpaedophile- 
Facebook.html  
1870
 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1126872/Father-stabbed-estranged-wife-death-changed-
Facebook-status-single.html 
1871
 BBC (2017), ‘Pakistan student killed over 'blasphemy' on university campus’; available online 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39593302  [Assessed 13
th
 July 2018] 
1872
 Malone, L., (2015), ‘A Breakdown of Anita Sarkeesian's Weekly Rape and Death Threats’, 
http://www.vocativ.com/culture/society/anita-sarkeesian-threats/ 
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                   Appendix – IV:  PRACTICE DIRECTION 
PRE-ACTION CONDUCT AND PROTOCOLS 
Title Number 
Introduction  Para. 1 
Objectives of pre-action conduct and protocols  Para. 3 
Proportionality Para. 4 
Steps before issuing a claim at court  Para. 6 
Experts  Para. 7 
Settlement and ADR  Para. 8 
Stocktake and list of issues  Para. 12 
Compliance with this practice direction and the protocols  Para. 13 
Limitation  Para. 17 
Protocols in force  Para. 18 
Appendix – V:  THE MEANING OF DEFAMATORY WORDS 
SIR ANTHONY CLARKE MR PRINCIPLES
1874
 
1. The governing principle is reasonableness 
2. The hypothetical reasonable reader is not naive but he is not unduly suspicious. 
He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a 
lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be 
treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, 
and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings 
are available 
3. Over-elaborate analysis is best avoided 
4. The intention of the publisher is irrelevant 
5. The article must be read as a whole, and any ‘bane and antidote’ taken together 
6. The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read 
the publication in question 
7. In delimiting the range of permissible defamatory meanings, the court should 
rule out any meaning which, ‘can only emerge as the produce of some strained, 
or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation’  
8. It follows that ‘it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words 
might be understood in a defamatory sense 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1873
 Kang, J., (2013), ‘Should Reddit Be Blamed for the Spreading of a Smear?’; available online 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/magazine/should-reddit-be-blamed-for-the-spreading-of-a-
smear.html [Assessed 13th July 2018] 
1874
 Jeynes v News Magazines Ltd and Another [2008] CA  
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Appendix – VI:  THE DEFAMATION ACT 2013 
(Section 1)............................................................................................ Serious harm                   
(Section 2)........................................................................................................ Truth  
(Section 3)........................................................................................ Honest opinion 
(Section 4)................................................ Publication on a matter of public interest 
(Sections 5, 10 and 13).................................................Operators of websites and         
persons who are not the author, editor or publisher of a statement complained   
(Section 6).................... Peer-reviewed statements in scientific or academic journals 
(Section 7)............................................................. Expansion of statutory privilege 
(Section 8)............................................................................. Single publication rule 
(Section 9).................................... Action against a person not domiciled in the EU 
(Section 11).................. Trial to be without a jury unless the court orders otherwise 
(Section 12)…. Power of court to order a summary of its judgment to be published 
 
Appendix – VII: EXAMPLES OF SOCIAL MEDIA APPS 
   
 Electronic communication: Blackberry Voice Call, Facebook Messenger, 
WhatsApp, Google Hangouts, MSN Messenger, chat rooms, email 
 Collaboration tools: Wikipedia, Wikitravel, Wikibooks 
 Group buying: Groupon, Living Social, Crowd savings 
 Location-based services: Check-ins, Facebook Places, Foursquare, Yelp 
 Micro-blogging sites: Twitter, Tumblr, Snapchat, Posterous 
 Media content (YouTube, Flick)  
 Publishing tools: WordPress, Blogger, Squarespace 
 Personal broadcasting tools: Blog Talk radio, Ustream, Livestream 
 Photo sharing sites: Flickr, Instagram 
 Rating/review sites: Amazon ratings, Angie’s List 
 Social networking sites: Facebook, Google Plus, Cafe Mom, Gather 
 Social bookmarking (news-aggregation): Digg, Delicious, Pinterest 
 Video sharing sites: YouTube, Vimeo, Viddler, Vine 
 Virtual worlds: Second Life, World of Warcraft, Farmville 
 Widgets: profile badges, like buttons 
 Social networking (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+)  
 Blogging (Tumblr, World Process)  
 Information sharing (Wiki How, Wikipedia, Quora)  
 Consumer Review (TripAdvisor, Yelp) 
 
